As with all COP meetings, the COP 28 meeting in Dubai also ran overtime and finally agreed on consensus language relating to fossil fuels: the bugbear of all climate activists. The main outcome of the COP 28 may be summarised as follows:

(1) Mention of fossil fuels for the first time which has caused people to go ecstatic. Strictly speaking, fossil fuels comprise coal, oil and gas. However, Coal has been the subject of discussion in past COPs so it is fair to say that Oil and Gas find mention for the first time in a COP meeting.

(2) Phase-down of Coal was agreed upon in Glasgow (2021) with India bang in the middle of the controversy surrounding it. But the ”UAE Consensus” now talks of “transitioning away” from fossil fuels in a just, equitable and orderly manner. There is a technical difference between “phasing-down” and “transitioning away”. The former signals an end goal; the latter is a notional undertaking.

(3) More problematic for countries like India is the stated goal of achieving global net zero by 2050. India has already announced that it will aim to do so by 2070. There is simply no way India can revise forward its already announced target in this regard. So developed countries will have to go “net negative” if this goal of net zero by 2050 along with the increasingly chimerical objective of limiting global warming to1.5 degree centigrade is to be met by the world.

(4) China and US, the two biggest GHG emitters on this planet can go around doing what they have been doing: China burns more Coal than the entire world put together and the US is the largest producer of oil and gas in the world. China shows no sign whatsoever of fulfilling the Glasgow promise of phasing-down Coal. US will continue to produce oil and gas for the foreseeable future with an unknown transition period.

(5) The Loss and Damage Fund was operationalised but with highly inadequate funds. Alliance of small island states (AOSIS) are known to be unhappy at the UAE consensus document. Indeed many of them were not even in the room when the document was gavelled. They will now have to be enticed with financial incentives.

(6) India can be justifiably happy that the Delhi G20 Summit declaration language of tripling global renewable energy capacity and doubling the rate of energy efficiency by 2030 was reflected in the final COP 28 document.

(7) On the crucially important issue of climate finance, there is a declaration on a Global Climate Finance Framework but little else. Lots of good intentions in the UAE consensus document but it is fair to sat that the developing countries are yet to see the colour of the money.

This is one of the COP meetings where India appears to have kept a low profile. This is smart diplomacy. In the past, India has sometimes taken a needlessly high profile or allowed itself to be bracketed with China which is a far bigger producer of GHG emissions than India will ever be. By focusing on climate justice and equity, India made its case softly but firmly in Dubai. The language in the final document accepts the need for equity and fairness.

India can certainly live with the so-called UAE consensus document. Some caveats however. We must emphasize that energy transition in countries such as India must be just, orderly and equitable, as suggested in the final document. Especially in the case of Coal, India has to work this out carefully. Second, while the world appears to favour a net zero by 2050, individual countries like India must be given flexibility in this regard. Last, on Methane a difference must be made between industrial emissions and those emanating from Agriculture. 70 percent of India’s Methane emissions are from Agriculture. COP 28 talks of accelerating and substantially reducing non-carbon-dioxide emissions globally, including in particular methane emissions by 2030. Agriculture is politically sensitive and India has an uphill task in this area.

It is important to underscore that COP declarations are non-binding and only provide broad guidance. At the end of the day, it is for individual countries to implement the general pledges made at COP meetings through what is known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The next round of strengthened NDCs is due in 2025. That is when we will know whether the world is on track to achieve the overall goal of limiting global warming to 2 degree centigrade (1.5 degree centigrade is already a pipedream) or whether this COP was all meaningless rhetoric.  In particular, the NDCs of the two big polluters, namely China and US, when they come out in 2025 will be closely watched by the world. India too will come under pressure and must already start preparing the ground for the next round of NDCs.

It has been stated, somewhat ambitiously, that the COP 28 meeting is the beginning of the end for fossil fuels. The jury is still out on that.

Coming close on the heels of the summit meeting between the Chinese leader Xi Jinping and American President Joe Biden in California last month, the Chinese supremo received the two EU leaders, namely, EU Council President Charles Michel and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Beijing on 7 December, 2023. It was the 24th annual EU-China summit meeting.

