Consider this for a minute. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its newly found independence, Ukraine possessed the third largest nuclear arsenal after US and Russia. It reportedly had as many as 5000 nuclear warheads and intercontiental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Imagine if Ukraine had kept those weapons, would Putin have dared to do what he did in February 2022? That said, Ukraine may have found it difficult to keep them for two reasons. First, it was not just expensive but the keys for launching the nuclear weapons were with Moscow. Second, it faced serious economic and social issues which were more of a priority than nuclear weapons at the time. Ukraine then trusted the Great Powers at the time and signed the so called Budapest Memorandum whose signatories, apart from Ukraine, were US, UK and Russia. This memorandum pretty much guaranteed the territorial integrity and security of Ukraine including its borders. But again, look what happened. So much for guarantees of great powers. It is a matter of supreme irony that Ukraine is still seeking security guarantees from the US, after what the latter has done to the transatlantic relationship.

One scholar clearly foresaw the problem Ukraine faces today. As far back as 1993, John Mearsheimer argued that it was imperative for Ukraine to hold onto nuclear weapons to maintain peace as these nuclear weapons would be a deterrent and would ensure that Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it . How prescient was that?

Ukraine’s story will have huge implications for the aspirations of countries to possess nuclear weapons. They will now seriously weigh the pros and cons of going nuclear. That, if it happens, will have serious repercussions for the NPT and the exisiting non-proliferation regime.

The problem is compounded by President Trump’s threat to withdraw the nuclear security umbrealla for Europe, if they do not meet conditions such as significantly increasing their defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP. The French leader Charles de Gaulle may have anticipated this several years back. It is interesting to ask why France got the bomb when it was already covered by the American nuclear umbrella? Quite simply because French President Charles de Gaulle simply didn’t trust Washington to live up to its security guarantees. Extended deterrence was a sham, he felt, and for Paris to be truly secure, it had no choice but to acquire a nuclear capability of its own. As he put it in 1963, “American nuclear weapons remain the essential guarantee of world peace. . . But the fact remains that American nuclear power does not necessarily respond immediately to all the eventualities concerning Europe and France. So, we decided to equip ourselves with an atomic force that is unique to us.” Again, how prescient was that?

With the US behaving the way it is under Trump, the Europeans have started openly discussing extension of nuclear deterrence based on weapons possessed by France and the UK. Germany’s new leader Merz was the first to openly talk about it. Others like Poland have said it is definitely worth looking at. The trouble is the French “force de frappe” as they call it, is exclusively and uniquely French and there is no consensus in France to share this with others. The far right leader Marine Le Pen has already ruled out this possibility. There is also the question of how much UK will be involved in extending its nuclear deterrence to countries of continental Europe, and how comfortable they will be with that. Poland, fast emerging as a major European defence power, has also differeing views on this. The Polish PM (the other Donald as it were) Tusk stated in parliament recently that there has been a profound change in American geopolitics and he is happy for Poland to look at possibilities related to possession of nuclear weapons. The Polish President Duda however remains a steadfast fan of Trump and has argued in favour of American nuclear weapons being stationed in Poland which could act as a deterrence against Russia. Either way, it is fair to conclude that countries like Poland are scrambling to look at nuclear weapons. In all of this, no one is even asking the question of how countries like Poland can acquire nuclear weapons unless they withdraw from the “venerable” Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty!

Poland is not the only power seeking nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has for long felt that it should have nuclear weapons, especially if Iran is on the verge of getting one. Turkey, which hosts U.S. nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, signaled a policy shift in 2019 when President Erdogan criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in nuclear energy could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so. South Korea is another candidate with 70 per cent of the population supporting the development of nuclear weapons, obviously in reponse to the North Korean threat. Japan is toying with the idea but public support is still not forthcoming. In any case, Japan has the wherewithal to quickly go nuclear if it decides to do so. It very recently did a volte-face on the full use of nuclear power, so do not rule out anything yet.

One or more of the above countries going nuclear could open the floodgates for others. It will then lead to a situation where the non-proliferation regime as we know it will unravel quite quickly. The political scientist Kenneth Waltz is said to have famously observed that when it comes to spread of nuclear weapons, more may actually be better. The world may be about to find out!

Two treaties provide the legal basis for what is commonly referred to as the European project. These are the “Treaty of Rome” (1957) and the ” Maastricht Treaty” (1992). In view of President Trump’s recent actions, it is pertinent to ask what the chances are of the European project surviving and continuing in its present form.

