It would certainly be premature to uncork the champagne, but one gets the feeling the endgame in the war in Ukraine may well be at hand. Trump’s negotiators i.e. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Presidential Adviser (more important, also President Trump’s son-in-law) Jared Kushner have been busy shuttling between Abu Dhabi, Moscow and Dublin, meeting with negotiators from both Russia and Ukraine, and then subsequently also meeting up with Russian President Putin and Ukraine’s President Zelensky. Europeans have hitherto been on the margins, but there is emerging consensus that Europe will be part of the negotiations from now on. What then are the main issues? Plenty, it would seem.

A chicken and egg situation: Assuming the substantive talks take off, there is a big sequencing issue that needs sorting between the two sides. Russia wishes to discuss a new security architecture for Europe which could then be the basis for permanent peace. On the other hand, Ukraine supported by EU, wants the war to end first, with a ceasefire preferably followed by a peace agreement. Then, and only then, are they prepared to sit with Russia to discuss a new European security architecture, if at all. It is possible that at the end of the day, parallel negotiations may have to take place.

The World simply wants the war to end. There is also a fair bit of war fatigue, certainly in Ukraine, but perhaps also in Russia, since further territoral gains by the latter appear improbable. Some reports (admittedly Western) put the number of dead since the war began at half a million in Russia, a figure that is high even for a country as big as Russia. So, it is arguable that the basic ground situation is favourable to a peace agreement.

At the time of writing, it appears that a decision has been taken in principle that all the issues i.e. ceasefire, peace agreement and a broad European security architecture, will be discussed together in parallel. Prima facie, the Russians seem to have got their way.

Who should represent Europe: The Americans have now said that Europe should be part of future talks. Russia may have reluctantly conceded, if one is to go by Kushner who said Putin is willing to “give it a try”. However, the big issue amongst Europeans was who should represent them in these talks. One option that was looked at is for European Council President Antonio Costa assisted by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, to represent Europe at these talks. Costa may have been acceptable to some EU member states but Kaja Kallas was seen as too hardline and viscerally opposed to Russia. In any case, the big two EU member states i.e. France and Germany, wanted to be on the negotiating table and did not favour this proposition at all. Germany said that the E3 format i.e. France, Germany and UK would be preferable to represent Europe. The problem with this was that many other European states (such as Italy and Poland) did not wish this arrangement.

The final compromise from the European Political Community Summit in Dublin was typically the one you would expect from the Europeans. It has now been suggested that EU will be represented by E5 i.e. France, Germany, UK, Italy and Poland plus representatives from the European Commission and the European Council. It remains to be seen how united they will be and whether they can all speak in one voice. President Putin may have scored a tactical victory already.

Substance of the negotiations: The two sides, at the time of writing, are far apart in their starting positions, which is not unusual in negotiations of this kind. The territorial question is the thorniest of it all. Russia wants the four Oblasts belonging to Eastern Ukraine i.e. Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, but including parts of it currently controlled by Ukraine. Ukraine, on the other hand, wishes to have a temporary line drawn on the basis of the actual battlefield situation. And even so, Ukraine wishes to retain the right to recover the territory at some point in the future. There is also the issue of buffer zones, to which Russia vehemently objects. Russians merely want a line clearly indicating what belongs to Ukraine and what belongs to them, something that is easier said than done.

The presence of European troops on Ukrainian soil to maintain peace after an agreement is signed, is a red flag for Russia but is a matter of life or death for Ukraine, since the latter wants to ensure there is no repeat of the Russian invasion that happened in February 2022.

Then, there are issues surrounding the proposed security architecture for Europe. NATO expansion, restoration of force posture to pre-1997 period, Ukraine’s force levels and presence of weaponry near Russia’s borders are all difficult issues. This also boils down to what security guarantees Ukraine and EU are willing to accept (no NATO membership for Ukraine but EU membership) in the final analysis and what can be acceptable to Russia. There are other issues like what happens to the Euros 260 billion which were frozen by EU and other G 7 countries when the war started. Russia’s energy ties with Europe, can they be normalised in some way? Finally, Russia will want all sanctions (primary and secondary) lifted against it after the peace agreement is signed, while Ukraine and EU will want a gradual lifting of these sanctions based on progress in the implementation of the peace agreement.

Meanwhile, Jared Kushner outlined a broad security framework for Europe that could have five principal goals: permanent security consultations, reliable crisis communications, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce escalation risks, and an enduring framework for long-term European security and stability. Kushner also underlined the principles that would underpin the new system: Any arrangement must fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independent decision-making of every nation; each country will retain authority over its own security and alliances, and no country would have a veto over another’s sovereign choices. A number of European observers have described this as too general and too vague to be meaningful. EU’s High Representative Kaja Kallas responded acerbically as only she can: We already have a European security architecture in place — NATO and European Union both have their respective roles. This points to some tough negotiations ahead, to put it very mildly.

On the other hand, Ukraine’s hands may have been strengthened in these negotiations now because National Security Advisers of the E5 group referred to above are expected to join in the technical discussions. But this could also make the talks much more acrimonious and difficult.

Yalta bis: To complicate things further for the Europeans, on the margins of the APEC meeting in Shenzhen on 18/19 November, there is a Russian proposal for a trilateral summit meeting between President Trump, President Xi Jinping and President Putin. Issues likely to be discussed have been reported in the press as: Ukraine, Iran and Arms Control. The idea that the three leaders can even discuss Ukraine without Ukraine or EU being present, has caused predictable outrage in Ukraine and Europe. But knowing President Trump, this may well happen, much to the consternation of the EU and others. This summit has been promptly dubbed “Yalta bis” by observers – a reference to the original Yalta summit between Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt which led to the division of Europe and the cold war. The rest that followed from it, as they say, is history.

Conclusion: It is curious to read President Trump after the midterm debacle in the US. With him though, any prediction one makes is hazardous business. But it does seem as though if there is one thing he may take away from the voters’ mandate, it is to try and resolve a war or two. Maybe he still yearns for that elusive Nobel peace prize. Certainly, with regard to Ukraine, he seems eager, some would say too eager, to reach a settlement which he describes as a ” big, beautiful agreement involving not just Ukraine, but all of Europe”. This is precisely the kind of talk that sends cold shivers down European spines!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Call it a wave, clean sweep or a Tsunami, the Democrats have won convincingly and may end up flipping not just the House, but also the Senate. This is a significant political moment in the US for a number of reasons:

>President Trump has dominated American politics for a decade. Is this his swan-song or has he still got aces up his sleeve?

