There is no question that the recently concluded G20 Summit is a testament to India’s rising geopolitical clout as well as a tribute to its brilliant diplomats. But beyond that it is worth examining the geostrategic implications flowing from it.

The External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar was asked an interesting question about which country/group of countries helped India the most in arriving at a consensus Leaders’ Declaration. The Minister did not bat an eyelid before responding that every G20 member helped but it was the group of “emerging countries” which supported India decisively. While he did not spell out the individual members, it is a reasonable guess that countries like Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa acted in close concert with India. So, the very first geopolitical question is: Is this the coming out party for the Global South under India’s decisive leadership?

Second, as many analysts have pointed out there is no doubt that the G7 countries which got away with murder in Bali (where Russia agreed to scathing self-criticism in the Leaders’ Declaration without so much as uttering a word in protest), had to seriously compromise in New Delhi when it came to the language on Ukraine. Why? Well, the G7 wanted to win back the Global South, after realizing it was losing influence in this important grouping. The second thing that weighed heavily within the G7 was the recent BRICS meeting which decided to expand under China’s influence. If the Delhi summit had been allowed to collapse on account of lack of consensus on Ukraine, the G20 as a forum could have suffered from irreversible damage at the expense of fora like the BRICS. Hence the compromise by G7 which invested in G20’s continued success. Indian PM’s meetings with Joe Biden (at a meal they had together before the summit began) and the telephonic conversation Modi had with Putin deserve mention in this regard. India’s ties with EU also helped. A little noticed meeting on the side lines was between the leaders of India, Brazil, South Africa and the US. These are the leaders who are going to handle G20 till 2026. This is hugely significant given US decision to court the Global South and to preserve the G20 as the premier forum for global economic cooperation.

Third, Xi Jinping (and thus China) was the dragon in the room! A number of initiatives which the G20 outlined in the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration were actually aimed at providing alternatives to Chinese lending and/or countering Chinese infrastructure initiatives. So, the drive to make multilateral development banks better, bigger and more effective is to make sure lower income countries have a viable alternative to debt diplomacy. Similarly, the co-chairing by US and India of a special event on “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment” and “India-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor” on the side lines of the G20 Summit was aimed at China’s BRI, no question about it.

Fourth, the Indian External Affairs Minister made it a point to say that China was being cooperative and supportive at the meetings in Delhi. It is again important to ask why? I think any move by China to disrupt and block decisions at the G20 summit would have incurred the wrath of not just India, but the Global South including Africa. And even China could not have afforded this considering its ambitions to be a leader of the Global South.

Fifth, the admission of African Union is a seminal event. None of the world’s problems, be it SDGs, climate change, food security or public health can henceforth be solved without Africa’s involvement. And Africa will eventually determine whether the World meets with success or not in solving difficult problems. From now on, it is impossible to ignore Africa in key multilateral fora.

Last, no question that Russia had a tactical victory at the New Delhi summit. But Russia would be making a huge mistake if its leaders believe the world, especially the Global South, is buying their line on the war in Ukraine. The fact is that the Global South is sick and tired of the war in Ukraine and wants it to end asap. Ukraine is not faultless, but Russia started this war and it thus has a greater responsibility to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The New Delhi G20 Summit has given a lifeline to Russia and it would be suicidal on its part not to take it and make a difference to world peace. Putin owes Modi one, and it may be worthwhile for India to consider cashing it at an appropriate time in the future.

No matter what happens at the New Delhi G20 Summit on September 9 and 10, you have to give it to India. Indian officials went to a lot of trouble, left no stone unturned and by taking G20 to every corner of the country, truly made it a people-centric mega event.

The Sherpas of G20 will meet from tomorrow in the Indian state of Haryana for a last-ditch attempt to find consensus on a Leaders’ Declaration, failing which it will be kicked up to the Leaders so that they can resolve the differences at the Summit meeting on September 9 and 10 in New Delhi.

