In the middle of all the frontline news emanating from the Middle East, there was a small news item tucked away on page 10 of the standard Indian newspaper. It announced, somewhat cryptically, that the Government of India had decided to withdraw its offer to host the international climate meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) in 2028. Also on 25 March, 2026 India submitted its much-delayed NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution), mandated by the Climate Accords of Paris (2015). And to top it all, the shutting down of the Strait of Hormuz has had an impact on the price of a barrel of Brent Crude which has risen from something like $60 before the war i.e. 28 February, 2026 to something like $100, as of this writing. So, what does all this mean for the fight against climate change?

For some time now, the Western countries have been reassessing their climate policies. The US is perhaps the most obvious example; after all, it withdrew (again) from the Paris Climate Accords. But the Trump administration has also rolled back the stringent regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency when it comes to preventing harmful emissions from power plants. The administration thus seeks to dismantle environmental regulations established during the Biden era that imposed strict limits on greenhouse gases and toxic pollutants. In parallel, the US has also offered incentives to major firms with a view to achieving energy independence, regardless of whether they are fossil or not. But the US is not the only Western power to do so. The European Union (EU), often described as the Green Superpower, has also faced serious problems when it comes to maintaining its climate ambition. Through its 2019 Green Deal, the EU was assiduously working towards making its industries more efficient and climate-neutral by 2050. But the plan is currently facing increasing domestic criticism and political pressure. Two central instruments of the Green Deal are the EU supply chain act and companies’ obligations to report on their social and environmental impacts. But the small and medium enterprises belonging to the EU protested against this; they have since been exempted. Only the big companies face obligations, some of it diluted.

The 27 EU member states had also agreed on rules aimed at protecting forests. Products such as tea, coffee, soy and beef were only to be available for sale in the EU if verifiably not linked to deforestation. However, the introduction of the new rules has now been postponed till the end of 2026. In addition, significantly fewer companies will have to prove that their products are manufactured in deforestation-free ways. Agriculture is the other area which contributes to lack of sustainability but which is politically sensitive in EU. Here too, politicians are increasingly giving in. In 2023 and 2024, farmers protesting stricter rules around the use of pesticides led to them not being adopted. Elsewhere, the EU decision to stop the production of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles within the bloc from 2035 could be history even before the law enters into force. The German government has voiced strong opposition to the deadline and the country’s car industry has been steadfast in opposing the decision. Now, the EU has officially decided to review the end of the internal combustion engine, leaving a question mark over whether a ban will ever come into force.

China’s case is curious. It stands at a critical juncture where emissions have started to level off, thanks to clean energy meeting all of the electricity demand increase, but there is still a large pipeline of coal power projects looming and limited progress in industrial decarbonisation. In other words, while China burns more coal than the rest of the world put together, it is also true that they outspend the rest of the world on renewable energy. The 15th five-year plan announced recently sees China walking back earlier commitments to gradually reduce coal consumption and power sector emissions. It has thus set a less strict carbon intensity target than for the previous five years, allowing emissions to increase over the five-year period. This is despte the fact that it is now by far the largest Greenhouse Gas Emitter on this planet.

India, after some delay, announced its NDC as mandated under the Paris Climate Accords. The main features are given below:

• India’s updated NDC sets the following goals:
  • 60% of installed electric capacity from non-fossil sources by 2035
  • 47% reduction in emissions intensity of GDP (from 2005 levels)
  • Carbon sink of 3.5–4 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent
•  India’s earlier NDC, submitted in August 2022, included:
  • 50% non-fossil installed capacity by 2030
  • 45% reduction in emissions intensity
  • Carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes CO₂ equivalent

It may be immediately seen from our NDC above that while it is realistic and achievable, it is far from being overly ambitious. The reasons for this are not far to seek. India’s climate policy and its NDC were never unconditional. They were always contingent on two things: one, on the extent of climate finance available including from external sources and two, on the need for protecting the basic right to development of the millions of its poor citizens. With the developed countries themselves slackening in their fight against climate change, there is no real pressure on India to put up ambitious climate targets. And the war in the Middle East is not helping matters for countries like India in the global south. Small wonder then that India also took the decision quietly to withdraw its offer to host the COP meeting in 2028. With the last few COP meetings turning acrimonious and India sometimes unjustifiably being cast as the villain, it is not worth India’s while to take it upon itself to organize a COP meeting where consensus-making may prove a himalayan task.

It would seem clear that Federal Governments, whether in the developed or developing world, are prone to reneging on their climate commitments. It is thus left to local/municipal governments, non-governmental organizations and climate activists to continue the valiant fight against climate change. Paris in 2015, I still remember vividly, was a time of hope and promise in the global fight against climate change. How things have changed in a matter of ten years!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The fourteenth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was held in Yaounde (capital city of Cameroon) from 26 to 30 March 2026. At a minimum, any Ministerial Conference ought to end with a Joint Declaration, even if anodyne and boilerplate. The above conference, however, ended with no declaration at all. Worse, in a throwback to the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999, some key trade Ministers departed and caught their flights back home even before the conference formally ended. The only thing to show for the four-day meeting was closing statements by the host Cameroonian Trade Minister and by the Director General of the WTO. In the WTO, more than other multilateral institutions, such statements have zero legal validity. In any case, both of them admitted no decisions could be arrived at by Ministers in Yaounde. The negotiating can has thus been kicked back by the Ministers to the trade negotiators in Geneva. This is disingenuous, since Geneva-based negotiators do not have the kind of plenipotentiary powers that Ministers possess. If Ministers could not resolve issues, it is scarcely possible that Geneva-based negotiators will deliver.

This is not the first time a WTO Ministerial Conference has failed in spectacular fashion. There was Seattle (1999) as pointed out earlier, but also a couple of others in Cancun (2003) and Buenos Aires (2017). But this one comes at a bad time for the WTO as an institution and for international trade, more broadly. With conflicts raging in Ukraine and Iran, the last thing the global economy needs is a crisis afflicting the multilateral trading system. But we live in dystopian times.

It may be worth recalling that the WTO has three basic functions: negotiating function, dispute settlement function and trade monitoring function. The problem is that all three departments of the WTO are now in serious crisis.

The WTO was supposed to be the most important negotiating forum for international trade. But since its establishment in 1995, it has basically come up with just two multilateral agreements i.e. one on trade facilitation and one on fisheries subsidies (albeit partial). Everyone agrees that the WTO must do two things: update existing rules in areas like Agriculture and come up with rules for new areas such as e-commerce or investment. The problem is that while some countries are more interested in the former, other countries are more focused on the latter. Crucially, decision-making in the WTO is on the basis of consensus which means each and every one of the 166 Members must agree on launching, conducting and concluding the negotiations. Up until the Doha Round of negotiations, the principle followed was known as “single undertaking” which meant that every Member had to agree with everything on the table. This had at least one advantage: every Member had something to gain from the negotiations. However, single undertaking has since been abandoned by the WTO, mainly because there is no agreement on launching a new “Round” after the dramatic failure to implement the Doha Round.