>President Trump was not on the ballot, but he did ask the voters to pretend that he was. So it cannot but be interpreted as a vote on his performance for the first two years of his mandate.

>These elections saw some $ 12 Billion being spent on these midterm elections. That is more than what was spent in the presidential election in 2024. It is significant that this did not make too much of a difference in the end.

>The American Congress has hitherto acquiesced in the decisions of President Trump, with some political observers arguing that it has thereby abdicated its responsibility of acting as a check on the President. Will this change and can it now resist the President? Expect the Congress to launch investigations, to impose funding restrictions on programmes, to issue summons to Cabinet Ministers and may be, even to launch impeachment proceedings against the President – though there is very little prospect of impeachment succeeding.

>Some Republican candidates had already distanced themselves from President Trump in their political campaign for the midterms. Will the dissatisfaction with President Trump now boil over in the Republican Party? May be not a civil war, but expect churn in the GOP.

>Lastly, how will this impact the presidential elections due in 2028? Does it provide a shot in the arm for Democrats and lead to introspection on the part of Republicans? Does this make the presidential elections of 2028 wide open?

Domestic politics will play itself out in the coming days and weeks. But it is the impact on America’s foreign policy and geopolitics that should interest the rest of the world.

On this aspect, some observations:

(1) A domestically constrained President in the last term feels, if anything, more free to do things abroad. So, the President’s scope to do good and inflict harm abroad, either remains the same as before or may even increase. We will have to wait and see how this affects the relatively unpredictable occupant of the White House.

(2) Congressional imprimatur has not been sought by successive Presidents for a number of policy initiatives. Obama issued 35 executive orders, George Bush issued 42. But Biden issued 162 executive orders in just one term. President Trump has already issued a whopping 166 executive orders in just two years. So expect rule by executive decree, whether the Congress likes it or not.

(3) The above point matters for the “deals” that the US enters into with its partners abroad. The Climate Change Agreement of Paris was deliberately labelled by the Americans, not as a binding “treaty”, but as a non-binding executive agreement which Obama could then sign without sending it for Congressional approval. This also meant that when President Trump took over, he could withdraw from the above agreement in one day. The Iran deal done by Obama in 2015 was the same story. Hence the current scepticism by the Iranians. Executive agreements concluded by American Presidents can be reversed quite easily by other Presidents. Treaties entered into by the US with congressional approval are much more valid, enduring and crucially, binding. With an adversarial Congress, its imprimatur will most certainly not be forthcoming for President Trump even if he seeks it. So countries around the world will accordingly take note. This might weaken America’s hand in negotiations since the natural instinct of foreign partners will be to try and run out the clock on President Trump.

(4) That said, there is nothing like a lame duck American president when it comes to foreign, security or even trade policy. President Trump will likely continue to do things he did before. Also, does not need to stand for re-election. As President Trump declared even before the disastrous midterm results, he has the veto and the executive powers to do pretty much everything he wishes to do. For example, in June of this year, both the House and the Senate passed a “War Powers Resolution” directing President Trump to end hostilities with Iran. The White House reaction was cryptic: The resolution had no force of law! In September, Congress passed sanctions on Russia with veto-proof majorities. President Trump used a national interest “waiver” to nullify the sanctions. So, expect President Trump to resort to more of this for the remaining two years of his mandate.

(5) China, EU, NATO and India simply did not figure in these midterm polls. To the extent foreign countries figured, it was Israel, Iran and the war in Ukraine to some extent. But that is because relations with these countries had domestic repercussions in terms of cost of living, anti-semitism and voter discontent with America being involved in wars overseas. In many ways, the voter discontent in these elections was mainly due to President Trump not keeping his promise on cost of living and America not gettting involved in unnecessary wars.

(6) America-Israel ties may be at a crossroads, with President Trump announcing on the eve of midterms that foreign aid amounting to some $ 4 billion may cease. But weapons will continue to flow to Israel, with the latter paying for it. The prospects for a solution in Iran may brighten, if only because of the high gas prices for Americans back home. A domestically shackled President Trump may become unshackled and he may well turn peacemaker (in Iran and Ukraine) to claim that elusive Nobel Peace Prize. A pious hope?

(7) One can expect ties with India to follow the same trajectory of incremental improvement that we saw in the last few months. Tariffs may no longer pose the kind of threat they once did and frankly even H1B was not very high on the voter’s list of priorities. Instead, the issues that really mattered in these midterm elections were: cost of living, war in Iran, ties with Israel/plight of Palestinians, AI (opposition to data centers) and interestingly, misuse of power & corruption.

A detailed analysis of these midterm elections will have to wait. But one thing seems clear: the youth and Latinos have been the swing voters in these elections. They were largely responsible for Trump’s election two years ago. They could well be largely responsible for the results now. The MAGA crowd may have abstained, we will have to wait and see the abstention rate.

One last conclusion. America’s resilience should never be in doubt. It is capable of swings and detours like any other country, but its ability to course-correct and bounce back must not be underestimated.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador and the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies in OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The World Bank has just issued a two page Poverty and Equity Brief with regard to India dated October 2026. The measurement of poverty is not merely economic; it is an intensely political and social exercise. The World Bank may not be the last word on the subject, yet it is arguably dispassionate and lends itself to easy comparison with other countries. For this reason, any report from the World Bank on poverty and equity deserves careful scrutiny.

The main thing in the report that has grabbed the attention of the press are the following statements:

>Over the past decade, India has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty across both monetary and non-monetary dimensions, recording
one of the fastest poverty declines in the world. In terms of numbers, this is incontestable.

>Between 2011 and 2023, the share of the population living below the Lower Middle-Income Country line ($4.20/day, 2021 PPP) fell from 57.7 percent to 16.1 percent, lifting an estimated 496 million people out of poverty.

>Extreme poverty ($3.00/day) declined from 27.1 percent to 2.6 percent during the same period.

A word on international poverty (extreme) line, lower Middle-Income class poverty line and Upper Middle-Income class poverty line as defined by the World Bank in 2023. Extreme poverty line is defined as $ 3 a day per person and by this measure it would appear that India has indeed made great strides by bringing down the percentage from 27.1 per cent to 2.6 per cent. India may be commended for this achievement. But the fact of the matter is that this criterion is often used with regard to Least Developed Countries, which India most certainly is not.