Some pointers as to what one should expect from the final declaration. The SDGs are at a crucial half way mark. The Global Sustainable Development Report 2023 which will be released by the UN Secretary General at a high profile event in New York in the third week of this month makes sombre reading. The Report proclaims that the world is “off course” when it comes to SDGs and more than half the world has simply been left behind. The G20 Leaders’ Declaration will obviously dwell on this issue, but the question is can it come up with a financial commitment to support the lower income countries help achieve the SDGs? Climate Change will evidently be an important focus. But here again, the focus will be on climate finance. Can the G20 ensure that the 100 Billion dollar a year commitment made in Paris in 2015 will be kept and a much higher amount agreed for the future. After all, as the Indian G20 Sherpa says the requirement for SDGs and Climate Change for poor and emerging countries is of the order of 5 to 6 Trillion Dollars.

India’s presidency may well be remembered for the work it did in Digital Public Infrastructure. The meetings of the Digital Economy Working Group have been substantive and the fact that there is agreement among all G20 countries on the definition, scope and challenges facing the digital economy is in itself notable. There may be agreement on the “One Future Alliance” which will be an open and inclusive forum for further discussion and action-oriented steps in this vital area. India’s role has been pivotal on this subject.

India will have broadly succeeded in achieving three overarching objectives. One, it has successfully showcased itself from the view point of tourism, investment and trade by taking the G20 delegates to the far corners of India. Second, India has sincerely strived to be the voice of the Global South. The main priorities of the Global South will doubtless figure in the final Leaders’ Declaration. For instance, the kind of reforms being proposed by the G20 Finance Track for the Multilateral Development Banks is precisely to help lower income countries meet their developmental challenges. Third, and perhaps most importantly, India has valiantly tried to be a bridge between the North and the South, especially on issues like the war in Ukraine. The final Leaders’ Declaration may be assessed against the above backdrop.

Russian President Putin was expected to give the Delhi G20 Summit a miss. Internal preoccupations with the war in Ukraine provide him with a legitimate excuse. And he made it a point to call PM Modi and explain his absence ahead of the summit meeting.

China’s Xi Jinping reportedly giving the Delhi Summit a miss cannot be explained away that easily. Three broad categories of reasons suggest themselves. One is geopolitical and this has to do with the lack of importance that China attaches to what it considers “Western” structures, of which G20 is certainly one. China appears more at ease in fora like the BRICS where it can lead and it is not under any international scrutiny. The New Delhi G20 Summit would have definitely put the spotlight on China, which Xi Jinping may have wanted to avoid. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party may not have wished for their supreme leader to be “exposed”. Second, China’s bilateral ties with the US are delicately poised and Xi Jinping may have wanted to wait for more progress to be made in bilateral ties before he ran into US President Biden. November APEC summit meeting in California seems preferable from this perspective. Third, there is the issue of China’s bilateral ties with India. It is difficult to say with certitude whether China wanted to snub India or whether Xi Jinping was simply not ready for the negative press coverage in India given the state of the bilateral relationship. Either way, it is hard to avoid the impression that Sino-Indian ties are sinking further and a solution to the border imbroglio now looks more and more unlikely in the short run. To the extent past G20 Summits have also had countries represented by Prime Ministers/ Foreign Ministers etc, India need not take to heart the absence of the Russian and Chinese Presidents. But the joint absence of both Russia and China at the New Delhi G20 Summit does smack of geopolitics more than anything else.

The much-awaited bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping on the side lines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg did not take place, unless you count the brief interaction between the leaders while they were present at the BRICS Leaders’ Lounge. Somehow, this seemed even less of an interaction than a “pull aside”, something all diplomats recognize as a valid interaction during multilateral meetings. So, what is going on between the two Asian giants?

Issues of procedure and substance appear to dog the two countries. It is not clear who wanted a meeting in the first place and when? The Chinese readout after the above interaction said this was at India’s request. India demurred saying there was a longstanding Chinese request for a bilateral meeting. Even the nature of the interaction is a matter of differing interpretation. The Indian side called it an “informal conversation”. The Chinese side called it a “candid and in-depth exchange of views”.