A large number of WTO Members are in favour of what is called plurilateral agreements, that is agreements among those who are willing and not necessarily among all WTO members. But a handful of countries led by India oppose this on technical and legal grounds. Areas where there have been plurilateral negotiations are, inter alia, electronic commerce and investment facilitation. India nevertheless opposed the move in Cameroon to include these kind of agreements in the WTO. Though India’s arguments are valid from a strictly legal point of view, it is a fact that a large number of countries from the global north and the global south are in favour of including such agreements within the WTO framework. This is particularly true of the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, where the plurilateral outcome is supported by 129 WTO Members, which is over three quarters of the total WTO membership. These countries went ahead and issued a Joint Declaration at the end of the Ministerial Conference in Yaounde highlighting the unprecedented political support for the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, expanded participation, and overwhelming backing for its incorporation into the WTO rulebook. Encouraged by the strong recognition of the Agreement’s development benefits, the 129 Members parties stated in Cameroon that they will continue to explore practical pathways for its effective implementation.

On the second function which is dispute settlement, it is well known that the US has been blocking for sometime the appointment of experts to the Appellate Body. This has rendered the famed dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO impotent. India, in its statement, raised this issue with concern. So did others. But nothing much may come out of it. With the US pursuing Section 301 cases against many of its trading partners, it has no conceivable incentive to enter into negotiations in this area.

One issue has been a constant in many WTO Ministerial meetings of the recent past. That is the question of whether or not a moratorium to impose customs duty on electronic transmissions should be extended for limited periods of time. Normally it has been extended for a period of two years or so. This time around, the US came up with a firm demand i.e. an indefinite and permanent extension of the said moratorium. The US tech companies obviously do not want governments to impose customs duties on things like e-books, streaming of music and movies. Developing countries like India wish to preserve this possibility, howsoever remote, as part of what is known as “policy space”. As a compromise, a four plus one year period of moratorium was agreed to in the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cameroon, only to be vehemently objected to by Brazil at the last minute unless negotiations in Agriculture (always a hot button issue in WTO and of interest to Brazil) was also agreed to by all WTO Members. This is the point at which the WTO Ministerial Conference collapsed in Cameroon. The official blame for the collapse of the Ministerial Conference has thus fallen on US and Brazil. India may have emerged unscathed for now in Cameroon, but the same issues can be expected to crop up again in Geneva.

The customs duty moratorium on electronic transmissions has always been linked to yet another issue: a moratorium on non-violation cases in TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. This is a highly complex and technical issue. Simply put, it means that you can actually be taken to court even if you do not violate the TRIPS Agreement per se, but if your actions otherwise cause nullification or impairment of expected benefits to the other party. Because the customs duty moratorium on electronic transmissions has now expired, so has the moratorium on non-violation cases in TRIPS. The latter has the potential to present problems for India.

To conclude, it is perhaps time for India to answer some basic questions about WTO and its trade policy:

> Does India wish to resurrect the WTO and if so, is it willing to spend the requisite political capital to achieve it?

>What kind of WTO does India want eventually? If a truly multilateral institution is out of reach, can India settle for one which is plurilateral, but with some guardrails?

>The time has come for India to take a view on both the Electronic Commerce Agreement and the Investment Facitiation for Development Agreement. How long can India be seen as opposing the overwhelming will of the WTO membership?

>US (and indirectly EU and China) have served notice of their intention to move away from MFN (Most Favoured Nation) which has hitherto been the bedrock of the multilateral trading system. How should India react to and cope with this momentous development?

>The issue of Special & Differential Treatment has been called into question and is on the table for negotiations. How should India approach this important issue?

>India, depending on the answer to the questions above, must also start looking at mega trade agreements like CPTPP ( Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). This will complement the series of FTAs we have signed recently.

All in all, Indian trade policy is at a crossroads. It must conduct a comprehensive reassessment of its trade policy and make the necessary adjustments without delay.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and a former Indian negotiator to the GATT and WTO. Views are personal.

As they do every year with unfailing and at times monotonous regularity, the office of the US Director of National Intelligence has published the “Annual Threat Assessment” for 2026 with information collected till 14 March, 2026.

The unclassified version of the report claims to reflect the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests around the world. The assessment supposedly focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the US during the next year. All the threats, the report asserts, require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near-term focus may help head off greater threats in the future. The main threats delineated in the report are summarised below.

Structure: In terms of structure, the current report differs from the one issued last year by the Biden administration. Last year, the threats were largely assigned to non-state actors in the Western Hemisphere and then a list of state actors led by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. CRINK, which is the acronym for these countries, also featured under the rubric adversarial cooperation of last year’s report. In contrast, the latest report, in addition to the threats in the Western Hemisphere, includes hot button issues such as threats emanating from AI, Quantum Computing, Cyber, WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and then looks at threats posed region-wise: Asia, Eurasia, Middle East and Africa.

Foreign Illicit Drug Actors: Unsurprisingly, Mexican and Colombian Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) get special mention in terms of the threat they pose. Venezuelan and Haitian gangs also find mention. India is mentioned only once: The report says while there has been noticeable improvement, China and India remain the primary source countries for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing equipment. It adds however that in January 2026, Prime Minister Modi and other Indian officials signaled a willingness to deepen engagement with the U.S. on counternarcotics. Unlike last year, migration figures in the report as a serious threat along with terrorism originating from ISIS and Al Qaida.

Homeland Defense: In a clear departure from past reports the assessment in 2026 states clearly that: The U.S.’s secure nuclear deterrent capability continues to ensure safety at home. However, the report asserts that China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan (emphasis mine) have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads, that can strike the Homeland. The report projects threats to the Homeland will expand to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035, from the current figure of more than 3,000 missiles. Interestingly, the report argues that Chinese officials probably fear that the Golden Dome for America will reduce Washington’s threshold for initiating military action against Beijing in a crisis, which may drive China to focus on using international arms control discussions.

Arctic: Arctic finds mention for the first time. The report says the following: Russia has the largest Arctic coastline and views itself as part of the neighborhood. Russia is America’s primary challenge in the Arctic as it aims to further its interests in the region as part of broader global balance-of-power competition. Moscow is seeking to expand and deepen its presence in the Arctic through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and
military activity. In addition to its own domestic economic and security concerns, this activity is aimed at countering a perceived growing US emphasis on expanding its influence and presence in the Arctic as a key national security strategic objective. As a non-Arctic country, China is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its strategic and economic interests primarily via its relationship with Russia, and Beijing has signaled its intent to grow its presence when international waters are accessible.