Since India is already a lower Middle-Income country, the relevant poverty line should be $ 4.20 a day per person. Viewed from this perspective, the World Bank report says between 2011 and 2023, poverty rate in India fell from 57.7 per cent to 16.1 per cent. This is no mean achievement and we can pat ourselves on our backs for this. But several caveats are in order:

>On $ 4.20 dollars, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) which has now been replaced by Viksit Bharat -Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission Act, 2025, has a wage floor of Rs 300 per day which then goes up to Rs 450 per day. In other words, $ 4.20 (Rs 480) cannot be considered anything other than a subsistence wage in many parts of the country.

>There is also a real danger that a large number of Indians are hovering just above this poverty line and the danger of them slipping below the line is really high. So, this 16.1 per cent while seemingly low, may actually be misleading.

>There is perhaps one good measure of Viksit Bharat in addition to total GDP and per capita GDP. That is to measure how many people are below the upper Middle-Income class poverty line which is defined as $ 8.30 a day per person. The statistic provided by the World Bank in this regard for India is damning. It says some 80 per cent repeat 80 per cent of the population would be below this poverty line of $ 8.30. While $ 8.30 may sound like a lot, actually it is Rs 830 a day per person and monthly pay works out to about Rs 25,000/ which is by no means extravagant even by Indian standards. In other words, 80 per cent of Indians earn less than Rs 25,000/ per month. It is this percentage that needs to be brought down to something like 20 per cent, if India is to become “Viksit” by 2047.

> The other unsurprising thing in the World Bank report is the fact that many of the households that remain poor continue to live in rural areas, where productivity is lower and access to higher-quality non-farm employment opportunities remain very limited.

>The World Bank report also demonstrates that poverty has become increasingly concentrated geographically. While living standards improved across most states in India, households in a contiguous belt stretching from Uttar Pradesh to West Bengal account for about 57 percent of India’s poor population. As a result, further reduction in national poverty will increasingly depend on creating productive employment in these states.

>It is also true that poverty will henceforth fall more gradually in India compared to before. Thus the poverty rate at the $4.20/day line is expected to fall from 14.2 percent in 2026 to 12.1 percent by 2028, a fall of only 2 per cent over two years.

>Income disparity remains pronounced, as median earnings among the top 10 percent of workers were about 13 times those of the bottom 10 percent in 2023.

India has its job cut out. We need not only high and rapid economic growth, but also growth that is inclusive, which is made possible only by sufficient job generation in the non-farm sector.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France who is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

France is going through a delicate phase in its history of the so-called Fifth Republic. For one thing, the country heads to crucial polls in May of next year. At the risk of sounding alarmist, these elections could well result in a political earthquake i.e. the election of the far-right National Rally’s leader, Ms Marine Le Pen, as President of the French Republic. Should that come to pass, there will be profound implications not just for France, but for the European Union as a whole.

Just when social peace was needed in the run-up to the above elections, there has been widespread violence following student protests. Student protests in France began last week, innocuously enough, in some provinces where students protested the lack of adequate infrastructure and more important, the lack of sufficient number of teachers. Through social media these protests gained prominence and soon enough, they spread like wildfire. In no time at all, some schools were torched and the police had no choice but to use force against some violent protesters. That led to students getting injured, further exacerbating an already tense situation. The events then took on a political colour when the far-left party (called France Insoumise) led by a firebrand politician Jean Luc Melanchon expressed his total and unconditional support to the protesting students. The far-right leader Marine Le Pen, shrewdly blamed the far-left party for insigating the students but also made the larger point that only her party, when elected, can maintain law and order in France. Pro-establishment politicians had nowhere to hide and were trying hard to douse the fire. It is no exaggeration to say that Macron’s legacy is in serious danger, as rumours swirl that he is eyeing Ursula Von der Lyen’s job as President of the European Commission.

A poll conducted last week showed that the French public disapproves of the Government’s handling of the protests even while blaming the far-left leader Melanchon for inciting the students. Again, it seems to be advantage National Rally and Marine Le Pen. The situation also suits National Rally since its charismatic young leader Mr Jordan Bardella has been accused of anti-semitism by the French press. Bardella has of course strongly denied the accusations, but the paper which originally made the allegation appeared to have some proof. All this has been forgotten in the imbroglio caused by student protests.

As if all this were not enough, France is also experiencing an economic crisis. Borrowing costs have reached their highest levels since 2008 and the spread between French 10-year bonds and German ones — an indicator that measures investors’ appetite to hold French debt over more traditionally stable German debt — shot above 150 basis points last week, a level not seen in years. The minority French government has introduced a budget last week with €43 billion worth of savings designed to reassure markets fretting about France’s massive debt and a stubbornly high budget deficit. But the minority government will find it difficult to get parliamentary approval for the same. One French observer has termed all of this as “maxi merde”, a French expletive which when roughly translated reads as “super shit”.

Germany, the other European giant, also faces challenges of its own. German voters go to the polls in Sachsen-Anhalt on September 6, with elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern two weeks later. An AfD (far-right German political party) parliamentary majority in Sachsen-Anhalt would almost certainly consume German politics for the coming months and fuel existing speculation surrounding Merz’s chancellorship. Merz and his coalition may remain in place through mid-2027, but this stability may come at a cost. The much-needed economic and social reforms that Merz had promised are likely to be watered down, and weak government will reinforce the public’s deep dissatisfaction with the political establishment in Germany.

European observers are watching the goings-on in France (and Germany) with some concern. Say what you will about rising powers such as Poland, the fact remains that France is now the only nuclear power in Europe and is the only European permanent member of the UN Security Council. Similarly, Germany’s economic clout looms large in Europe. For the foreseeable future therefore, France and Germany, also known as the Franco-German locomotive, is critically important for the smooth functioning of Europe. With conflict still raging in Ukraine, Europe struggling to fight against Chinese commercial aggression and the US completely reassessing its transatlantic alliance, the travails of France, combined with potential problems in Germany, could not have come at a worse time, both for the two countries concerned and for Europe as a whole.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is at present Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

One of the most awaited bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS summit was that between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian PM Modi. In the event, the meeting was convivial without being substantial. Both countries stuck to their tradition of issuing separate readouts, which in diplomacy means either the officials did not have time to draft a Joint Statement or differences persisted to prevent one from being issued. It is safe to assume that it was the latter in this case.

