France is going through a delicate phase in its history of the so-called Fifth Republic. For one thing, the country heads to crucial polls in May of next year. At the risk of sounding alarmist, these elections could well result in a political earthquake i.e. the election of the far-right National Rally’s leader, Ms Marine Le Pen, as President of the French Republic. Should that come to pass, there will be profound implications not just for France, but for the European Union as a whole.

Just when social peace was needed in the run-up to the above elections, there has been widespread violence following student protests. Student protests in France began last week, innocuously enough, in some provinces where students protested the lack of adequate infrastructure and more important, the lack of sufficient number of teachers. Through social media these protests gained prominence and soon enough, they spread like wildfire. In no time at all, some schools were torched and the police had no choice but to use force against some violent protesters. That led to students getting injured, further exacerbating an already tense situation. The events then took on a political colour when the far-left party (called France Insoumise) led by a firebrand politician Jean Luc Melanchon expressed his total and unconditional support to the protesting students. The far-right leader Marine Le Pen, shrewdly blamed the far-left party for insigating the students but also made the larger point that only her party, when elected, can maintain law and order in France. Pro-establishment politicians had nowhere to hide and were trying hard to douse the fire. It is no exaggeration to say that Macron’s legacy is in serious danger, as rumours swirl that he is eyeing Ursula Von der Lyen’s job as President of the European Commission.

A poll conducted last week showed that the French public disapproves of the Government’s handling of the protests even while blaming the far-left leader Melanchon for inciting the students. Again, it seems to be advantage National Rally and Marine Le Pen. The situation also suits National Rally since its charismatic young leader Mr Jordan Bardella has been accused of anti-semitism by the French press. Bardella has of course strongly denied the accusations, but the paper which originally made the allegation appeared to have some proof. All this has been forgotten in the imbroglio caused by student protests.

As if all this were not enough, France is also experiencing an economic crisis. Borrowing costs have reached their highest levels since 2008 and the spread between French 10-year bonds and German ones — an indicator that measures investors’ appetite to hold French debt over more traditionally stable German debt — shot above 150 basis points last week, a level not seen in years. The minority French government has introduced a budget last week with €43 billion worth of savings designed to reassure markets fretting about France’s massive debt and a stubbornly high budget deficit. But the minority government will find it difficult to get parliamentary approval for the same. One French observer has termed all of this as “maxi merde”, a French expletive which when roughly translated reads as “super shit”.

Germany, the other European giant, also faces challenges of its own. German voters go to the polls in Sachsen-Anhalt on September 6, with elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern two weeks later. An AfD (far-right German political party) parliamentary majority in Sachsen-Anhalt would almost certainly consume German politics for the coming months and fuel existing speculation surrounding Merz’s chancellorship. Merz and his coalition may remain in place through mid-2027, but this stability may come at a cost. The much-needed economic and social reforms that Merz had promised are likely to be watered down, and weak government will reinforce the public’s deep dissatisfaction with the political establishment in Germany.

European observers are watching the goings-on in France (and Germany) with some concern. Say what you will about rising powers such as Poland, the fact remains that France is now the only nuclear power in Europe and is the only European permanent member of the UN Security Council. Similarly, Germany’s economic clout looms large in Europe. For the foreseeable future therefore, France and Germany, also known as the Franco-German locomotive, is critically important for the smooth functioning of Europe. With conflict still raging in Ukraine, Europe struggling to fight against Chinese commercial aggression and the US completely reassessing its transatlantic alliance, the travails of France, combined with potential problems in Germany, could not have come at a worse time, both for the two countries concerned and for Europe as a whole.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is at present Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

One of the most awaited bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS summit was that between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian PM Modi. In the event, the meeting was convivial without being substantial. Both countries stuck to their tradition of issuing separate readouts, which in diplomacy means either the officials did not have time to draft a Joint Statement or differences persisted to prevent one from being issued. It is safe to assume that it was the latter in this case.

What then to make of the Modi-Xi meeting? It is hard to disregard the attempts by both sides to seek mutual rapprochement. It is possible this rapprochement, at least from the Chinese side, is more tactical. The fact that President Xi Jinping is meeting President Trump shortly may have also played its part. The evidence for this rapprochement from China lies in the statement by the Chinese side for the first time ever that “The two sides should stay committed to advancing bilateral relations and resolving the boundary question, seek parallel, mutually reinforcing progress, and maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas”. So far, it is the Indian side which has been saying loud and clear that peace and tranquility on the border is essential for continued development of bilateral relations. Hitherto, the Chinese position has been that the border issue must be properly placed in the context of the overall bilateral ties. By explicitly accepting the link between the border issue and bilateral ties, and by going further to state that the two sides should seek parallel and mutually reinforcing progress in both issues, the Chinese side has seemingly departed from its traditional script to accomodate the Indian position. We will see whether they stick to this line. For, this implies that if peace and tranquility breaks down on the border, then India and/or China will be justified in cutting back on bilateral ties. The Indian side’s desire for rapprochement was reflected in the ” Eight points of outcomes and consensus of the 25th round of talks between Special Representatives of China and India on the boundary question” issued as a Joint Statement on 26 August, 2026. After all, the two sides agreed to seek early and substantial harvest of boundary delimitation and border management. Terms of reference for both the Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and Working Group on Border Management are yet to be agreed upon though.

Having said that, deeper issues remain. The Indian readout mentions, as past ones did with monotonous regularity, the three mutuals: mutual interest, mutual sensitivity and mutual respect; and reiterates for the umpteenth time that differences must not be allowed to become disputes. Neither finds direct resonance with the Chinese side which is surprising since this is largely motherhood and apple pie kind of language. China is instead content to say in their readout (again for the umpteenth time) that China and India are partners, not rivals. Indeed, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi thinks this is the “most important consensus” that was reached by the two leaders on the margins of the BRICS summit. Interestingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson quoted PM Modi as saying India has an independent foreign policy and that India will not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities on its territory. The spokesperson went on to say that China values PM Modi’s statements in this context. The Indian readout does not make a reference to this purported statement by our PM.

If China really wants to be India’s partner and not its rival, it should prove that through its actions. As the bigger country, it can begin by engaging with India to find a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the border issue, commit itself fully to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and at least not prevent, if not actively encourage, the rise of India. China can also coooperate much more with India in UN and other fora. China harping on India’s independent foreign policy is a not so subtle reference to our ties with the US. But that is an argument India can make too, with regard to China’s ties with some of India’s neighbours.