There was no Joint Statement issued after the above meeting, perhaps a sign of the times. There was no Joint Statement after the Biden-Xi meeting in California either. One inference may be that ties between the major powers are so fraught that the very fact of their meeting at summit level must be welcomed as a positive and only achievement. Differences appear tough to resolve, so the maximum that can be expected is to “manage” these differences by good optics.

From press reports it is clear what EU conveyed to Xi Jinping. The Chinese readout from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in contrast, is general and rhetorical.

EU seems to have emphasized the following in its message to China:

(1) While China is EU’s most important trading partner, the current trade deficit of about Euros 400 billion is unacceptable for EU. Chinese response was to say that it was not deliberate Chinese trade policy to have a trade surplus! EU, on the other hand, believes this is directly attributable to “overcapacity” of the Chinese manufacturing industry and to Chinese barriers faced by EU companies. EU said it had tools at its disposal to deal with this but that it would prefer a mutually acceptable solution. EU stated the idea was not to decouple from China but to de-risk!

(2) Digital economy was stressed and EU sought easing of cross border data flows.

(3) Cooperation in the context of the ongoing COP 28 climate conference was emphasized.

(4) EU welcomed the resumption of Human Rights Dialogue in February 2023 and reiterated its deep concerns of the human rights situation in China especially in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong.

(5) While EU reiterated its One China policy, it did express concern about the tension in the Taiwan Strait and at unilateral measures to change the status quo in the South and East China sea.

(6) EU asked China to put pressure on Russia to stop the aggression in Ukraine. EU reminded China of its special responsibility as UNSC P-5 Member to uphold the UN Charter and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Un member states. On Ukraine, China said a ceasefire must be instituted asap. The European Union wants Beijing to use its influence on Russia to stop the war, and urged Xi to stop Chinese private companies exporting European-made dual-use items to Russia. Brussels initially left these Chinese firms off its latest Russia sanctions package unveiled last month, but could just as easily change course. China’s response to all this was that Russia is a sovereign and independent country and that Putin took decisions based on its national interest!

(7) On the conflict in Gaza, the only thing both sides agreed was their joint commitment to a two-state solution.

For China’s part, the summit meeting with the EU is really part of a diplomatic strategy to promote a multipolar world. China’s interpretation of this is to encourage the EU to be an “independent actor” and practice “strategic autonomy”. It is clear that China expects this independence and strategic autonomy to be practiced by the EU vis-a-vis the US. It also helps China that there is no consensus among the 27 member states on a unified policy, much less strategy, with regard to China. Italy for instance has announced that it is withdrawing from the Belt and Road Initiative, a serious setback for China. China’s spokesperson at the Foreign Ministry said that China firmly opposes smearing and undermining cooperation in building the Belt and Road Initiative, and opposes stoking bloc confrontation. This is puzzling since Italy’s decision was sovereign and based on its national interest.

Be that as it may, the Chinese side called the talks candid, frank, in-depth and constructive. Xi reportedly said that China and the EU should handle their differences through dialogue and warned the EU against confrontation with China adding that the two sides should not regard each other as rivals because of different systems. Cooperation rather than confrontation was emphasized by Xi. But the EU sees China not just as a partner for cooperation but an economic competitor and a systemic rival. It is difficult to square this circle.

The EU may not sound as belligerent as the US towards China, but deep inside it does have the same concerns about China. For instance, the EU has begun subsidy investigation against Chinese exports of electric vehicles, thereby drawing China’s ire. EU has also put in place restrictions on export of sensitive European technology to China, which the latter believes are unjustified.

Most importantly, Xi Jinping is reported to have said that “all kinds of interference” must be eliminated from EU-China ties, a not so subtle reference to the influence of the US and the Transatlantic Alliance. The Chinese side in its readout only stressed the following: EU does not wish to decouple from China, that EU reiterated the One China policy and the fact that EU desired to have close communication and coordination with China, uphold multilateralism and the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and work for the settlement of regional hotspots including Ukraine and the Middle East. Really motherhood and apple pie kind of language.

