While the WTO does poorly in the areas of negotiations and dispute settlement, there is an area where it carries on gamely. That is the field of trade monitoring. To do this in full measure, the WTO provides for a Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO) which entails periodic review of the trade policies and practices of WTO Members. While Members like US and EU must subject themselves to this review every two years, countries like India must undertake this every four years. On 21 and 23 July the WTO carried out this mandated trade policy review of India. It was the eighth such review of India.

The stated objective of the trade policy review is to contribute to
improved adherence by all WTO Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members. This last mentioned point is important. The recommendations are purely advisory in nature and are not legally binding on the countries concerned. This is something the Indian delegation to the Uurguay Round of negotiations (of which I was a part) fought hard. US and EU argued for legally binding recommendations. We resisted and prevailed. Yet, the value of this exercise is important and countries will be well advised to note what other trading partners think of its trade policies and practices.

The Secretariat report acknowledges the ambition of India to become Viksit Bharat by 2047. It also notes that to attain high-income economy status by 2047, India will need to sustain real GDP growth (as opposed to nominal growth) of 8 per cent annually till then. The World Bank has come up with revised criteria recently for classification of countries as low-income, high-income etc but uses Gross National Income (GNI) not GDP (Gross Domestic Product). For the uninitiated, GNI equals GDP plus net income received by a country from abroad. The World Bank basically divides countries into (a) low income (less than $ 1135 GNP per capita); (b) lower-middle income ($ 1136 – 4495 GNP per capita); (c) upper-middle income ($ 4496 – 13,935 GNP per capita); and (d) high-income, more than $ 13,395 GNP per capita. The very first thing we should be clear is what we mean by Viksit Bharat? Do we mean more than $ 13,395 GNP per capita? For India, in 2025, the difference in GDP per capita and GNP per capita is marginal ($ 2702 versus $2760) so we need not concern ourselves with it too much. But it will be seen from the above that upper-middle income status has a very wide range from $ 4496 to $ 13,935 GNP per capita. There is little doubt that India will soon move into this bracket, certainly by 2030. But whether we can go beyond GNP per capita of $13,395 and become a high-income country is moot at this point. It might be useful for the NITI Ayog to come up with a quantitative target of say $ 10,000 GNP per capita by 2047 to denote Viksit Bharat. Even for this, India must get to a $15 Trillion economy by 2047, no mean feat. NITI Ayog could also combine this with a Gini coefficient target specific for India to ensure that growth achieved is inclusive.

Back to the Trade Policy Review of India at the WTO. A lot of positive comments were made by WTO Members. Member participation was high, denoting the level of importance attached to India in the global economy. About 1090 written questions were received from 44 WTO Members. It was acknowledged that India is an increasingly important pole of global demand. A number of countries cited their rapid increase in bilateral trade with India. Several least-developed countries thanked India for preferential access to its market and requested that India’s duty-free, quota-free access be extended further. India’s digital public infrastructure, predictably, came in for praise. Members also urged India to continue its wide-ranging reform agenda even while seeking further information on the transparency and effectiveness of a broad range of trade-related measures undertaken by it.

On the question of plurilateral negotiations at the WTO (also called Joint Statement Initiatives) which India has hitherto declined to join, a number of Members, both developed and developing, encouraged India to consider participating in arrangements such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement and the interim arrangement for Electronic Commerce. It is clear that India will have to take a call on this important issue, sooner rather than later. The fact that India’s non-participation in plurilateral negotiations is causing concern even among countries of the Gobal South is something that India has to factor in while taking a final decision in the matter.

In terms of flak received, WTO Members raised issues of transparency and predictability about India’s trade measures. In particular, Members raised points about tariff changes, unexpected export restrictions, complex licencing arrangements, lengthy investment approvals and a lack of regulatory certainty. It was suggested by many that there needed to be greater outreach by our authorities to trading partners on proposed measures before their entry into force. Our WTO notification record was highlighted as an area where there could be further improvement.

Numerous questions were raised about India’s standards, technical regulations and Quality Control Orders. In particular, further clarifications were sought by Members on consultation procedures, reasons for delay in conducting factory visits, lack of clear implementation timelines, alignment with international standards, simplified conformity assessment requirements and more recognition of foreign labs and certification bodies. WTO Members highlighted the burden delays placed on their exporters and the importance of transparency, proportionality and predictability.

Agriculture got a fair share of its questions and concerns. India’s minimum support prices, input subsidies, public stockholding programmes, import licencing and export restrictions on products such as wheat, rice, sugar and onions were all raised. Also highlighted were sanitary and phytosanitary measures relating to the availability of underlying risk assessments and realted methodologies. This is a matter of some concern. Despite valiant efforts by the Indian delegation in Geneva and our capital-based negotiators, there is relative lack of understanding in Geneva of how unfair the Agreement on Agriculture is towards countries like India. Food security for India is non-negotiable and yet this is not sufficiently understood and appreciated by our trading partners, especially those which are developed and who have had a field day subsidising their own agriculture until recently. No one said the WTO is fair, so welcome to the real and tough world of trade negotiations!

Questions were also raised about our Production-Linked Incentive schemes as also with our FDI policies and investment screening procedures. We need to satisfy our main trading partners in this regard.

On the plus side, Members welcomed the significant increases recorded in patent filings from India, expanded use of digital filing and progress in digitalization of customs and border procedures.

While India need not attach equal weight to all the questions and comments above, concerns expressed about lack of transparency, predictability, proportionality and investor-friendly trade measures must be taken seriously. After all, India has signed a number of FTAs in the recent past and if the fruits of those have to be reaped by us, we need to put in place a trade policy regime that is fit for purpose. The Ministry of Commerce has its work cut out.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian trade negotiator and is at present Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

As any diplomat who has served in West Asia (aka Middle East) knows, aphorisms abound. One is that nothing in the region is ever as simple as it seems. The other is that, people in the region are liable to say something and then do exactly the opposite. These two things, even if remotely accurate, make it very difficult for outsiders to understand the region in all its complexity. But the Iran war has introduced a new degree of complexity which makes it hard even for experts to understand and predict events. Consider the following relationships.

US-Israel dissension: US-Israel ties have largely stood the test of time, though American Presidents have struggled on and off to bring their ironclad ally into line. But something different seems to be happening now. Questions like “who is the effing superpower here?” are being bandied about by the MAGA crowd, with Tucker Carlson leading the charge. More important, public opinion in the US which hitherto had cut Israel a lot of slack, appears to be turning. When unconfirmed reports emerge that the US provided intelligence inputs to Iran, of all countries, about the possibility of Israeli attacks against their negotiators, you know something is amiss somewhere. It is still premature to say that there is a rupture in the ironclad relationship, but it is doubtful if full trust can be restored anytime soon. Voices in the US blame Israel for having led Trump up the garden path in launching an unnecessary war against Iran. Interestingly, Israel itself is conscious of this and has promised to end its dependence on the US in ten year’s time. Who would have thought?

US-Iran rapprochement? It is important to understand the signficance of an American President signing a MOU with an Iranian President. This has not happened in decades. Add to this the provision in the MOU that US undertakes to develop a plan involving a whopping sum of USD 300 billion to help in the development and reconstruction of Iran, and you begin to rub your eyes in disbelief. The MOU could yet collapse. But Iran is a country which has normalized the slogan ” death to America” in the region. It is hard to overlook the geopolitical evolution in current American thinking, which should worry the hell out of not just Israel but also the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries.