While talking of the border, India talks of respecting past agreements concluded with China in the matter. China makes no such reference in its readout. Perhaps the time has come, as some Indian experts have suggested, to come up with new understanding between the two sides. Easier said than done of course.

News reports also suggest that our PM did convey to the Chinese President that both countries must respect the core interests/concerns of each other. This is important since China keeps harping on its core interests/concerns (which also keep evolving very conveniently for them) but one has never come across mention of India’s core interests/concerns in any Chinese literature.

At the end of the day, India does not have the luxury of non-engagement with China. Not only is China a powerful neighbour with a long and disputed border with India, but it is an extremely critical commercial and trading partner for India. India may possess far less clout than China, but it is in the latter’s interest to also engage with India in good faith so that the structural impediments in the relationship are resolved where possible and managed where necessary and most important, are not allowed to completely derail bilateral ties. Such an eventuality does neither country any good in dealing with the geopolitical turbulence the world is witnessing. If there is one positive from the most recent Xi-Modi meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Delhi, it may be this mutual realization on the part of both countries.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University in India. Views are personal.

The Trump administration released its National Security Science and Technology Strategy (hereinafter referred to as NSSTS) on August 18, 2026. If you think this is a document that the American administration releases annually, you would be wrong. The last time a document bearing this title was released by the White House was in 1995 by the Clinton Administration. Other intervening administrations incorporated this in either the National Security Strategy itself or in the form of standalone memos.

So, you might ask what was the provocation for such a document after a long gap. The answer is predictable: People’s Republic of China! The present document highlights the importance of leadership in emerging technologies and warns of losing the advantage to China.

The American objective is clear: It wants to remain the world’s most scientifically and technogically advanced/innovative country and to build upon this strength. However, the NSSTS recognizes that American leadership in S&T is being challenged by potenial adversaries that are investing heavily in advanced technology development and military applications. The document also states clearly that potential adversaries seek asymmetric capabilities to counter US military superiority as well as steal US intellectual property. It also acknowledges that potential adversaries seek to disrupt supply chains and infrastructure including by controlling the extraction, refining, export and manufacturing of critical minerals.

To tackle the above, the NSSTS sets out four pillars of scientific and technological development as it pertains to national security. The first pillar entitled, “Focusing Techno-Strategic Competition” describes the importance of maintaining and advancing US technlogical advantage on the battlefield specifically three priority areas: undersea, space and Artificial Intelligence. The document also emphasizes the need to use technology to counter strategic threats to the homeland such as the “Golden Dome” among other things. The second pillar ” Building Technological Resilience” focuses on developing preemptive resilience in technological systems critical to national security. The document emphasizes that in order to achieve this objective, the US must lead on transformative emerging technologies and keeping foreign adversaries out of critical technology systems and supply chains. In other words, technology denial regime will be the preferred option for the US. Potentially transformative emerging technologies include, but are not limited to: AI & Autonomy, Biotechology and Quantum information technologies. The third pillar ” Accelerate the Pace of Innovation” outlines how to maintain the American advantage in emerging technologies by accelerating research and development through, inter alia, removing regulatory barriers, incentivizing research and reforming the defence acquisition process. The final pillar ” Protect National Security Science & Technology” specifically calls out China as a threat and proposes to protect critical science and technology through increased scrutiny of foreign investments, companies, and personnel involved in the research and development process. The NSSTS for instance seeks to prohibit fundamental research funding to high-risk entities, including companies
on the section 1260H list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States.

The NSSTS also dwells on implementation of the above strategy. It talks of strengthening education and training in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) at all levels, update R&D infrastructure as well as augment R&D funding. Cooperation with allies and partners is mentioned for what it is worth.

A final appendix lists the latest and updated critical emerging technologies, a list that is extremely useful for the uninitiated.

In March 2026, China released its 15th Five Year Plan (FYP). The 15th FYP calls for “extraordinary measures” to reduce China’s reliance on foreign S&T and strengthen China’s S&T self-reliance and independent innovation capacity. It emphasizes indigenous innovation as the core driver of
China’s development, a direction that its leaders first set out in 2006. Chinese indigenous innovation can involve the acquisition of foreign technologies that are then adapted and rebranded as Chinese capabilities; China uses foreign commercial and research ties to fill capability gaps in
advancing national goals. The FYP focuses on boosting Chinese capabilities to build self-reliance in areas in which it currently depends on the United States, Europe, and Japan, including aircraft; agriculture; advanced equipment, instruments, and tools; energy; gas turbines; software; and
semiconductors. The Chinese targets and priorities are: (1) Accelerating development in semiconductors, aerospace, biomedicine, novel energy storage and smart robots; (2) Cutlivating beakthrough technologies such as quantum computing, biomanufacturing, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied AI and 6G; (3) Targeting annual growth in society-wide R&D spending above 7 per cent to support the entire domestic innovation chain and (4) Moving past isolated tech breakthroughs to full-chain industrial synergy, particularly in home-grown chip manufactuing, foundational software and advanced materials.

There you have it! All this points to a full-fledged battle for tech supremacy between an established superpower and an emerging one, the outcome of which may well decide the fate of humanity.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. He is also the inaugural Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies. Views are personal.

So much is being written about on geopolitics and International Relations (IR), as it concerns global events. The war in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Iran, have thus occupied both the print and digital media. But amidst all this, one tends to forget the theoretical foundations of IR. This blog is a modest attempt to make amends. While doing so, focus is brought to bear not just on Western theoretical constructs but also on recent attempts by Chinese scholars to put forward their own theories related to IR.

Any Western treatise of IR will per force talk of three main theories of IR, namely, Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. There are of course others but for the purpose of this blog, we will confine ourselves to these three.

Realism, conceived in the early part of the twentieth century, is a fairly straightforward theory of state-centred international relations, which contends that all states are attempting to enhance their power and that those governments which can efficiently accumulate such strength will prosper, quickly transcending the achievements of comparatively less successful states. According to this theory, a nation’s primary goal ought to be self-preservation, and increasing power has to be a socio-economic and political requisite.

In the present scheme of things, both the US and China seem wedded to this theory of IR, bent as they are on accumulating and enhancing their power. John Mearsheimer has argued that the international relations system requires that states maximize their offensive power to be secure and keep rivals from gaining power at their expense. The problem is this then becomes an exercise at hegemony, making the Thucidydes Trap a possibility, if not a probability. According to ‘offensive realism’, a branch of the realism school, nations are prone to rivalry and conflict because they are self-interested, power-maximizing, and frightened of other states. Furthermore, it contends that nations are obligated to behave in this manner in order to survive in the international system. ‘Defensive realism’, yet another branch of the realism school, argues that states tend to act in favour of a balance of power instead of letting other states develop economically, military strengths, and political power because it is perceived as a threat to their security and interests. It is for readers to judge which branch is subscribed to by either US or China.