Last year in April 2022 after a similar EU-China summit, EU High Representative for foreign policy, Josep Borell, said that it turned out to be a “dialogue of the deaf”. It is hard to see how this year’s EU-China summit can be described any differently.

So, it is time for another one of those COP (Conference of Parties) meetings. This time it will be hosted by the United Arab Emirates in Dubai from 30 November to 12 December. This is the 28th edition of the COP. And this one is important because it is supposed to carry out the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement (2015), which is a vital opportunity for the Parties to reflect on ambition, implementation, and cooperation, in line with the Paris temperature goal to hold the global average temperature increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

For sometime now, the US and China have gotten together before the COP meetings and have invariably issued a Joint Statement which in turn has served as a template for the main meeting. After all, US and China are now the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases, amounting to a whopping 43 per cent of global GHG emissions between themselves. US and China have already labelled the forthcoming COP 28 in Dubai as a “Methane and non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases Summit”. This is clever by the two biggest polluters. By focusing on Methane and non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases, inconvenient truths relating to coal, oil and gas use as well as climate finance may be brushed under the carpet.

China’s ability to ramp up coal use in recent months is the result of a huge national campaign over the past two years to expand coal mines and build more coal-fired power plants. State media celebrated the industriousness of the 1,000 workers who toiled without vacations in the spring of 2023 to finish one of the world’s largest coal-fired power plants in south-eastern China. Even the US gets 60 per cent of its energy from Coal and Natural Gas. And the idea repeated in successive COP meetings that all fossil fuels must abate is becoming more and more of a chimera. In the Glasgow COP meeting we saw the last minute drama over phase-down of coal as opposed to phase-out, as if that mattered one bit. China continues to burn more coal than the entire world put together and its GHG emissions exceed that of the entire developed world. So, Glasgow’s COP 26 (2021) promise to phase-down unabated coal power and inefficient subsidies for fossil fuels is rhetoric that will be honoured more in breach than in observance.

It is therefore interesting to see the two biggest polluters on the planet focus on Methane and non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases to avoid facing flak from others about their own green performance. Meanwhile. it has now been established that 2023 will indeed be the warmest year the world has ever seen. One does not need any Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change to tell us this. If you live in the developing world you can actually feel climate change every day of your life. And if you visited Europe in July this year, you will have wondered why you paid so much to travel to experience an “Indian Summer”!

The Global Stocktake language has already been agreed upon by the US and China in their “Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis” dated November 14 after detailed talks between US Climate Envoy John Kerry and his Chinese counterpart Xie Zhenhua from 4 to 7 November 2023.

India will have to watch out for the following at Dubai. If the Dubai COP 28 is going to be all about Methane, it is worth recalling that India did not sign on to the “Global Methane Pledge” (launched at the COP 26 in 2021) proposed by the US and the EU aimed at 30 per cent reduction of global methane emissions from 2020 levels by 2030. India is currently the fourth largest emitter of Methane, after China, US and Russia. China has released its long-awaited Methane Action Plan, but the plan only sets basic directions to control methane emissions across sectors, again falling short of setting meaningful reduction targets. India may come under pressure to do something similar.

India is a large emitter of methane, primarily because of the size of its rural economy and by virtue of having the largest cattle population. India has argued that it plans to deploy technology and capture methane that can be used as a source of energy. In a communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, India said approximately 20% of its anthropogenic methane emissions come from agriculture (manure management), coal mines, municipal solid waste, and natural gas and oil systems. To tap into this “potential,” the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) has invested heavily in a national strategy to increase biogas production and reduce methane emissions. This biogas strategy includes many policy initiatives, capacity-building, and public-private partnerships. In addition to promoting biogas development, the strategy supports goals for sustainable development, sanitation improvements, and increased generation of renewable energy.

Meanwhile, climate justice continues to languish at COP meetings. Take climate finance for example. The US-China Joint Statement merely notes that the developed countries expect the pledge of $100 billion transfer to developing countries to happen in 2023, a promise made in 2009.

