The attempted assassination of former President Trump on 13 July changes the fundamental calculus about the impending American elections. Before the horrific event, the election was broadly tied between Trump and Biden. The presidential debate, in which Trump got the better of Biden, may or may not have been a tipping point; but the shooting in Butler city, horrendous as it was, changes everything.

It is not over until it is over, of course. But it is hard to see Trump losing from here. Even if Biden is persuaded to step down, his replacement will have the uphill task of proving that he or she is up to the challenge. And it is almost impossible to get rid of the tag that the person replacing Biden is a second choice of the democrats and was chosen only when Biden became unelectable.

Against the above background, it is perhaps time to look at how geopolitics will change under Trump and Vance. So, here goes:

(1) The most immediate impact will be on the war in Ukraine. If there was any doubt about how a possible Trump administration will deal with it, all doubts were set to rest by Trump’s running mate J.D. Vance, who said: I really don’t care what happens to Ukraine! This should send shivers down the spine of decision makers in NATO and EU.

(2) J.D. Vance has also said the US military should focus on China, affirming in typical Trumpian language: I don’t like China. He added for good measure that China cannot be allowed to build its middle class at America’s expense. Vance hints that American arms to Ukraine are better if diverted to Taiwan.

(3) A possible Trump administration will also push European nations to spend more on defence and take care of themselves. Vance has made some very controversial statements about European nations: he has praised Orban’s policies in Hungary, he has called Germany’s Energy policy idiotic and its defence policy insufficient. He has also lashed out at UK calling it an Islamist state.

(4) Predictably, Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov has welcomed Vance’s statement on Ukraine. It is interesting therefore that while the Russians may well love a future Trump administration and even wish for it, the Chinese will be alarmed by what they are hearing on Taiwan, for instance.

Where does all this leave India? Purely on objective geopolitical criteria, it is hard to deny that a possible Trump administration may actually be better for India than the re-election of Biden. But of course we have no say in the matter. On trade though, we must prepare ourselves regardless of whether it is on party or the other which prevails in the US. Since we have decided to deal with the US bilaterally, it would make sense to start looking at outstanding issues between the two countries and consider mutually acceptable solutions. Tariffs on US products and barriers to services must be on the radar and reviewed. We must also look at securing meaningful concessions for our own exports to the large US market.

A possible Trump administration will be a setback to the emergence of a multipolar world mainly because it will debilitate the EU, even while it seeks to confront China. The weakening of EU may not be in our interest but the US confrontation with China may bestow some much-needed strategic space. This is something that must be factored in while India crafts its foreign and security policy for the impending world of Donald Trump.

You have to hand it to French psephologists and pollsters. They have an envious track record when it comes to predicting elections in France. First, the polls said that in the European elections on June 9, Le Pen’s party will win and it did. Then, in the first round of the legislative elections held on June 30, the polls said Le Pen’s party will come first and it did. That said, in the second round of the legislative elections scheduled to take place on July 7, things are more difficult to predict. That is because of the complicated French system where it allows not just the top two candidates of the first round to go through, but also others who polled 12.5 per cent of the registered voters.

The poll scenario is also complicated by two other factors. First, the voter turnout has been high in the first round. This means getting 12.5 per cent of the voters is not a difficult threshold to cross and there may be three-cornered or even four-cornered contests in many of the 577 legislative constituencies up for grabs. Second, there are calls for forging a common “republican front” so as to stop the National Rally (Le Pen’s Party) in its tracks and prevent it from gaining an absolute majority in the French parliament, which it will if it secures 289 out of 577 seats. One way this is sought to be prevented is for all parties other than National Rally to field the best candidate against Le Pen’s nominee and for others to withdraw. It is not immediately clear that the far-left and the conservative right will necessarily heed the call of Macron and his Prime Minister who have appealed that “not one vote” should go to the National Rally. In an exceptional move, more than a hundred French diplomats have appealed, anonymously of course, to the people not to let Le Pen’s party win.

Despite the above, two outcomes look likely on 7 July, both detrimental to Macron’s political future. One, perhaps the more likelier, is a hung parliament. Two, a less probable but certainly plausible one, that is an absolute majority for Le Pen’s party which will mean that for the first time a far-right party will assume power in France since the infamous Vichy regime in the 1940s.