But first, what is the European project? It is interesting that when the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957, there was no mention of defence and security. That is because in 1949, NATO was set up by the US along with eleven allies: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the US. So, it was well understood that the European project at that time was a political and economic one, not a military one. The Treaty of Rome therefore, talks of a common market, common economic and competition policies and political unification. This last mentioned point is important. The Treaty of Rome which established the European Community had as its objective stated in the preamble: Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. This has since become a loaded expression in terms of European integration and how much countries should surrender a bit of their sovereignty to Brussels. Indeed, one of the arguments in favour of Brexit was precisely this “ever closer union”, a term vehemently objected to by Brexiteers. The irony is the expression was about ever closer union of peoples, not administrations or bureaucracies.

It is however the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, that fleshed out the concept of the European project and in that sense updated the Treaty of Rome. This Treaty outlined a three pillar system: economic integration, common foreign & security policy and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. The Treaty not only established the European Union (as opposed to the European Economic Community) but also set the foundation for a common currency, common citizenship, common agricultural & industrial policy, common European parliament and most of all, a common foreign and security policy. This had a profound impact on European integration which has since come to be known, in layman’s terms, as the European project.

It is interesting to note that the European project made huge advances in every single area, namely, common currency (euro), common citizenship (Schengen), common agricultural & industrial policy and of course a common European parliament. Where the European project did not make sufficient progress is in the area of common foreign and security policy. There were substantive reasons for this. In 1954 a European Defence Community was attempted, but the French parliament refused to ratify it, ensuring the proposal was dead on arrival. Individual countries like France but also the UK (at that time) had nuclear deterrence and were keen to safeguard it. While they were members of NATO, they were not willing to completely submit to a supranational authority, when it came to defence. Meanwhile, the US underwrote the security expenditure of the EU to a substantial extent, cementing the transatlantic alliance.

As countries of Europe started taking the American security umbrella as a given, they started implementing the other aspects of the European project in full. Foreign and in particular, security policy, consequently lagged behind. Kissinger is reported to have famously asked what is the telephone number of the person in EU that he can call if there is a crisis. In view of all this, it has become common to call EU, an economic giant but a military pigmy. European states (not all but many of them) also built a massive and expensive social safety net for their citizens when it came to healthcare, education and pension.

President Trump, in just a matter of few weeks, has called into question the entire European project. He has done this mainly by threatening to withdraw the American security umbrella which has protected Europe from 1949 onwards. As if to prove he is not bluffing, he has completely sidelined Europe when it comes to the conflict in Ukraine (by talking directly to Russia and Ukraine) and has threatened to stop military and financial aid to Ukraine. For the EU, this has been a rude shock and has sent them scurrying for action. Partly in response to this, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a European defence plan i.e. ” ReArm Europe” amounting to a whopping 800 billion euros. It remains to be seen how the Member States will react to this. For one thing, this will mean suspending EU’s Stability and Growth Pact rules which limit budget deficits of Member States to 3 per cent of GDP, limit national debt to 60 per cent of GDP and promote fiscal discipline. Even countries like France are already close to 5 per cent of GDP as budget deficit. With this plan for a defence fund of 800 billion euros, all fiscal discipline will go out of the window. The other big change that Trump’s policy has brought about in Europe is on the nuclear question. The new German Chancellor Merz has already requested that the French nuclear deterrence be extended to his country. French President Macron has stated in response that while the French nuclear deterrence is comprehensive, sovereign and entirely French, he is open to discussing the question of extending this deterrence to allies in Europe. Far-right French leader Marine Le Pen has vehemently objected to this, thus exposing the faultlines that are likely to occur.

American leaders like Trump and Vance firmly believe the bloated welfare state in Europe is made possible by and is in fact financed because of the US security umbrella. They are therefore determined to pull back the security umbrella, substantially, if not wholly. It is also true that many Europeans will agree that expenditure on their welfare state is excessive and must be scaled back. The question is if the proposed European defence plan takes up most of the monetary resources available, then there will be very little left for the welfare state and consequently, for the European project as it was originally envisaged.

Europe truly confronts a hinge moment in its history.

So, the all important encounter between Trump and Modi is over. On one end of the spectrum, many have called it a masterclass by Modi on how to deal with Trump. Yet others, fewer in number, have said the power dynamic between the two leaders is unpredictable and it is good to keep in mind that India had made smart, pre-emptive concessions to avoid the situation getting out of hand. But all things considered, there was no blood on the floor after the meeting and when compared to how the EU, Ukraine, Mexico and Canada are being treated by Trump, India can count its blessings.