Liberalism is centred on the premise that the existing international system is capable of establishing a harmonious global order. Instead of depending on aggressive force, such as military conflict, liberalism encourages global cooperation as a tool of advancing every state’s individual goals. Liberalists think that the negative repercussions of using warfare, such as economic damage and civilian fatalities, considerably outweigh the possible gains. As a result, liberal political leaders normally like to use economic and political power to realize national objectives. In the current, globally connected world, economic techniques such as bilateral trade agreements and international political diplomacy may be more efficient than using force in achieving political objectives. That said, multilateralism and global cooperation is at an all time low in international relations today. So, there are very few takers for this school of thought, at least among the major powers.

Constructivism theory in international affairs is based on the assumption that nations, like humans, exist in a world of our making in which certain concepts, such as social facts, gender roles are created by human activity, as opposed to brute facts, which are developed independently. Its arguments are based on concepts such as discourses, conventions, identities, and social interaction, which are widely used in contemporary conversations about a variety of international matters such as globalization, international human rights, defence policy, and others. Constructivism believes that the structure of the international system cannot be uniformly applied to all state relations as it mainly bases the relations and interactions between countries and their shared understanding as the source of conflict or cooperation. Constructivists view identity as the basis for interests, institutions, and relations between countries. It is conceivable to look at the war in Ukraine through the lens of constructivists.

The Chinese theories of IR mirror, at least to an extent, the Western theories above. The respective three schools are: Yan Xuetong’s moral realism, Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia system and Qin Yaqing’s relational theory.

Yan Xuetong’s moral realism is realism with a softer edge if you like. According to Yan Xuetong, there are three different ways in which governmental power can be wielded in Chinese political thought – qiang (tyranny), ba (hegemony), and wang (humane authority). Yan argues that the humane authority style of leadership is regarded in Confucian thoughts as the highest and most prized form of government. Moral realism is about humane authority. As Yan Xuetong elaborated, at the core of humane authority thinking is benevolence and righteousness.  It is about practicing those virtues and moral values in order to be accepted by others as the world leader. Whether world leaders in general and Chinese leaders in particular, practice this today is arguable.

Since the first publication of The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution in 2005, Zhao Tingyang has been promoting the idea of Tianxia as an inclusive global philosophy that transcends the perspective of the nation state so that all must look at all without excluding anyone. According to Zhao Tingyang, political theorists in the West are mainly concerned about life in terms of the individual, community, and nation-state. In contrast, the Chinese tradition looks to the levels of the world (i.e. Tianxia), state, and family. It is argued that the Westphalian world order inevitably leads to conflict in world politics due to it being based on competing national interests. Due to the limitations of Western political theory, with the nation-state as the largest political unit, Zhao suggests that we need to transcend the principle of ‘internationality’ and think about the world from a truly global perspective. Zhao Tingyang then draws from an idealised version of the Tianxia system of the Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–256 bc) as the paradigmatic model and argues that the system would solve world-scale peace problems through its world institution. After all, the Tianxia system is supposed to be an all-inclusive geographical, psychological, and institutional term. It is meant to operate on three levels: (1) the earth, that is, all lands under the sky; (2) a common or public choice made by all peoples in the world, truly representing the general will; and (3) a universal political system for the world. The Chinese scholars may well argue that the Belt and Road initiative, albeit flawed for some, is based on this utopian school of Chinese theory of IR!

Qin Yaqing is one of the main advocates of the need to construct the Chinese theories of IR based on its cultural traditions. It is not surprising that Qin Yaqing explores Chinese cultural and philosophical traditions as sources to develop an IR theory, especially when considering his intellectual background. Most of his earlier work was hugely influenced by constructivism in IR, which sees state behaviours as shaped by cultural factors such as culture, norms, and identity. Since 2015, Qin officially put forward the “relational” theory of IR which theorises the Chinese notion of “relationality” as the core of his theory. His theory involves four basic assumptions: (1) relationality is the basic unit for analysing the social world; (2) rationality is embedded within relationality; (3) relationality determines identity; and (4) relationality generates power. Is it possible to talk of Chinese influence and power in East Asia, based on the Chinese identity of a large number of inhabitants in those countries?

At the end of the day, theories of IR are what they are, namely, theories. They may lead to a better understanding of major events around us, but care must be exercised to ensure not to overinterpret events to suit one’s theoretical bias.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Consider the following three news items in as many months. First, in June this year, The Times of Israel reported that Qatar secretly secured US approval for a financial arrangement with Iran that allowed billions of dollars to flow to Tehran in return for the safe passage of Qatari tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. The arrangement also allowed Iran access to frozen funds in Qatar. Observers noted that since the “arrangement”, Qatar has largely been spared attacks by Iran while some other GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries, like Kuwait and Bahrain, were targeted. Second, in January of this year, the Saudis refused use by the US of the air bases to attack Iran. Again, beginning of this month, when Trump forewarned that he will bomb the hell out of Iran (his language was much more colourful than that), it was the Saudi leader known by his initials MBS who clearly told President Trump not to proceed with the attacks against Iran. Third, in today’s News18 there is a report which says the following: UAE on August 11 and 12 released $3 billion in assets and transferred about 2 tonnes of gold and 15 commercial planes to Iran. None of the above press reports have been refuted so far.

Taken together, this is an excellent indication of the strategic posturing of the “big three” of the GCC countries, namely, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. When the US/Israel attacks commenced in February against Iran, it was not clear what position the GCC countries would take. After all, it was in their collective interest to see Iran significantly weakened, if not entirely obliterated. But the big revelation of this war has been the strategic leverage possessed by Iran, which the latter has cleverly put to use. One obviously was the Strait of Hormuz which is now being bandied about as a weapon of choice by Iran. Two, by attacking critical infrastructure in the GCC countries as retaliation against US strikes, Iran has made them realize that geography is cruel and cannot be wished away. The GCC countries now realize that they have to live with Iran and while it is true that they had hitherto outsourced their security to the US in the form of expensive toys and bases, it is now clear that in the future these countries will hedge their bets, even while maintaining some “de minimis” security relationship with the US. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye may be seen in this light. Others like Qatar and UAE have signed security and defence agreements with Ukraine, with focus on drone and missile cooperation at the heart of it. UAE of course has an alliance with Israel which is special: after all, Israel deployed its famous “dome” and some troops to the UAE recently to counter Iranian drones. The UAE and Oman have also signed defence agreements with France in May and June respectively. All of this may suit the US which, for now, has run out of both military ammunition and political will to be drawn into another “forever war” in West Asia. It is now increasingly clear that the Trump foreign security doctrine in its essence focuses primarily on two theatres: the Western Hemisphere and the Western Pacific, to the relative exclusion of others.