What then to make of the Modi-Xi meeting? It is hard to disregard the attempts by both sides to seek mutual rapprochement. It is possible this rapprochement, at least from the Chinese side, is more tactical. The fact that President Xi Jinping is meeting President Trump shortly may have also played its part. The evidence for this rapprochement from China lies in the statement by the Chinese side for the first time ever that “The two sides should stay committed to advancing bilateral relations and resolving the boundary question, seek parallel, mutually reinforcing progress, and maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas”. So far, it is the Indian side which has been saying loud and clear that peace and tranquility on the border is essential for continued development of bilateral relations. Hitherto, the Chinese position has been that the border issue must be properly placed in the context of the overall bilateral ties. By explicitly accepting the link between the border issue and bilateral ties, and by going further to state that the two sides should seek parallel and mutually reinforcing progress in both issues, the Chinese side has seemingly departed from its traditional script to accomodate the Indian position. We will see whether they stick to this line. For, this implies that if peace and tranquility breaks down on the border, then India and/or China will be justified in cutting back on bilateral ties. The Indian side’s desire for rapprochement was reflected in the ” Eight points of outcomes and consensus of the 25th round of talks between Special Representatives of China and India on the boundary question” issued as a Joint Statement on 26 August, 2026. After all, the two sides agreed to seek early and substantial harvest of boundary delimitation and border management. Terms of reference for both the Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and Working Group on Border Management are yet to be agreed upon though.

Having said that, deeper issues remain. The Indian readout mentions, as past ones did with monotonous regularity, the three mutuals: mutual interest, mutual sensitivity and mutual respect; and reiterates for the umpteenth time that differences must not be allowed to become disputes. Neither finds direct resonance with the Chinese side which is surprising since this is largely motherhood and apple pie kind of language. China is instead content to say in their readout (again for the umpteenth time) that China and India are partners, not rivals. Indeed, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi thinks this is the “most important consensus” that was reached by the two leaders on the margins of the BRICS summit. Interestingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson quoted PM Modi as saying India has an independent foreign policy and that India will not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities on its territory. The spokesperson went on to say that China values PM Modi’s statements in this context. The Indian readout does not make a reference to this purported statement by our PM.

If China really wants to be India’s partner and not its rival, it should prove that through its actions. As the bigger country, it can begin by engaging with India to find a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the border issue, commit itself fully to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and at least not prevent, if not actively encourage, the rise of India. China can also coooperate much more with India in UN and other fora. China harping on India’s independent foreign policy is a not so subtle reference to our ties with the US. But that is an argument India can make too, with regard to China’s ties with some of India’s neighbours.

While talking of the border, India talks of respecting past agreements concluded with China in the matter. China makes no such reference in its readout. Perhaps the time has come, as some Indian experts have suggested, to come up with new understanding between the two sides. Easier said than done of course.

News reports also suggest that our PM did convey to the Chinese President that both countries must respect the core interests/concerns of each other. This is important since China keeps harping on its core interests/concerns (which also keep evolving very conveniently for them) but one has never come across mention of India’s core interests/concerns in any Chinese literature.

At the end of the day, India does not have the luxury of non-engagement with China. Not only is China a powerful neighbour with a long and disputed border with India, but it is an extremely critical commercial and trading partner for India. India may possess far less clout than China, but it is in the latter’s interest to also engage with India in good faith so that the structural impediments in the relationship are resolved where possible and managed where necessary and most important, are not allowed to completely derail bilateral ties. Such an eventuality does neither country any good in dealing with the geopolitical turbulence the world is witnessing. If there is one positive from the most recent Xi-Modi meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Delhi, it may be this mutual realization on the part of both countries.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University in India. Views are personal.

The Trump administration released its National Security Science and Technology Strategy (hereinafter referred to as NSSTS) on August 18, 2026. If you think this is a document that the American administration releases annually, you would be wrong. The last time a document bearing this title was released by the White House was in 1995 by the Clinton Administration. Other intervening administrations incorporated this in either the National Security Strategy itself or in the form of standalone memos.

So, you might ask what was the provocation for such a document after a long gap. The answer is predictable: People’s Republic of China! The present document highlights the importance of leadership in emerging technologies and warns of losing the advantage to China.

The American objective is clear: It wants to remain the world’s most scientifically and technogically advanced/innovative country and to build upon this strength. However, the NSSTS recognizes that American leadership in S&T is being challenged by potenial adversaries that are investing heavily in advanced technology development and military applications. The document also states clearly that potential adversaries seek asymmetric capabilities to counter US military superiority as well as steal US intellectual property. It also acknowledges that potential adversaries seek to disrupt supply chains and infrastructure including by controlling the extraction, refining, export and manufacturing of critical minerals.

To tackle the above, the NSSTS sets out four pillars of scientific and technological development as it pertains to national security. The first pillar entitled, “Focusing Techno-Strategic Competition” describes the importance of maintaining and advancing US technlogical advantage on the battlefield specifically three priority areas: undersea, space and Artificial Intelligence. The document also emphasizes the need to use technology to counter strategic threats to the homeland such as the “Golden Dome” among other things. The second pillar ” Building Technological Resilience” focuses on developing preemptive resilience in technological systems critical to national security. The document emphasizes that in order to achieve this objective, the US must lead on transformative emerging technologies and keeping foreign adversaries out of critical technology systems and supply chains. In other words, technology denial regime will be the preferred option for the US. Potentially transformative emerging technologies include, but are not limited to: AI & Autonomy, Biotechology and Quantum information technologies. The third pillar ” Accelerate the Pace of Innovation” outlines how to maintain the American advantage in emerging technologies by accelerating research and development through, inter alia, removing regulatory barriers, incentivizing research and reforming the defence acquisition process. The final pillar ” Protect National Security Science & Technology” specifically calls out China as a threat and proposes to protect critical science and technology through increased scrutiny of foreign investments, companies, and personnel involved in the research and development process. The NSSTS for instance seeks to prohibit fundamental research funding to high-risk entities, including companies
on the section 1260H list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States.

The NSSTS also dwells on implementation of the above strategy. It talks of strengthening education and training in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) at all levels, update R&D infrastructure as well as augment R&D funding. Cooperation with allies and partners is mentioned for what it is worth.

A final appendix lists the latest and updated critical emerging technologies, a list that is extremely useful for the uninitiated.