UAE-KSA rift: One of the biggest casualties of the Iran war has been GCC unity, such as it was prior to the conflict. There is a lot of history to the deep mistrust between the Emiratis and the Saudis which in the past prevented the GCC from even launching a common currency. UAE normalizing its ties with Israel through the Abraham accords in 2020 was another area where the Emiratis differed with the Saudis who have always linked this issue with progress in Palestinian statehood. The conflicts in Yemen and South Sudan also saw the Emiratis and Saudis back different groups, leading to tension in the ties. UAE pulling out of OPEC, in the view of some analysts, was the last nail in the coffin. The Saudis were clearly not pleased.

But it is the current Iran conflict that has led to UAE and KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) falling foul of each other. It is no secret that UAE bore the brunt of the attacks from Iran and has also suffered the biggest reputational damage from the war. After all, the entire Dubai paradigm is under threat and it will take years for it to recover. UAE has clearly hitched its wagon to Israel and the US, in a clear break from the rest of the GCC. Given the traditional Shia-Sunni animosity between Iran and KSA, one would have thought the Saudis would have joined the Emiratis in wanting to teach a lesson to the Iranians. Curiously however, this did not happen. Indeed, at one stage the Saudis withheld permission from the US for their bases in KSA to be used for launching attacks against Iran. US threatened the Saudis that anti-drone interceptors would be withheld from them, before matters were resolved. Even so, one of the things that the Pakistanis reportedly secured was a commitment from Iran not to attack KSA. After all, the safety of Paksitani troops was at stake!

The bottom line is this. The UAE-KSA rift is here to stay and will jeopardise all attempts to achieve unity in the GCC.

Israel-Turkey rift: Something has changed in the ties between Israel and Turkey. On June 23rd an Israeli minister claimed that Turkey, along with Syria, had replaced Iran as the biggest danger to his country. Israel also upped the ante by recognising the genocide of the Armenian people carried out by the Ottomans in 1915 (Turkey does not recognise the deaths as a war crime, let alone a genocide). Not to be outdone, Turkey’s interior minister said he hoped to become the governor of Jerusalem once the city came under Turkish control. After all, the Ottoman empire ruled Jerusalem and Palestine for four centuries until 1917. Israel worries about Turkey’s outsized footprint in Syria and its budding military alliance with Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is concerned with Israel’s wars in Gaza, Iran and Lebanon, and its co-operation with Kurdish insurgents. Turkish policymakers consider Israel an impediment to every single file in the Middle East they are involved in. For now, the risk of confrontation between these two countries may be remote, but this relationship bears watching.

Qatar‘s substantive mediation: There are reasons to believe that while Paksitan did play an initial role as an interlocutor/ mediator, the more substantive role of late has been played by Qatar. This is interesting since Iran in March had reportedly succeeded in destroying the Ras Laffan City, the World’s biggest LNG facility in Qatar. But since March, there have been no serious attacks on Qatar. The obvious inference is that Qatar may have transferred (unblocked) substantial sums of USD to Iran, apart from taking on a more important mediatory role. This is of course due to Qatar’s enlightened self interest, more than anything else.

A Sunni axis in the offing? There have been repeated attempts in the past to establish a Sunni axis. In the current context, a Sunni axis has as its starting point the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement concluded in September 2025 between KSA and Pakistan. Famously, it has a NATO Article 5-like clause which says any attack on one country will be viewed as an attack on both. This also explains why Pakistan was so keen to implore Iran not to attack KSA, lest its troops get sucked into a conflict in the region. The million dollar question is this: Will Turkey and Egypt be happy to join this incipient “Sunni Alliance”? Evidence so far is mixed. Turkey has differences with KSA in terms of ambitions to lead the Islamic world and has the additional burden of belonging to NATO. Egypt has enough internal problems of its own for it not to want to be distracted by this, though it will welcome the monetary resources that come with it. All in all, it is an alliance in the making, and may remain that way for a while.

The curious case of Kurds: When the US along with Israel started the war with Iran, President Trump let it be known that he expected the Kurdish groups in Iran to rise up against the Iranian regime with a view to overthrowing the latter. President Trump, as is his wont, reversed gear a week later when he said that he did NOT want the Kurds to do anything since the war in Iran was complicated as it is! The CIA was reportedly working to arm Kurdish forces, and there are credible reports that the Trump administration was in active discussions with Kurdish groups about providing them with military support.  In effect, the US was bombing Iran with a view to potentially prepare the ground for Kurdish parties based in the region and across the border in Iraq to launch an offensive against the Iranian regime. This never came to pass. Nevertheless in February, five Kurdish parties announced the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. These include the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, the Kurdistan Free Life Party and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan which joined later. The coalition’s leadership is largely based in Iraq or in exile in the West, though it is also well-organized inside Iran through clandestine networks. It is however unclear whether the newfound unity among the Iranian Kurds will endure. Disagreements over strategy, competition for resources, historical enmities and changing conditions may conspire to undermine their strategic cooperation in the near term.

Oman goes it alone as usual: Among all the GCC countries, Oman views itself differently. Other GCC countries call Oman “special”, with barely concealed sarcasm. Despite this, Oman has always ploughed a lonely furrow. Oman has always maintained excellent ties with Iran, going against the grain. Indeed, in May last year both Oman and Iran signed a number of agreements . More important, Iranian President Pezeshkian after a bilateral meeting with the Omanese Sultan praised Oman’s “active and constructive” role in facilitating “indirect” nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington. The Iranian president affirmed Iran’s full trust in Oman as a neutral mediator and reiterated Tehran’s commitment to diplomacy. That was then. In the recent conflict, Oman’s role appears to have been marginal. On the possibility of a toll for the Hormuz Strait, Oman has formally maintained the Strait must be open unconditionally and without fees. Indeed, Oman joined in the GCC Ministerial statement issued after the Rubio visit which rejected any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz. This in turn was predictably rejected by Iran. Subsequently Oman too walked back these remarks. What then is the actual position of Oman on the issue of fees/toll for the Hormuz Strait? Oman’s position may be described as one of “strategic ambiguity”. As a result, Omani diplomats tack back and forth between insisting no toll will be charged, and suggesting that ships might be eventually asked to pay a fee which will be called something other than a toll.

Whither I2U2? Conventional wisdom has it that the war in Iran means the I2U2 will be difficult to get off the ground. This may be true as far as it goes. If it however does materialize fully at a later stage, the I2U2 may be seen as a counterweight to the “Sunni Alliance” referred to earlier. Regardless, India has vastly strengthened its ties with the UAE for both strategic and energy security reasons. This has not and should not prevent India from maintaining good ties with both KSA and Iran.

If all of the above makes your head spin, you are not alone. It merely reconfirms two other aphorisms that I heard about West Asia when I served there as India’s envoy to Bahrain. One, the region, with tedious consistency, produces more history than it can consume. Two, what happens in the region seldom stays there!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the Kingdom of Bahrain and is at present Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.

Now that we have a piece of paper (MOU) signed by both American President Trump and Iranian President Pezeshkian, it may be a good time to compare this document with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by EU plus 3 (US,UK,France, Germany,China,Russia, with the EU’s High Representative) with Iran as far back as 2015.

But before we do that, some broad observations. The JCPOA was a “final” agreement painstakingly arrived at after two years of negotiations. The MOU is an “interim” framework with a “final” agreement potentially emerging after 60 days or more, decided by mutual consent. The JCPOA involved the major powers and was thus legally binding. The MOU is binding, to the extent it is, only for US and Iran. In effect, we are comparing apples and oranges.