The Omanese Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr, writing in Le Monde in July this year, said the ongoing war had revealed the drawbacks of the current security architecture in the Gulf which according to him was based on a false narrative of containing Iran, allegedly based on an existential threat from the latter. This had led to excessive militarization of the entire region. He called for a new inclusive security framework for the Gulf. The basic points he makes in the Le Monde article are worthy of reflection:

>Any security framework must include not just the 6 GCC countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain) but also Iran and Iraq;

>Shift the onus of maintaining peace and security in the region to local players rather than rely on external military intervention;

>Establish an immediate, permanent international framework in accordance with international law to safeguard freedom of navigation in the vital Strait of Hormuz, noting Oman and Iran’s special geographic responsibility over the key maritime corridor; and

>Strategic recalibration entailing rebalancing ties with key global players (read the US) to fit an emerging order following the recent war, rather than continuing with outdated geopolitical narratives.

Having spent more than four years in Bahrain, I am aware of Oman’s special position in the GCC. Oman has always maintained ties with Iran and has been the object of mild rebuke from its GCC partners for doing so. But Oman has always had the courage of conviction to pursue an independent foreign and security policy, which sometimes has diverged from the rest of the GCC. The Omanese Foreign Minister makes eminent sense in the article above. The million dollar question is: will the other GCC players buy into it?

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

While the WTO does poorly in the areas of negotiations and dispute settlement, there is an area where it carries on gamely. That is the field of trade monitoring. To do this in full measure, the WTO provides for a Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO) which entails periodic review of the trade policies and practices of WTO Members. While Members like US and EU must subject themselves to this review every two years, countries like India must undertake this every four years. On 21 and 23 July the WTO carried out this mandated trade policy review of India. It was the eighth such review of India.

The stated objective of the trade policy review is to contribute to
improved adherence by all WTO Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members. This last mentioned point is important. The recommendations are purely advisory in nature and are not legally binding on the countries concerned. This is something the Indian delegation to the Uurguay Round of negotiations (of which I was a part) fought hard. US and EU argued for legally binding recommendations. We resisted and prevailed. Yet, the value of this exercise is important and countries will be well advised to note what other trading partners think of its trade policies and practices.

The Secretariat report acknowledges the ambition of India to become Viksit Bharat by 2047. It also notes that to attain high-income economy status by 2047, India will need to sustain real GDP growth (as opposed to nominal growth) of 8 per cent annually till then. The World Bank has come up with revised criteria recently for classification of countries as low-income, high-income etc but uses Gross National Income (GNI) not GDP (Gross Domestic Product). For the uninitiated, GNI equals GDP plus net income received by a country from abroad. The World Bank basically divides countries into (a) low income (less than $ 1135 GNP per capita); (b) lower-middle income ($ 1136 – 4495 GNP per capita); (c) upper-middle income ($ 4496 – 13,935 GNP per capita); and (d) high-income, more than $ 13,395 GNP per capita. The very first thing we should be clear is what we mean by Viksit Bharat? Do we mean more than $ 13,395 GNP per capita? For India, in 2025, the difference in GDP per capita and GNP per capita is marginal ($ 2702 versus $2760) so we need not concern ourselves with it too much. But it will be seen from the above that upper-middle income status has a very wide range from $ 4496 to $ 13,935 GNP per capita. There is little doubt that India will soon move into this bracket, certainly by 2030. But whether we can go beyond GNP per capita of $13,395 and become a high-income country is moot at this point. It might be useful for the NITI Ayog to come up with a quantitative target of say $ 10,000 GNP per capita by 2047 to denote Viksit Bharat. Even for this, India must get to a $15 Trillion economy by 2047, no mean feat. NITI Ayog could also combine this with a Gini coefficient target specific for India to ensure that growth achieved is inclusive.

Back to the Trade Policy Review of India at the WTO. A lot of positive comments were made by WTO Members. Member participation was high, denoting the level of importance attached to India in the global economy. About 1090 written questions were received from 44 WTO Members. It was acknowledged that India is an increasingly important pole of global demand. A number of countries cited their rapid increase in bilateral trade with India. Several least-developed countries thanked India for preferential access to its market and requested that India’s duty-free, quota-free access be extended further. India’s digital public infrastructure, predictably, came in for praise. Members also urged India to continue its wide-ranging reform agenda even while seeking further information on the transparency and effectiveness of a broad range of trade-related measures undertaken by it.

On the question of plurilateral negotiations at the WTO (also called Joint Statement Initiatives) which India has hitherto declined to join, a number of Members, both developed and developing, encouraged India to consider participating in arrangements such as the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement and the interim arrangement for Electronic Commerce. It is clear that India will have to take a call on this important issue, sooner rather than later. The fact that India’s non-participation in plurilateral negotiations is causing concern even among countries of the Gobal South is something that India has to factor in while taking a final decision in the matter.

In terms of flak received, WTO Members raised issues of transparency and predictability about India’s trade measures. In particular, Members raised points about tariff changes, unexpected export restrictions, complex licencing arrangements, lengthy investment approvals and a lack of regulatory certainty. It was suggested by many that there needed to be greater outreach by our authorities to trading partners on proposed measures before their entry into force. Our WTO notification record was highlighted as an area where there could be further improvement.

Numerous questions were raised about India’s standards, technical regulations and Quality Control Orders. In particular, further clarifications were sought by Members on consultation procedures, reasons for delay in conducting factory visits, lack of clear implementation timelines, alignment with international standards, simplified conformity assessment requirements and more recognition of foreign labs and certification bodies. WTO Members highlighted the burden delays placed on their exporters and the importance of transparency, proportionality and predictability.

Agriculture got a fair share of its questions and concerns. India’s minimum support prices, input subsidies, public stockholding programmes, import licencing and export restrictions on products such as wheat, rice, sugar and onions were all raised. Also highlighted were sanitary and phytosanitary measures relating to the availability of underlying risk assessments and realted methodologies. This is a matter of some concern. Despite valiant efforts by the Indian delegation in Geneva and our capital-based negotiators, there is relative lack of understanding in Geneva of how unfair the Agreement on Agriculture is towards countries like India. Food security for India is non-negotiable and yet this is not sufficiently understood and appreciated by our trading partners, especially those which are developed and who have had a field day subsidising their own agriculture until recently. No one said the WTO is fair, so welcome to the real and tough world of trade negotiations!