The Indo-American Joint Statement is the first one I can remember in recent times where there is no mention of India’s candidature of UNSC and American backing for the same. This has less to do with India and more to do with Trump’s disdain for multilateralism in general and UN in particular. India will nevertheless need to draw appropriate conclusions from this. UNSC reform looks even more impossible under Trump. We may have to rely more and more on templates like Quad, IMEEC, I2U2 and triangular cooperation groupings like the ones we have with Australia/France and UAE/France. The rest of the emphasis in the Joint Statement is on defence, technology and trade. The acronyms COMPACT (Catalysing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accerlerated Commerce and Technology) , ASIA (Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance) , Mission 500 (doubling Indo-American bilateral trade to $ 500 billion by 2030) and TRUST (Transforming the Relationship using Strategic Technology) sum it up quite well. The fact remains it is India which needs to constantly keep pushing the US to realize the strategic objectives behind each of these acronyms.

A word on immigration and trade. These two will be problematic areas that deserve delicate handling by both at the leadership level. Illegal Emigration can never be in India’s interest and it is commendable that PM Modi has taken a stance on this issue. I remember when I was Ambassador in Bahrain, India’s view on this issue was slightly different. Even legal migration to the US and the West will present significant challenges for India and we must be ready for it.

On trade, India must grab the opportunity for a deal offered by the US side with both hands. That really is the only way out with the US, which is a large export market for India. Separately, we must also conclude the FTA with the EU. International Trade henceforth will be on a non-MFN, reciprocal and strategic basis and I am going to stick my neck out and say something completely heretic: there is no good reason for India alone to be WTO-compliant, when the major players i.e. US, China and the EU are playing ducks and drakes with the multilateral trading system.

Trump’s conversation with Modi appears to suggest that India may get a freer hand in dealing with both Pakistan and Bangladesh. So, India must not squander this opportunity and the window that has been presented to it. More crucially, it is Trump’s relationship with Russia that may actually secure more strategic space for India. The only exception to this enhanced strategic space for India, may be the way Trump eventually deals with China. He is still delightfully vague about how the US will proceed to deal with China. But there has been a fair bit of writing on how Trump is broadly inclined to accept spheres of influence. If true, India should worry about it. According to this hypothesis, Trump would be content with the US playing a predominant role in the Western Hemisphere (and perhaps the Western Pacific), allow Russia to have its own sphere of influence in parts of Europe and most significantly, allow China its own sphere of influence in East Asia. This will likely lead to a more assertive China on its disputed border with India. South Asia by itself is not important enough for Trump in the larger scheme of things, but he will not be opposed to a significant Indian presence. Which is why India needs to get its act together in its neighbourhood preferably going alone if it can or else, acting in concert with like-minded powers. That said, India should expect to come up against Chinese shenanigans both on its border and in its neighbourhood. This will doubtless pose a major strategic challenge for India.

It is not that Trump campaigned in poetry and is now governing in prose. He has been true to his word, most of the time. He threatened tariffs on allies and foes. He said he would pull out of multilateral institutions. He stated ominously that he would get rid of government departments altogether. His cabinet nominees have been outlandish as promised by him. In both the Middle East and Ukraine, we are yet to see Trump’s full hand. But what little he has said about Gaza has been nothing short of outrageous. All this in less than a month of assuming office. There are decades when nothing happens and then weeks when decades happen. 4 more years of Trump seems like an eternity.

The more interesting analysis, preliminary because it is still early days, is to look at two aspects of Trump’s decision making. One, is he always getting his way? If not, what is his strike rate? Two, is he beating a strategic retreat in some instances? If so, what is making him do it? This tentative analysis should be interesting to all of Trump’s partners so that they can be better equipped to deal with his chaotic leadership style over the next four years.

First, the question of imposing tariffs. Tariffs were announced with great fanfare on Mexico, Canada and China. Bizarrely, Mexico and Canada were subject to higher tariffs than China, which ironically has been declared “the” principal rival and threat to the US. But, after tough, last minute negotiations, Trump decided to give both Mexico and Canada a month’s reprieve. The main reason was not to give the friendly countries of Mexcico and Canada more time, but because the Wall Street stocks tumbled and reacted very negatively to the announcement of tariffs on these two countries. The Wall Street then moderated its losses once Trump gave these two countries more time. This could not have been lost on Trump’s international partners. Lesson one: Trump’s actions are not irreversible and he listens to the stock market and the domestic economy more than anyone else.