Standstill Clause

Pending the final ageement, the US and Iran agree to maintain the status quo i.e. Iran will maintain the status quo of its nuclear program and the US will not impose any new sanctions and will not deploy any additional forces in the region. On the latter point, there is an interesting clause which says that the US undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal. What exactly does this imply? It would seem to refer to the 50,000-odd troops that the US has for its ongoing military operations around Iran. It certainly does not refer to US bases in the GCC countries!

Nuclear Issue

The JCPOA is nothing if not categorical. It asserts: Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will it ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. But it also provides that the JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In fact, it talks of Iran’s “right” under the NPT to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The MOU on the other hand says: Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.

While the language seems stronger in the JCPOA than the MOU, I think the key is whether or not Iran is entitled to any peaceful nuclear programme at all. Presumably, this will be dealt with in the subsequent negotiations. But Trump was clear in the press conference yesterday in Evian. Why should a country like Iran that has so much energy in the form of oil and gas, need nuclear energy at all? This will doubtless be a thorny issue in the forthcoming negotiations.

The JCPOA had detailed and technical annexes about uranium enrichment and so on. The MOU has none of that because this issue is yet to be negotiated as part of the final agreement.

Strait of Hormuz

This was simply not an issue before February 2026. The fact that it is now, may be considered a sign of US retrenchment from not just the region, but from the world in general. If true, China will draw the necessary conclusions.

The MOU makes clear that immediately upon signing (which has already happened) the US will begin the removal of its naval blockade and end it within 30 days. During the same period, Iran will restore the traffic of vessels in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic. Interestingly, Iran will make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels with “no charge” only for a period of 60 days from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. After this period, Iran will consult with Oman to “define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states”. This is subject to variable interpretation. But one common interpretation is that some kind of “service fee” for Iran and Oman may be applicable to the vessels utilizing the Strait of Hormuz, even if UNCLOS is accepted by Iran and Oman.

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Iran

The JCPOA merely says that parties to the agreement reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

The MOU is much more explicit: US and Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and terrritorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs. This appears significant for Iran which sought an iran clad commitment that US will not go back to bombing. But the value of this commitment is dubious. President Trump is already saying if Iran does not meet its commitments, the US will go back to bombing it. There is also the other wild card that is Israel. Israel, notably, is not a party to the MOU so not bound by this commitment. But the MOU does say the US and its allies (Israel?) and Iran and its allies (Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis?) through this MOU declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts including Lebanon. They also undertake not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other and ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. One can see why Israel is so unhappy about the MOU!

Dollars and Cents

The JCPOA says it will lead to the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. All this was immediate since the JCPOA was a final agreement. One of the criticisms of the Republicans against the JCPOA was that the Obama administration paid “huge” sums of dollars to Iran with nothing to show in return. As will be seen below, this criticism of the JCPOA may come back to haunt the Republicans.

On sanctions, the MOU says the US undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against Iran including the UN Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary in an agreed upon schedule as part of the final deal. It was agreed that this issue will be immediately addressed in the negotiations that follow. So, this is valuable leverage that the US still has vis-a-vis Iran.

But three measures of economic relief for Iran are discernible. One, Iran can straightaway start selling its crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives even pending the final agreement. US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the same. Two, the US undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. Procedures to be agreed upon. Three, the US undertakes with regional partners to develop a defintive, mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for reconstruction and economic development of Iran. Mechanism to be developed as part of the final deal within 60 days. When asked about this in the press conference yesterday, President Trump countered by saying that so much destruction has been wrought by the bombing on Iran that they need the money for reconstruction. Add to this unconfirmed reports that both Qatar and UAE have already transferred substantial sums in dollars to Iran for agreeeing to sign the MOU.

Role for UNSC

Given the lack of trust between the two parties and perhaps at the insistence of the Iranians, the MOU provides that the final agreement will be endorsed by a binding UNSC resolution. This, presumably, will make it more difficult for the two sides to renege on the final agreement that is arrived upon.

In order to definitively judge the MOU against the JCPOA, one will need to know the broad contours of the final agreement arrived at by US and Iran in the next 60 days or more.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University.

French President Emmanuel Macron is nothing if not dramatic. Speaking at Sorbonne in 2024, he proclaimed with customary chutzpah: “Our Europe is mortal; it can die, and it all depends on our choices.” For once, Macron was not exaggerating when he said that. Europe does seem to face unprecedented existential challenges.

I have just returned from Barcelona after participating in a well-attended conference whose title was duly provocative: Europe’s strategic autonomy, myth or reality! The conference though organized by the ” Cercle d’economia” of Barcelona, attracted strategic thinkers from all over Europe. I was invited along with a distinguished Professor from the University of Beijing to give the Indian and Chinese perspectives respectively. While it is impossible to summarize the outcome of the two-day conference here, I do wish to make two significant points. One, the general mood was sombre. Two, there was wide consensus among those present that while America continues to innovate the best and China still manufactures prolifically, all the EU is able to do is regulate!

The economic climate in Europe was a matter of substantive debate and discussion. There was a feeling that Europe was being squeezed by both China and the US. Specific problems faced by Europe ranged from the housing crisis, low productivity, youth unemployment and burgeoning immigration, both legal and illegal. As an aside, it was interesting that while Barcelona had 10,000 Indian immigrants, they had something like 30,000 Pakistani immigrants! While a range of solutions were offered by economists and thinkers, the final conclusion was that Europe was too big an entity for a “one size fits all” economic and social solution. Brussels came in for a fair bit of criticism and China was seen more as a strategic threat than as a benign partner. US under Trump was considered an unreliable and unpredictable partner. But speaker after speaker was at pains to point out that the changes in the US were more or less irreversible and will outlast President Trump regardless of who wins in the presidential elections there in 2028.

India’s strategic autonomy was lauded and even viewed with some jealousy. As opposed to China, we were largely seen in benevolent terms. There was some talk of Europe and India getting together to strengthen their “geopolitical alliance”. But the European economic operators and company representatives who were present in large numbers continued to believe that India was a tough place to do business. I did underline the reforms and the ease of business steps taken by the Government. I got a patient hearing, if nothing else.

Europe’s strategic autonomy is under assault from three directions. Energy independence from Russia is proving to be difficult. Economic derisking from China is easier said than done. As if both these were not challenge enough, Europe now eventually seeks security and military independence from the US, thanks to moves by the Trump administration. Doing any one of these is difficult in the best of times; but for Europe to cope with all three at once, is nothing short of daunting.

The most worrying thing was that there was absolutely no discussion among the European strategic community regarding a new security architecture for Europe involving Russia. Russia was viewed in antithetical terms and there was conviction that Ukraine was making incremental progress, especially of late. Equally, it was felt that the economic situation in Russia was dire and President Putin was under enormous domestic pressure over the war in Ukraine.

These days, it is impossible to attend any conference anywhere in the world without a session devoted to Artificial Intelligence (AI). So it was in Barcelona too. Europe was seen as falling behind both US and China in this crucial area. The Commission led by Von der Leyen was to announce a European technological sovereignty package: a set of measures to strengthen the EU’s capacity in semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud and open source. It was expected to help Europe become a leader in AI, strengthen its digital autonomy, and help build a more sustainable digital future. This package was eventually announced by the Commission on 4 June. It remains to be seen how well this plan is implemented all over EU.