In March 2026, China released its 15th Five Year Plan (FYP). The 15th FYP calls for “extraordinary measures” to reduce China’s reliance on foreign S&T and strengthen China’s S&T self-reliance and independent innovation capacity. It emphasizes indigenous innovation as the core driver of
China’s development, a direction that its leaders first set out in 2006. Chinese indigenous innovation can involve the acquisition of foreign technologies that are then adapted and rebranded as Chinese capabilities; China uses foreign commercial and research ties to fill capability gaps in
advancing national goals. The FYP focuses on boosting Chinese capabilities to build self-reliance in areas in which it currently depends on the United States, Europe, and Japan, including aircraft; agriculture; advanced equipment, instruments, and tools; energy; gas turbines; software; and
semiconductors. The Chinese targets and priorities are: (1) Accelerating development in semiconductors, aerospace, biomedicine, novel energy storage and smart robots; (2) Cutlivating beakthrough technologies such as quantum computing, biomanufacturing, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied AI and 6G; (3) Targeting annual growth in society-wide R&D spending above 7 per cent to support the entire domestic innovation chain and (4) Moving past isolated tech breakthroughs to full-chain industrial synergy, particularly in home-grown chip manufactuing, foundational software and advanced materials.

There you have it! All this points to a full-fledged battle for tech supremacy between an established superpower and an emerging one, the outcome of which may well decide the fate of humanity.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. He is also the inaugural Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies. Views are personal.

So much is being written about on geopolitics and International Relations (IR), as it concerns global events. The war in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Iran, have thus occupied both the print and digital media. But amidst all this, one tends to forget the theoretical foundations of IR. This blog is a modest attempt to make amends. While doing so, focus is brought to bear not just on Western theoretical constructs but also on recent attempts by Chinese scholars to put forward their own theories related to IR.

Any Western treatise of IR will per force talk of three main theories of IR, namely, Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. There are of course others but for the purpose of this blog, we will confine ourselves to these three.

Realism, conceived in the early part of the twentieth century, is a fairly straightforward theory of state-centred international relations, which contends that all states are attempting to enhance their power and that those governments which can efficiently accumulate such strength will prosper, quickly transcending the achievements of comparatively less successful states. According to this theory, a nation’s primary goal ought to be self-preservation, and increasing power has to be a socio-economic and political requisite.

In the present scheme of things, both the US and China seem wedded to this theory of IR, bent as they are on accumulating and enhancing their power. John Mearsheimer has argued that the international relations system requires that states maximize their offensive power to be secure and keep rivals from gaining power at their expense. The problem is this then becomes an exercise at hegemony, making the Thucidydes Trap a possibility, if not a probability. According to ‘offensive realism’, a branch of the realism school, nations are prone to rivalry and conflict because they are self-interested, power-maximizing, and frightened of other states. Furthermore, it contends that nations are obligated to behave in this manner in order to survive in the international system. ‘Defensive realism’, yet another branch of the realism school, argues that states tend to act in favour of a balance of power instead of letting other states develop economically, military strengths, and political power because it is perceived as a threat to their security and interests. It is for readers to judge which branch is subscribed to by either US or China.

Liberalism is centred on the premise that the existing international system is capable of establishing a harmonious global order. Instead of depending on aggressive force, such as military conflict, liberalism encourages global cooperation as a tool of advancing every state’s individual goals. Liberalists think that the negative repercussions of using warfare, such as economic damage and civilian fatalities, considerably outweigh the possible gains. As a result, liberal political leaders normally like to use economic and political power to realize national objectives. In the current, globally connected world, economic techniques such as bilateral trade agreements and international political diplomacy may be more efficient than using force in achieving political objectives. That said, multilateralism and global cooperation is at an all time low in international relations today. So, there are very few takers for this school of thought, at least among the major powers.

Constructivism theory in international affairs is based on the assumption that nations, like humans, exist in a world of our making in which certain concepts, such as social facts, gender roles are created by human activity, as opposed to brute facts, which are developed independently. Its arguments are based on concepts such as discourses, conventions, identities, and social interaction, which are widely used in contemporary conversations about a variety of international matters such as globalization, international human rights, defence policy, and others. Constructivism believes that the structure of the international system cannot be uniformly applied to all state relations as it mainly bases the relations and interactions between countries and their shared understanding as the source of conflict or cooperation. Constructivists view identity as the basis for interests, institutions, and relations between countries. It is conceivable to look at the war in Ukraine through the lens of constructivists.

The Chinese theories of IR mirror, at least to an extent, the Western theories above. The respective three schools are: Yan Xuetong’s moral realism, Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia system and Qin Yaqing’s relational theory.

Yan Xuetong’s moral realism is realism with a softer edge if you like. According to Yan Xuetong, there are three different ways in which governmental power can be wielded in Chinese political thought – qiang (tyranny), ba (hegemony), and wang (humane authority). Yan argues that the humane authority style of leadership is regarded in Confucian thoughts as the highest and most prized form of government. Moral realism is about humane authority. As Yan Xuetong elaborated, at the core of humane authority thinking is benevolence and righteousness.  It is about practicing those virtues and moral values in order to be accepted by others as the world leader. Whether world leaders in general and Chinese leaders in particular, practice this today is arguable.

Since the first publication of The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution in 2005, Zhao Tingyang has been promoting the idea of Tianxia as an inclusive global philosophy that transcends the perspective of the nation state so that all must look at all without excluding anyone. According to Zhao Tingyang, political theorists in the West are mainly concerned about life in terms of the individual, community, and nation-state. In contrast, the Chinese tradition looks to the levels of the world (i.e. Tianxia), state, and family. It is argued that the Westphalian world order inevitably leads to conflict in world politics due to it being based on competing national interests. Due to the limitations of Western political theory, with the nation-state as the largest political unit, Zhao suggests that we need to transcend the principle of ‘internationality’ and think about the world from a truly global perspective. Zhao Tingyang then draws from an idealised version of the Tianxia system of the Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–256 bc) as the paradigmatic model and argues that the system would solve world-scale peace problems through its world institution. After all, the Tianxia system is supposed to be an all-inclusive geographical, psychological, and institutional term. It is meant to operate on three levels: (1) the earth, that is, all lands under the sky; (2) a common or public choice made by all peoples in the world, truly representing the general will; and (3) a universal political system for the world. The Chinese scholars may well argue that the Belt and Road initiative, albeit flawed for some, is based on this utopian school of Chinese theory of IR!