The readout from both sides was also very different for the emphasis and for what it did not say. The Indian readout underlined that the “maintenance of peace and tranquillity at borders and observing and respecting the LAC was essential for the normalisation of India-China relationship”. The Chinese side stated that the border issue must be treated “properly” by India while bearing in mind “the overall interest of their bilateral relations”. The Indian side stated that the “two leaders agreed (emphasis mine) to ask their respective officials to intensify efforts for expeditious disengagement and de-escalation”. The Chinese readout studiously avoided the use of either disengagement or de-escalation and seemed to stick to their customary stand on the issue of putting aside the border problem and getting on with other aspects of bilateral ties.

One thing seems certain and that is Xi Jinping will make it to the Delhi G20 Summit. Since hope springs eternal in the breasts of both Indians and Chinese (perhaps more in the former than the latter), there could be a “proper” (pun intended for our Chinese friends) sit-down bilateral meeting between the two leaders to discuss the border issue in some detail. If that does not happen, bilateral ties may be expected to languish.

For now though, all eyes are on New Delhi and the G20 Summit which will take place on September 9 and 10. The outcome document which emanated from the G20 Trade Ministers meeting in Jaipur yesterday (August 25) provides a template for the Final Leaders’ Declaration when it comes to the paragraph on Ukraine. What the Trade Ministers did yesterday was to repeat the language verbatim from the Bali Leaders’ Declaration on Ukraine with an asterisk. The asterisk in the footnote clarifies that Russia rejected the inclusion of geopolitical para 32 (dealing with Ukraine) on the basis that it does not conform to the G20 mandate while recognizing the status of para 32 as Chair’s Summary. Russia obviously agreed with the rest of the text. Interestingly, China also stated that the G20 Trade Ministers meeting is not the right forum to discuss geopolitical issues and did not support the inclusion of the geopolitical-related content in para 32. Yet another paragraph 33 talks about upholding international law and defending the principles enshrined in the UN Charter. This para 33 ends with our PM’s words: today’s era must not be of war. This paragraph was accepted in toto by both Russia and China.

Indian officials can now breathe easy since this can be replicated in the final Delhi Leaders’ Declaration to be issued on September 10. The rest of the Declaration should be substantive enough, considering the extensive and wide-ranging meetings that have been held during India’s presidency.

The 15th BRICS Summit is scheduled to take place from August 22 to 24 at Johannesburg. The leaders of Brazil, India, China and South Africa will attend in person. Russia’s President Putin will not attend in person. The official reason for this is that his presence is required more at home than in South Africa because of the war in Ukraine. But it would have made for a diplomatic kerfuffle if he attended, considering South Africa is a ratified member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and that the ICC has issued an arrest warrant against President Putin. South Africa may have heaved a quiet sigh of relief at Putin’s absence.

This is a crucial summit-level meeting since the BRICS grouping faces a fork in the road. It may be worth recalling that the BRICS grouping held its first summit in 2009, when it was still BRIC, but then subsequently invited South Africa to join in 2010 to become BRICS. BRICS then had the following strategic objectives:

(a) A non-Western grouping which sought increased geopolitical clout for its members;

(b) All rising economies, with China leading the way thereby signifying that the economic centre of gravity has shifted from the North to the South;

(c) Countering the Bretton Woods institutions like IMF and the World Bank by setting up institutions like the New Development Bank for the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries; and

(d) More generally to pursue the desirable goal of a multipolar world.

It is not easy to assess the performance of the BRICS grouping for the last 13 years or so. There have certainly been some achievements in soft areas like economic cooperation and people to people ties. Such People to people exchanges include the Young Diplomats Forum, Parliamentarian Forum, Trade Union Forum, Civil BRICS as well as the Media Forum. It is fair to say that China has outgrown the other members in economic and military terms, bringing about a certain imbalance to the grouping. The New Development Bank is certainly a showpiece of BRICS cooperation.