China: The report does not believe China will seek reunification with Taiwan by force in 2026. It nonetheless believes that Beijing will continue seeking to set the conditions for eventual unification with Taiwan short of conflict. China, despite its threat to use force to compel unification if necessary and to counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine China’s rise, prefers to achieve unification without the use of force, according to the report. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to develop military plans and capabilities for attempting to achieve unification using military force if directed to do so in the future. On South China Sea, the report is unambiguous. It asserts that China seeks to advance political and military control of its claimed territory in the South China Sea. During the past year, China has advanced its control over disputed maritime territory in the South China Sea, particularly at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, through persistent military and coast guard patrols and diplomatic and legal actions. There is a reference to China-Japan ties. China–Japan tensions increased significantly, according to the report, following comments made by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi describing a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as a “survival threatening situation” for Japan.

South Asia: On Indo-Pak ties, the report is worth quoting in full. “During the past year, South Asia remained a source of enduring security challenges for the U.S. India–Pakistan relations remain a risk for nuclear conflict given past conflicts where these two nuclear states squared off, creating the danger of escalation. The terrorist attack last year near Pahalgam, in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, demonstrated the dangers of
terrorist attacks sparking conflict. President Trump’s intervention deescalated the most recent nuclear tensions, and we assess that neither country seeks to return to open conflict, but that conditions exist for terrorist actors to continue to create catalysts for crises.” The report goes on to add that Pakistan continues to develop increasingly sophisticated missile technology that provides its military the means to develop missile systems with the capability to strike targets beyond South Asia, and if these trends continue, it could possess ICBMs that would threaten the US. This characterisation of Pakistan is new.

Eurasia: The report asserts that Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally by military and nonmilitary means. Its robust, advanced conventional and nuclear forces are an enduring threat to the Homeland, U.S. allies and partners, and U.S. forces abroad. The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including nuclear exchanges. Russia has also cultivated partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to further its objectives.

Interestingly, the report argues that Russia’s aspirations for multipolarity could allow for selective collaboration with the U.S. if Moscow’s threat perceptions regarding Washington were to diminish. On the conflict in Ukraine, the report states the obvious that Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine and sees little reason to stop fighting so long as its forces continue to gain ground. Moscow almost certainly remains confident that it will prevail on the battlefield in Ukraine and force a settlement on its terms. However, U.S. efforts to forge peace hold the potential to change this dynamic and ameliorate some of the conflict’s regional effects. Crucially, the report concludes that a durable settlement to the war in Ukraine could open the door for a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations and an improved bilateral geostrategic and commercial relationship. Could this be the line of reasoning that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are taking in negotiations with Kirill Dimitriev in the context of finding an end to the conflict in Ukraine?

Middle East: The report endorses “Operation Epic Fury” and says it almost certainly has curtailed Iran’s ability to project power, but admits that Iran is using all of its remaining capabilities—including advanced ballistic missiles, UAVs, and the Axis of Resistance—to retaliate against the US and its allies in the hope of bringing the conflict to a close. Even before the conflict, Iran’s strategic position was significantly degraded by setbacks in the region and its failure to resolve domestic frustrations. Ominously, the report warns that if the regime survives, Tehran almost certainly will seek to exact revenge for the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the report admits it still maintains its long-term strategic intent to avenge the death of former IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani by targeting current and former U.S. officials.

Conclusion: The report is along expected lines and apart from a couple of points it makes on Pakistan and on potential for cooperation with Russia, it is probably par for the course. It is however clear that the report has gradually turned into an advisory, more than a report containing specific recommendations. The US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, probably put it accurately when she said, in the context of threats posed by Iran, that her department can only provide intelligence inputs to the President who then has the last word on whether something constitutes a threat, imminent or not!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Two big wars have occurred in this decade. First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which is still wreaking havoc. Second, the ongoing US-Israel war against Iran which has unleashed a wider war in the Middle East. The purpose of this blog is not to discuss the merits and demerits of the two wars. There is enough commentary on that already. Instead, the idea is to look at the dynamics of warfare, based on these two conflicts. It would be no exaggeration to say that warfare is changing in significant ways.

The most important legal implication though is for Article 51 of the UN Charter which says: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” By this token, India’s “Operation Sindoor” may be justified since a terrorist attack did occur in Pehalgam and India’s actions may be construed as self-defence. But in both the other conflicts referred to above, the case becomes much more tenuous. The fact of the matter is that in the case of both impending attacks and especially potential attacks involving nuclear weapons, the State at the receiving end cannot be expected to wait for an armed attack to take place and then exercise its right of self defence. The challenge therefore is to assess credible and tangible security threats faced by a State and then determining its right to self-defence. The sooner the international community gets around this issue, the better. Otherwise, we will continue to have a situation where the UN Charter is honoured more in breach than in observance.

The use of airpower seems cardinal in the evolving dynamics of warfare. The idea that invasion takes place on the land border with tanks rolling backed by shells and artillery conjures up an image of the famous movie “Patton”. This may have been how the war in Ukraine started, but since then it is airfare which has determined the course of the conflict. With the conflict in Iran, this is even more the case, what with airpower dominating the narrative.

The story of missiles and drones in these conflicts is worth noting. First, the difference. Drones and missiles are both unmanned aerial vehicles used for military purposes, but they have distinct differences. Drones are typically smaller, more maneuverable, and can be controlled remotely by a human operator. They are often used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes. Missiles, on the other hand, are larger, faster, and are usually launched from a stationary platform or aircraft. They are designed to deliver a payload to a specific target with precision and are often used for long-range attacks. Overall, drones offer more flexibility and versatility in their operations, while missiles are more specialized in their capabilities.

Now about the cost of waging warfare. The cost of missiles varies hugely from one to another. For instance, an Akash missile costs Rs 2 Crores (210,000 USD) each. Brahmos on the other hand costs Rs 34 Crores (3.7 million USD). The S 400 missile system which is versatile engages 36 targets at once and carries some 100-odd missiles. The cost of a single S 400 missile system is a whopping Rs 35,000 crores (3.81 billion USD), with each missile in it costing apprximately Rs 8 crores (870,000 USD). The costliest missile is arguably the Trident missile from the United States with a staggering cost of 90 million USD each. This ballistic missile is launched from submarines and is recognized as the most advanced of its kind in the U.S. arsenal. To prevent these missiles from reaching their targets, missile interceptors are used. Missile interceptors (as opposed to drone interceptors which is dealt with below) are expensive. For instance a patriot missile interceptor costs 4 million USD, a THAAD interceptor costs up to 15 million USD, SM interceptor costs a whopping 20 million USD! This is referred to among military analysts as “missile math” and is a subject of much discussion since huge finances are at stake.