Qin Yaqing is one of the main advocates of the need to construct the Chinese theories of IR based on its cultural traditions. It is not surprising that Qin Yaqing explores Chinese cultural and philosophical traditions as sources to develop an IR theory, especially when considering his intellectual background. Most of his earlier work was hugely influenced by constructivism in IR, which sees state behaviours as shaped by cultural factors such as culture, norms, and identity. Since 2015, Qin officially put forward the “relational” theory of IR which theorises the Chinese notion of “relationality” as the core of his theory. His theory involves four basic assumptions: (1) relationality is the basic unit for analysing the social world; (2) rationality is embedded within relationality; (3) relationality determines identity; and (4) relationality generates power. Is it possible to talk of Chinese influence and power in East Asia, based on the Chinese identity of a large number of inhabitants in those countries?

At the end of the day, theories of IR are what they are, namely, theories. They may lead to a better understanding of major events around us, but care must be exercised to ensure not to overinterpret events to suit one’s theoretical bias.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Consider the following three news items in as many months. First, in June this year, The Times of Israel reported that Qatar secretly secured US approval for a financial arrangement with Iran that allowed billions of dollars to flow to Tehran in return for the safe passage of Qatari tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. The arrangement also allowed Iran access to frozen funds in Qatar. Observers noted that since the “arrangement”, Qatar has largely been spared attacks by Iran while some other GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries, like Kuwait and Bahrain, were targeted. Second, in January of this year, the Saudis refused use by the US of the air bases to attack Iran. Again, beginning of this month, when Trump forewarned that he will bomb the hell out of Iran (his language was much more colourful than that), it was the Saudi leader known by his initials MBS who clearly told President Trump not to proceed with the attacks against Iran. Third, in today’s News18 there is a report which says the following: UAE on August 11 and 12 released $3 billion in assets and transferred about 2 tonnes of gold and 15 commercial planes to Iran. None of the above press reports have been refuted so far.

Taken together, this is an excellent indication of the strategic posturing of the “big three” of the GCC countries, namely, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. When the US/Israel attacks commenced in February against Iran, it was not clear what position the GCC countries would take. After all, it was in their collective interest to see Iran significantly weakened, if not entirely obliterated. But the big revelation of this war has been the strategic leverage possessed by Iran, which the latter has cleverly put to use. One obviously was the Strait of Hormuz which is now being bandied about as a weapon of choice by Iran. Two, by attacking critical infrastructure in the GCC countries as retaliation against US strikes, Iran has made them realize that geography is cruel and cannot be wished away. The GCC countries now realize that they have to live with Iran and while it is true that they had hitherto outsourced their security to the US in the form of expensive toys and bases, it is now clear that in the future these countries will hedge their bets, even while maintaining some “de minimis” security relationship with the US. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye may be seen in this light. Others like Qatar and UAE have signed security and defence agreements with Ukraine, with focus on drone and missile cooperation at the heart of it. UAE of course has an alliance with Israel which is special: after all, Israel deployed its famous “dome” and some troops to the UAE recently to counter Iranian drones. The UAE and Oman have also signed defence agreements with France in May and June respectively. All of this may suit the US which, for now, has run out of both military ammunition and political will to be drawn into another “forever war” in West Asia. It is now increasingly clear that the Trump foreign security doctrine in its essence focuses primarily on two theatres: the Western Hemisphere and the Western Pacific, to the relative exclusion of others.

The Omanese Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr, writing in Le Monde in July this year, said the ongoing war had revealed the drawbacks of the current security architecture in the Gulf which according to him was based on a false narrative of containing Iran, allegedly based on an existential threat from the latter. This had led to excessive militarization of the entire region. He called for a new inclusive security framework for the Gulf. The basic points he makes in the Le Monde article are worthy of reflection:

>Any security framework must include not just the 6 GCC countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain) but also Iran and Iraq;

>Shift the onus of maintaining peace and security in the region to local players rather than rely on external military intervention;

>Establish an immediate, permanent international framework in accordance with international law to safeguard freedom of navigation in the vital Strait of Hormuz, noting Oman and Iran’s special geographic responsibility over the key maritime corridor; and

>Strategic recalibration entailing rebalancing ties with key global players (read the US) to fit an emerging order following the recent war, rather than continuing with outdated geopolitical narratives.

Having spent more than four years in Bahrain, I am aware of Oman’s special position in the GCC. Oman has always maintained ties with Iran and has been the object of mild rebuke from its GCC partners for doing so. But Oman has always had the courage of conviction to pursue an independent foreign and security policy, which sometimes has diverged from the rest of the GCC. The Omanese Foreign Minister makes eminent sense in the article above. The million dollar question is: will the other GCC players buy into it?

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

While the WTO does poorly in the areas of negotiations and dispute settlement, there is an area where it carries on gamely. That is the field of trade monitoring. To do this in full measure, the WTO provides for a Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO) which entails periodic review of the trade policies and practices of WTO Members. While Members like US and EU must subject themselves to this review every two years, countries like India must undertake this every four years. On 21 and 23 July the WTO carried out this mandated trade policy review of India. It was the eighth such review of India.

The stated objective of the trade policy review is to contribute to
improved adherence by all WTO Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members. This last mentioned point is important. The recommendations are purely advisory in nature and are not legally binding on the countries concerned. This is something the Indian delegation to the Uurguay Round of negotiations (of which I was a part) fought hard. US and EU argued for legally binding recommendations. We resisted and prevailed. Yet, the value of this exercise is important and countries will be well advised to note what other trading partners think of its trade policies and practices.

The Secretariat report acknowledges the ambition of India to become Viksit Bharat by 2047. It also notes that to attain high-income economy status by 2047, India will need to sustain real GDP growth (as opposed to nominal growth) of 8 per cent annually till then. The World Bank has come up with revised criteria recently for classification of countries as low-income, high-income etc but uses Gross National Income (GNI) not GDP (Gross Domestic Product). For the uninitiated, GNI equals GDP plus net income received by a country from abroad. The World Bank basically divides countries into (a) low income (less than $ 1135 GNP per capita); (b) lower-middle income ($ 1136 – 4495 GNP per capita); (c) upper-middle income ($ 4496 – 13,935 GNP per capita); and (d) high-income, more than $ 13,395 GNP per capita. The very first thing we should be clear is what we mean by Viksit Bharat? Do we mean more than $ 13,395 GNP per capita? For India, in 2025, the difference in GDP per capita and GNP per capita is marginal ($ 2702 versus $2760) so we need not concern ourselves with it too much. But it will be seen from the above that upper-middle income status has a very wide range from $ 4496 to $ 13,935 GNP per capita. There is little doubt that India will soon move into this bracket, certainly by 2030. But whether we can go beyond GNP per capita of $13,395 and become a high-income country is moot at this point. It might be useful for the NITI Ayog to come up with a quantitative target of say $ 10,000 GNP per capita by 2047 to denote Viksit Bharat. Even for this, India must get to a $15 Trillion economy by 2047, no mean feat. NITI Ayog could also combine this with a Gini coefficient target specific for India to ensure that growth achieved is inclusive.