Questions were also raised about our Production-Linked Incentive schemes as also with our FDI policies and investment screening procedures. We need to satisfy our main trading partners in this regard.

On the plus side, Members welcomed the significant increases recorded in patent filings from India, expanded use of digital filing and progress in digitalization of customs and border procedures.

While India need not attach equal weight to all the questions and comments above, concerns expressed about lack of transparency, predictability, proportionality and investor-friendly trade measures must be taken seriously. After all, India has signed a number of FTAs in the recent past and if the fruits of those have to be reaped by us, we need to put in place a trade policy regime that is fit for purpose. The Ministry of Commerce has its work cut out.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian trade negotiator and is at present Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

As any diplomat who has served in West Asia (aka Middle East) knows, aphorisms abound. One is that nothing in the region is ever as simple as it seems. The other is that, people in the region are liable to say something and then do exactly the opposite. These two things, even if remotely accurate, make it very difficult for outsiders to understand the region in all its complexity. But the Iran war has introduced a new degree of complexity which makes it hard even for experts to understand and predict events. Consider the following relationships.

US-Israel dissension: US-Israel ties have largely stood the test of time, though American Presidents have struggled on and off to bring their ironclad ally into line. But something different seems to be happening now. Questions like “who is the effing superpower here?” are being bandied about by the MAGA crowd, with Tucker Carlson leading the charge. More important, public opinion in the US which hitherto had cut Israel a lot of slack, appears to be turning. When unconfirmed reports emerge that the US provided intelligence inputs to Iran, of all countries, about the possibility of Israeli attacks against their negotiators, you know something is amiss somewhere. It is still premature to say that there is a rupture in the ironclad relationship, but it is doubtful if full trust can be restored anytime soon. Voices in the US blame Israel for having led Trump up the garden path in launching an unnecessary war against Iran. Interestingly, Israel itself is conscious of this and has promised to end its dependence on the US in ten year’s time. Who would have thought?

US-Iran rapprochement? It is important to understand the signficance of an American President signing a MOU with an Iranian President. This has not happened in decades. Add to this the provision in the MOU that US undertakes to develop a plan involving a whopping sum of USD 300 billion to help in the development and reconstruction of Iran, and you begin to rub your eyes in disbelief. The MOU could yet collapse. But Iran is a country which has normalized the slogan ” death to America” in the region. It is hard to overlook the geopolitical evolution in current American thinking, which should worry the hell out of not just Israel but also the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries.

UAE-KSA rift: One of the biggest casualties of the Iran war has been GCC unity, such as it was prior to the conflict. There is a lot of history to the deep mistrust between the Emiratis and the Saudis which in the past prevented the GCC from even launching a common currency. UAE normalizing its ties with Israel through the Abraham accords in 2020 was another area where the Emiratis differed with the Saudis who have always linked this issue with progress in Palestinian statehood. The conflicts in Yemen and South Sudan also saw the Emiratis and Saudis back different groups, leading to tension in the ties. UAE pulling out of OPEC, in the view of some analysts, was the last nail in the coffin. The Saudis were clearly not pleased.

But it is the current Iran conflict that has led to UAE and KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) falling foul of each other. It is no secret that UAE bore the brunt of the attacks from Iran and has also suffered the biggest reputational damage from the war. After all, the entire Dubai paradigm is under threat and it will take years for it to recover. UAE has clearly hitched its wagon to Israel and the US, in a clear break from the rest of the GCC. Given the traditional Shia-Sunni animosity between Iran and KSA, one would have thought the Saudis would have joined the Emiratis in wanting to teach a lesson to the Iranians. Curiously however, this did not happen. Indeed, at one stage the Saudis withheld permission from the US for their bases in KSA to be used for launching attacks against Iran. US threatened the Saudis that anti-drone interceptors would be withheld from them, before matters were resolved. Even so, one of the things that the Pakistanis reportedly secured was a commitment from Iran not to attack KSA. After all, the safety of Paksitani troops was at stake!

The bottom line is this. The UAE-KSA rift is here to stay and will jeopardise all attempts to achieve unity in the GCC.

Israel-Turkey rift: Something has changed in the ties between Israel and Turkey. On June 23rd an Israeli minister claimed that Turkey, along with Syria, had replaced Iran as the biggest danger to his country. Israel also upped the ante by recognising the genocide of the Armenian people carried out by the Ottomans in 1915 (Turkey does not recognise the deaths as a war crime, let alone a genocide). Not to be outdone, Turkey’s interior minister said he hoped to become the governor of Jerusalem once the city came under Turkish control. After all, the Ottoman empire ruled Jerusalem and Palestine for four centuries until 1917. Israel worries about Turkey’s outsized footprint in Syria and its budding military alliance with Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Turkey is concerned with Israel’s wars in Gaza, Iran and Lebanon, and its co-operation with Kurdish insurgents. Turkish policymakers consider Israel an impediment to every single file in the Middle East they are involved in. For now, the risk of confrontation between these two countries may be remote, but this relationship bears watching.

Qatar‘s substantive mediation: There are reasons to believe that while Paksitan did play an initial role as an interlocutor/ mediator, the more substantive role of late has been played by Qatar. This is interesting since Iran in March had reportedly succeeded in destroying the Ras Laffan City, the World’s biggest LNG facility in Qatar. But since March, there have been no serious attacks on Qatar. The obvious inference is that Qatar may have transferred (unblocked) substantial sums of USD to Iran, apart from taking on a more important mediatory role. This is of course due to Qatar’s enlightened self interest, more than anything else.

A Sunni axis in the offing? There have been repeated attempts in the past to establish a Sunni axis. In the current context, a Sunni axis has as its starting point the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement concluded in September 2025 between KSA and Pakistan. Famously, it has a NATO Article 5-like clause which says any attack on one country will be viewed as an attack on both. This also explains why Pakistan was so keen to implore Iran not to attack KSA, lest its troops get sucked into a conflict in the region. The million dollar question is this: Will Turkey and Egypt be happy to join this incipient “Sunni Alliance”? Evidence so far is mixed. Turkey has differences with KSA in terms of ambitions to lead the Islamic world and has the additional burden of belonging to NATO. Egypt has enough internal problems of its own for it not to want to be distracted by this, though it will welcome the monetary resources that come with it. All in all, it is an alliance in the making, and may remain that way for a while.

