The much-awaited and the oft-postponed summit meeting between American President Donald Trump and Chinese supremo Xi Jinping finally took place in Beijing on 14 May. In the current geopolitical context, it is hard to imagine a more consequential meeting between two world leaders. Whichever way one looks at it, the geopolitcal ramifications are important and can now be reasonably deduced. Here is an attempt to do so.
Strategic Parity
One may quibble about relative strengths in specific fields, but there is no gainsaying the fact that we are now talking about two Great Powers that possess broad strategic parity. By this, I mean that we can safely rule out, at least in the near term, the possibility of one power overwhelmingly dominating the other. President Trump probably understands this better than most people, hence his treatment of Xi Jinping with kid gloves. China, on the other hand, wanted to message the world that the latter must henceforth treat China on par with the US. To the domestic Chinese audience, Xi Jinping wished to convey that he is now the leader who is courted by the US, not the other way around. The venue for the all important summit meeting was China not the US, which is a story in itself. Whether the Chair for Trump was a trifle smaller than the one for Xi, is a matter for behavioural scientists, not geopolitical analysts. Finally, it was apparent to all that President Trump sought this meeting more than Xi did. There appears to be an agreement for Xi to reciprocate by visiting US later this year. It will be interesting to see whether Xi will do it as part of a multilateral engagement (G20) or whether it will be a stand-alone visit such as the one by President Trump.
No Joint Statement
Since there was a lot of time to prepare for this summit meeting (after all it was being talked about for weeks, if not months), the absence of a Joint Statement is illustrative of lack of substantive agreement between the two sides on a panoply of issues confronting the world. The summit meeting must therefore be seen for what it is: an attempt by the two sides to manage conflict, ringfence competition and enhance communication, especially between the two militaries to prevent things from spiralling out of control. Viewed this way, several analysts felt it was good the meeting happened at all. In the absence of an agreed Joint Statement, both sides put out their respective readouts. We now turn our attention to this.
The US Readout
As is often the case, the American readout is both specific and elaborate. The Americans have termed it, as is their wont, a “Fact Sheet”. There has been no contradiction of its contents from the Chinese side so far, so we will take them to be facts. The American readout talks of an “agreement” between the two leaders on the following: (1) Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon; (2) Asked for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened while “agreeing” that no country (Iran or Oman) or no organization (Iranian Revolutionary Guard) can charge tolls; and (3) Both leaders “confirmed” their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea. These then are the big geopolitical items in the American readout. Iran, which might consider itself a close ally of China’s, may have reason to be nervous about this language. They will no doubt seek clarifications from their Chinese interlocutors. North Korea will pay little regard to niceties like a readout; in any case, the shared goal to denuclearize Pyongyang has been in the works for years! Few other specific things in the American readout are Chinese purchase of 200 Boeing aircrafts, 17 Billion USD worth of American ag products and restoration of market access for American beef and poultry products. Other best endeavour clauses are: China to address U.S. concerns regarding supply chain shortages related to rare earths and other critical minerals and address U.S. concerns regarding prohibitions or restrictions on the sale of rare earth production and processing equipment and technologies. In the same vein there is agreement in principle on establishment of two Boards: a Board of Trade and a Board of Investment both of which are G2G mechanisms. No details are provided, so we will have to wait and see how these are fleshed out.
The Chinese Readout
It is interesting that Xi Jinping is said to have asked whether the two countries can avoid the Thucidydes trap and provide a new paradigm for great power relations. This was in sharp contrast to a speech made by Xi in Seattle in September 2015 when he said “there was no such thing as the Thucidydes trap”. Indeed, the Chinese have introduced a new term i.e. “constructive strategic stability” which they will no doubt flesh out in the days and weeks ahead to protect and advance their core interests. Indeed, Xi Jinping already interpreted the above phrase when he stated categorically to Trump that “Taiwan was the most important issue” in Sino-American ties. If handled properly, the Chinese readout says there could be stability in bilateral ties; if not, it warns of conflict. It is hard to remember the last time the Chinese were as blunt as this in their warning to the Americans. This too is a sign of growing Chinese confidence in their own strength. President Trump gave out mixed messaging on Taiwan. On the one hand, he asked both China and Taiwan to cool it and did not rule out arms transfers to the island nation. On the other hand, he admitted that China is a powerful country and that they were only 59 miles away while the US was 9500 miles away! This is the clearest hint yet that the US may not be inclined to fight a war in a distant land. But Trump also expressed confidence that China will not do anything unilaterally to change the status quo as long as he was in office. On a separate matter, the Chinese really rolled out the red carpet to President Trump, knowing this will please the latter.
Russia
The visit by Russain President Putin to Beijing close on the heels of President Trump was of course a coincidence. But the fact that there was such a detailed Joint Statement agreed to by Xi and Putin does send a signal. As if that were not enough, Xi and Putin signed some 40-odd agreements. There were earlier unsubstantiated reports that Xi said to Trump that Putin may come to regret his invasion of Ukraine. While it seems unlikely that Xi said something similar (this is not the Chinese style of speaking at the summit level), the Putin visit to Beijing makes for interesting optics. Unlike Iran or North Korea, Russia’s utility for China is weightier in terms of its larger geopolitical conflict against the West, but also for its own energy needs. Language in the Joint Statement against Western (read American) hegemony is certainly strong and probably rhetorical. But as the lack of an agreement on “Power of Siberia 2 pipeline” shows, China does call the shots in the relationship, whether or not one agrees that Russia is a junior partner. This has not prevented Putin from claiming that the relationship has reached unprecedentededly high levels.
ASEAN
ASEAN countries led by Singapore generally believe that a detente, albeit temporal, between US and China is excellent news. So, they will, on balance, be happy about the outcome of the summit. But countries like Philippines may have reason to worry about their treaty ally status with the US and what it means if China turns even more aggressive in the South China Sea. On the other hand, China is already the leading trade and investment partner for ASEAN. Expect those ties to become even stronger.
European Union
EU now has a double barelled problem. Its transatlantic relationship is in trouble, symbolised by the existential problem facing NATO and the American response to the war in Ukraine. Equally, its relationship with China is also facing headwinds. And with the US now softening its position vis-a-vis China, the EU may now begin to face some heat from the latter. This will require more unity from EU and more determined trade & investment measures by Brussels, both of which are likely to prove difficult. One possible outcome might be that EU itself may end up softening its tone with regard to China.
India
There is no question that Sino-American ties impact India in its own ties with the US and China. Regarding Indo-American ties, the idea that the US needs India to be a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific has been accepted by many as gospel. If that indeed turns out to be true, then well and good and the status quo can continue. But if not, some recalibration of Indo-US ties are in order. This is no bad thing since the relationship will and should stand eventually on its own merits. Expectations from the relationship will become more realistic. And there are still areas like Tech, Defence and Energy where huge strides are possible. In parallel, India must chart its own pathway for a sustainable and beneficial relationship with China based on three mutuals: mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests. Easier said than done of course.
Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 