Enter cheap drones into the picture. In fact the famous Iranian Shahed drone costs just 30,000 USD. About 11 feet long, they emit a loud buzz and carry explosives in the nose, detonating on impact. Compact enough to be launched from trucks, they are easy to conceal and difficult to track.The longer-range Shahed-136 variant can travel roughly 2,500 km, enabling strikes across much of the Middle East. To counter them, the US has sometimes used multimillion dollar missile interceptors. The Patriot missile defence system — widely considered a benchmark in air defence — relies on interceptors that can cost more than 3 million USD per launch and are produced in limited numbers. In 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 interceptors, a record output for the company. The US military has deployed alternative counter-drone technologies aimed at reducing costs. Raytheon’s Coyote system, which uses drones to hunt and destroy other drones, carries an estimated price tag of about 126,500 USD per interceptor, according to a report from the Center for a New American Security. Though far less expensive than a PAC-3 missile, it still costs four or five times more than a Shahed drone.

The war in Ukraine has thrown up interesting possibilities. Ukraine has massive experience dealing with Shahed drones used by Russia, and has mass produced cheap drone interceptors. Ukraine has reportedly dispatched drone interceptors and military personnel to Jordan as Middle Eastern countries fend off Iranian strikes on infrastructure and United States military assets during the current US-Israel war on Tehran. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that a Ukrainian team departed recently for Jordan, which has US military assets at its Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. The move followed a request from the US, President Zelenskyy said, as Washington seeks cheaper technology for intercepting Iranian missiles targeting Israeli and US defence assets as well as other infrastructure across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ukrainians have been fighting against Shahed drones  for years now, and no other country in the world is said to have this kind of experience. “We are ready to help,” Zelenskyy wrote on X recently, adding that Ukraine has asked for advanced US defence systems, such as the Patriot system, in exchange.

If there was a major lesson for India from Operation Sindoor, it was the need to upgrade its drone power—both in terms of a strike force and in defending itself against enemy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In fact, battlefields have been transformed by drones, which are now indispensable for ISR (Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance) through medium/ high altitude drones, or for precise strike missions through battlefield support UAVs armed with bombs and missiles. During the brief and sharp conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, another form of attack drones gained prominence. Known as loitering munitions or fire-and-forget ‘kamikaze’ UAVs, these are armed with warheads that ‘loiter’ over an area before identifying and swooping down on targets—often used in ‘swarms’ to overwhelm air defences and pulverise enemy assets. The high level of integration of these range of drones in modern warfare is now essential to ensure the success of the Indian armed forces. While India acquitted itself well with the limited range but highly precise, expensive and powerful drones, apart from successfully carrying out a range of counter measures to destroy incoming cheap Turkish- and Chinese-made Pakistani UAVs, experts believe that there is need for an urgent review of the country’s drone warfare capability which was lacking on several fronts. India can’t depend only on expensive platforms. India should fast-track induction of low-cost drones and loitering munitions for mass deployment, build domestic production lines, adapt air-defence and electronic warfare to counter saturation attacks and develop tactics for combined use of high-end and expendable drones. Israel’s Iron Beam drone interceptor is a game-changing system with an operational cost of only 2 to 3.5 USD per shot, providing a great alternative to missile-based defence. Small wonder then that India is in advanced negotiations with Israel to acquire the Iron Beam laser-based interception system to strenthen its air defence.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

With the Middle East (aka West Asia) going up in flames, it is no longer an exaggeration to say that the world is on the brink. The more difficult question to answer is what happens now?

Major continents are in the throes of upheaval. The Western Hemisphere is already facing the full force of the “Donroe Doctrine” (alternatively styled as the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine) as we saw in the events unfolding in Venezuela. It is fair to say that things have not yet settled in Venzuela following the overthrow of the former President Maduro. American ties with both Canada and Mexico may have gotten civil, but not yet chummy as they ought to be. US has imposed a fuel blockade of Cuba, and President Trump let it be known intriguingly that there may be a “friendly takeover” of Cuba. Suffice it to say that the Western Hemisphere is producing more headlines than it can consume these days.

The African continent has been home to violent conflicts for a long time. At the time of writing, wars rage in Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, The Sahel trio of Mali, Burkina Faso & Niger, and Mozambique. Need one say more about the dark continent?

Europe has been in the throes of a conflict since February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. Despite the best efforts of President Trump and others, the conflict shows no sign of abating. It has truly taken on the character of a war of attrition, with enormous death and destruction bang in the middle of Europe. At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that the conflict in Ukraine will end anytime soon.

While Asia has had episodic conflicts, it has been generally free of large-scale and destructive wars. That said, the war between Pakistan and Afghanistan now seems seriously worrisome. Gulf countries have had a go at mediation in the past, but the two neighbours seem more antagonistic than ever. And in the Himalayas, it is worth recalling that India and China maintain some 50,000 troops each, in eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The situation in the Taiwan Strait, South and East China Sea is also far from normal.

But it is the Middle East that has, justifiably, occupied airtime and headlines for the last 48 hours or so. It has thus dubiously lived up to its reputation of being a permanently unsettled region. The joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran have the potential to dramatically alter the strategic landscape in not just the Middle East, but in the world at large. The question, however, on everyone’s mind is how long the conflict will last? This is important for a variety of reasons. But the most important has to do with the global economy and with the sea lanes of communication in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has already retaliated against the US-Israeli attacks. But will it have the wherewithal to survive, resist and retaliate for a meaningful period of time? As for US objectives, it certainly would not want to get sucked into a quagmire, which is what Iran may prove to be. President Trump must be acutely aware of voices in his MAGA constituency which detest “forever” wars. Curiously, the reaction from China and Russia to the US-Israeli attempt at regime change in Iran has been muted, to put it mildly. This will be the subject of much analysis and dissection among foreign policy wonks.

So, what explains all of the above? That is not an easy question to answer. Rather than resort to facile explanantions attributable to the actions of one country’s leader or the other, answers must be sought in structural factors that affect international relations at this point. The truth of the matter is that, geopolitically and geoeconomically, the world appears multipolar albeit with strong binary characterstics, underpinned by the dominance of both the US and China. But geomilitarily, the world is still very much unipolar with the US calling the shots. In the final analysis, it is only the US which seems capable of projecting hard power across continents. In order to achieve global strategic equilibrium, a certain degree of multipolarity is essential not just in the geopolitical and geoeconomic spheres, but also in the geomilitary sphere. That might bring an element of balance of power and long-term stability in international relations. Easier said than done, you say. Well, you would be right.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

With the AI (Artificial Intelligence) international summit in full swing in Delhi, the question occurred to me as to how many people know the basics of this hugely complex subject. I certainly did not know too much; but after some research, this is what I discovered. Domain experts may stop right here and need not proceed further. Others, hopefully, may find it of some value.

Definition: There are tons of definitions on the subject. The simplest one is that AI is a technology that enables machines and computers to perfom tasks that typically require human intelligence. In other words, it is a set of technologies that empowers computers to learn, reason and to perform a variety of advanced tasks in ways that previously used to require human intelligence, such as understanding language, analysing data, and even providing helpful suggestions.