If there is a hung parliament, President Macron has the onerous task of calling on someone to assume the office of the Prime Minister. The charismatic nominee of Le Pen, Jordan Bardella has smartly made it known that he is not interested in the PM post, unless his party gets an absolute majority. The problem is compounded by the fact that Macron cannot dissolve parliament again for one more year. So, he will have to convince someone to become PM or resort to a technocratic government for the period there is a hung parliament, both of which will increase political uncertainty in the second largest European economy. Either way, Macron’s predicament is unenviable.

If however, the National Rally does end up getting an absolute majority on July 7 then that would be tantamount to a political earthquake in France. This may lead to an arrangement called co-habitation i.e. the President and the PM from two different political dispensations. It is not that France has not seen co-habitation before. But this time would be different because of the divergence between the election manifesto of Le Pen’s party the National Rally and that of Macron’s centrist party. First, on immigration, the views of Le Pen and her colleagues are bound to be hardline. Indeed, her party has propounded the concept of “national preference” which is based on controversial things like: no automatic citizenship for those born in France, illegal migrants not entitled to France’s famous social safety net, no sensitive government posts for those with dual nationality and mass deportations. All this will bring France into direct conflict with Brussels and may be even with the European Human Rights Commission. Second, Le Pen opposes defence arrangements within EU, something Macron is passionate about. Third, relations with Germany will come under the scanner if the National Rally has its way. Indeed, this is why the German Chancellor has expressed the wish for the French electorate to vote for any party other than Le Pen’s. Fourth, Le Pen’s party hopes to spend a lot more on energy and other subsidies that will cause a much bigger deficit in France than the current one which is 5.5 per cent of GDP. EU which prescribes a limit of 3 per cent has already warned France about it. It is highly doubtful if Le Pen and her party give a damn about EU in this regard.

All in all, France which is the second most important power in EU (first, if you take into account its nuclear deterrence) could potentially hamstring the EU. Franco-German motor may be expected to sputter and eventually stop running. Le Pen has moderated her comments somewhat on Ukraine and NATO. But it is clear where she is coming from; for her there are serious limits to French support for Ukraine. Russia cannot but be pleased at the prospect of Le Pen gaining political clout in France.

What about China? Le Pen and her party have said little. But she will be inclined to give China the benefit of doubt and not toe the
American line on “de-coupling”, for instance. That has the potential to create transatlantic friction as well.

All in all, the second round of legislative elections in France on July 7 are momentous not just for France but for the world at large. The real imponderable, however, is how the man or woman in the French street sees it. We will know soon enough!

No matter how you define the countries belonging to the Global South, it is incontestable that they want the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to end without any further delay. True, they do not have the agency to bring the two wars to an end. But they must have their voices heard.

The Ukraine war began in February 2022 and has lasted more than two years now. While no one should underestimate the loss of life and property in both Ukraine and Russia, it is also undeniable that countries of the Global South have suffered for no fault of theirs and continue to face adverse consequences. The war in Ukraine has had a direct effect on three vital issues of concern for the Global South: food security, fertilizer and fuel (oil and gas) availability. There are now reliable studies that show that due to the war in Ukraine, oil, gas and food prices have risen worldwide. This has had a disproportionate impact on low-income countries and within those countries on lower-income households. It is ironic that there has not been a proper discussion about this in international fora. It can also be safely said without fear of contradiction that the war in Ukraine has set several countries back in terms of their ability to achieve the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) in particular those relating to poverty and hunger. Agenda 2030 therefore runs the risk of being largely unfulfilled.

The war in Gaza is admittedly of a different nature. While the whole world sympathized with Israel after the horrific and condemnable attacks by Hamas on October 7 last year, there is now an equally universal view that the Israeli response in Gaza has been disproportionate and has had scant regard for Palestinian life and property. In the name of destroying Hamas, the Israeli Defence Forces through their actions in Gaza have violated the Geneva Conventions, duly ratified by Israel. While the countries of the Global South have not been as directly impacted by the war in Gaza as they have been by the war in Ukraine, they would be extremely concerned if the war in Gaza spreads to other parts of the Middle East such as Lebanon, drawing in the Hezbollah. If this were to happen, the chances of oil prices increasing and commercial maritime sea routes being affected cannot be ruled out. This again will put an intolerable burden on low-income countries of the Global South.