With China, it played somewhat differently. Trump did impose a 10 per cent tariff on Chinese exports to the US. But China, in what is seen as a highly strategic riposte, put export controls on critical metals such as Tungsten, Bismouth, Indium, Molybdenum and Tellurium. Tungsten, in particular, is of huge importance for the US and China supplies 45 per cent of US Tungsten imports. It is clear that China this time was fully prepared for a trade war with the US. Equally, this is a warning to Trump that any action he contemplates against China will hurt both countries. Trump will henceforth need to ask himself the question as to whether his country can afford the pain. Lesson two: Trump respects power and that is why he likes his “friend” Xi Jinping. Trump is expected to talk to Xi Jinping soon, he knows there is no other option with China.

Trump’s actions aimed at undermining the multilateral institutions can be expected to continue, mainly because it is relatively “cost-free” for him. So, his pulling the US out of the Paris Climate Accords, the World Health Organization, initiating sanctions against International Criminal Court personnel, withdrawal from the OECD global tax deal and ceasing henceforth to participate in the UN Human Rights Council will all sound the death knell of multilateralism as we know it. He may also be happy to see the WTO wither away. Lesson three: Trump is happy to punch opponents who cannot push back.

While the Senate and the Congress appear supine vis-a-vis Trump, the judiciary is showing some signs of fighting back. Thus, in cases involving Trump attempting to freeze federal funding, get rid of federal workers or end birthright citizenship, the Courts have stepped in and put Trump’s plans on hold. While it is not clear that the Courts can permanently veto Trump, at least there is serious opposition to him. But if these cases find their way to the Supreme Court, Trump having packed the top court with a conservative majority may eventually have his way. Lesson four: there are still some constituencies in America which are showing spunk. Trump will doubtless target them in due course.

US may have got its way with Panama, but that is seriously not a power play. A bigger test will come when Trump turns his attention to EU with tariffs and his claims on Greenland. Lesson five: Trump is motion in perpetuity. He believes in keeping all countries off guard, big or small, friend or foe.

With some other issues, Trump is as mercantilist as they come. On Ukraine, he has made it clear that he is more interested in the critical minerals that it possesses, than in any moral argument involving the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Things could not be clearer to Russia. Lesson six: Trump’s ultimate mantra is show me the colour of the money.

The Middle East is a quagmire that sucks in even the shrewdest American Presidents. Trump has shocked everyone with his proposal to evacuate Gaza and then develop it into a “riviera”. If only wishes were horses. Almost no Arab country has welcomed his proposal. Israel may love it but even it knows this proposal is dead on arrival. That may not stop Trump and Netanyahu and therein lies a big danger for the Middle East. Lesson seven: His first trip will be to Saudi Arabia where he is seeking one trillion dollars as investment in the US. Rest of the things do not matter to him so expect him to completely forget about the proposal to evacuate Gaza. He is not wedded to any of his proposals in perpetuity so he can walk back from them at any time of his choosing.

What of India? Well, so far so good. Our PM will go to Washington and will hopefully work his magic on Trump. We have also been smart in taking some pre-emptive measures, whether it is accepting illegal immigrants back to our country or reducing the customs duties on items of interest to the US. India should continue to cultivate Trump and avoid getting into his crosshairs. Final lesson: lie low, hide your strength and bide your time. Easier said than done. Just ask China!

We now have enough initial and substantive evidence to try and make sense of what the Trump administration might adopt as its basic foreign policy doctrine. The following broad principles suggest themselves:

(a) Disinclination to prosecute existing wars abroad and opposition to commencing new ones.

(b) Making America a manufacturing and industrial power again, by fair means or foul.

(c) Cracking down on illegal immigration through dramatic gestures such as deportation. Selective and regulated legal immigration where required.

(d) Will no longer have key alliances based on common values, such as EU or even G7. Instead, US will have a number of transactional relationships which it will aim to exploit to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives.

Based on the above, Trump may be expected to take positions outlined below on some of the most critical issues facing the world order.

NATO: Secretary of State designate Marco Rubio in his Senate confirmation hearing stated that the US will continue to support the alliance but that it expected the Europeans to spend more money. This is unsurprising. But Rubio went on to add that the US should be a “backstop to aggression in Europe” rather than a “bedrock to the continent’s security”. This is a paradigm shift since the end of World War II and will not be lost on the Europeans. How this will play out in terms of pulling out some American troops from the continent, formation of an European defence force and defence spending by EU countries, all of this needs close watching.