Importance of AI: AI can be applied to a wide range of sectors, namely, IT, healthcare, finance, marketing, manufacturing, tourism and transportation. But more than anything else, AI enhances efficiency, promotes data-driven decision making, improves accuracy, promotes savings in costs and encourages personalization.

Inevitability of AI: AI penetration has moved well beyond experiments; a whopping 88 per cent of organizations worldwide are already using AI in some form or the other. Roughly 1 in 6 people used AI products by the end of 2025, a figure set to rise exponentially in the months and years ahead. In terms of per capita AI adoption, UAE and Singapore lead the world. Other countries are following suit. Whether one likes it or not, AI is here to stay.

Infrastructure: The US ranks first in terms of AI infrastructure, but ranks lower (28th) in per capita adoption. In terms of the main infrastructure i.e. the data centers, there are key components to it: GPUs (Graphic Processing Units), networking, storage, cooling and scalable power systems. There are at present 10,800-odd data centers around the world. US leads the way with 3960, followed by UK with 498, Germany with 470, China with 365, France with 335 and India with 275. The current AI summit in Delhi has two strategic objectives from India’s point of view: to attract substantial investments into India and to shape, to the extent possible, the regulatory landscape in AI.

Regulation: Everyone (including Mark Zuckerberg) agrees that there is need for regulating AI. The question is how far countries wish to go in regulating AI. Key issues that policy makers will have to grapple include: liability – who is responsible when AI systems cause harm; data privacy/ safety – AI requires vast datasets often violating privacy; Intellectual Property – copyrighted data is often used without authorization; and algorithmic bias – AI systems can amplify societal biases leading to unfair outcomes in hiring and law enforcement. For Governments, striking the right regulatory balance between a regime which prevents abuse of AI on the one hand and promotes innovation and investment on the other, is of vital importance. There is global regulatory divergence already: EU seems to prefer binding risk-based regulations while other countries like Japan focus on flexibility and laissez-faire. India has released AI governance guidelines focusing on safety, trust, and inclusion, tending towards the EU model.

Inclusion: AI, like any other transformative technology, can either benefit humanity or completely rupture it. In countries like India, it can also cause a deep and unbridgeable divide. This is really the central challenge for countries of the global south. Microsoft has come up with its “AI Diffusion Report” which states unambigously that AI usage in the Global North is roughly twice that in the Global South. There is no option, the above Report says , except for Governments and other stakeholders to undertake the following:

• Building the infrastructure needed for AI diffusion
• Empowering people through technology and skills for schools and nonprofits
• Strengthening multilingual and multicultural AI capabilities
• Enabling local AI innovations that address community needs
• Measuring AI diffusion to guide future AI policies and investments

The ongoing AI Summit in Delhi may be expected to come up with recommendations on the subject of inclusive AI.

Impact on Environment: One of the biggest worries for countries of the global south is the colossal energy and water requirements that AI will require.  The proliferating data centres that house AI servers produce electronic waste. They are large consumers of water, which is becoming scarce in countries of the global south. They rely on critical minerals and rare elements, which are often mined unsustainably and which are in short supply. And they use massive amounts of electricity, spurring the emission of planet-warming greenhouse gases.  When establishing data centres, companies must disclose the environmental impact and all stake holders must join hands to tackle the above problems. The UNESCO way back in 2021 had come up with “Recommendation on the ethics of artificial intelligence” which is well worth looking at. It is available on UNESCO’s website.

Job Losses: Backed by the exponential diffusion of AI, one view is that the impact might be more dramatic than expected in Africa and South Asia and for rural and remote communities. Emerging markets and low-income developing countries are less prepared for AI and may be more affected than others. Cross-country studies of labour market exposure to AI  reveal that advanced countries face a higher risk to congnitive jobs ; but they are also better positioned to exploit the benefits of AI compared to emerging and developing economies.

India faces, potentially, a double whammy. The digital divide and the gender divide both feeding on each other and complicating things. Also, the IITs producing batch after batch of software coders who then seek jobs in the US or elsewhere, may be threatened. The biggest risk may however not be mass unemployment, but widening inequality.

The good news is that AI’s trajectory is not pre-determined and could yet be influenced by a country’s choices. The charter for action must include: proactive policy interventions, taking into account ethical considerations and massive investment in human capital. Seen from this perspective, the AI Summit in Delhi could not have come at a more appropriate time.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

It has been suggested from time to time that India, an emerging if not a global power, must issue a National Security Strategy (NSS). It is understood that a classified, internal document approximating a NSS exists for policy makers. But that is not the same as an unclassified version which is available for the wider public. While there has been understandable reluctance on the part of the authorities to do so, nothing prevents others from doing it. This is an initial attempt to do so. For ease of understanding, there are three sections: objectives, principles and strategy.

Objectives

There can be little doubt that the most important objective of any national security strategy is to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Equally, protection of its citizens and advancing their interests is a no-brainer. This requires a modern military on both the continental and the maritime sphere. What is perhaps less understood is that economic security is of paramount importance. Lifting millions of people from poverty, giving them jobs and providing them substantial access to affordable health, housing and education is an imperative necessity. The Indian economy which is a 4 trillion dollar one must therefore become a 10 trillion one with a relatively high per capita income which will put us in the bracket of an upper middle-income country. Only this and this alone can enable India to become Viksit Bharat by 2047. A multipolar world order with a fairer distribution of power is preferable, for obvious reasons.

Principles

At one level, the oft-repeated expression “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” can guide foreign and security policy. But this is more like motherhood and apple pie, to which no one can object. More specifically, India has always subscribed to some unexceptionable principles when it comes to practicing its foreign and security policy. One is the sovereign equality of nations. India has always believed that no matter how big or small, rich or poor, all countries are equal and their sovereignty must be respected in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Second, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign and independent countries. Third, a clear preference for dialogue and peaceful resolution of issues rather than the use of force. Fourth, India has always favoured international cooperation to deal with global challenges such as climate change and public health. Fifth, India has been long committed to multilateralism and to the ideals of institutions like the United Nations, even while flagging the need for fundamental reform. Sixth, India has striven to be the voice of the Global South wherever it can, articulating its priorities and negotiating on its behalf. Seventh, there is no question that technology, AI and Quantum computing will drive the economy of the world. India believes that technology and AI must be accessible, open and non-discriminatory. Eighth, India still favours the goal of global nuclear disarmament, no matter how unrealistic that may sound today. Ninth, the war against terrorism must be a principled and unconditional one; there are no good terrorists and bad terrorists. Tenth and last, India has benefitted enormously from globalization. The importance of free trade, open markets for our goods and services, access to rare earths, foreign direct investment and the legal migration of our citizens across borders cannot be overstated. This also entails open sea lanes of communication as well as safe undersea cables.   