For India, the forthcoming BRICS summit is a crucial one for the following reasons:

(1) There are reports that many countries are seeking membership of BRICS. China seems the keenest to allow this (Russia may be expected to go along with China) , with South Africa in tow. Brazil is reluctant but India will probably be the most concerned. India’s concern is linked to expansion of membership leading to a dilution of the original purpose for which BRICS was established and its legitimate disquietude of it increasingly becoming a China-dominated geopolitical grouping aimed at countering the US/West. India has therefore asked for the enunciation of principles and criteria for expansion of membership which must be agreed upon by consensus. It is also clear that if the grouping goes ahead with expansion, the original criteria which were significant in determining membership in BRICS will take a backseat, fundamentally changing the character of the grouping.

(2) China’s motives for pushing expansion of membership is also cause for concern. It is now less to do with the original principle of seeking a multipolar world and more for serving its own geopolitical ends such as its tussle for supremacy with the US. Indeed, India’s best argument is that BRICS should not become collateral in what is a great-power battle for supremacy between China and the US.

(3) China also wants BRICS to emerge as some kind of a forum of the Global South, something India may not be sure about, given its own credentials and ambitions to be the voice of the Global South.

(4) India-China ties themselves are under severe strain and these cannot but be expected to play a role in India’s eventual stand on the grouping’s future. There is a possible Modi-Jinping face to face meeting on the side lines of the BRICS summit. Could some understanding between China and India emerge on the border conflict which has caused Sino-Indian ties to nosedive? If so, could that also influence matters such as expansion of BRICS membership?

The fifteenth BRICS summit may provide answers to some, if not all of the questions above. Johannesburg should attract the attention of all for the next couple of days.

Happy 77th Independence Day to all Indians at home and abroad! For me, it is a day of celebration of course, but also one of reflection. I like to take stock of the strides India has made, at least from the time I remember, and also consider the journey ahead.

My earliest recollection of Independence Day celebrations was at Kendriya Vidyalaya in Madurai when we sang patriotic songs and distributed sweets and flags to all those around us. India may have been poor then- I am talking about the early seventies after all- but we were mighty proud of our country. Bangladesh was becoming free. I was told by my Father to paint the headlights of our car black which I duly did. This was to make sure that in the night the enemy aircrafts did not spot us: never mind that this was Madurai in the deep South. For me that was patriotism!

I remember we had to be careful not to waste Milk or food of any kind in the family which comprised four siblings. Not just because we were modest, but because these were not exactly in plentiful supply in India. But proud we were. So, imagine my pride when I was selected for the prestigious Indian Foreign Service and more importantly, chosen to represent India abroad. The night the UPSC results were announced, I could not sleep a wink!

Telephones were a luxury in 1981. My Father wrote a letter to the General Manager, Telephones, in Chennai asking whether he could get a landline quicker than the customary 5-year waiting period, since I was serving abroad in public interest and he needed to be in touch with me. Even as late as 1992, the wait for a cooking gas cylinder in Delhi was six months and one had to use Minister’s quotas to get one sooner.

India, therefore, has come a long long way since then. There was a silly childhood dream of mine: to visit 100 countries before I die. I have visited 78 countries and given the fact that I turned 66 years recently, it is not altogether certain that I can still fulfil my dream. But this much I can say without fear of contradiction: there is no country other than India I would rather be in! We are diverse, democratic and driven, so what is not to like and love!

That said, we do have some distance to traverse. India may have a multitude of problems but for me it is poverty and deprivation which is the main challenge. We have to get our economic act together, become a 10 Trillion dollar economy and bring down the number of people in abject poverty to a low number, if not zero. And the interesting thing is that for perhaps the first time in the country’s history, this is well nigh possible. India finds itself in a geopolitical sweet spot, is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, it is very young and its youth are innovative and dynamic. Let us all resolve to do our bit then to make sure no one in India lives in abject poverty.

JAI HIND!

The cold war period was characterised by proxy wars fought between the then super powers i.e. the USA and the USSR. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the advent of the unipolar moment, there was no question of proxy wars. There was direct military intervention by the only superpower, namely, the United States whether it was to liberate Kuwait or to invade Iraq. The US simply did not have any rival that was its match, so the era was one of unilateral interventions by the United States, whenever and wherever it wished, sometimes with disastrous consequences for all concerned.

