While the war in Iran is showing little signs of coming to an end, there are already telltale signs of a shift in the geopolitical landscape. It is too early to tell whether these are enduring trends or a mere blip. But they are worth noting and watching.
The first development is the little noticed fact of Israel helping the UAE in the recent war. The news report is worth quoting in full: “Israel has, for the first time, deployed an Iron Dome air defense system and troops to the United Arab Emirates during the ongoing war with Iran. The move came after the UAE faced over 550 missiles and 2,200 drones from Iran, depleting its interceptor stockpiles. The unprecedented cooperation underscores deepening Israeli-UAE military ties but could spark political sensitivities both domestically and in the Gulf.” Anwar Mohammed Gargash, the respected former Minister for Foreign Affairs from UAE argued that Iran’s actions have fundamentally altered regional perceptions making the latter a long-term strategic threat to Gulf security for decades to come. Gargash went on to add that rebuilding trust with Teheran will take ages. Gargash, who often speaks for the regime, characterised Iran’s strategy of targeting its neighbours as a miscalculation that reflects ” military weakness, moral bankruptcy and political isolation.” Gargash concluded by indicating that Iran’s aggression would drive Gulf states closer to the US and Israel, adding for good measure that even countries without formal ties to Israel might open new communication channels for security cooperation. Indeed, Gargash has called for financial reparations from Iran for damages to civilian infrastructure, unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and measures aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear, missile and drone programs.
The positions taken by Kuwait/Bahrain matter less and it is doubtful whether countries like Qatar and Oman will entirely share Gagarsh’s perspective in full. But it is Saudi Arabia’s views which are worth monitoring in this conflict. The Saudis have appeared more guarded than the Emiratis in their public reaction. Perhaps, the assessment is that the Americans may cut and run and the Saudis will still have to deal with a belligerent Iran. It is true that the Saudis entered into a defence agreement with Pakistan in September of last year well before the Iran war began. But the real question now is whether the Saudis will be more inclined for a rapprochement with Israel, since they are angry with Iran about the attacks on its critical infrastructure.
The Saudis may have been more measured than the Emiratis in their reaction to Iranian action, but they have sought to proactively beef up their defence. In this regard, the defence arrangement arrived at end of March between Saudi Arabia and Ukraine is important. The Ukrainians stated that it lays the foundation for future contracts, technological cooperation, and investment and emphasized, somewhat implausibly, Ukraine’s international role as a security provider!
More crucially, Ukraine has said they are ready to share expertise and systems with Saudi Arabia. Ukraine has also boasted that they are resisting the same kind of terrorist attacks – ballistic missiles and drones – that the Iranian regime is currently carrying out in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Ukraine and the Saudis also discussed the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf region, Russia’s assistance to the Iranian regime, developments in energy markets, and potential energy cooperation. Above all, Ukraine has reportedly signed a $ 400 million aid deal with the Saudis.
Meanwhile, French President Macron may have set the cat among the pigeons when he stated on 24 April in Greece: “We should not underestimate that this is a unique moment where a U.S. president, a Russian president, a Chinese president are dead against the Europeans. So, this is the right moment for us to wake up”. He also added for good measure that he fully expected the tensions with US to outlast President Trump. Macron also went on to add that the mutual defence clause in the EU Treaty i.e. Article 42.7 must be operationalised and went on to contend that this was actually stronger that Article 5 of NATO which deals with collective defence. Macron is of course close to being a lame duck President, but the fact that EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas was to oversee what was called a “tabletop” exercise to establish how the bloc’s mutual assistance clause, Article 42.7, would work in practice, is interesting to say the least. The plan was expected to test the bloc’s political rather than military response.
China’s position on the war in Iran has been interesting. On the one hand, the US getting embroiled in the war in Iran is excellent news for China. It allows China enormous strategic space to act in Taiwan Strait, South and East China Sea. If nothing else, it allows China ample time to prepare and make its plans. On the other hand, China has an abiding interest in seeing the war end in Iran, if only to ensure its energy security. And it does seem as though the Chinese weighed in on Iran to accept Pak mediation. China has also been vocal, lately, on the need for Strait of hormuz to be open. They also have a few cards up their sleeve in the run-up to the Trump-Xi meeting scheduled to take place mid May.
It is hard to contest the argument that Russia has benefitted from the war in Iran. Oil prices have almost doubled, sanctions on oil sales have been lifted albeit temporarily, the NATO alliance is in deep trouble and frankly, the world has stopped focusing on Ukraine. The visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister after Pakistan and Oman, to Russia is interesting against this backdrop. Iran is said to be seeking closer strategic cooperation with Russia, particularly but not exclusively confined to the nuclear issue.
Does all of the above amount to a reshuffling of the broader geopolitical landscape? May be not irreversibly, but it is hard to deny some shifts are already taking place. EU is de-risking vis-a-vis the US; but they are not the only ones. Some like Saudi Arabia may be doing that too, while others like UAE will come to depend more on the US and even Israel. US-China tensions may be expected to continue, so a G-2 scenario is unrealistic. At the same time, with the EU caught in an existential crisis, the world is struggling to become multipolar anytime soon. For the foreseeable future therefore, the world may therefore be “nonpolar” or “apolar” with US and China merely more preeminent than other powers. That should largely explain the position of a bunch of countries belonging to the global south, which are powerless to stop the war but are naturally inclined to hedge their bets and adopt a wait and watch attitude.
Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 