Strategy

It is accepted that strategic autonomy practiced through a foreign policy based on multi-alignment has stood India in good stead. The distinction between strategic autonomy and strategic hedging is worth underlining. The former is about securing valuable policy space. The latter is about using the space so acquired, judiciously, to advance national interest.

Based on the above broad framework, the foreign and security strategy of India regarding major powers and regions are delineated below.

It should be obvious that those who contest the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India must be considered the main strategic threat for India. China, because of its various territorial claims on the border and particularly the one relating to Arunachal Pradesh, is an obvious candidate in this regard. Because the comprehensive national power differential between China and India is huge, India has no choice but to engage in both internal balancing and external balancing for the foreseeable future. The former relates to building serious internal capacity and the latter relates to building alliances with major powers. However, constructive engagement with China is not merely an option for India; it is an imperative.

The other country which falls in the threat category is of course Pakistan which may not be a pacing threat anymore but a serious rogue threat, nevertheless.

“Neighbourhood First” policy, thoughtful as it is, is work in progress. Bangladesh may prove to be a bellwether in this regard.

In terms of the 42 strategic partnerships that India has, the USA continues to be the most important one despite recent setbacks. One hears talk about trust being broken, but diplomacy is unsentimental and about permanent interests. The decision by the US to do away with the punitive tariffs and reduce the reciprocal tariffs, has not come a day too soon. It now remains for both sides to work hard to regain the time lost and to realize the full potential of the most consequential strategic partnership of the twenty-first century.  

Russia will remain a strategic partner for India in its own right. But the war in Ukraine is a drag on ties and Russia must do everything to end it as quickly as possible.  

EU is critical for India, and both share a fundamental conviction about multipolarity in the world order.  The recently concluded FTA (Free Trade Agreement) and the Security & Defence Partnership between India and the EU is a paradigmatic shift in this regard. Both the EU and India do fancy themselves in pole position in a multipolar world. EU may be an economic giant, but a geopolitical minnow. India faces a different problem: its economic heft has simply not kept pace with its rising geopolitical clout. Can the EU and India help each other achieve their full potential?

Japan and Australia are not just part of the Quad but provide fulcrum points for India’s Act East policy. South Korea will remain a crucial trade and investment partner of India.  ASEAN centrality is work in progress. GCC countries are vital for India’s prosperity.

Finally, India cannot afford to ignore Africa and Latin America in the medium to long term.  

The above list is not exhaustive but meant as a starting point for India’s National Security Strategy. It is about time the country had a debate.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Speaking Notes

Check Against Delivery

Hon’ble Minister PT Rajan, Ambassador Tirumurti, Excellencies, Ladies
and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure and honour to be here in Chennai on this happy
occasion.
I can think of no one more qualified to lead the Deccan Centre for
International Relations than Ambassador Tirumurti.
I congratulate the organizers for this excellent initiative for one obvious
reason and for another one which is less obvious.
The obvious one is that there is no rational reason why Centres of IR
and Think Tanks should be based primarily in Delhi. In fact, to the
contrary.
The less obvious reason is that when it comes to business and
technology, the two vectors that the proposed Deccan Centre hopes to
address, it is the South of India which has played a leading role. Yet, the
South has not weighed in as much as it should have, in policy
formulation. If India has a conservative and defensive trade policy for
instance, it is because the South has not played its full part. I hope the
Deccan Centre will change this and emerge as an ardent advocate of
both the business and tech interests of the southern states.
My talk today will be divided into two parts: one, current state of
geopolitics and two, India’s response to it.
In geopolitics, there are decades when nothing happens and then there
are weeks when decades happen. 2025 was one such year. It was
characterised by cascading strategic turbulence, leading to “geopolitics
on steroids”, as it were.

The Liberal International Order, some might say is on its last legs, but it
really has ended for all intents and purposes.
We may well see a settled multipolar world order at some point in the
future, but the present situation is undoubtedly one of commotion,
confusion and chaos.