Expect a lot of rhetoric at this annual climate jamboree. The COP 28 may be expected to support the G20 Delhi Leaders Declaration to pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030 and to accelerate the substitution for coal, oil and gas generation.

But the politics of climate change will endure. Unfortunately, so will global warming.

Now that the much-awaited meeting between American President Joe Biden and Chinese supremo Xi Jinping is done and dusted, there were no major surprises really. Nonetheless, a few remarks are in order:

(1) No Joint Statement suggests no real commitments to each other in writing. Remember the oral assurances of Xi Jinping to Barack Obama about not building military installations in the South China Sea. We all know what happened after. 

(2) The Taiwan elections in January 2024 may be seminal. If the KMT(Kuomintang)-led coalition does win, it could mean a paradigm shift in China-Taiwan ties, which in turn will impact everything else beginning with Sino-American ties themselves. Everyone is worried about an outright Chinese invasion or amphibious landing with regard to Taiwan. What if China got what it wanted without firing a single shot? Sun Tzu’s Art of War and all of that. Just saying.

(3) The speech made by Xi Jinping to the US business community is worthy of scrutiny. The top 20 American companies were present and Xi gets a standing ovation. So much for the US trying to de-risk. It tells you the US companies need China as much as Xi needs their help in coping with economic headwinds back home. 

(4) Xi Jinping says the planet is big enough to accommodate both China and the US. He also says China has no intention of surpassing or overtaking the US. This is rich, in view of recent Chinese actions to undermine what it considers American hegemony. Also, the Chinese do not believe Asia is big enough for both China and India. But then, no one has ever accused China of consistency!

(5) The meeting has helped paper over the profound differences that separate the two sides. No real breakthroughs. Even Fentanyl has been consigned to an anti-narcotics Working Group though Xi may have given oral assurances in this regard.

(6) COP-28 meeting in Abu Dhabi will be all about tripling global renewable energy capacity by 2030, but in the meanwhile the real message to China is: burn as much Coal and fossil fuels as you wish.

(7) Yes, military-to-military communications may be re-established. In addition, Xi apparently agreed to pick up the phone if Biden calls himself. We will know about its efficacy when the next incident in the South China Sea occurs.

(8) On both Ukraine and the Middle East, discussions appear to have been superficial. Biden reportedly did all the talking; Xi listened and merely took note.

It is hard to avoid the impression that China needs this truce as much as the US. China faces political and economic headwinds as noted by many, and Biden is lagging behind in the polls.

Unless you look upon favourably at Xi agreeing to send a few cuddly Pandas to the US and Biden wishing Xi’s wife “happy birthday” even as Xi reportedly forgot his wife’s birthday, there were very few signs of substantial progress on critical issues. But if you were an inveterate optimist you are entitled to think that conflict between the two great powers has been postponed for the time being.

So, it is as certain as one can possibly be that American President Joe Biden and the Chinese supremo Xi Jinping will meet on November 15 in California on the side lines of the APEC summit. The very fact that they are meeting may be considered as good news by some in a world where bad news abounds. Others will point out that the US wanted this bilateral powwow much more than China did. After all, no less than six American Cabinet Ministers paid preparatory visits to Beijing over the last several months. It would seem China played hard to get, though it is clear by now that it too needs the meeting for reasons of its own.

China’s main objectives from the talks are:

(1) To persuade the US to lift most, if not all, trade, technology and investment restrictions imposed by it. Two Working Groups dealing with Economic and Finance issues respectively have met. We will have to wait and see whether the US will tweak its de-risking strategy by changing the dimensions of the “small yard, high fence” to cater to Chinese demands. Looks unlikely but you never know.

(2) To convey to the US that forming alliances or blocs aimed at China will not contribute to better ties. China has in mind things like AUKUS, Camp David alliance (US, Japan and South Korea) as well as groupings like Quad.

(3) To reiterate to the US that the most core of its core interests is Taiwan and that this is non-negotiable from the Chinese perspective.