The curious case of Kurds: When the US along with Israel started the war with Iran, President Trump let it be known that he expected the Kurdish groups in Iran to rise up against the Iranian regime with a view to overthrowing the latter. President Trump, as is his wont, reversed gear a week later when he said that he did NOT want the Kurds to do anything since the war in Iran was complicated as it is! The CIA was reportedly working to arm Kurdish forces, and there are credible reports that the Trump administration was in active discussions with Kurdish groups about providing them with military support.  In effect, the US was bombing Iran with a view to potentially prepare the ground for Kurdish parties based in the region and across the border in Iraq to launch an offensive against the Iranian regime. This never came to pass. Nevertheless in February, five Kurdish parties announced the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. These include the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, the Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, the Kurdistan Free Life Party and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan which joined later. The coalition’s leadership is largely based in Iraq or in exile in the West, though it is also well-organized inside Iran through clandestine networks. It is however unclear whether the newfound unity among the Iranian Kurds will endure. Disagreements over strategy, competition for resources, historical enmities and changing conditions may conspire to undermine their strategic cooperation in the near term.

Oman goes it alone as usual: Among all the GCC countries, Oman views itself differently. Other GCC countries call Oman “special”, with barely concealed sarcasm. Despite this, Oman has always ploughed a lonely furrow. Oman has always maintained excellent ties with Iran, going against the grain. Indeed, in May last year both Oman and Iran signed a number of agreements . More important, Iranian President Pezeshkian after a bilateral meeting with the Omanese Sultan praised Oman’s “active and constructive” role in facilitating “indirect” nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington. The Iranian president affirmed Iran’s full trust in Oman as a neutral mediator and reiterated Tehran’s commitment to diplomacy. That was then. In the recent conflict, Oman’s role appears to have been marginal. On the possibility of a toll for the Hormuz Strait, Oman has formally maintained the Strait must be open unconditionally and without fees. Indeed, Oman joined in the GCC Ministerial statement issued after the Rubio visit which rejected any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz. This in turn was predictably rejected by Iran. Subsequently Oman too walked back these remarks. What then is the actual position of Oman on the issue of fees/toll for the Hormuz Strait? Oman’s position may be described as one of “strategic ambiguity”. As a result, Omani diplomats tack back and forth between insisting no toll will be charged, and suggesting that ships might be eventually asked to pay a fee which will be called something other than a toll.

Whither I2U2? Conventional wisdom has it that the war in Iran means the I2U2 will be difficult to get off the ground. This may be true as far as it goes. If it however does materialize fully at a later stage, the I2U2 may be seen as a counterweight to the “Sunni Alliance” referred to earlier. Regardless, India has vastly strengthened its ties with the UAE for both strategic and energy security reasons. This has not and should not prevent India from maintaining good ties with both KSA and Iran.

If all of the above makes your head spin, you are not alone. It merely reconfirms two other aphorisms that I heard about West Asia when I served there as India’s envoy to Bahrain. One, the region, with tedious consistency, produces more history than it can consume. Two, what happens in the region seldom stays there!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the Kingdom of Bahrain and is at present Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.

Now that we have a piece of paper (MOU) signed by both American President Trump and Iranian President Pezeshkian, it may be a good time to compare this document with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by EU plus 3 (US,UK,France, Germany,China,Russia, with the EU’s High Representative) with Iran as far back as 2015.

But before we do that, some broad observations. The JCPOA was a “final” agreement painstakingly arrived at after two years of negotiations. The MOU is an “interim” framework with a “final” agreement potentially emerging after 60 days or more, decided by mutual consent. The JCPOA involved the major powers and was thus legally binding. The MOU is binding, to the extent it is, only for US and Iran. In effect, we are comparing apples and oranges.

Standstill Clause

Pending the final ageement, the US and Iran agree to maintain the status quo i.e. Iran will maintain the status quo of its nuclear program and the US will not impose any new sanctions and will not deploy any additional forces in the region. On the latter point, there is an interesting clause which says that the US undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of Iran within 30 days after the final deal. What exactly does this imply? It would seem to refer to the 50,000-odd troops that the US has for its ongoing military operations around Iran. It certainly does not refer to US bases in the GCC countries!

Nuclear Issue

The JCPOA is nothing if not categorical. It asserts: Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will it ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. But it also provides that the JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In fact, it talks of Iran’s “right” under the NPT to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The MOU on the other hand says: Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.

While the language seems stronger in the JCPOA than the MOU, I think the key is whether or not Iran is entitled to any peaceful nuclear programme at all. Presumably, this will be dealt with in the subsequent negotiations. But Trump was clear in the press conference yesterday in Evian. Why should a country like Iran that has so much energy in the form of oil and gas, need nuclear energy at all? This will doubtless be a thorny issue in the forthcoming negotiations.

The JCPOA had detailed and technical annexes about uranium enrichment and so on. The MOU has none of that because this issue is yet to be negotiated as part of the final agreement.

Strait of Hormuz

This was simply not an issue before February 2026. The fact that it is now, may be considered a sign of US retrenchment from not just the region, but from the world in general. If true, China will draw the necessary conclusions.

The MOU makes clear that immediately upon signing (which has already happened) the US will begin the removal of its naval blockade and end it within 30 days. During the same period, Iran will restore the traffic of vessels in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic. Interestingly, Iran will make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels with “no charge” only for a period of 60 days from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. After this period, Iran will consult with Oman to “define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states”. This is subject to variable interpretation. But one common interpretation is that some kind of “service fee” for Iran and Oman may be applicable to the vessels utilizing the Strait of Hormuz, even if UNCLOS is accepted by Iran and Oman.

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Iran

The JCPOA merely says that parties to the agreement reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

The MOU is much more explicit: US and Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and terrritorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs. This appears significant for Iran which sought an iran clad commitment that US will not go back to bombing. But the value of this commitment is dubious. President Trump is already saying if Iran does not meet its commitments, the US will go back to bombing it. There is also the other wild card that is Israel. Israel, notably, is not a party to the MOU so not bound by this commitment. But the MOU does say the US and its allies (Israel?) and Iran and its allies (Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis?) through this MOU declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts including Lebanon. They also undertake not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other and ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. One can see why Israel is so unhappy about the MOU!

Dollars and Cents

The JCPOA says it will lead to the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. All this was immediate since the JCPOA was a final agreement. One of the criticisms of the Republicans against the JCPOA was that the Obama administration paid “huge” sums of dollars to Iran with nothing to show in return. As will be seen below, this criticism of the JCPOA may come back to haunt the Republicans.