The events of the last few years however point to a disquieting pattern: the return of the proxy wars. The most significant proxy war at present is the one in Ukraine. Technically, the war may be between Russia and Ukraine, but no one is fooled. Ukraine would simply have never been in a position to fight against Russia, without military assistance from the US in particular; and Russia views NATO as the existential threat, not Ukraine. Even now, the nightmare scenario is one in which NATO gets directly drawn into a fight with Russia, with catastrophic geopolitical consequences.

The coup in Niger has all the makings of a proxy war. While it was initially a case of a putsch, pure and simple, it is now gradually turning into a battleground between the West (led by France) and Russia. Indeed, Russian flags were seen in the aftermath of the coup in Niger. The infamous Wagner Group did try to take advantage of the situation, to no avail. But the situation is far from resolved, with a tug of war between the putschists and the former President backed by the West and by the majority of the African countries. The exceptions are: Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso. The situation is fluid but being closely monitored. Could it be a battleground for yet another proxy war?

The scrap between a Chinese coast guard vessel and a Philippine military supply boat led to a resurgence of tensions in the South China Sea. Chinese used water cannons and Philippines summoned the Chines Envoy in manila to lodge a protest. The US State Department issued a statement saying that an attack on Philippine boats etc would lead to US invoking defence commitments under Article IV of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty. While the war of words continues, it is hard to avoid the impression that it is simply a matter of time before the South China Sea becomes a battleground for a proxy war between US and China. The same goes for Taiwan, which is of course the core of all core interests, as far as China is concerned. Taiwan would be the ultimate proxy war.

North Korea is next and the sabre rattling by its leader Kim Jong Un when he launched an intercontinental ballistic missile in July 2023 elicited a strong response from not just South Korea, but from Japan and the United States. The US is concerned about North Korea’s actions and is trying hard for a rapprochement between Japan and South Korea, which appears plausible. Around the same time, both China and Russia sent delegations to Pyongyang as if to show support amid criticism of its actions by US, Japan and South Korea. North Korea could easily become yet another proxy war.

Both Sudan and Yemen are in situations that can only be described as fragile. And in both cases, proxy wars cannot be ruled out. In the case of Yemen, it is one between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Sudan, it really is becoming a Saudi-UAE proxy war. And so the list goes on.

So, why are proxy wars back in vogue? One plausible reason is that the unipolar moment has ended and a multipolar world order is yet to take shape. The world order is therefore characterised by uncertainty which reigns in the midst of a “polycrisis”. All this perhaps makes it conducive for big powers to flex their muscles in their backyard. After all, there is no global policeman to restrain their actions. The trouble is that these proxy wars have the effect of making an uncertain and chaotic world more uncertain and more chaotic.

It is a well known secret that Sino-Indian ties could not possibly be worse. The two leaders Modi and Xi Jinping had met at least 18 times before 2019; following the Ladakh border conflict, the two leaders have met just once in Bali in November 2022. Until recently, everyone thought this was a face to face meeting involving exchange of mere pleasantries. But now there are reports that the two leaders did go beyond pleasantries. The readout by the two sides makes interesting reading. First, it was the Chinese Foreign Ministry that put out a statement following a meeting at Johannesburg this week between India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign policy Czar Wang Yi. The statement suggested that these talks were a follow up on the “consensus reached by Modi and Xi Jinping on stabilizing bilateral relations” following their face to face meeting at Bali. Since this is the first time many Indians were hearing about this, the Ministry of External Affairs through its spokesman confirmed that there was indeed a ” general discussion on the need to stabilise bilateral relations” between the two leaders. You do not have to be a professional diplomat to see the difference in the two sides’ characterisation of the face to face meeting between Modi and Xi Jinping. The Chinese side is talking of a “consensus” and the Indian side is referring to a “general discussion”. Both sides, to be fair, agree that the subject matter of the limited talks were about stabilising bilateral ties.