The actions of the two Great Powers, i.e. US and China on the one hand
and actions of the major power Russia, on the other hand, bear scrutiny.
It is fashionable to attribute the current geopolitical turbulence
exclusively to the US and to the mercurial occupant of the White House.
That would be a strategic error. The fact is that for most of the world’s
history, there was never any settled global order. The Liberal
International Order thus was largely an exception to the rule. The world
is normally characterised by chaos, so in some ways we are back to the
“normal” state of affairs in the world.
That said, there is no gainsaying the fact that the US Foreign, Security
and Trade Policy have undergone a dramatic shift under the Trump
Administration, no question about it.
The disdain for multilateralism in general and the UN in particular, is
obvious and hard to miss. After all, US has withdrawn from scores of
international organizations. And with the “Board of Peace” proposal, it is
hard to see the US actively returning to the UN anytime soon. The UN
Security Council remains dysfunctional and a UN that is both politically
and financially weakened is something the world must contend with.
The UN is not the only casualty. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
remains in limbo, and the US has formally conveyed to the WTO’s
highest body that it no longer thinks the MFN (Most Favoured Nation
Clause) is fit for purpose. The EU and China have since followed suit.
Bear in mind that the MFN was hitherto the bedrock of the multilateral
trading system.
On defence and security, both the NSS (National Security Strategy) and
the NDS (National Defence Strategy) make abundantly clear what has
been clear on the ground: American retrenchment. Thus, the primary
focus henceforth will be on homeland security and on the Western
Hemisphere.
But the real impact of American policy is on the traditional alliance
structure. The transatlantic alliance and the NATO have been thebulwark of Western security and defence since at least World War II. No
longer. The US has made clear that it expects NATO allies to do
substantially more and its support henceforth may be critical but
certainly much more limited. Individual alliance partners such as Japan,
South Korea and The Philippines have also been served notice that they
must do more.
As American military bandwidth is shrunk deliberately, the ripples will be
felt in Europe and Middle East. The big question is what happens to the
Indo-Pacific? The US NDS talks of maintaining a favourable balance of
power in the Indo-Pacific, again urging allies and partners to do more.
But US policy towards China is still to emerge clearly. For instance, the
US NDS says the US does not seek to strangle, humiliate or dominate
China. At the same time, it says the US cannot allow China or any other
power to dominate it in the Indo-Pacific. What this will entail and how this
delicate balance of power is achieved remains to be seen. The meeting
between President Xi Jinping and President Trump in April may reveal
clues to this question.
We turn to China. There is absolutely no doubt that China faces serious
domestic headwinds. These head winds pertain to turmoil in the military,
youth unemployment, the real estate bubble, massive industrial
overcapacity and a shrinking population. Add to this an external
environment which is protectionist and wary of China. But China is
nothing if not resilient. For now, China is on a wait and watch mode vis-
à-vis Trump and the US. There is mixed messaging from both countries
towards one another.
Russia, which qualifies as a major power, feels extremely betrayed by
the West and has hence turned disruptive. In a war of attrition in
Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated it has the upper hand. Russia’s
legitimate security interests must be met and it is clear that it is
impossible to have a stable European Security Architecture without
Russia. That said, the onus now is on Russia to find a way to end the
conflict.
All other powers, big and small, have had to cope with the actions of the
above big powers, the only way they could: engage in strategic hedging.
And when all powers do it, it leads to multiple strategic hedging.
India’s response to this geopolitical turbulence has not been easy.
Before assessing the same, it is important to remember that theturbulence is not necessarily of India’s making. But a country must deal
with the world as it is, not as it wishes it to be. Be that as it may, in my
view India deserves a 6.5 out of 10 for the way it has performed.
With the US, there is no denying that there are issues, particularly
relating to trade. But the policy followed by India: no confrontation, no
capitulation and continued conversation, has been the best one so far.
Also, in areas other than trade, bilateral contacts and progress has
continued. Two questions are critical: (1) How much longer before a
trade deal? (2) How will India be required to cope if and when the US-
China ties reach some equilibrium? We will know soon enough.
With China, India has not yielded at the border, but full de-escalation has
not happened. Trade has continued and our exports have done better,
but the deficit continues. People to people ties are showing signs of
picking up. China with the domestic headwinds and friction with the US,
does not wish to open another active front with India. India for its part,
cannot take on China entirely on its own. Given this, a temporary
détente is in the interest of both countries.
Russia has been a challenge for India. The war in Ukraine has hurt us.
So, India can and should try harder with President Putin to persuade him
to end the war in Ukraine. As for our dependence on Russian weapons
and platforms, the best guess is that for the foreseeable 10 years or so,
legacy dependence will continue. PM Modi has said on more than one
occasion that this is not the era of war, and it is in India’s interest that the
war comes to an end. India has already paid a price in this regard.
The present geopolitical turbulence offers India a 1991- Redux moment.
India’s geopolitical clout is hugely weakened by its lack of economic,
trade and technological heft. A 4 trillion-dollar economy is insufficient for
a population of 1.5 billion people. We need inclusive growth and we
need to get to at least 10 trillion dollars asap.
The FTA with EU was a big step in the right direction by India. But we
need to carry out deep structural reforms in Agriculture, Land, Labour,
Power and Regulations if we are to fully benefit from this and other
FTAs. It is worth noting that we have also signed a Security and Defence
Partnership with the EU. There is a point to note here. All countries will
henceforth have to bring their trade policy in broad alignment with their
security and geopolitical strategy. The days of having a comprehensive security partnership with one power and a full-fledged trade partnership with another power, may be numbered.
Let me conclude with the following observations:
(1) There is simply no going back to the Liberal International Order.
(2) There is no going back either to a unipolar moment with a single
hegemon.
(3) I do not see any realistic prospect for a G-2, involving the US and
China.
(4) Trade, Technology and Investment will be based on trust,
resilience and reciprocity. By the same token, it has the potential to
be weaponised.
(5) Military conflicts will continue to proliferate. Military expenditure will
continue to soar, even among middle powers. The nuclear order is
in danger of unravelling. Between Ukraine and North Korea, which
one would countries rather be? And what if Ukraine had
possessed nuclear weapons? The Saudi-Pak military deal is
evidence of this.
(6) Technology will disrupt and will create a new divide. How countries
like India cope with Tech and AI, will offer lessons for the Global
South.
(7) Global problems like climate change, public health, and even the
laudable SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) will take a back
seat, much to humanity’s detriment.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me conclude by quoting that inscrutable Chinese saying: We live in
interesting times!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The National Defence Strategy (NDS), 2026, was published a couple of days ago by the US Department of War. It is primarily meant to offer guidance to the American senior Pentagon leadership as well as Commanders and Field Activity Directors. Taken by itself, there is nothing hugely earth shaking in the document. However, read in conjunction with the much more detailed National Security Strategy issued by the Trump administration in December 2025, the broad outline of US Foreign and Security Policy becomes apparent.

The NDS begins by making the political point that previous American administrations had squandered military advantage, lives, goodwill and resources for grandiose nation building projects. Asserting that the US has the world’s strongest and most capable military, the NDS states that the Department of War will not be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change and nation building. Instead, the NDS’s underlying motto is “peace through strength”.

The NDS bluntly says it is not in America’s interest, nor is it its duty, to act everywhere on its own. Nor will the US make up for allied security shortfalls arising from their leaders’ own irresponsible choices. American allies, transatlantic or elsewhere in the world, cannot now say they were not forewarned!

Like the NSS, the NDS gives primacy to homeland security and the Western Hemisphere. Securing America’s borders is sought to be done, skies will be defended through the Golden Dome and a robust nuclear deterrent will be maintained. In the Western Hemisphere, the NDS says the US will guarantee military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America and interestingly, Greenland. More comfortingly, the NDS says that the US will engage in good faith with its neighbours from Canada to partners in Central & South America even while ensuring that they respect and do their part to defend shared interests. And if they do not, Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine will kick in.

The NDS declares China as the second most powerful country in the world- behind only the US. By calling China the most powerful state relative to the US since the 19th century, the NDS grudgingly accepts some strategic parity between the US and China. Crucially, the NDS spells out that the American objective is to “maintain a favourable balance of military power” in the Indo-Pacific. However, the NDS adds that this is not for purposes of dominating, humiliating or strangling China. On the contrary, the goal is to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate US or its allies. Ruling out regime change or an existential struggle with China, the NDS seeks “a decent peace” on terms favourable to the US but one that China can also accept and live under. Two questions arise immediately: one, the omission of the words “military overmatch” from the NSS is glaring; two, the NDS does not explain how the US can achieve its objectives without dominating China and at the same time not allowing China to dominate the US. And the key question is whether these terms are acceptable to China in the Indo-Pacific. The question is what constitutes “decent peace” and “a favourable balance of military power” in the Indo-Pacific.

On Taiwan, the NDS argues in favour of sustaining a strong denial defence along the First Island Chain. Again, the NDS says the US will work closely with its allies and partners in the region to incentivize and enable them to do more for collective defence, especially in ways that are relevant to an effective denial defence.

Russia is described by the NDS as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future. Despite a host of problems, the NDS says the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates that Russia still retains deep reservoirs of military and industrial power. It also adds that Russia has shown national resolve. Saying that Russia could employ threats relating to undersea, space and cyber capabilities against US Homeland, the NDS says the US is ready to counter this. Saying the NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia, the NDS makes the critical point that while the US will remain engaged in Europe, it will nevertheless prioritize defending its Homeland and deterring China.