Whether Europe’s strategic autonomy is a myth or reality is arguable. What is clear is that European Union faces multiple challenges which if not properly handled will have the effect of diminishing its strategic autonomy, rather than enhancing it. This is a moment for Europe to be united, not divided. And yet, differences abound, whether it is Europe’s strategy of countering China, or its strategy of coping with the US or the strategy of resisting Russia. There is also the fate of the Franco-German engine which has been so vital for the smooth functioning of the EU. France is on the cusp of a terribly important election next year. If someone like Jordan Bardella becomes the French President, France’s approach to EU and Brussels will undergo a paradigm shift. This could potentially include things like the use of the French nuclear arsenal and will therefore vitally impact the “forward deterrence” proposition put forward by President Macron. As for Germany, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, France and Germany spent nearly the same amount on defence. By 2029 however, Germany’s defence budget is expected to swell to at least €150bn ($174bn)—roughly double that of France’s. For European security, German rearmament is welcome. Yet in Paris the prospect may also prompt some discomfort. The Franco-German link was forged around an implicit equilibrium: France carries the military burden, while Germany provides economic might. If that equation were to change radically, a lot of other things might have to change too in the EU.

EU will undoubtedly cope with all this, as only it can. The question though is whether all of this will prevent the EU from achieving great power status in the near term, which then has profound implications for the kind of multipolar world order we are heading towards.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University in India. Views are personal.

The much-awaited and the oft-postponed summit meeting between American President Donald Trump and Chinese supremo Xi Jinping finally took place in Beijing on 14 May. In the current geopolitical context, it is hard to imagine a more consequential meeting between two world leaders. Whichever way one looks at it, the geopolitcal ramifications are important and can now be reasonably deduced. Here is an attempt to do so.

Strategic Parity

One may quibble about relative strengths in specific fields, but there is no gainsaying the fact that we are now talking about two Great Powers that possess broad strategic parity. By this, I mean that we can safely rule out, at least in the near term, the possibility of one power overwhelmingly dominating the other. President Trump probably understands this better than most people, hence his treatment of Xi Jinping with kid gloves. China, on the other hand, wanted to message the world that the latter must henceforth treat China on par with the US. To the domestic Chinese audience, Xi Jinping wished to convey that he is now the leader who is courted by the US, not the other way around. The venue for the all important summit meeting was China not the US, which is a story in itself. Whether the Chair for Trump was a trifle smaller than the one for Xi, is a matter for behavioural scientists, not geopolitical analysts. Finally, it was apparent to all that President Trump sought this meeting more than Xi did. There appears to be an agreement for Xi to reciprocate by visiting US later this year. It will be interesting to see whether Xi will do it as part of a multilateral engagement (G20) or whether it will be a stand-alone visit such as the one by President Trump.

No Joint Statement

Since there was a lot of time to prepare for this summit meeting (after all it was being talked about for weeks, if not months), the absence of a Joint Statement is illustrative of lack of substantive agreement between the two sides on a panoply of issues confronting the world. The summit meeting must therefore be seen for what it is: an attempt by the two sides to manage conflict, ringfence competition and enhance communication, especially between the two militaries to prevent things from spiralling out of control. Viewed this way, several analysts felt it was good the meeting happened at all. In the absence of an agreed Joint Statement, both sides put out their respective readouts. We now turn our attention to this.

The US Readout

As is often the case, the American readout is both specific and elaborate. The Americans have termed it, as is their wont, a “Fact Sheet”. There has been no contradiction of its contents from the Chinese side so far, so we will take them to be facts. The American readout talks of an “agreement” between the two leaders on the following: (1) Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon; (2) Asked for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened while “agreeing” that no country (Iran or Oman) or no organization (Iranian Revolutionary Guard) can charge tolls; and (3) Both leaders “confirmed” their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea. These then are the big geopolitical items in the American readout. Iran, which might consider itself a close ally of China’s, may have reason to be nervous about this language. They will no doubt seek clarifications from their Chinese interlocutors. North Korea will pay little regard to niceties like a readout; in any case, the shared goal to denuclearize Pyongyang has been in the works for years! Few other specific things in the American readout are Chinese purchase of 200 Boeing aircrafts, 17 Billion USD worth of American ag products and restoration of market access for American beef and poultry products. Other best endeavour clauses are: China to address U.S. concerns regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals and address U.S. concerns regarding prohibitions or restrictions on the sale of rare earth production and processing equipment and technologies. In the same vein there is agreement in principle on establishment of two Boards: a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment both of which are G2G mechanisms. No details are provided, so we will have to wait and see how these are fleshed out.

The Chinese Readout

It is interesting that Xi Jinping is said to have asked whether the two countries can avoid the Thucidydes trap and provide a new paradigm for great power relations. This was in sharp contrast to a speech made by Xi in Seattle in September 2015 when he said “there was no such thing as the Thucidydes trap”. Indeed, the Chinese have introduced a new term i.e. “constructive strategic stability” which they will no doubt flesh out in the days and weeks ahead to protect and advance their core interests. In fact, it is interesting that the American readout also mentions “constructive bilateral relations of strategic stability based on fairness and reciprocity”. The additional words, fairness and stability, can be interpreted any which way by the two parties. Xi Jinping has already interpreted the above phrase when he stated categorically to Trump that “Taiwan was the most important issue” in Sino-American ties. If handled properly, the Chinese readout says there could be stability in bilateral ties; if not, it warns of conflict. It is hard to remember the last time the Chinese were as blunt as this in their warning to the Americans. This too is a sign of growing Chinese confidence in their own strength. President Trump gave out mixed messaging on Taiwan. On the one hand, he asked both China and Taiwan to cool it and did not rule out arms transfers to the island nation. On the other hand, he admitted that China is a powerful country and that they were only 59 miles away while the US was 9500 miles away! This is the clearest hint yet that the US may not be inclined to fight a war in a distant land. But Trump also expressed confidence that China will not do anything unilaterally to change the status quo as long as he was in office. On a separate matter, the Chinese really rolled out the red carpet to President Trump, knowing this will please the latter.

Russia

The visit by Russain President Putin to Beijing close on the heels of President Trump was of course a coincidence. But the fact that there was such a detailed Joint Statement agreed to by Xi and Putin does send a signal. As if that were not enough, Xi and Putin signed some 40-odd agreements. There were earlier unsubstantiated reports that Xi said to Trump that Putin may come to regret his invasion of Ukraine. While it seems unlikely that Xi said something similar (this is not the Chinese style of speaking at the summit level), the Putin visit to Beijing makes for interesting optics. Unlike Iran or North Korea, Russia’s utility for China is weightier in terms of its larger geopolitical conflict against the West, but also for its own energy needs. Language in the Joint Statement against Western (read American) hegemony is certainly strong and probably rhetorical. But as the lack of an agreement on “Power of Siberia 2 pipeline” shows, China does call the shots in the relationship, whether or not one agrees that Russia is a junior partner. This has not prevented Putin from claiming that the relationship has reached unprecedentededly high levels.

ASEAN

ASEAN countries led by Singapore generally believe that a detente, albeit temporal, between US and China is excellent news. So, they will, on balance, be happy about the outcome of the summit. But countries like Philippines may have reason to worry about their treaty ally status with the US and what it means if China turns even more aggressive in the South China Sea. On the other hand, China is already the leading trade and investment partner for ASEAN. Expect those ties to become even stronger.