On sanctions, the MOU says the US undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against Iran including the UN Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary in an agreed upon schedule as part of the final deal. It was agreed that this issue will be immediately addressed in the negotiations that follow. So, this is valuable leverage that the US still has vis-a-vis Iran.

But three measures of economic relief for Iran are discernible. One, Iran can straightaway start selling its crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives even pending the final agreement. US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the same. Two, the US undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. Procedures to be agreed upon. Three, the US undertakes with regional partners to develop a defintive, mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for reconstruction and economic development of Iran. Mechanism to be developed as part of the final deal within 60 days. When asked about this in the press conference yesterday, President Trump countered by saying that so much destruction has been wrought by the bombing on Iran that they need the money for reconstruction. Add to this unconfirmed reports that both Qatar and UAE have already transferred substantial sums in dollars to Iran for agreeeing to sign the MOU.

Role for UNSC

Given the lack of trust between the two parties and perhaps at the insistence of the Iranians, the MOU provides that the final agreement will be endorsed by a binding UNSC resolution. This, presumably, will make it more difficult for the two sides to renege on the final agreement that is arrived upon.

In order to definitively judge the MOU against the JCPOA, one will need to know the broad contours of the final agreement arrived at by US and Iran in the next 60 days or more.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University.

French President Emmanuel Macron is nothing if not dramatic. Speaking at Sorbonne in 2024, he proclaimed with customary chutzpah: “Our Europe is mortal; it can die, and it all depends on our choices.” For once, Macron was not exaggerating when he said that. Europe does seem to face unprecedented existential challenges.

I have just returned from Barcelona after participating in a well-attended conference whose title was duly provocative: Europe’s strategic autonomy, myth or reality! The conference though organized by the ” Cercle d’economia” of Barcelona, attracted strategic thinkers from all over Europe. I was invited along with a distinguished Professor from the University of Beijing to give the Indian and Chinese perspectives respectively. While it is impossible to summarize the outcome of the two-day conference here, I do wish to make two significant points. One, the general mood was sombre. Two, there was wide consensus among those present that while America continues to innovate the best and China still manufactures prolifically, all the EU is able to do is regulate!

The economic climate in Europe was a matter of substantive debate and discussion. There was a feeling that Europe was being squeezed by both China and the US. Specific problems faced by Europe ranged from the housing crisis, low productivity, youth unemployment and burgeoning immigration, both legal and illegal. As an aside, it was interesting that while Barcelona had 10,000 Indian immigrants, they had something like 30,000 Pakistani immigrants! While a range of solutions were offered by economists and thinkers, the final conclusion was that Europe was too big an entity for a “one size fits all” economic and social solution. Brussels came in for a fair bit of criticism and China was seen more as a strategic threat than as a benign partner. US under Trump was considered an unreliable and unpredictable partner. But speaker after speaker was at pains to point out that the changes in the US were more or less irreversible and will outlast President Trump regardless of who wins in the presidential elections there in 2028.

India’s strategic autonomy was lauded and even viewed with some jealousy. As opposed to China, we were largely seen in benevolent terms. There was some talk of Europe and India getting together to strengthen their “geopolitical alliance”. But the European economic operators and company representatives who were present in large numbers continued to believe that India was a tough place to do business. I did underline the reforms and the ease of business steps taken by the Government. I got a patient hearing, if nothing else.

Europe’s strategic autonomy is under assault from three directions. Energy independence from Russia is proving to be difficult. Economic derisking from China is easier said than done. As if both these were not challenge enough, Europe now eventually seeks security and military independence from the US, thanks to moves by the Trump administration. Doing any one of these is difficult in the best of times; but for Europe to cope with all three at once, is nothing short of daunting.

The most worrying thing was that there was absolutely no discussion among the European strategic community regarding a new security architecture for Europe involving Russia. Russia was viewed in antithetical terms and there was conviction that Ukraine was making incremental progress, especially of late. Equally, it was felt that the economic situation in Russia was dire and President Putin was under enormous domestic pressure over the war in Ukraine.

These days, it is impossible to attend any conference anywhere in the world without a session devoted to Artificial Intelligence (AI). So it was in Barcelona too. Europe was seen as falling behind both US and China in this crucial area. The Commission led by Von der Leyen was to announce a European technological sovereignty package: a set of measures to strengthen the EU’s capacity in semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud and open source. It was expected to help Europe become a leader in AI, strengthen its digital autonomy, and help build a more sustainable digital future. This package was eventually announced by the Commission on 4 June. It remains to be seen how well this plan is implemented all over EU.

Whether Europe’s strategic autonomy is a myth or reality is arguable. What is clear is that European Union faces multiple challenges which if not properly handled will have the effect of diminishing its strategic autonomy, rather than enhancing it. This is a moment for Europe to be united, not divided. And yet, differences abound, whether it is Europe’s strategy of countering China, or its strategy of coping with the US or the strategy of resisting Russia. There is also the fate of the Franco-German engine which has been so vital for the smooth functioning of the EU. France is on the cusp of a terribly important election next year. If someone like Jordan Bardella becomes the French President, France’s approach to EU and Brussels will undergo a paradigm shift. This could potentially include things like the use of the French nuclear arsenal and will therefore vitally impact the “forward deterrence” proposition put forward by President Macron. As for Germany, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, France and Germany spent nearly the same amount on defence. By 2029 however, Germany’s defence budget is expected to swell to at least €150bn ($174bn)—roughly double that of France’s. For European security, German rearmament is welcome. Yet in Paris the prospect may also prompt some discomfort. The Franco-German link was forged around an implicit equilibrium: France carries the military burden, while Germany provides economic might. If that equation were to change radically, a lot of other things might have to change too in the EU.

EU will undoubtedly cope with all this, as only it can. The question though is whether all of this will prevent the EU from achieving great power status in the near term, which then has profound implications for the kind of multipolar world order we are heading towards.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University in India. Views are personal.

The much-awaited and the oft-postponed summit meeting between American President Donald Trump and Chinese supremo Xi Jinping finally took place in Beijing on 14 May. In the current geopolitical context, it is hard to imagine a more consequential meeting between two world leaders. Whichever way one looks at it, the geopolitcal ramifications are important and can now be reasonably deduced. Here is an attempt to do so.