The US, on the other hand, believes the bilateral relationship with China has three aspects, namely, Cooperation, Competition and Confrontation. The US wishes to focus predominantly on the first, namely, cooperation which includes issues like Climate Change, Public Health, Nuclear Disarmament, Cybersecurity and Fentanyl. On Competition, the US is not likely to let up since there is national security consensus that China is the “pacing challenge” of the century. It is hard to see the US compromising on this issue. Lastly, on Confrontation, US will convey in the strongest terms possible its concern with regard to Chinese activities in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea etc. It is hard to see a meeting point on this issue, so the American proposal will be to at least resume military-to-military talks (suspended since the Balloon Affair) for which Chinese approval will be sought.

So much for the bilateral dossier. On other issues, the US will ask China to press Iran so that the conflict in Gaza does not become a wider regional war. China too may not want to see the conflict spread. On Ukraine, China will feel the pressure of answering for the close ties it entertains with Russia. The bottom line however is that the Chinese are smart enough to realize that both the wars in Gaza and Ukraine put pressure on the strategic bandwidth of the US even while simultaneously providing more strategic space for China. It is therefore hard to see why the Chinese should change tack on these two fundamental issues. Indeed, there are a number of analysts who explain this as the main reason for current Chinese aggression in the South China sea. Whether this will spread to the Taiwan Strait is a trillion dollar question really.

It is no secret that Xi Jinping faces both political and economic headwinds back home. The visit to America and the talks with Joe Biden will help cement the domestic perception that China considers the US as its only equal and this meeting is evidence of that. Despite all this, it is a meeting that bears close watching.

If one goes right back to the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there were still some sane voices arguing for a diplomatic solution. India’s statements on the issue always harped on a peaceful resolution of the issue based on talks. After 620-odd days of raging conflict, thousands of lives lost and immense loss of property, it would appear that there are finally moves afoot by both the US and the EU to persuade Ukraine’s President Zelensky to seek a negotiated solution. It is too soon to predict if these will be successful. But whether Russia will be keen for a diplomatic solution at this time is far from clear. After all, the much-vaunted Ukrainian counter-offensive has turned out to be a dud and frankly, the status quo suits the Russians more than it does Ukraine. As far back as March 2022, there was a serious possibility of a diplomatic solution on the table which was nipped in the bud by the West. Look at the cost being paid by all for that single act of folly.

The conflict in Gaza has done two things to the war in Ukraine: it has taken the headline focus away from the war in Ukraine even while accentuating the “Ukraine fatigue” already being felt in the EU and elsewhere. The US President who asked for combined humanitarian and defence assistance of some $106 billion for Ukraine and Israel, has predictably got the Congressional green light for the latter amounting to $15 billion, but not for Ukraine. As noted elsewhere by me, Ukraine cannot hold a candle to Israel in the American Congress.

With regard to the conflict that has erupted in Gaza, again sane voices are calling for a ceasefire followed by talks aimed at a two-state diplomatic solution. What Hamas did to Israel on October 7 was horrific and worthy of unconditional condemnation. Of course Israel has a right to defend itself by all means. But Israel is also a State in the comity of nations and as its PM Netanyahu said recently : “Israel and its military act according to the highest standards of international law in order to prevent harm to non-combatants, and we will continue to do so until victory”. This was in response to an Israeli Minister who said Gaza could be “nuked”. The Minister was dismissed by PM Netanyahu.

Israel is now under international scrutiny and will have to live up to the public statement made above by its PM. More importantly, Israel will have to determine what constitutes “victory” against Hamas and spell out what happens the day after. Israel still retains a lot of sympathy from its well wishers around the world, but it is in its own abiding interest to consider a negotiated, two-state diplomatic solution. There is simply no alternative to that. If it needs further convincing on this point, it need look no further than what is currently going on in Ukraine. War is never a long-term solution to problems; diplomacy is!