European Union

EU now has a double barelled problem. Its transatlantic relationship is in trouble, symbolised by the existential problem facing NATO and the American response to the war in Ukraine. Equally, its relationship with China is also facing headwinds. And with the US now softening its position vis-a-vis China, the EU may now begin to face some heat from the latter. This will require more unity from EU and more determined trade & investment measures by Brussels, both of which are likely to prove difficult. One possible outcome might be that EU itself may end up softening its tone with regard to China.

India

There is no question that Sino-American ties impact India in its own ties with the US and China. Regarding Indo-American ties, the idea that the US needs India to be a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific has been accepted by many as gospel. If that indeed turns out to be true, then well and good and the status quo can continue. But if not, some recalibration of Indo-US ties are in order. This is no bad thing since the relationship will and should stand eventually on its own merits. Expectations from the relationship will become more realistic. And there are still areas like Tech, Defence and Energy where huge strides are possible. In parallel, India must chart its own pathway for a sustainable and beneficial relationship with China based on three mutuals: mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests. Easier said than done of course.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

While the war in Iran is showing little signs of coming to an end, there are already telltale signs of a shift in the geopolitical landscape. It is too early to tell whether these are enduring trends or a mere blip. But they are worth noting and watching.

The first development is the little noticed fact of Israel helping the UAE in the recent war. The news report is worth quoting in full: “Israel has, for the first time, deployed an Iron Dome air defense system and troops to the United Arab Emirates during the ongoing war with Iran. The move came after the UAE faced over 550 missiles and 2,200 drones from Iran, depleting its interceptor stockpiles. The unprecedented cooperation underscores deepening Israeli-UAE military ties but could spark political sensitivities both domestically and in the Gulf.” Anwar Mohammed Gargash, the respected former Minister for Foreign Affairs from UAE argued that Iran’s actions have fundamentally altered regional perceptions making the latter a long-term strategic threat to Gulf security for decades to come. Gargash went on to add that rebuilding trust with Teheran will take ages. Gargash, who often speaks for the regime, characterised Iran’s strategy of targeting its neighbours as a miscalculation that reflects ” military weakness, moral bankruptcy and political isolation.” Gargash concluded by indicating that Iran’s aggression would drive Gulf states closer to the US and Israel, adding for good measure that even countries without formal ties to Israel might open new communication channels for security cooperation. Indeed, Gargash has called for financial reparations from Iran for damages to civilian infrastructure, unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and measures aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear, missile and drone programs.

The positions taken by Kuwait/Bahrain matter less and it is doubtful whether countries like Qatar and Oman will entirely share Gagarsh’s perspective in full. But it is Saudi Arabia’s views which are worth monitoring in this conflict. The Saudis have appeared more guarded than the Emiratis in their public reaction. Perhaps, the assessment is that the Americans may cut and run and the Saudis will still have to deal with a belligerent Iran. It is true that the Saudis entered into a defence agreement with Pakistan in September of last year well before the Iran war began. But the real question now is whether the Saudis will be more inclined for a rapprochement with Israel, since they are angry with Iran about the attacks on its critical infrastructure.

The Saudis may have been more measured than the Emiratis in their reaction to Iranian action, but they have sought to proactively beef up their defence. In this regard, the defence arrangement arrived at end of March between Saudi Arabia and Ukraine is important. The Ukrainians stated that it lays the foundation for future contracts, technological cooperation, and investment and emphasized, somewhat implausibly, Ukraine’s international role as a security provider!

More crucially, Ukraine has said they are ready to share expertise and systems with Saudi Arabia. Ukraine has also boasted that they are resisting the same kind of terrorist attacks – ballistic missiles and drones – that the Iranian regime is currently carrying out in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Ukraine and the Saudis also discussed the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf region, Russia’s assistance to the Iranian regime, developments in energy markets, and potential energy cooperation. Above all, Ukraine has reportedly signed a $ 400 million aid deal with the Saudis.

Meanwhile, French President Macron may have set the cat among the pigeons when he stated on 24 April in Greece: “We should not underestimate that this is a unique moment where a U.S. president, a Russian president, a Chinese president are dead against the Europeans. So, this is the right moment for us to wake up”. He also added for good measure that he fully expected the tensions with US to outlast President Trump. Macron also went on to add that the mutual defence clause in the EU Treaty i.e. Article 42.7 must be operationalised and went on to contend that this was actually stronger that Article 5 of NATO which deals with collective defence. Macron is of course close to being a lame duck President, but the fact that EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas was to oversee what was called a “tabletop” exercise to establish how the bloc’s mutual assistance clause, Article 42.7, would work in practice, is interesting to say the least. The plan was expected to test the bloc’s political rather than military response. 

China’s position on the war in Iran has been interesting. On the one hand, the US getting embroiled in the war in Iran is excellent news for China. It allows China enormous strategic space to act in Taiwan Strait, South and East China Sea. If nothing else, it allows China ample time to prepare and make its plans. On the other hand, China has an abiding interest in seeing the war end in Iran, if only to ensure its energy security. And it does seem as though the Chinese weighed in on Iran to accept Pak mediation. China has also been vocal, lately, on the need for Strait of hormuz to be open. They also have a few cards up their sleeve in the run-up to the Trump-Xi meeting scheduled to take place mid May.

It is hard to contest the argument that Russia has benefitted from the war in Iran. Oil prices have almost doubled, sanctions on oil sales have been lifted albeit temporarily, the NATO alliance is in deep trouble and frankly, the world has stopped focusing on Ukraine. The visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister after Pakistan and Oman, to Russia is interesting against this backdrop. Iran is said to be seeking closer strategic cooperation with Russia, particularly but not exclusively confined to the nuclear issue.

Does all of the above amount to a reshuffling of the broader geopolitical landscape? May be not irreversibly, but it is hard to deny some shifts are already taking place. EU is de-risking vis-a-vis the US; but they are not the only ones. Some like Saudi Arabia may be doing that too, while others like UAE will come to depend more on the US and even Israel. US-China tensions may be expected to continue, so a G-2 scenario is unrealistic. At the same time, with the EU caught in an existential crisis, the world is struggling to become multipolar anytime soon. For the foreseeable future therefore, the world may be “nonpolar” or “apolar” with US and China merely more preeminent than other powers. That should largely explain the position of a bunch of countries belonging to the global south, which are powerless to stop the war but are naturally inclined to hedge their bets and adopt a wait and watch attitude.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.

In the middle of all the frontline news emanating from the Middle East, there was a small news item tucked away on page 10 of the standard Indian newspaper. It announced, somewhat cryptically, that the Government of India had decided to withdraw its offer to host the international climate meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) in 2028. Also on 25 March, 2026 India submitted its much-delayed NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution), mandated by the Climate Accords of Paris (2015). And to top it all, the shutting down of the Strait of Hormuz has had an impact on the price of a barrel of Brent Crude which has risen from something like $60 before the war i.e. 28 February, 2026 to something like $100, as of this writing. So, what does all this mean for the fight against climate change?

For some time now, the Western countries have been reassessing their climate policies. The US is perhaps the most obvious example; after all, it withdrew (again) from the Paris Climate Accords. But the Trump administration has also rolled back the stringent regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency when it comes to preventing harmful emissions from power plants. The administration thus seeks to dismantle environmental regulations established during the Biden era that imposed strict limits on greenhouse gases and toxic pollutants. In parallel, the US has also offered incentives to major firms with a view to achieving energy independence, regardless of whether they are fossil or not. But the US is not the only Western power to do so. The European Union (EU), often described as the Green Superpower, has also faced serious problems when it comes to maintaining its climate ambition. Through its 2019 Green Deal, the EU was assiduously working towards making its industries more efficient and climate-neutral by 2050. But the plan is currently facing increasing domestic criticism and political pressure. Two central instruments of the Green Deal are the EU supply chain act and companies’ obligations to report on their social and environmental impacts. But the small and medium enterprises belonging to the EU protested against this; they have since been exempted. Only the big companies face obligations, some of it diluted.