India has argued relentlessly in favour of dialogue and diplomacy in both instances, namely, the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza. It may be recalled that India in the context of its G20 Presidency, very successfully held the “Voice of the Global South Summit” in January 2023 before the Delhi G20 Summit and then again in November 2023 after the Delhi G20 Summit was successfully concluded. Both of these meetings took place virtually. Perhaps the time has come for India to convene another edition of the “Voice of the Global South Summit” which could pass a resolution comprising the following points:

(1) Express concern over the continuation of the two wars in Ukraine and Gaza which threaten global peace and security.

(2) Affirm that the two wars have adversely affected the economies of the Global South, in particular the lower-income countries.

(3) Call on the parties to both conflicts to cease hostilities, accept ceasefire and immediately enter into talks aimed at finding a negotiated solution.

(4) Call on the international community, especially the richer countries to help with post-war reconstruction and make related humanitarian efforts.

It is possible that the above resolution remains rhetorical and nothing changes on the ground. But an important political point will have been made backed by moral suasion. After all, countries of the Global South have a right to express themselves on issues of vital interest to them. It is well worth a try.

China may soon acquire the dubious distinction of being everyone’s foe. The G7 summit that concluded recently in Italy in the Leaders’ Communique mentions China specifically at least 8 times, the bulk of it in the context of the war in Ukraine and under the section entitled Indo-Pacific. Almost all references to China are condemnatory. It is now clear that for the G7, it is not merely Russia that is the sole adversary!

In the context of the war in Ukraine, the Leaders stated that they will continue taking measures against actors in China and third countries that materially support Russia’s war machine, including financial institutions, consistent with our legal systems, and other entities in China that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items for its defence industrial base. This formulation is broad enough to allow almost any Chinese entity that is seen as contributing to the Russian “defence industrial base” to be caught in the net. The Leaders’ while expressing deep concern at China’s support to Russia, called on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine.

In the Indo-Pacific region, the G7 Leaders called on China to step up efforts to promote international peace and security, and to tackle the climate, biodiversity, and pollution crises, combat illicit synthetic drug trafficking, ensure global macroeconomic stability, support global health security, and address vulnerable countries’ debt sustainability and financing needs.

On international trade, the G7 leaders expressed concern about China’s persistent industrial targeting and comprehensive non-market policies and practices that are leading to global spill-overs, market distortions and harmful overcapacity in a growing range of sectors, undermining workers, industries, and economic resilience and security in the West.

The Leaders called on China to uphold its commitment to act responsibly in cyberspace. They undertook to continue efforts to disrupt and deter persistent, malicious cyber activity stemming from China, which threatens our citizens’ safety and privacy, undermines innovation, and puts our critical infrastructure at risk.

The Leaders expressed serious concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion. They opposed China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation. They also expressed serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous water cannons against Philippine vessels. In this regard, they reaffirmed that there was no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea and that they opposed China’s militarisation activities in this maritime region.

In what will doubtless be particularly galling to China, the G7 Leaders expressed concern at the human rights situation in China, including in Tibet and in Xinjiang where forced labour was a major concern. They also worried about China’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy, independent institutions and civil society and continued erosion of rights and freedom, including through the recent enactment of legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law that had broad and vaguely defined provisions regarding “sedition”, “state secrets,” and interactions with foreign entities. These developments, the G7 Leaders averred, will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong.

The G7 Leaders called on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of the Western communities and the integrity of its democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

It is hard to think of a G7 Leaders’ Communique or any Leaders’ Declaration for that matter, which is so broadly critical of China on such a wide range of issues. It is possible to argue that all this is mere rhetoric and it remains to be seen how much of this is enforceable and will in fact be implemented by G7 Countries across the board. Even so, China should be extremely concerned that it is being pilloried in such a manner by a group of still-influential countries belonging to the West.

The European Union appears besieged both externally and internally. And this is not good news for those who believe in a strong EU and its legitimate place in an emerging multipolar world.