It is now highly likely that there will be a bilateral meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in California next month on the side lines of the APEC summit. It has taken numerous visits by American dignitaries ranging from Anthony Blinken to Gina Raimondo to John Kerry to Janet Yellen, not to mention meetings of Jake Sullivan, for the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi now to travel to the US to meet with American policy makers. Wang Yi, apart from meeting Blinken and Sullivan is widely expected to call on Biden himself. Not so long ago, the Chinese spokesperson said: communication for the sake of communication is not worth it and we ask the American side to be sincere. So, does this signify a change of heart from China? Not really. China is playing along in the full knowledge that America is currently distracted by the goings-on in West Asia. The Xi Jinping-Joe Biden meeting is worth watching, to keep a look out for “guardrails” so as to ensure that competition in Sino-American ties does not veer to conflict. There appears to be convergence between the two sides that a temporary truce suits both countries. Nothing more should be read into this development.

That said, the recent spat between China and Philippines in the South China Sea did evoke a strong reaction from the US which cited its treaty alliance with Philippines, warning China that it would not stand idly by. The American side will reportedly raise the incident with China when Biden and Xi meet. Expect China to respond by referring to the nine dash line. But China does not even have a Defence Minister at this time, so one will have to wait and see. But the departure of the former Chinese Defence Minister may be no bad thing; he was sanctioned by the US and the new Defence Minister whoever he may be (the only “she” in China is “Xi”) could make it easier for a meeting with US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin.

The one thing on which both countries’ interests may align is in ensuring that there is no wider conflagration in the Middle East. Biden will not want things to spin out of control in the Middle East with elections looming large. And with the Chinese economy slowing down, Xi Jinping can do without oil prices going through the roof and a global recession taking root. But the US is concerned that China has not condemned Hamas and appears overtly pro-Palestinian. US would also want China to exercise influence on Iran. It is not evident China will readily oblige.

In a concrete development, two Working Groups have been set up between the US and China: one dealing with financial issues and the other dealing with economic issues. Sino-American engagement is well and truly under way. China’s objectives in this regard are clear: to ensure that there are no restrictions placed on China with regard to sensitive technologies, critical minerals and semi-conductors. The Americans have been talking about a “small yard and high fence”. The Chinese preferably want no yard and certainly no fence! India, which has signed up for a “US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology” should follow these discussions closely.

The other thing to watch out for is an emerging axis between China, Russia and Iran. It is tentative at present, but indications are these countries will increasingly coordinate their positions on the Middle East and elsewhere. This cannot but be a matter of concern for the US and the West. Xi Jinping in his meeting with Biden would rather talk about the Middle East, Ukraine and the North Korea’s weapons program than about the thorny bilateral issues such as commercial espionage, cyber attacks and its own aggressive actions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.

China will gauge the strategic will and/or strength of the US in these bilateral conversations. After all, the US is stretched, militarily speaking, with Gaza and Ukraine. And to top it all this happens to be election season in the US. It is after making a detailed strategic assessment that China will decide whether to take forward the thaw in its ties with America or to continue its line of confrontation. Whether China chooses the former or the latter, has profound implications for India since it affects its margin for strategic manoeuvre. In an interesting move, the Pentagon released its annual report to Congress even as Wang Yi was in the US. The crux of the Pentagon Report is: China is rapidly modernising its armed forces, expanding its nuclear arsenal and hopes to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049; it clearly states that China continues to be the “pacing challenge” for the US. The Chinese Defence Ministry has predictably blasted the Pentagon Report to Congress saying it distorts the country’s security policy and military strategy and over hypes the Chinese military threat. In light of this, it is better not to be too optimistic about what deliverables can be achieved in the Biden-Xi talks. Still, jaw-jaw in California is better than war-war in the Taiwan Strait.

There is little doubt that the Middle East is now hurtling towards a veritable catastrophe. It is hard to be certain, but the Hamas may have had the following objectives in mind when it committed the horrific attacks on Israeli citizens:

> To draw international attention to the Palestinian issue which was languishing;

> To reverse the rapprochement that was taking place between Saudi Arabia and Israel on the one hand and the normalization that was taking place due to the Abraham Accords;

> To avoid Hamas (itself) becoming irrelevant to the political dynamics of the Middle East; and

> To provoke a massive Israeli response which will most certainly lead to large civilian casualties taking the focus away from atrocities committed by Hamas and drawing attention right back to Israel and its nefarious policies.