The 27 EU member states had also agreed on rules aimed at protecting forests. Products such as tea, coffee, soy and beef were only to be available for sale in the EU if verifiably not linked to deforestation. However, the introduction of the new rules has now been postponed till the end of 2026. In addition, significantly fewer companies will have to prove that their products are manufactured in deforestation-free ways. Agriculture is the other area which contributes to lack of sustainability but which is politically sensitive in EU. Here too, politicians are increasingly giving in. In 2023 and 2024, farmers protesting stricter rules around the use of pesticides led to them not being adopted. Elsewhere, the EU decision to stop the production of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles within the bloc from 2035 could be history even before the law enters into force. The German government has voiced strong opposition to the deadline and the country’s car industry has been steadfast in opposing the decision. Now, the EU has officially decided to review the end of the internal combustion engine, leaving a question mark over whether a ban will ever come into force.

China’s case is curious. It stands at a critical juncture where emissions have started to level off, thanks to clean energy meeting all of the electricity demand increase, but there is still a large pipeline of coal power projects looming and limited progress in industrial decarbonisation. In other words, while China burns more coal than the rest of the world put together, it is also true that they outspend the rest of the world on renewable energy. The 15th five-year plan announced recently sees China walking back earlier commitments to gradually reduce coal consumption and power sector emissions. It has thus set a less strict carbon intensity target than for the previous five years, allowing emissions to increase over the five-year period. This is despte the fact that it is now by far the largest Greenhouse Gas Emitter on this planet.

India, after some delay, announced its NDC as mandated under the Paris Climate Accords. The main features are given below:

• India’s updated NDC sets the following goals:
  • 60% of installed electric capacity from non-fossil sources by 2035
  • 47% reduction in emissions intensity of GDP (from 2005 levels)
  • Carbon sink of 3.5–4 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent
•  India’s earlier NDC, submitted in August 2022, included:
  • 50% non-fossil installed capacity by 2030
  • 45% reduction in emissions intensity
  • Carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes CO₂ equivalent

It may be immediately seen from our NDC above that while it is realistic and achievable, it is far from being overly ambitious. The reasons for this are not far to seek. India’s climate policy and its NDC were never unconditional. They were always contingent on two things: one, on the extent of climate finance available including from external sources and two, on the need for protecting the basic right to development of the millions of its poor citizens. With the developed countries themselves slackening in their fight against climate change, there is no real pressure on India to put up ambitious climate targets. And the war in the Middle East is not helping matters for countries like India in the global south. Small wonder then that India also took the decision quietly to withdraw its offer to host the COP meeting in 2028. With the last few COP meetings turning acrimonious and India sometimes unjustifiably being cast as the villain, it is not worth India’s while to take it upon itself to organize a COP meeting where consensus-making may prove a himalayan task.

It would seem clear that Federal Governments, whether in the developed or developing world, are prone to reneging on their climate commitments. It is thus left to local/municipal governments, non-governmental organizations and climate activists to continue the valiant fight against climate change. Paris in 2015, I still remember vividly, was a time of hope and promise in the global fight against climate change. How things have changed in a matter of ten years!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was held in Yaounde (capital city of Cameroon) from 26 to 30 March 2026. At a minimum, any Ministerial Conference ought to end with a Joint Declaration, even if anodyne and boilerplate. The above conference, however, ended with no declaration at all. Worse, in a throwback to the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999, some key trade Ministers departed and caught their flights back home even before the conference formally ended. The only thing to show for the four-day meeting was closing statements by the host Cameroonian Trade Minister and by the Director General of the WTO. In the WTO, more than other multilateral institutions, such statements have zero legal validity. In any case, both of them admitted no decisions could be arrived at by Ministers in Yaounde. The negotiating can has thus been kicked back by the Ministers to the trade negotiators in Geneva. This is disingenuous, since Geneva-based negotiators do not have the kind of plenipotentiary powers that Ministers possess. If Ministers could not resolve issues, it is scarcely possible that Geneva-based negotiators will deliver.

This is not the first time a WTO Ministerial Conference has failed in spectacular fashion. There was Seattle (1999) as pointed out earlier, but also a couple of others in Cancun (2003) and Buenos Aires (2017). But this one comes at a bad time for the WTO as an institution and for international trade, more broadly. With conflicts raging in Ukraine and Iran, the last thing the global economy needs is a crisis afflicting the multilateral trading system. But we live in dystopian times.

It may be worth recalling that the WTO has three basic functions: negotiating function, dispute settlement function and trade monitoring function. The problem is that all three departments of the WTO are now in serious crisis.

The WTO was supposed to be the most important negotiating forum for international trade. But since its establishment in 1995, it has basically come up with just two multilateral agreements i.e. one on trade facilitation and one on fisheries subsidies (albeit partial). Everyone agrees that the WTO must do two things: update existing rules in areas like Agriculture and come up with rules for new areas such as e-commerce or investment. The problem is that while some countries are more interested in the former, other countries are more focused on the latter. Crucially, decision-making in the WTO is on the basis of consensus which means each and every one of the 166 Members must agree on launching, conducting and concluding the negotiations. Up until the Doha Round of negotiations, the principle followed was known as “single undertaking” which meant that every Member had to agree with everything on the table. This had at least one advantage: every Member had something to gain from the negotiations. However, single undertaking has since been abandoned by the WTO, mainly because there is no agreement on launching a new “Round” after the dramatic failure to implement the Doha Round.

A large number of WTO Members are in favour of what is called plurilateral agreements, that is agreements among those who are willing and not necessarily among all WTO members. But a handful of countries led by India oppose this on technical and legal grounds. Areas where there have been plurilateral negotiations are, inter alia, electronic commerce and investment facilitation. India nevertheless opposed the move in Cameroon to include these kind of agreements in the WTO. Though India’s arguments are valid from a strictly legal point of view, it is a fact that a large number of countries from the global north and the global south are in favour of including such agreements within the WTO framework. This is particularly true of the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, where the plurilateral outcome is supported by 129 WTO Members, which is over three quarters of the total WTO membership. These countries went ahead and issued a Joint Declaration at the end of the Ministerial Conference in Yaounde highlighting the unprecedented political support for the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, expanded participation, and overwhelming backing for its incorporation into the WTO rulebook. Encouraged by the strong recognition of the Agreement’s development benefits, the 129 Members parties stated in Cameroon that they will continue to explore practical pathways for its effective implementation.

On the second function which is dispute settlement, it is well known that the US has been blocking for sometime the appointment of experts to the Appellate Body. This has rendered the famed dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO impotent. India, in its statement, raised this issue with concern. So did others. But nothing much may come out of it. With the US pursuing Section 301 cases against many of its trading partners, it has no conceivable incentive to enter into negotiations in this area.