At one level, this difference in perception should not come as a surprise. Right from the onset of the conflict in Ladakh, the Chinese side has stubbornly insisted that the border problem must be set aside and not allowed to interfere with the development of bilateral ties in other areas. India, on the other hand, has steadfastly maintained that the border area must be tackled by China through de-escalation and disengagement for bilateral ties to resume in a normal fashion. As the External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar has said repeatedly, having thousands of troops on the border is not normal and this abnormal situation must end. He also put the onus for this on China, since the problem was precipitated by them and not us.

So, why is China talking in terms of a “consensus” having been reached by the two leaders at Bali. Has anything changed fundamentally? Not by the looks of it. One way of interpreting this is that China may be extending an olive branch to India. Evidence that this may be true, comes from a number of Chinese scholars and people like Kishore Mahbubani (who is close to the powers that be in China) who have been putting forward the proposition that the Ladakh incidents were an “accident” and that both countries should now kiss and make up. This seems hardly credible, but there it is.

It has been hard to gauge China’s motives as to why it did what it did in Ladakh in 2020. A variety of theories have been floated by experts, but the “accident theory” seems like a new one. Regardless of the merit of this explanation, one thing is clear: it is hard to understand what China has really achieved by poking a sleeping elephant and opening up another front with India. Perhaps China realizes this fact now; equally perhaps, China wishes to focus exclusively on its battle with the US. Who knows? After all, we are dealing with a country where the Foreign Minister is here today and gone tomorrow!

Chinese explanation of India’s China policy is interesting, as gauged from Global Times, which serves as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party. First, it says India often plays the victim card following the heavy defeat it suffered in 1962. Second, it accuses India for having a superiority complex due to it being the “world’s largest democracy”. Third, it says India wishes to catch up with China as the future factory of the world. Lastly, the Chinese believe India is good at playing the game of “balance of power”. Interestingly, Global Times admits that before 2020 India did not “openly take sides between US and China”. This is as close to an admission by China as it can, that the Ladakh events provoked by it have pushed India into a closer embrace of the US. This is arguably the opposite of what was intended by China.

Regardless of the above, it would appear that in the short term Sino-Indian ties will remain frosty at best and inimical at worst. Witness the emergence again of the issue of stapled visas for Indian nationals belonging to Arunachal Pradesh. It is going to be a long haul for both sides before a semblance of normalcy is restored in the relationship.

Sino-American ties are again the talk of the town. Since the marathon conversation lasting hours between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese foreign policy czar Wang Yi in May 2023 in Vienna, there has been a flurry of bilateral meetings between the two countries. But here is the thing. All visits have been unidirectional i.e. from US to China. Consider this. Secretary of State Tony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Climate Envoy John Kerry have all made visits to China over the last two months. But there have been no reciprocal visits from China to the US. What is more, the Chinese have still not responded to the US request for talks between the two militaries. This last is a cause for concern given the tense relations between the two countries and the possibility of a flare-up in the Taiwan Strait or the South China sea. What is more, in all the above conversations, the unmistakeable impression that emerges is that the Americans want the dialogue with China much more than the Chinese themselves do. Janet Yellen bowing before the Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng will be the enduring optics for a while.

All of the above could be part of Chinese power play. It may also be based on an assessment, right or wrong, by China that the US does not have the bandwidth to take on two military fronts: one in Ukraine and the other, hypothetically, in the Taiwan Strait or the East/South China sea. There is no gainsaying the fact that the longer the conflict in Ukraine drags on, the better it is for China. This is particularly the case since recent reports talk of some Russian success on the battlefield. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly bestowed more strategic space to China; for most others, it has had the reverse effect of diminution of strategic space, which certainly has been the case for the US and for countries like India.

It is against this backdrop that the grand old man of diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, undertook a visit to China. Kissinger was treated like a King and met President Xi Jinping, not to mention others who matter in China. Xi Jinping was fulsome in his praise for Kissinger and the reasons are not far to seek. Kissinger is of the firm view that it is incumbent upon the US to carry out a rapprochement with China as soon as possible. What is more, Kissinger is absolutely convinced that confrontation with China does not serve America’s national interest. If you think this line of reasoning and his own visit undermines American policy towards China, then you would be absolutely right. Hence the clarification from State Department that Kissinger was in China as a private citizen and not on behalf of President Biden. But Kissinger is no ordinary citizen and the Chinese know that only too well. Xi Jinping had done his homework when he said that not only is Kissinger 100 years old, but that this was also his hundredth visit to China. Xi Jinping also said that China does not forget its old friends.