If the above was indeed the original aim of Hamas, then it has certainly achieved it in substantial measure. While there has been understandable sympathy for Israel, there have also been pro-Palestinian protests and increased spotlight on Israel’s polices in the West. And while Bahrain and UAE may have been critical of Hamas, other States have either been careful (Saudi Arabia) or openly supportive of Hamas and critical of Israel (Qatar). The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been halted in its tracks and the Abraham Accords are under severe stress. It is also sadly true that Hamas has really not elicited the kind of opprobrium that one might have expected after the horrific attacks they unleashed on Israel. What is more, Israel appears on the brink of launching a massive retaliatory strike on what it believes are Hamas targets in the North of Gaza. Israeli Defence Forces asking a million Palestinians to shift to the South of Gaza has already been characterised as a “humanitarian disaster” by the UN. It is all but certain that Israel will carry out a ground invasion of Gaza. If it does, it will play precisely into the hands of Hamas. In such an eventuality, huge civilian casualties may be expected. Israel thus finds itself in a catch-22 situation from which there is no escape.

There is also the “Arab Street” factor. Following a ground invasion, if that happens, the street will react strongly to Palestinian civilian casualties and will force their leaders to take a more sympathetic line in favour of Palestinian aspirations. Arab countries may then solidly rally behind the Palestinian cause.

The question as to why some observers see a moral equivalence between Israel’s nefarious policies and the violent tactics used by Hamas, goes to the heart of what is referred to as the “root causes” of a conflict or as to who committed the original sin. This leads to a situation where supporters of the Palestinian cause will dwell on how Israel has deprived the Palestinians of all rights and created the conditions for a movement like Hamas to emerge and flourish. With equal vehemence, supporters of Israel will refer to the barbarity that characterises the actions of Hamas. There is no winning this argument. But there must be universal condemnation of actions such as the one resorted to by Hamas against innocent citizens along with serious attempts by the international community to resolve the underlying causes of a conflict as longstanding and as intractable as the Palestinian one.

The argument that Hamas does not represent the legitimate aspirations of all Palestinians will doubtless be countered by the argument of some that Bibi Netanyahu does not represent all of the Israeli people. The fact remains however that Netanyahu is the legitimate Prime Minister of Israel and therefore carries the greater burden of accountability for his actions.

The other issue concerning Hamas and Israel is that one is a state entity and the other a non-state actor. States, by definition, are held to higher standards of behaviour than non-state actors especially since the latter have not subscribed to instruments like the Hague Convention, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Convention against Torture. There is nevertheless an increasing tendency to hold non-state actors to account and to higher standards. This is reflective of the general revulsion towards terrorism felt by the public in democratic countries. Yet, as the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said: We democracies distinguish ourselves from terrorists by striving for a different standard even when it is difficult and holding ourselves accountable when we fall short.” It is far from clear that Israel’s hawkish Prime Minister Netanyahu will heed this sensible advice given to him by the American Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.

At the time of writing this, Israel has unleashed the fiercest bombing ever in Gaza: a region with the densest population in the world. The air strikes are widely believed to be a precursor to a frightful ground invasion. It is hard not to have the presentiment of an impending calamity!

Just as the world was tiring of the war in Ukraine, the Middle East region turned to what it does best: produce more geopolitics than it can consume and create the basis for a horrendous conflict. It is hard to lose sight of the fact that the Middle East had been relatively peaceful. One has to go back to July/August 2014 when more than 2000 Palestinians and 73 Israelis were killed in a war that lasted seven weeks in the region. Hamas appears to have taken Israeli security forces and the world by surprise by the ghastly attacks it carried out inside Israel. The toll at present: 700 Israelis killed and several abducted by Hamas. In retaliation, 400 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli air strike so far in Gaza. Israelis are already terming this as their ” 9/11″ and have sworn massive retaliation with absolutely no mercy. This has all the signs of an unfolding catastrophe.