The external challenge in the form of the war in Ukraine is not going its way, with Russia making small but significant gains and demonstrating much greater staying power than Ukraine. The belated aid from the US was welcome but it may be not be enough to turn things around quickly. Meanwhile, the decision by US and implicitly by NATO, to allow Ukraine to directly hit targets deep inside Russia is a serious and provocatory step. This has profound implications for what has hitherto been a proxy conflict and if this goes ahead, there is every possibility of the war in Ukraine descending into direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, with unpredictable consequences. The main strategy of NATO and the West is to ” irreversibly lock things up” so as to prepare for a Trump presidency. The idea is to reduce the room for manoeuvre as much as possible for Trump, should he become the next President. The next NATO summit scheduled to take place in the middle of July is worth watching closely; fiery rhetoric and escalatory measures are to be expected. While France and UK may be expected to go along with the above, the position of Germany will be crucial.

Meanwhile, the just-concluded European elections have delivered an outcome which is less far-right than expected but that is small consolation to the rebuke the ruling parties have suffered, inter alia, in both France and Germany. Despite enlargement, the old axiom is still true: a Franco-German consensus is necessary but not sufficient to get anything important done in the EU. But for sometime now, there have been differences in the approach of France and Germany. For starters, Macron and Scholz are as different as French cheese and German sausage. They barely tolerate each other. Second, France tends to be ambitious being a nuclear power and a UNSC permanent member but without the financial wherewithal. Germany on the other has the means to be ambitious, but is conservative and is not particularly attached to either the French “grandeur” or to its “strategic autonomy”. With both Macron and Scholz suffering significant political losses in the EU elections, expect both leaders to be preoccupied domestically. Indeed, Macron has already called for snap legislative polls and the outcome may be a sort of “co-habitation” further constraining Macron’s room for manoeuvre. All this without taking into account the differences that exist within the EU towards the war in Ukraine, relations with Russia and ties with the US. It is fair to say that the EU is more divided than ever. This will have consequences for the fundamental EU treaty objective of deeper integration and establishing an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe.

India must pay attention to the kind of Europe that is emerging. The broad sentiment in EU appears more anti-immigrant than before, more protectionist than before and more inward-looking than before. We will of course have to wait and see the kind of European Commission that emerges, whether or not Ursula von der Leyen is at the helm. For now though, we must pursue the FTA talks as well as we can and also see how we can make progress on the India-EU Trade and Technology Council. The fact that the EU has fundamental interests in India (think Indo-Pacific and China) and vice versa, can hopefully provide a basis for augmenting bilateral ties when the next EU-India summit takes place.

A trilateral summit between China, Japan and South Korea was held on May 27 in Seoul. This trilateral cooperation summit has met eight times in the past with very little to show for it. There was a Trilateral Cooperation Vision adopted about 5 years ago which has remained largely on paper. There is a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul since 2011. From its inception, the grouping was intended to promote and strengthen trade, investment and commercial ties between the three countries. After all, these three countries account for over 20 percent of both global trade and GDP. At one time, the three countries had intended to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among themselves which, if it had happened, would have been consequential. But that was not to be. This summit has never been attended by the Chinese President himself. It is always the Chinese Premier who represents China at these meetings. This made sense in the past when Chinese Premiers had some residual clout to make economic and commercial decisions. It is highly doubtful if the current Chinese Premier Li Qiang has any meaningful power in this regard.

The timing of this trilateral cooperation summit between China, Japan and South Korea is curious, to say the least. For one, it is taking place after serious rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. It also comes close on the heels of another important trilateral summit held in Camp David (US) between the leaders of US, Japan and South Korea in August 2023. China’s motivation in attending this summit therefore appears obvious. But Japan and South Korea, with PM Kishida and President Yoon going along with it is interesting. More on this later.

In the event, the Joint Statement issued in Seoul after the trilateral summit involving China, Japan and South Korea on May 27 is anodyne. It talks of more frequent meetings (this one is taking place after 5 years), some institutionalisation of the existing arrangements, people to people exchanges, combating climate change, public health, tackling ageing, sports, cultural festivals and the like. Perhaps the most important decision is to use RCEP as a base to work up towards a FTA between all the three countries. Seems a tall order, at least for now. Most observers feel that the very fact that the trilateral summit took place itself is an achievement and one will have to wait and watch how things unfold.