The question on everyone’s mind is: can Kissinger pull it off for a second time? After all, he was the architect of the policy in 1971 when US successfully courted China altering the geopolitical landscape forever. The truth however is that the Americans probably understand China much better now than they did back in 1971. And if there is an issue on which there is bipartisan consensus inside the Beltway, it is China. This may not change anytime soon.

The best that can happen to the Sino-American relationship in the medium-term is the establishment of some guardrails so that the ties don’t deteriorate into outright conflict. The desire for this outcome however may be more from the American side since the Chinese are still playing hardball. The evolving situation in this regard bears close watching.

While the media has understandably devoted lot of attention to the PM’s successful visit to the US, the one which is now about to take place i.e. PM Modi’s visit to France on July 13/14 is, in my view, of even more importance for India.

India has about thirty-odd strategic partnerships with various countries. But if there is one partnership which is undergirded by complete strategic convergence, that is indisputably the Franco-Indian one. Consider this. India wishes to follow an independent foreign policy; so does France. India practices strategic autonomy; so does France. India wishes to see a stable, multipolar world; so does France. Over and above all this, India and France are committed to values such as democracy, pluralism and secularism. Small wonder then that when the whole Western world had declared India a pariah following the 1998 nuclear tests, it was France and France alone which understood India’s actions and established the first-ever strategic partnership with India. This year, India and France are thus celebrating the 25th anniversary of that significant moment in history. It is fitting that PM Modi will make the trip to take part in the Bastille Day parade on July 14; even more symbolically, Indian armed forces will march past alongside their French brothers and sisters on Champs Elysees. And if that were not enough, the famous Rafale Aircraft will dominate the skyline.

If you think the visit is all about pomp and circumstance, you are mistaken. Substantive conversations and meetings are expected and progress will doubtless be made in the so-called tripod which forms the bedrock of the relationship: defence, nuclear and space. In defence, we may see agreements which will finally help the hitherto buyer-seller relationship between the two countries move to that between an investor and investee, with substantial transfer of technology. A bilateral dialogue on space has been recently instituted; the two leaders will take stock of it and provide political guidance. Nuclear cooperation has admittedly stalled with regard to the building of 6 nuclear power plants in Jaitapur, Maharashtra. Both sides are guilty in various degrees. Both must recommit to the ultimate goal with renewed vigour.

The new areas are exciting as well. Green Hydrogen may well become the lynchpin of the future Franco-Indian relationship. So will areas like quantum computing, artificial intelligence and cyber security. France has some of the best green technology; India must actively seek and acquire it.

Trade and Investment are well below potential. We could appeal to France to help us with the Free Trade Agreement negotiations that India is undertaking with EU, keeping in mind the competence of the European Commission in the matter. India’s own trade and investment with France needs political impetus, we have left it for too long in the hands of the private sector of the two countries.

People-to-people ties must be given a fillip. Indian students are missing a trick in not looking more seriously at France for higher studies. (Full disclosure: the author obtained his PhD from Sciences Po University in Paris). France has set itself the goal of welcoming many thousands of Indian students on its soil; Indian students must grab the opportunity with both hands. French language is beautiful; but it is no longer a barrier since a lot of courses are offered in English.

France has proved to be a reliable and a trusted strategic partner. It has given us solid support whether it is India’s candidature for the UN Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group or indeed enabling us in joining groups like the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Missile Technology Control Regime. France has provided solid support for India’s demarches in the UN Security Council for counter-terrorism efforts including listing of terrorists.