Strategic Parity

One may quibble about relative strengths in specific fields, but there is no gainsaying the fact that we are now talking about two Great Powers that possess broad strategic parity. By this, I mean that we can safely rule out, at least in the near term, the possibility of one power overwhelmingly dominating the other. President Trump probably understands this better than most people, hence his treatment of Xi Jinping with kid gloves. China, on the other hand, wanted to message the world that the latter must henceforth treat China on par with the US. To the domestic Chinese audience, Xi Jinping wished to convey that he is now the leader who is courted by the US, not the other way around. The venue for the all important summit meeting was China not the US, which is a story in itself. Whether the Chair for Trump was a trifle smaller than the one for Xi, is a matter for behavioural scientists, not geopolitical analysts. Finally, it was apparent to all that President Trump sought this meeting more than Xi did. There appears to be an agreement for Xi to reciprocate by visiting US later this year. It will be interesting to see whether Xi will do it as part of a multilateral engagement (G20) or whether it will be a stand-alone visit such as the one by President Trump.

No Joint Statement

Since there was a lot of time to prepare for this summit meeting (after all it was being talked about for weeks, if not months), the absence of a Joint Statement is illustrative of lack of substantive agreement between the two sides on a panoply of issues confronting the world. The summit meeting must therefore be seen for what it is: an attempt by the two sides to manage conflict, ringfence competition and enhance communication, especially between the two militaries to prevent things from spiralling out of control. Viewed this way, several analysts felt it was good the meeting happened at all. In the absence of an agreed Joint Statement, both sides put out their respective readouts. We now turn our attention to this.

The US Readout

As is often the case, the American readout is both specific and elaborate. The Americans have termed it, as is their wont, a “Fact Sheet”. There has been no contradiction of its contents from the Chinese side so far, so we will take them to be facts. The American readout talks of an “agreement” between the two leaders on the following: (1) Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon; (2) Asked for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened while “agreeing” that no country (Iran or Oman) or no organization (Iranian Revolutionary Guard) can charge tolls; and (3) Both leaders “confirmed” their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea. These then are the big geopolitical items in the American readout. Iran, which might consider itself a close ally of China’s, may have reason to be nervous about this language. They will no doubt seek clarifications from their Chinese interlocutors. North Korea will pay little regard to niceties like a readout; in any case, the shared goal to denuclearize Pyongyang has been in the works for years! Few other specific things in the American readout are Chinese purchase of 200 Boeing aircrafts, 17 Billion USD worth of American ag products and restoration of market access for American beef and poultry products. Other best endeavour clauses are: China to address U.S. concerns regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals and address U.S. concerns regarding prohibitions or restrictions on the sale of rare earth production and processing equipment and technologies. In the same vein there is agreement in principle on establishment of two Boards: a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment both of which are G2G mechanisms. No details are provided, so we will have to wait and see how these are fleshed out.

The Chinese Readout

It is interesting that Xi Jinping is said to have asked whether the two countries can avoid the Thucidydes trap and provide a new paradigm for great power relations. This was in sharp contrast to a speech made by Xi in Seattle in September 2015 when he said “there was no such thing as the Thucidydes trap”. Indeed, the Chinese have introduced a new term i.e. “constructive strategic stability” which they will no doubt flesh out in the days and weeks ahead to protect and advance their core interests. In fact, it is interesting that the American readout also mentions “constructive bilateral relations of strategic stability based on fairness and reciprocity”. The additional words, fairness and stability, can be interpreted any which way by the two parties. Xi Jinping has already interpreted the above phrase when he stated categorically to Trump that “Taiwan was the most important issue” in Sino-American ties. If handled properly, the Chinese readout says there could be stability in bilateral ties; if not, it warns of conflict. It is hard to remember the last time the Chinese were as blunt as this in their warning to the Americans. This too is a sign of growing Chinese confidence in their own strength. President Trump gave out mixed messaging on Taiwan. On the one hand, he asked both China and Taiwan to cool it and did not rule out arms transfers to the island nation. On the other hand, he admitted that China is a powerful country and that they were only 59 miles away while the US was 9500 miles away! This is the clearest hint yet that the US may not be inclined to fight a war in a distant land. But Trump also expressed confidence that China will not do anything unilaterally to change the status quo as long as he was in office. On a separate matter, the Chinese really rolled out the red carpet to President Trump, knowing this will please the latter.

Russia

The visit by Russain President Putin to Beijing close on the heels of President Trump was of course a coincidence. But the fact that there was such a detailed Joint Statement agreed to by Xi and Putin does send a signal. As if that were not enough, Xi and Putin signed some 40-odd agreements. There were earlier unsubstantiated reports that Xi said to Trump that Putin may come to regret his invasion of Ukraine. While it seems unlikely that Xi said something similar (this is not the Chinese style of speaking at the summit level), the Putin visit to Beijing makes for interesting optics. Unlike Iran or North Korea, Russia’s utility for China is weightier in terms of its larger geopolitical conflict against the West, but also for its own energy needs. Language in the Joint Statement against Western (read American) hegemony is certainly strong and probably rhetorical. But as the lack of an agreement on “Power of Siberia 2 pipeline” shows, China does call the shots in the relationship, whether or not one agrees that Russia is a junior partner. This has not prevented Putin from claiming that the relationship has reached unprecedentededly high levels.

ASEAN

ASEAN countries led by Singapore generally believe that a detente, albeit temporal, between US and China is excellent news. So, they will, on balance, be happy about the outcome of the summit. But countries like Philippines may have reason to worry about their treaty ally status with the US and what it means if China turns even more aggressive in the South China Sea. On the other hand, China is already the leading trade and investment partner for ASEAN. Expect those ties to become even stronger.

European Union

EU now has a double barelled problem. Its transatlantic relationship is in trouble, symbolised by the existential problem facing NATO and the American response to the war in Ukraine. Equally, its relationship with China is also facing headwinds. And with the US now softening its position vis-a-vis China, the EU may now begin to face some heat from the latter. This will require more unity from EU and more determined trade & investment measures by Brussels, both of which are likely to prove difficult. One possible outcome might be that EU itself may end up softening its tone with regard to China.

India

There is no question that Sino-American ties impact India in its own ties with the US and China. Regarding Indo-American ties, the idea that the US needs India to be a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific has been accepted by many as gospel. If that indeed turns out to be true, then well and good and the status quo can continue. But if not, some recalibration of Indo-US ties are in order. This is no bad thing since the relationship will and should stand eventually on its own merits. Expectations from the relationship will become more realistic. And there are still areas like Tech, Defence and Energy where huge strides are possible. In parallel, India must chart its own pathway for a sustainable and beneficial relationship with China based on three mutuals: mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests. Easier said than done of course.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.