Back to the Trade Policy Review of India at the WTO. A lot of positive comments were made by WTO Members. Member participation was high, denoting the level of importance attached to India in the global economy. About 1090 written questions were received from 44 WTO Members. It was acknowledged that India is an increasingly important pole of global demand. A number of countries cited their rapid increase in bilateral trade with India. Several least-developed countries thanked India for preferential access to its market and requested that India’s duty-free, quota-free access be extended further. India’s digital public infrastructure, predictably, came in for praise. Members also urged India to continue its wide-ranging reform agenda even while seeking further information on the transparency and effectiveness of a broad range of trade-related measures undertaken by it.

On the question of plurilateral negotiations at the WTO (also called Joint Statement Initiatives) which India has hitherto declined to join, a number of Members, both developed and developing, encouraged India to consider participating in arrangements such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement and the interim arrangement for Electronic Commerce. It is clear that India will have to take a call on this important issue, sooner rather than later. The fact that India’s non-participation in plurilateral negotiations is causing concern even among countries of the Gobal South is something that India has to factor in while taking a final decision in the matter.

In terms of flak received, WTO Members raised issues of transparency and predictability about India’s trade measures. In particular, Members raised points about tariff changes, unexpected export restrictions, complex licencing arrangements, lengthy investment approvals and a lack of regulatory certainty. It was suggested by many that there needed to be greater outreach by our authorities to trading partners on proposed measures before their entry into force. Our WTO notification record was highlighted as an area where there could be further improvement.

Numerous questions were raised about India’s standards, technical regulations and Quality Control Orders. In particular, further clarifications were sought by Members on consultation procedures, reasons for delay in conducting factory visits, lack of clear implementation timelines, alignment with international standards, simplified conformity assessment requirements and more recognition of foreign labs and certification bodies. WTO Members highlighted the burden delays placed on their exporters and the importance of transparency, proportionality and predictability.

Agriculture got a fair share of its questions and concerns. India’s minimum support prices, input subsidies, public stockholding programmes, import licencing and export restrictions on products such as wheat, rice, sugar and onions were all raised. Also highlighted were sanitary and phytosanitary measures relating to the availability of underlying risk assessments and realted methodologies. This is a matter of some concern. Despite valiant efforts by the Indian delegation in Geneva and our capital-based negotiators, there is relative lack of understanding in Geneva of how unfair the Agreement on Agriculture is towards countries like India. Food security for India is non-negotiable and yet this is not sufficiently understood and appreciated by our trading partners, especially those which are developed and who have had a field day subsidising their own agriculture until recently. No one said the WTO is fair, so welcome to the real and tough world of trade negotiations!

Questions were also raised about our Production-Linked Incentive schemes as also with our FDI policies and investment screening procedures. We need to satisfy our main trading partners in this regard.

On the plus side, Members welcomed the significant increases recorded in patent filings from India, expanded use of digital filing and progress in digitalization of customs and border procedures.

While India need not attach equal weight to all the questions and comments above, concerns expressed about lack of transparency, predictability, proportionality and investor-friendly trade measures must be taken seriously. After all, India has signed a number of FTAs in the recent past and if the fruits of those have to be reaped by us, we need to put in place a trade policy regime that is fit for purpose. The Ministry of Commerce has its work cut out.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian trade negotiator and is at present Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

As any diplomat who has served in West Asia (aka Middle East) knows, aphorisms abound. One is that nothing in the region is ever as simple as it seems. The other is that, people in the region are liable to say something and then do exactly the opposite. These two things, even if remotely accurate, make it very difficult for outsiders to understand the region in all its complexity. But the Iran war has introduced a new degree of complexity which makes it hard even for experts to understand and predict events. Consider the following relationships.

US-Israel dissension: US-Israel ties have largely stood the test of time, though American Presidents have struggled on and off to bring their ironclad ally into line. But something different seems to be happening now. Questions like “who is the effing superpower here?” are being bandied about by the MAGA crowd, with Tucker Carlson leading the charge. More important, public opinion in the US which hitherto had cut Israel a lot of slack, appears to be turning. When unconfirmed reports emerge that the US provided intelligence inputs to Iran, of all countries, about the possibility of Israeli attacks against their negotiators, you know something is amiss somewhere. It is still premature to say that there is a rupture in the ironclad relationship, but it is doubtful if full trust can be restored anytime soon. Voices in the US blame Israel for having led Trump up the garden path in launching an unnecessary war against Iran. Interestingly, Israel itself is conscious of this and has promised to end its dependence on the US in ten year’s time. Who would have thought?

US-Iran rapprochement? It is important to understand the signficance of an American President signing a MOU with an Iranian President. This has not happened in decades. Add to this the provision in the MOU that US undertakes to develop a plan involving a whopping sum of USD 300 billion to help in the development and reconstruction of Iran, and you begin to rub your eyes in disbelief. The MOU could yet collapse. But Iran is a country which has normalized the slogan ” death to America” in the region. It is hard to overlook the geopolitical evolution in current American thinking, which should worry the hell out of not just Israel but also the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries.

UAE-KSA rift: One of the biggest casualties of the Iran war has been GCC unity, such as it was prior to the conflict. There is a lot of history to the deep mistrust between the Emiratis and the Saudis which in the past prevented the GCC from even launching a common currency. UAE normalizing its ties with Israel through the Abraham accords in 2020 was another area where the Emiratis differed with the Saudis who have always linked this issue with progress in Palestinian statehood. The conflicts in Yemen and South Sudan also saw the Emiratis and Saudis back different groups, leading to tension in the ties. UAE pulling out of OPEC, in the view of some analysts, was the last nail in the coffin. The Saudis were clearly not pleased.