There are no serious differences between France and India, that is for sure. But there are at least two subjects on which our respective positions are nuanced. One is Ukraine, where the position of the two countries is somewhat different. France certainly understands where India is coming from; still, the Indian side can benefit from a detailed assessment by the French side on the current situation in Ukraine. China is the other subject that will be discussed. Our relationship with China is at an all time low; but France does actively engage with China (witness recent Macron visit to Beijing) and has close ties of trade and investment with it. The Indian side could benefit from the current thinking in France and EU about the “de-risking” strategy being contemplated and the long-term prospects for Sino-Russian cooperation.

I have been asked, as a former Indian Ambassador to France, whether the recent unfortunate events in France will affect the Indian PM’s impending visit. First, they are all the more reason for PM Modi to go to France now to express solidarity. Second, France is perfectly capable of handling its domestic affairs and I have no doubt that it will bounce back, as it always does. Third, these unfortunate events will have no impact whatsoever on the bilateral ties, which are exemplary. Last, but not least, France never comments officially on the internal affairs of India; the least we can do is reciprocate this in full measure, which we have done.

There is every reason to be confident that PM Modi’s visit will provide a huge fillip to the existing bilateral ties and take it to the next level. In an uncertain world, it would be no exaggeration to say that the Franco-Indian relationship is a force for good and stability.

The world order was already characterised by a “polycrisis”. But recent developments in Russia can best be described as a “grey rhino” event (Wagner imbroglio) superimposed on top of a “black swan” event (Russian invasion of Ukraine). Discerning trends, much less forecasting events, has become next to impossible in this international scenario. Is Putin stronger or weaker after the Wagner rebellion? Have Russia’s war efforts been hindered irreparably? Will Ukraine’s counter offensive get a shot in the arm? So many questions and so few answers! India must closely watch what is going on in Russia for the implications are more serious than what may appear on the surface.

One reason for the current world disorder is the complete lack of balance of power in any part of the world leading to general and global disequilibrium. The unipolar moment is long gone, though the US still remains the pre-eminent power. China which until very recently was hurtling towards superpower status, is facing unexpected headwinds, economic and social, if not political. For the very first time, observers are beginning to ask questions regarding what was once considered totally inevitable: Can China ever overtake the US in terms of comprehensive national power? Europe is mired in its own misery, some of its own making and the rest thanks to goings-on in Ukraine. That leaves middle powers such as Japan, India, Australia and Korea which ironically enough are not doing so badly. These are typically “swing states” which actually have a tremendous opportunity in the current circumstances to punch above their weight, if they know how to play it right.

India’s move to align itself closer to the US, exemplified by the hugely successful visit of PM Modi to Washington is a good example of India “playing it right”. For India, a multipolar Asia is a sine qua non for a multipolar world. At present, India by itself cannot ensure (though it can contribute to ) a multipolar Asia, much less a multipolar world. Hence, the need for what foreign policy experts call “external balancing” which is what PM Modi’s US visit was about. It is not possible for Asia to be multipolar as long as China believes in a hegemonic role for itself. And it is no rocket science that if there is one country that can potentially measure up to China, it is India. In this fundamental sense, China was the “dragon in the room” during the recent summit meeting between PM Modi and President Biden. But for India there were other substantive reasons as well: defence, security, technology and people-to-people ties, to name a few.

It was interesting to see the reaction to the visit by PM Modi to Washington in the CCP mouthpiece Global Times. Reacting to one American media report that the US had placed a huge bet on India, the Global Times proclaimed loudly that the “US will lose its huge bet”. If that wasn’t clear enough, the paper went on to say that the “close” Indo-American ties were “temporary, unstable and unreliable”. Intriguingly, it went on to say that India is a strategically independent country and it was therefore unlikely to follow the script written by Washington. The paper expressed the belief that India would make calm and sober choices, as history had proven. It added, for good measure, that becoming a “pawn” in the US containment of China does not align with either India’s national interest or indeed with the dignity of India as a major power. All this is extraordinary coming from a country that is entirely and solely credited by some observers for driving India into the arms of the US!

Such then is the state of the world where nothing is what it seems on the surface. To paraphrase Churchill, international relations appears to be a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. And we may be passing through a moment in time when decades happen in weeks as Lenin famously proclaimed!