The immediate implications of this sudden eruption in the Middle East is hard to ignore:

(1) The detente that we began to see in the region, either the easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran or even the Abraham Accords arrived at in 2020 may well see some setbacks. This bears close watching.

(2) The war in Ukraine, already affected by “Ukraine fatigue” may well recede from the headlines. Could this give more breathing space to Russia?

(3) Given the special status of Israel in the US and its politics, it is possible that China takes even more of a backseat than it already has, due to the war in Ukraine. The implications for Indo-Pacific in general and countries of the region like India in particular, need careful scrutiny.

(4) The Middle East has erupted at a time when the US and China are trying to re-establish channels of communication which had broken down following the “balloon” affair. There appears to be every possibility now that Chinese President Xi Jinping will travel to California for the APEC Summit in November and meet with American President Joe Biden. Xi Jinping would love for this bilateral summit meeting with Joe Biden to be dominated by the conflagration in the Middle East, rather than about China’s own activities in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea or the South China Sea.

(5) One must also examine if there are any implications for the much-vaunted India-Middle East-Europe-Corridor (IMEC) which was recently announced on the side lines of the New Delhi G20 Summit.

(6) The impact on global economic recovery, especially with the expected spike in oil prices is also something that needs to be reckoned with.

In International Relations and Geopolitics, no one can fully anticipate events like the one Hamas unleashed on Israel on October 7, 2023, the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur war and on the holiest day of Yom Kippur (the day of atonement) itself. Which is why it is said of world leaders that they cannot control the “in tray” and have to play the cards they are dealt. This war that has just erupted in the Middle East will have repercussions well beyond the region.

Analysts and observers had always underscored two things about the War in Ukraine. One, this will not be a short duration war in which one side will demolish the other and claim victory. Two, the longer the war goes on, “Ukraine fatigue” could set in, handing Russia an important strategic advantage.

There is now hard evidence that both those predictions are coming true. Everyone now realizes this war is far from over and is becoming one of attrition. The other “Ukraine fatigue” factor has perhaps kicked in sooner than one expected. The first warning signals came from Poland which was ironic because it started out as a staunch supporter of Ukraine. In a surprise move, Poland sought to extend the ban on import of food grains from Ukraine to protect its farmers. Indeed, Poland was not the only one. Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia joined Poland in banning outright Ukrainian food grains from April to September so that their countries are not flooded with grain imports, to the detriment of their farmers. So much for European solidarity! The Polish change of heart was strongest, may be because it is heading for polls in October. The Polish PM said it would not open up its borders to Ukrainian food grains, regardless of the decisions by the “clerks in Brussels”, a derisive reference to the European Commission in Brussels. Ukraine’s President Zelensky may have overplayed his card when in a speech at the UN General Assembly he said, in an oblique reference to Poland and others, that some countries were only pretending to support Ukraine while the latter was waging war against Russia. This prompted an angry reaction from the Polish PM who told President Zelensky “never to insult the Polish people” as he did in his speech at the UN. And soon thereafter, Poland announced that it was no longer transferring weapons to Ukraine and that Poland needed them for its own defence. The Polish President Duda walked back some of the above remarks, but the damage had been done. Poland is heading to the polls and one will have to wait and see how much of a factor Ukraine is for the electorate.

Meanwhile, the poll results in Slovakia may be a hint of things to come. In results just in, Slovak politician Robert Fico has won and will try and form a coalition government. Normally, what happens in Slovakia stays in Slovakia. But Robert Fico is clearly anti-Ukraine and may definitely be considered pro-Russia, which these days is equivalent to verbal abuse in the Western world. Hungary’s Victor Orban suddenly does not seem as lonely a politician as he was just a few months ago. He has company in Europe.

As if all this were not alarming enough, the US has managed to embarrass itself, as is its wont these days. The American Congress just voted last minute which will keep the Government from shutting down completely, but at least $ 24 Billions in aid to Ukraine will hang fire till mid-November. This at a time when the Ukrainian counter-offensive is neither an offensive nor is it able to counter Russia on the battlefield. If this is the situation with Biden, imagine what it would be with Trump in the White House.

President Putin must be rubbing his hands with glee!