But it is the current Iran conflict that has led to UAE and KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) falling foul of each other. It is no secret that UAE bore the brunt of the attacks from Iran and has also suffered the biggest reputational damage from the war. After all, the entire Dubai paradigm is under threat and it will take years for it to recover. UAE has clearly hitched its wagon to Israel and the US, in a clear break from the rest of the GCC. Given the traditional Shia-Sunni animosity between Iran and KSA, one would have thought the Saudis would have joined the Emiratis in wanting to teach a lesson to the Iranians. Curiously however, this did not happen. Indeed, at one stage the Saudis withheld permission from the US for their bases in KSA to be used for launching attacks against Iran. US threatened the Saudis that anti-drone interceptors would be withheld from them, before matters were resolved. Even so, one of the things that the Pakistanis reportedly secured was a commitment from Iran not to attack KSA. After all, the safety of Paksitani troops was at stake!

The bottom line is this. The UAE-KSA rift is here to stay and will jeopardise all attempts to achieve unity in the GCC.

Israel-Turkey rift: Something has changed in the ties between Israel and Turkey. On June 23rd an Israeli minister claimed that Turkey, along with Syria, had replaced Iran as the biggest danger to his country. Israel also upped the ante by recognising the genocide of the Armenian people carried out by the Ottomans in 1915 (Turkey does not recognise the deaths as a war crime, let alone a genocide). Not to be outdone, Turkey’s interior minister said he hoped to become the governor of Jerusalem once the city came under Turkish control. After all, the Ottoman empire ruled Jerusalem and Palestine for four centuries until 1917. Israel worries about Turkey’s outsized footprint in Syria and its budding military alliance with Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is concerned with Israel’s wars in Gaza, Iran and Lebanon, and its co-operation with Kurdish insurgents. Turkish policymakers consider Israel an impediment to every single file in the Middle East they are involved in. For now, the risk of confrontation between these two countries may be remote, but this relationship bears watching.

Qatar‘s substantive mediation: There are reasons to believe that while Paksitan did play an initial role as an interlocutor/ mediator, the more substantive role of late has been played by Qatar. This is interesting since Iran in March had reportedly succeeded in destroying the Ras Laffan City, the World’s biggest LNG facility in Qatar. But since March, there have been no serious attacks on Qatar. The obvious inference is that Qatar may have transferred (unblocked) substantial sums of USD to Iran, apart from taking on a more important mediatory role. This is of course due to Qatar’s enlightened self interest, more than anything else.

A Sunni axis in the offing? There have been repeated attempts in the past to establish a Sunni axis. In the current context, a Sunni axis has as its starting point the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement concluded in September 2025 between KSA and Pakistan. Famously, it has a NATO Article 5-like clause which says any attack on one country will be viewed as an attack on both. This also explains why Pakistan was so keen to implore Iran not to attack KSA, lest its troops get sucked into a conflict in the region. The million dollar question is this: Will Turkey and Egypt be happy to join this incipient “Sunni Alliance”? Evidence so far is mixed. Turkey has differences with KSA in terms of ambitions to lead the Islamic world and has the additional burden of belonging to NATO. Egypt has enough internal problems of its own for it not to want to be distracted by this, though it will welcome the monetary resources that come with it. All in all, it is an alliance in the making, and may remain that way for a while.

The curious case of Kurds: When the US along with Israel started the war with Iran, President Trump let it be known that he expected the Kurdish groups in Iran to rise up against the Iranian regime with a view to overthrowing the latter. President Trump, as is his wont, reversed gear a week later when he said that he did NOT want the Kurds to do anything since the war in Iran was complicated as it is! The CIA was reportedly working to arm Kurdish forces, and there are credible reports that the Trump administration was in active discussions with Kurdish groups about providing them with military support.  In effect, the US was bombing Iran with a view to potentially prepare the ground for Kurdish parties based in the region and across the border in Iraq to launch an offensive against the Iranian regime. This never came to pass. Nevertheless in February, five Kurdish parties announced the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. These include the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, the Kurdistan Free Life Party and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan which joined later. The coalition’s leadership is largely based in Iraq or in exile in the West, though it is also well-organized inside Iran through clandestine networks. It is however unclear whether the newfound unity among the Iranian Kurds will endure. Disagreements over strategy, competition for resources, historical enmities and changing conditions may conspire to undermine their strategic cooperation in the near term.

Oman goes it alone as usual: Among all the GCC countries, Oman views itself differently. Other GCC countries call Oman “special”, with barely concealed sarcasm. Despite this, Oman has always ploughed a lonely furrow. Oman has always maintained excellent ties with Iran, going against the grain. Indeed, in May last year both Oman and Iran signed a number of agreements . More important, Iranian President Pezeshkian after a bilateral meeting with the Omanese Sultan praised Oman’s “active and constructive” role in facilitating “indirect” nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington. The Iranian president affirmed Iran’s full trust in Oman as a neutral mediator and reiterated Tehran’s commitment to diplomacy. That was then. In the recent conflict, Oman’s role appears to have been marginal. On the possibility of a toll for the Hormuz Strait, Oman has formally maintained the Strait must be open unconditionally and without fees. Indeed, Oman joined in the GCC Ministerial statement issued after the Rubio visit which rejected any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz. This in turn was predictably rejected by Iran. Subsequently Oman too walked back these remarks. What then is the actual position of Oman on the issue of fees/toll for the Hormuz Strait? Oman’s position may be described as one of “strategic ambiguity”. As a result, Omani diplomats tack back and forth between insisting no toll will be charged, and suggesting that ships might be eventually asked to pay a fee which will be called something other than a toll.

Whither I2U2? Conventional wisdom has it that the war in Iran means the I2U2 will be difficult to get off the ground. This may be true as far as it goes. If it however does materialize fully at a later stage, the I2U2 may be seen as a counterweight to the “Sunni Alliance” referred to earlier. Regardless, India has vastly strengthened its ties with the UAE for both strategic and energy security reasons. This has not and should not prevent India from maintaining good ties with both KSA and Iran.

If all of the above makes your head spin, you are not alone. It merely reconfirms two other aphorisms that I heard about West Asia when I served there as India’s envoy to Bahrain. One, the region, with tedious consistency, produces more history than it can consume. Two, what happens in the region seldom stays there!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the Kingdom of Bahrain and is at present Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.