Two specific actions proposed by the NDS will be examined by countries everywhere in the world. One, the NDS specifically calls for increased burden-sharing with not just American allies but also its partners. Thus, the NDS repeats the mantra of the NSS that Europe take primary responsibility for its own conventional defence to the security threat it faces. US support to NATO allies will be critical but “more limited”, the NDS says. In a similar vein, the NDS says that in the Middle East, the US will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies. Israel will be helped to defend itself, cooperation to be deepened with Arab Gulf partners and integration enabled between Israel and the Arab partners through the Abraham Accords. In the Korean Peninsula, the NDS postulates that South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, once again with critical but more limited US support.

The NDS concludes by emphasizing the US Defence Industrial Base and how to supercharge it. The DIB, according to the NDS, must produce, deliver, and sustain critical munitions, systems and platforms. The NDB avers that the effort to supercharge the Defence Indutrial Base will require nothing short of a national mobilization – a call to industrial arms on par with similar revivals of the last century that ultimately powered the US to victory in both the world wars and the Cold War that followed.

Conclusion

The key things that stand out in this iteration of the NDS are:

>US is no longer going to be present in every strategic theatre, all at once;

>Homeland and Western Hemisphere have been given primacy as in the NSS;

>In the Indo-Pacific, where America’s allies share the desire for a free and open regional order, the NDS underlines that allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China;

>An ambiguous defense strategy (perhaps deliberate) to counter China;

>Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defense as well as cope with the threat from Russia;

>South Korea to take charge of deterring North Korea in the Korean Peninsula;

>In the Middle East, allies and partners led by Israel to counter threat from Iran and its proxies; and

>Ambitious plan to supercharge America’s defense industrial base.

In my blog last month entitled ” Trump’s National Security Strategy has evolved” I had made bold to predict that there are signs of American foreign and security policy retrenchment from both institutions and regions. The National Defense Strategy just released provides further evidence of this.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Now that the artificial deadline imposed by newspapers & magazines on “yearend despatches” is over and the dust has settled, it is time to look back calmly at the year gone by. The title for this blog pretty much suggested itself. 2025 can really be reduced to just two words: geopolitical turbulence. No surprises there. But given below are the megatrends thrown up in the last one year or so.

Parity between two Great Powers: If ever historians look back at the point when China attained a degree of parity with the United States of America, it would have to be the year 2025. Strategic and geopolitical parity are notoriously hard to measure. Even so, multiple reports written by various American agencies openly admit there is only one peer competitor to the US and that is China. And President Trump may have given it his seal of approval when he said on social media that “The G2 will be convening shortly” before his October 2025 meeting with President Xi Jinping. China certainly behaved as America’s equal in 2025, whether it is the tariff war, the tech race or defending its core interests. Things could still change quickly. But for now, it is hard to contest that there are two Great Powers in the world, namely, the US and China. Then, there are the rest.

Uncertainty around traditional alliance structures: The most dramatic example of this phenomenon is obviously the transatlantic alliance, embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But other individual alliances such as the one that the US has with Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia and Philippines, to name a few, all appear to be under some form of pressure or the other. Part of the uncertainty stems from the American sentiment that treaty allies must share much more of the burden than they have done so far and may also be a consequence of the American strategic retrenchment expressed by its National Security Strategy that the Western Hemisphere will, more than others, be a priority theatre. No one is yet predicting a total breakdown of the alliance structure itself; but it is difficult to see the status quo being maintained. Interestingly, loose alliance-like relations such as those between Russia/China on the one hand and Venzuela/Iran on the other, will also need to be reworked or rethought by the parties concerned, in light of recent events. Last but not least, the “friendship without limits” between Russia and China did have some limits after all. Could the limits to the relationship expand with time?

Total collapse of MFN: Since the end of World War II and the advent of first GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and then the WTO (World Trade Organization), the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle has been the bedrock of all international trade. But now, the most powerful trading player in the world i.e the US, has formally proposed to the WTO that the practice of MFN should end and is not fit for purpose. Regardless of the validity of this claim, this constitutes a huge departure from how most of the world traded with each other. Some 69 per cent of all existing global trade is still based on MFN. But, this may be expected to see a steep decline in the years ahead. International trade in the future will most certainly be strategic, preferential, reciprocal and most certainly non-MFN. Weaponisation of strategic trade is a brutal reality: look at the issue of controls on semiconductor chips on the one hand, and rare earths on the other. Meanwhile, expect Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and bilateral trade agreements to grow exponentially, undermining MFN further.

RIP Multilateralism: For some years now, multilateralism has been in terminal decline. The reasons are too well known to bear any repetition here. On January 7 this year, the US which is invariably the principal funder of both UN and non-UN organizations, decided to pull out of some 66 international organizations. And without the US, many of these organizations will lose their raison détre. It is too early to say what will replace multilateralism. Some speak of US minus one, but that is easier said than done, as the WTO has now started to realize. Plurilateral institutions such as G20, BRICS, SCO seem to have limits to their functioning as well.

Military Expenditure Soars as conflicts prevail: One defining feature of 2025 has been the continuation of old conflicts and the advent of new ones. The war in Ukraine has continued for the fourth year running; the bombing may have stopped in Gaza but strife persists; Yemen is restless; Sudan is restive; Venezuela is on edge; and China is militarily assertive in its backyard. There were also limited wars elsewhere in the world. The net result of all this is that the rise in annual military expenditure in 2024 (the last year for which data is available) was the steepest in the last 30 years with a ten per cent increase touching 2.8 trillion dollars. This will almost certainly rise in 2025 for reasons mentioned above. War is hugely profitable, as the saying goes!

Technological Disruption: For tech buffs, it is fair to say that 2025 was the year of “irrational exuberance”. The kind of investment made in Artificial Intelligence is truly scary and it is hard not to think of it as a bubble. The American lead in matters tech is incontestable; but what is true is also the fact that China is fast catching up. Witness the emergence of DeepSeek! The tech war will play itself out over the next few years. But 2025 may well have been a turning point.

Multiple Strategic Hedging: There is no index to measure the degree of trust between nations. But if there was one, it would be very very low. This lack of trust between countries, translates into a foreign and security policy characterised by strategic hedging. And when every country hedges against the other, then it constitutes multiple strategic hedging leading to a spaghetti bowl of strategic partnerships of bewildering shapes and colours.

Multipolar but unruly world disorder: Policy wonks have already pronounced the death of the liberal international order which was established in the aftermath of World War II. That is probably true. Equally, people have hastened to announce the advent of a multipolar world based on spheres of influence. This seems a little less certain, if only because there are two Great Powers in serious contestation with one another and then you have the rest which are jostling for space and influence. Yet, the nomenclature “multipolar world” gives a certain degree of assurance to policy wonks who need comforting words to describe the world they see in front of them. The trouble is that the expression “multipolar world order” denotes a certain number of identifiable poles by common agreement and a reasonable semblance of order based on consensus. Both of those simply do not exist as of now. The world is therefore arguably multipolar and is most certainly disorderly, unruly and fractious. And therein lies the problem for decision makers who have to craft meaningful foreign and security policy for their countries.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.