China clearly saw the Camp David Summit of August 2023 between US, Japan and South Korea as a strategic challenge. After all the joint statement emanating from Camp David promised to strengthen security cooperation among US, Japan and South Korea (all three treaty allies anyway) and called out China specifically for “dangerous and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea”. The Spirit of Camp David declaration also talked of a free and open Indo-Pacific and emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. It also reaffirmed the commitment of US, Japan and South Korea to the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions. China must have noted with alarm not only the rapprochement between Japan and South Korea but also the joint attempt by these two countries to get close to the US from a strategic and security perspective.

The real question is therefore what was in it for the Japanese PM and South Korean President to meet with the Chinese Premier in summit format after a gap of 5 long years. The explanation lies in the massive trade and investment relationship that both Japan and South Korea have with China. While there is no question that Japan and South Korea (Japan much more than South Korea) will want to “de-risk” their trade and investment ties with China over the medium to long term, in the short term they do not want too much disruption in their existing trade and commercial ties with China. For both Japan and South Korea, China is the number one trading partner and any disruption will hurt them badly in the short run. The other thing that Japan and South Korea may be doing is a bit of strategic hedging of their own vis-a-vis the US. The US has carried out serious industrial policy actions such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) and Science Act which is intended to lure microchip manufacturing back to the United States. This has serious implications for both Japan and South Korea. This is perhaps why Japan and South Korea agreed to language in the Joint Statement which talks of strengthening supply chain cooperation with China. Japan and South Korea may thus want to keep their options regarding China open, in the event of Trump winning the American presidency in 2025 and other unpredictable geopolitical developments.

The real “Great Game” is thus being played out in the Indo-Pacific with Japan and South Korea being courted simultaneously by the two Great Powers, namely, the US and China.

On May 23 the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received the Brazilian foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim in Beijing. The two sides discussed, inter alia, the conflict in Ukraine. After the meeting the Chinese news agency Xinhua put out a “six point common understanding” reached between China and Brazil for a possible resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The six points are reproduced below:

1.The two sides call on all relevant parties to observe three principles for deescalating the situation, namely no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no provocation by any party.

2.The two sides believe that dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. All parties should create conditions for the resumption of direct dialogue and push for the deescalation of the situation until the realization of a comprehensive ceasefire. China and Brazil support an international peace conference held at a proper time that is recognized by both Russia and Ukraine, with equal participation of all parties as well as fair discussion of all peace plans.

3.Efforts are needed to increase humanitarian assistance to relevant regions and prevent a humanitarian crisis on a larger scale. Attacks on civilians or civilian facilities must be avoided, and civilians including women and children and prisoners of war (POWs) must be protected. The two sides support the exchange of POWs between the parties to the conflict.

4.The use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons must be opposed. All possible efforts must be made to prevent nuclear proliferation and avoid nuclear crisis.

5.Attacks on nuclear power plants and other peaceful nuclear facilities must be opposed. All parties should comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety and resolutely prevent man-made nuclear accidents.

6.Dividing the world into isolated political or economic groups should be opposed. The two sides call for efforts to enhance international cooperation on energy, currency, finance, trade, food security and the security of critical infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, undersea optical cables, electricity and energy facilities, and fiber-optic networks, so as to protect the stability of global industrial and supply chains.

The following observations are warranted:

> Celso Amorim is the most influential foreign policy adviser to Brazilian President Lula and in that sense is way more consequential than the Foreign Minister of Brazil. So, the statement agreed upon by him with Wang Yi can be construed as Brazil’s official position on Ukraine.

>There is absolutely no reference to Russia having to withdraw from any of the Ukrainian territories it has occupied. What the Sino-Brazilian proposal does is to freeze the conflict calling for no further expansion on the battlefield and no further escalation of fighting. This may be expected to infuriate Ukraine, the EU and the West who have all been calling for a Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian-occupied territories as a pre-condition to any resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The Sino-Brazilian proposal therefore is probably dead on arrival.

>Urging dialogue and diplomacy, it calls for an international peace conference at the right time which is supported by both Russia and Ukraine. It is clear neither China nor Brazil think of the impending Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland in June 2024 as either useful or legitimate.