One issue has been a constant in many WTO Ministerial meetings of the recent past. That is the question of whether or not a moratorium to impose customs duty on electronic transmissions should be extended for limited periods of time. Normally it has been extended for a period of two years or so. This time around, the US came up with a firm demand i.e. an indefinite and permanent extension of the said moratorium. The US tech companies obviously do not want governments to impose customs duties on things like e-books, streaming of music and movies. Developing countries like India wish to preserve this possibility, howsoever remote, as part of what is known as “policy space”. As a compromise, a four plus one year period of moratorium was agreed to in the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cameroon, only to be vehemently objected to by Brazil at the last minute unless negotiations in Agriculture (always a hot button issue in WTO and of interest to Brazil) was also agreed to by all WTO Members. This is the point at which the WTO Ministerial Conference collapsed in Cameroon. The official blame for the collapse of the Ministerial Conference has thus fallen on US and Brazil. India may have emerged unscathed for now in Cameroon, but the same issues can be expected to crop up again in Geneva.

The customs duty moratorium on electronic transmissions has always been linked to yet another issue: a moratorium on non-violation cases in TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. This is a highly complex and technical issue. Simply put, it means that you can actually be taken to court even if you do not violate the TRIPS Agreement per se, but if your actions otherwise cause nullification or impairment of expected benefits to the other party. Because the customs duty moratorium on electronic transmissions has now expired, so has the moratorium on non-violation cases in TRIPS. The latter has the potential to present problems for India.

To conclude, it is perhaps time for India to answer some basic questions about WTO and its trade policy:

> Does India wish to resurrect the WTO and if so, is it willing to spend the requisite political capital to achieve it?

>What kind of WTO does India want eventually? If a truly multilateral institution is out of reach, can India settle for one which is plurilateral, but with some guardrails?

>The time has come for India to take a view on both the Electronic Commerce Agreement and the Investment Facitiation for Development Agreement. How long can India be seen as opposing the overwhelming will of the WTO membership?

>US (and indirectly EU and China) have served notice of their intention to move away from MFN (Most Favoured Nation) which has hitherto been the bedrock of the multilateral trading system. How should India react to and cope with this momentous development?

>The issue of Special & Differential Treatment has been called into question and is on the table for negotiations. How should India approach this important issue?

>India, depending on the answer to the questions above, must also start looking at mega trade agreements like CPTPP ( Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). This will complement the series of FTAs we have signed recently.

All in all, Indian trade policy is at a crossroads. It must conduct a comprehensive reassessment of its trade policy and make the necessary adjustments without delay.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and a former Indian negotiator to the GATT and WTO. Views are personal.

As they do every year with unfailing and at times monotonous regularity, the office of the US Director of National Intelligence has published the “Annual Threat Assessment” for 2026 with information collected till 14 March, 2026.

The unclassified version of the report claims to reflect the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests around the world. The assessment supposedly focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the US during the next year. All the threats, the report asserts, require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near-term focus may help head off greater threats in the future. The main threats delineated in the report are summarised below.

Structure: In terms of structure, the current report differs from the one issued last year by the Biden administration. Last year, the threats were largely assigned to non-state actors in the Western Hemisphere and then a list of state actors led by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. CRINK, which is the acronym for these countries, also featured under the rubric adversarial cooperation of last year’s report. In contrast, the latest report, in addition to the threats in the Western Hemisphere, includes hot button issues such as threats emanating from AI, Quantum Computing, Cyber, WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and then looks at threats posed region-wise: Asia, Eurasia, Middle East and Africa.

Foreign Illicit Drug Actors: Unsurprisingly, Mexican and Colombian Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) get special mention in terms of the threat they pose. Venezuelan and Haitian gangs also find mention. India is mentioned only once: The report says while there has been noticeable improvement, China and India remain the primary source countries for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing equipment. It adds however that in January 2026, Prime Minister Modi and other Indian officials signaled a willingness to deepen engagement with the U.S. on counternarcotics. Unlike last year, migration figures in the report as a serious threat along with terrorism originating from ISIS and Al Qaida.

Homeland Defense: In a clear departure from past reports the assessment in 2026 states clearly that: The U.S.’s secure nuclear deterrent capability continues to ensure safety at home. However, the report asserts that China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan (emphasis mine) have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads, that can strike the Homeland. The report projects threats to the Homeland will expand to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035, from the current figure of more than 3,000 missiles. Interestingly, the report argues that Chinese officials probably fear that the Golden Dome for America will reduce Washington’s threshold for initiating military action against Beijing in a crisis, which may drive China to focus on using international arms control discussions.

Arctic: Arctic finds mention for the first time. The report says the following: Russia has the largest Arctic coastline and views itself as part of the neighborhood. Russia is America’s primary challenge in the Arctic as it aims to further its interests in the region as part of broader global balance-of-power competition. Moscow is seeking to expand and deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and
military activity. In addition to its own domestic economic and security concerns, this activity is aimed at countering a perceived growing US emphasis on expanding its influence and presence in the Arctic as a key national security strategic objective. As a non-Arctic country, China is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its strategic and economic interests primarily via its relationship with Russia, and Beijing has signaled its intent to grow its presence when international waters are accessible.

China: The report does not believe China will seek reunification with Taiwan by force in 2026. It nonetheless believes that Beijing will continue seeking to set the conditions for eventual unification with Taiwan short of conflict. China, despite its threat to use force to compel unification if necessary and to counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine China’s rise, prefers to achieve unification without the use of force, according to the report. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to develop military plans and capabilities for attempting to achieve unification using military force if directed to do so in the future. On South China Sea, the report is unambiguous. It asserts that China seeks to advance political and military control of its claimed territory in the South China Sea. During the past year, China has advanced its control over disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea, particularly at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, through persistent military and coast guard patrols and diplomatic and legal actions. There is a reference to China-Japan ties. China–Japan tensions increased significantly, according to the report, following comments made by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi describing a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as a “survival threatening situation” for Japan.

South Asia: On Indo-Pak ties, the report is worth quoting in full. “During the past year, South Asia remained a source of enduring security challenges for the U.S. India–Pakistan relations remain a risk for nuclear conflict given past conflicts where these two nuclear states squared off, creating the danger of escalation. The terrorist attack last year near Pahalgam, in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, demonstrated the dangers of
terrorist attacks sparking conflict. President Trump’s intervention deescalated the most recent nuclear tensions, and we assess that neither country seeks to return to open conflict, but that conditions exist for terrorist actors to continue to create catalysts for crises.” The report goes on to add that Pakistan continues to develop increasingly sophisticated missile technology that provides its military the means to develop missile systems with the capability to strike targets beyond South Asia, and if these trends continue, it could possess ICBMs that would threaten the US. This characterisation of Pakistan is new.

Eurasia: The report asserts that Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military and nonmilitary means. Its robust, advanced conventional and nuclear forces are an enduring threat to the Homeland, U.S. allies and partners, and U.S. forces abroad. The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges. Russia has also cultivated partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to further its objectives.

Interestingly, the report argues that Russia’s aspirations for multipolarity could allow for selective collaboration with the U.S. if Moscow’s threat perceptions regarding Washington were to diminish. On the conflict in Ukraine, the report states the obvious that Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine and sees little reason to stop fighting so long as its forces continue to gain ground. Moscow almost certainly remains confident that it will prevail on the battlefield in Ukraine and force a settlement on its terms. However, U.S. efforts to forge peace hold the potential to change this dynamic and ameliorate some of the conflict’s regional effects. Crucially, the report concludes that a durable settlement to the war in Ukraine could open the door for a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations and an improved bilateral geostrategic and commercial relationship. Could this be the line of reasoning that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are taking in negotiations with Kirill Dimitriev in the context of finding an end to the conflict in Ukraine?