>Both China and Brazil express themselves strongly against the threat or use of nuclear weapons and safety of nuclear installations. This is welcome and an extension of the Chinese position. The Indian position is similar as well.

>Both countries oppose the formation of political and economic groups. For China to say this is par for the course. But Brazil siding with China in implicitly opposing groups like AUKUS or even Quad, and calling for efforts to enhance international cooperation on energy, currency, finance, trade, food security and the security of critical infrastructure etc so as to protect the stability of global industrial and supply chains is cocking a snook at the US regarding its alliances in the Indo-Pacific, the sanctions in place against Russia & China, and its elaborate efforts at building resilient supply chains. Is this the beginning of some common positions by Brazil and China in the context of BRICS? We will have to wait and see.

It is well known that Lula is his own man and is capable of taking on EU and the West. What is also interesting is that the Chinese press has claimed that China and Brazil, in coming up with this six point common understanding are speaking on behalf of the Global South. India and others in the Global South should duly take note.

The CEO of NITI Ayog, the apex public policy think tank of the Government of India, delivered a speech at the annual business summit of the CII (Confederation of Indian Industry) on 17 May, 2024. The speech was interesting inasmuch as it proposed a radical overhaul of India’s trade and industrial policy. The fact that the person in question Mr B V R Subrahmanyam, was a former Commerce Secretary of the Government of India and he now heads NITI Ayog, whose proximity to the Government cannot be in doubt, makes the speech that much more interesting. He suggests nothing short of a major overhaul of India’s trade and industrial policy. The key elements of the speech are given below along with comments.

(1) Lowering the applied tariffs: It is well known that the Government has, over the last few years, systematically raised applied tariffs on selected items through executive decisions. While these are broadly WTO-legal (given the considerable gap between India’s bound and applied tariffs) and may possibly fetch extra revenue for the Government, they also contribute to enormous unpredictability for traders, not to mention that fact that its primary purpose is to protect domestic industry from competition thus keeping them fundamentally uncompetitive. Lowering applied tariffs therefore is worth considering.

(2) Become part of GVCs: The CEO recognizes that India has been singularly unsuccessful in becoming part of the Global Value Chains (GVCs). He still holds out hope that this can happen, a view that may or may not be shared by others. The fact that China has a major excess capacity problem, that markets are saturated and there is protectionism raising its head in the West needs to be factored in. Still, it is worth a try. I myself would focus more on ensuring that India does everything to be part of the emerging Resilient Supply Chains. Of course, both strategies are not mutually exclusive.

(3) Government’s increase in CAPEX not matched by our Private Sector: There is no question that the Government has significantly increased CAPEX (Capital Expenditure) in infrastructure year on year for the last ten years. Curiously though, the Indian private sector has stubbornly refrained from keeping pace. It is time the Government had a detailed conversation (perhaps even at the level of PM) with our private sector titans to find out what is keeping them from doing this. The CEO has admitted that this is a problem, the first step in doing something about it.

(4) More ease of doing business: The CEO is remarkably frank in admitting that while some progress has been made, more needs to be done to improve the ease of doing business. He calls it “low procedures”, meaning less red tape. He should know, having been an Indian bureaucrat of long standing. He also makes a valid point of reforming both our contract and dispute settlement procedures, both of which are onerous and time consuming. It is hard to disagree with this point; who can dislike motherhood and apple pie!

(5) Continue Reform: The CEO hints at reform of the banking sector where he argues India needs “bigger banks” and must eventually have our own JP Morgans and Citibanks. Easier said than done you might say, but worth trying. While this is welcome, I would argue that both Agriculture and Land reforms are fundamental if India is to become a major destination for FDI. Triumph of wishful thinking?

(6) NTBs: Perhaps the most revolutionary proposal he makes is the way he says India should approach the whole array of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These refer to barriers erected by industrialised (but also others) countries relating to labour, environment and more broadly, standards & regulations. The CEO argues dramatically that these are not barriers per se, but part of how the society in an importing country imposes conditions that they deem fair and fit. He therefore argues that Indian industry must simply adjust to it if it wants to export to these destinations, instead of cribbing about these. This is a radical departure from the typical thinking in our Commerce Ministry where until recently, these NTBs were considered anathema by our authorities and industry alike. In particular, he calls on our industry to adjust to the European Union’s proposal of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), something that should be music to the ears of the EU negotiators with whom we are negotiating a FTA. It will be interesting to know how our industry reacts to all of this.

(7) FTAs: The CEO makes a fervent plea for India signing more and more FTAs. He says, by and large, domestic industry must not be sheltered and exposed to foreign competition. India has embarked on a FTA signing spree, though the major ones with EU and UK are yet to be concluded. In these negotiations, Labour Standards, Environment, Government Procurement and Digital Commerce will figure prominently. By the way, foreign negotiators have told me in complete confidence that there are too few Indian negotiators who are saddled with FTAs and that India’s lack of negotiating bandwidth is also contributing to delay in these talks. This must be dealt with by the new Government.

Conclusion: It is possible that the CEO of NITI Ayog was being deliberately provocative so that the Indian intelligentsia and trade policy cognoscenti can debate and subsequently prepare the Indian political class and the public for the kind of measures that India may have to take eventually. Equally, it may also serve as an admonition to our industry that they should no longer expect to be mollycoddled.

In any case, the CEO has done great service by raising these profound issues. If it leads to a healthy debate among experts, academics and decision makers, the speech will have eminently served its purpose. The new Government must pay attention to the issues raised with a view to resolving them early in its tenure. Needless politicisation of these issues must be avoided since that will surely prevent progress. At the end of the day, India needs a trade and industrial policy that is fit for purpose and is in consonance with its overall strategic objectives; right now, it hasn’t got one!

One thing seems certain after more than two years since Russia invaded Ukraine and unleashed a war in the heart of Europe. While conventional wisdom is that there is a stalemate in the war, the prevalent prognosis by experts is that there is no way Ukraine can win this war from here. But perhaps, it is important to clarify what victory or defeat means in the context of the war in Ukraine.

For Ukraine to win this war, it has to regain all the territories it lost since at least February 2022 when Russia invaded it, if not since March 2014 when Russia took over Crimea. The latter seems more rhetorical as a war objective but the former seems critical if Ukraine is to declare “mission accomplished”. This means Ukraine must evict the Russian forces, which are occupying either fully or partially the following “Oblasts”: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhiya. In the current context, that not only seems like a tall order, it appears well-nigh impossible for Ukraine. This uncomfortable truth is known not just to the US but also to EU officials. And yet, everyone from Macron downwards has been saying that Russia must not be allowed to win the war. It is hard to fathom what they mean when they say that unless they are hinting at a direct conflict between NATO and Russia. For now though, all Russia has to do is maintain the status quo which it is doing comfortably. Witness the latest Russian ingress in Kharkiv, putting Ukrainian troops under severe pressure elsewhere. Ukraine is beset by a multitude of problems: shortage of manpower, lack of ammunition and problems of corruption, war fatigue and bad governance. In sharp contrast, Russia’s war economy is doing okay, military conscription is proceeding apace and President Putin has just won another term. It is not that there are no problems in Russia, but it would seem the ability of the ordinary Russians to accept hardship is much more than was previously imagined. They also seem to have bought into Putin’s narrative of this being a fight for survival for the Russian State and Civilization.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is waiting with bated breath for US assistance to arrive. But it may be a case of too little, too late. One little noticed fact is the arrival of NATO soldiers in the form of “special military advisers” in Ukraine. Poland’s President Donald Tusk merely confirmed what people knew all along. That tens of hundreds of NATO soldiers are already in Ukraine. This is a paradigm shift to which Russia cannot be expected to remain immune. Macron was not exactly being facetious when he contemplated putting boots on the ground in Ukraine and called it “strategic ambiguity”. All this has the potential to bring NATO into direct conflict with Russia. Ukraine now has serious weaponry which can hit Russia deep within its territory. A war between Russia and NATO is still implausible, but not entirely inconceivable. President Putin’s occasional statements about nuclear preparedness is likely aimed at this horrific eventuality.