Middle East: The report endorses “Operation Epic Fury” and says it almost certainly has curtailed Iran’s ability to project power, but admits that Iran is using all of its remaining capabilities—including advanced ballistic missiles, UAVs, and the Axis of Resistance—to retaliate against the US and its allies in the hope of bringing the conflict to a close. Even before the conflict, Iran’s strategic position was significantly degraded by setbacks in the region and its failure to resolve domestic frustrations. Ominously, the report warns that if the regime survives, Tehran almost certainly will seek to exact revenge for the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the report admits it still maintains its long-term strategic intent to avenge the death of former IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani by targeting current and former U.S. officials.

Conclusion: The report is along expected lines and apart from a couple of points it makes on Pakistan and on potential for cooperation with Russia, it is probably par for the course. It is however clear that the report has gradually turned into an advisory, more than a report containing specific recommendations. The US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, probably put it accurately when she said, in the context of threats posed by Iran, that her department can only provide intelligence inputs to the President who then has the last word on whether something constitutes a threat, imminent or not!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Two big wars have occurred in this decade. First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which is still wreaking havoc. Second, the ongoing US-Israel war against Iran which has unleashed a wider war in the Middle East. The purpose of this blog is not to discuss the merits and demerits of the two wars. There is enough commentary on that already. Instead, the idea is to look at the dynamics of warfare, based on these two conflicts. It would be no exaggeration to say that warfare is changing in significant ways.

The most important legal implication though is for Article 51 of the UN Charter which says: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” By this token, India’s “Operation Sindoor” may be justified since a terrorist attack did occur in Pehalgam and India’s actions may be construed as self-defence. But in both the other conflicts referred to above, the case becomes much more tenuous. The fact of the matter is that in the case of both impending attacks and especially potential attacks involving nuclear weapons, the State at the receiving end cannot be expected to wait for an armed attack to take place and then exercise its right of self defence. The challenge therefore is to assess credible and tangible security threats faced by a State and then determining its right to self-defence. The sooner the international community gets around this issue, the better. Otherwise, we will continue to have a situation where the UN Charter is honoured more in breach than in observance.

The use of airpower seems cardinal in the evolving dynamics of warfare. The idea that invasion takes place on the land border with tanks rolling backed by shells and artillery conjures up an image of the famous movie “Patton”. This may have been how the war in Ukraine started, but since then it is airfare which has determined the course of the conflict. With the conflict in Iran, this is even more the case, what with airpower dominating the narrative.

The story of missiles and drones in these conflicts is worth noting. First, the difference. Drones and missiles are both unmanned aerial vehicles used for military purposes, but they have distinct differences. Drones are typically smaller, more maneuverable, and can be controlled remotely by a human operator. They are often used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes. Missiles, on the other hand, are larger, faster, and are usually launched from a stationary platform or aircraft. They are designed to deliver a payload to a specific target with precision and are often used for long-range attacks. Overall, drones offer more flexibility and versatility in their operations, while missiles are more specialized in their capabilities.

Now about the cost of waging warfare. The cost of missiles varies hugely from one to another. For instance, an Akash missile costs Rs 2 Crores (210,000 USD) each. Brahmos on the other hand costs Rs 34 Crores (3.7 million USD). The S 400 missile system which is versatile engages 36 targets at once and carries some 100-odd missiles. The cost of a single S 400 missile system is a whopping Rs 35,000 crores (3.81 billion USD), with each missile in it costing apprximately Rs 8 crores (870,000 USD). The costliest missile is arguably the Trident missile from the United States with a staggering cost of 90 million USD each. This ballistic missile is launched from submarines and is recognized as the most advanced of its kind in the U.S. arsenal. To prevent these missiles from reaching their targets, missile interceptors are used. Missile interceptors (as opposed to drone interceptors which is dealt with below) are expensive. For instance a patriot missile interceptor costs 4 million USD, a THAAD interceptor costs up to 15 million USD, SM interceptor costs a whopping 20 million USD! This is referred to among military analysts as “missile math” and is a subject of much discussion since huge finances are at stake.

Enter cheap drones into the picture. In fact the famous Iranian Shahed drone costs just 30,000 USD. About 11 feet long, they emit a loud buzz and carry explosives in the nose, detonating on impact. Compact enough to be launched from trucks, they are easy to conceal and difficult to track.The longer-range Shahed-136 variant can travel roughly 2,500 km, enabling strikes across much of the Middle East. To counter them, the US has sometimes used multimillion dollar missile interceptors. The Patriot missile defence system — widely considered a benchmark in air defence — relies on interceptors that can cost more than 3 million USD per launch and are produced in limited numbers. In 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 interceptors, a record output for the company. The US military has deployed alternative counter-drone technologies aimed at reducing costs. Raytheon’s Coyote system, which uses drones to hunt and destroy other drones, carries an estimated price tag of about 126,500 USD per interceptor, according to a report from the Center for a New American Security. Though far less expensive than a PAC-3 missile, it still costs four or five times more than a Shahed drone.

The war in Ukraine has thrown up interesting possibilities. Ukraine has massive experience dealing with Shahed drones used by Russia, and has mass produced cheap drone interceptors. Ukraine has reportedly dispatched drone interceptors and military personnel to Jordan as Middle Eastern countries fend off Iranian strikes on infrastructure and United States military assets during the current US-Israel war on Tehran. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that a Ukrainian team departed recently for Jordan, which has US military assets at its Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. The move followed a request from the US, President Zelenskyy said, as Washington seeks cheaper technology for intercepting Iranian missiles targeting Israeli and US defence assets as well as other infrastructure across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ukrainians have been fighting against Shahed drones  for years now, and no other country in the world is said to have this kind of experience. “We are ready to help,” Zelenskyy wrote on X recently, adding that Ukraine has asked for advanced US defence systems, such as the Patriot system, in exchange.

If there was a major lesson for India from Operation Sindoor, it was the need to upgrade its drone power—both in terms of a strike force and in defending itself against enemy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In fact, battlefields have been transformed by drones, which are now indispensable for ISR (Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance) through medium/ high altitude drones, or for precise strike missions through battlefield support UAVs armed with bombs and missiles. During the brief and sharp conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, another form of attack drones gained prominence. Known as loitering munitions or fire-and-forget ‘kamikaze’ UAVs, these are armed with warheads that ‘loiter’ over an area before identifying and swooping down on targets—often used in ‘swarms’ to overwhelm air defences and pulverise enemy assets. The high level of integration of these range of drones in modern warfare is now essential to ensure the success of the Indian armed forces. While India acquitted itself well with the limited range but highly precise, expensive and powerful drones, apart from successfully carrying out a range of counter measures to destroy incoming cheap Turkish- and Chinese-made Pakistani UAVs, experts believe that there is need for an urgent review of the country’s drone warfare capability which was lacking on several fronts. India can’t depend only on expensive platforms. India should fast-track induction of low-cost drones and loitering munitions for mass deployment, build domestic production lines, adapt air-defence and electronic warfare to counter saturation attacks and develop tactics for combined use of high-end and expendable drones. Israel’s Iron Beam drone interceptor is a game-changing system with an operational cost of only 2 to 3.5 USD per shot, providing a great alternative to missile-based defence. Small wonder then that India is in advanced negotiations with Israel to acquire the Iron Beam laser-based interception system to strenthen its air defence.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.