Russia has meanwhile started consolidating its military gains and begun focusing on economics. The replacement of the Defence Minister by an economist may hint at rationalising the expenditure of the Defence Ministry. Putting a civilian in charge of the Defence Ministry also shows Putin’s confidence about his war aims. The National Security Council team has been reshuffled as a result. It is clear the Russians are planning long term.

Against the above background, the impending visit of Russian President Putin to China and his summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping is terribly important from a geopolitical point of view. Putin will push for more security and economic assistance from his “best friend” Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, has just returned from a visit to Paris where he has been hectored to by Macron and von der Leyen on Chinese military support for Russia in Ukraine. Xi Jinping will therefore need to walk a tightrope. On the one hand, Russia making gains in Ukraine is in China’s short-term interest; on the other hand, China still needs the markets of US and EU for its goods and does not wish to risk further sanctions. Reading the forthcoming Putin-Xi Jinping summit scheduled to take place in China will be both interesting and difficult.

As I have said elsewhere, all major powers are jostling for influence till the American elections produce a clear winner and the European elections produce a new team in Brussels. It is clear the war in Ukraine will end in negotiations. It is equally clear the situation on the ground will not change substantially. It is simply a matter of time. In the meantime, the meaningless war grinds on consuming both lives and property.

India’s strategic landscape was adversely impacted when the war broke in Ukraine. This will change only when the conflict ends with a negotiated settlement. A diplomatic settlement in Ukraine will also potentially release Russia from its current junior status and excessive dependence on China; something that is also in India’s long-term strategic interest. Ironically, this would also be in Europe’s long-term strategic interest. After all, any durable security architecture in Europe has to include Russia, one way or the other.

There is unusual bipartisan consensus in the American Congress when it comes to China. Ironically, there is at present more consensus in America on policy towards China than on policy towards either Ukraine or indeed towards Israel. That is saying a lot.

While the telephonic call between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping was free from acrimony, visits since then from the US especially that of Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have hardened positions on both sides. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen first raised thorny issues of Tik Tok, unfair trade subsidies and industrial overcapacity with her Chinese interlocutors. This met with the usual Chinese reaction that market forces and Chinese productivity/efficiency are at work. It is extremely unlikely that China will change its industrial policy upon the request of the US. Blinken’s visit was much more difficult and fractious. Indeed, the media in China was unusually harsh in treating the Blinken visit and urged the Chinese Government to take a hard line. After all, this visit was at the “invitation” of China, and the media was wondering why he was invited in the first place. Blinken, for his part, made clear that the main issue at present in the relationship was Chinese security assistance to Russia which according to Americans was tilting the war in favour of the latter. Ironically, Blinken said if China sought good ties with Europe it cannot possibly help Russia in the war in Ukraine. The other issue raised by Blinken, namely, China’s actions in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait also drew a predictable response from China: defiance and denial.

Prior to Blinken’s visit from 24 to 26 April, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz paid a visit to China for three days accompanied by who else but top executives from Mercedes Benz and BMW. On de-risking, the Chief Executive of BMW said it all to a Chinese news channel: We actually see more opportunities than risks in China. Must have been music to Chinese ears! Clearly, there is daylight between the China policy of Brussels and that of Berlin. Significantly, there was no clear demarche by Scholz to the Chinese about their military assistance to Russia; instead, he asked Xi Jinping to use his influence with Putin to urge the latter to end the insane war in Ukraine.

That brings us to the China policy of the other important European power, i.e. France. Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to make his first European visit, post-pandemic, to Paris in the first week of May to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between France and China. Xi Jinping is visiting Paris also as a measure of reciprocity after Macron decided early on to visit Beijing every single year of his presidency. While trade will be high on the agenda, China will seek to mollify France and the EU with large orders of Airbus. Still, the question is whether Macron will seriously take up with Xi Jinping the issue of China’s security assistance to Russia in the war in Ukraine. Or will he, like Olaf Scholz, urge Xi Jinping to persuade Putin to end the war and seek negotiations. If the war in Ukraine was truly existential for Europe, you would expect both Germany and France to raise the issue of critical military assistance from China to Russia which may be tilting the war. But this does not seem to be happening.

Behind all this is a waiting game. And that concerns the American elections. You can be sure that no major power is going to fundamentally alter its stance on Ukraine or reveal all its cards, until it knows who the next occupant of the White House is!