Ukraine: On the war in Ukraine, Rubio stated that it is time for the US to be realistic, something sure to cause much angst in Europe. Rubio confirmed what has already been known for sometime: the war in Ukraine has become one of attrition. He added, significantly, that both Russia and Ukraine will be ultimately required to make concessions. Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg has already made known his views on the subject, which the Europeans do not neccesarily like. But they do not have much choice in the matter. Transatlantic ties are set for a roller coaster ride. But things may not reach breaking point; EU will simply have to cough up more concessions to the Americans and accept American hegemonic power.

Middle East: If the ceasefire deal in Gaza goes through (Israel is expected to relent after last minute objections), it seems clear where the credit belongs. Trump’s statement, amounting to bluster, that if there is no deal there will be “hell to pay” for Hamas seems to have helped. But more important, Israel seems to have relented under pressure from Trump. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff appears to have read the riot act to Netanhayu. The Qatari negotiator, significantly, said that the deal agreed to has exactly been the same one on the table for months and hinted that it is Israel which had objected all along. Phases two and three of the deal will doubtless be more contentious but Trump seems capable of displaying “tough love” to Israel, something Biden was incapable of. Trump will most certainly push for a Saudi-Israel normalization which actually opens up possibilities for a compromise on the Palestinian issue, not least because the Saudis cannot justify normalization with Israel without some concrete progress on Palestine. Blinken has spoken at length about how a Palestinian State can potentially come about; ironically, Trump may actually end up succeeding in this regard where others have failed.

China: The latest telephonic conversation between Xi Jinping and Trump ( it will be interesting to know if Xi initiated it or Trump) suggests that the latter wishes to avoid confrontation and prefers to do a deal with the former. Xi Jinping was invited by Trump for his inauguration and the former declined. Yet, Trump has now signalled his eagerness to travel to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping. Purely on grounds of psychology, round one goes to Xi Jinping. There are two interesting statements attributed to Trump on Taiwan. One in his first term and I paraphrase it: Taiwan is like two feet from China; if China chooses to invade Taiwan, there is not a fucking thing we can do about it! The second statement more recently, and again I paraphrase: Xi Jinping will not invade Taiwan, because he thinks I am crazy and unpredictable! The million dollar question: Can unpredictability stemming from perceived insanity count for effective foreign policy? Only time will tell. We knew all along that Trump will struggle with two instincts: Manage China through his ostensible dealmaking prowess or frontally take on China showing how strong he is to his domestic constituency. For now though, it is the former Trump who is showing up. Rubio said what he had to say about China at the Senate confirmation hearing calling it “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted”; in actual practice, that will make no damn difference to his Boss.

Trade: Rubio was right in saying that the US will pull back from Free Trade Agreements and restore the focus on American manufacturing. The US domestic market will be ruthlessly used as leverage to extract reciprocal concessions, from friends and foes alike. On tech and critical minerals, de-risking from China may continue but with key modifications. The idea of a “small yard, high fence” may be set aside, if for no other reason than for people like Musk. Instead, Trump has hinted that he may welcome Chinese investment and technology into the US; indeed, he might suggest to Xi Jinping this is the best way to access the American market. He will, in effect, tell China to help US become the factory of the world. Whether Xi Jinping will fall for it in its entirety, is another matter. The WTO will find it difficult to survive another Trump term. It will languish further and render itself irrelevant. The rest of the world can cry itself hoarse on the integrity of the multilateral trading system and the need to reform it. Trump will not give a damn.

India: It is difficult to fathom where India figures in Trump’s scheme of things. It would seem India is not a high priority for Trump; but that may have to do with India’s lack of sheer hard power; after all, Trump values that more than anything else. A bunch of Ambassadors/ Special Envoys have been announced, but none for India so far. One hopes the Quad summit will be held in India when Trump can make a State Visit with pomp and circumstance. Still, India will be enlisted for support by US vis-a-vis China and in that context, Quad may be expected to flourish. Vietnam is similarly placed like India and faces pressure on the trade front from the US. How Vietnam handles the US may have lessons for India. India must play the “wait and watch” game without appearing too anxious; indeed, benign neglect by the US may be no bad thing for India, allowing it space and time for achieving economic and military strength through tough reforms.

United Nations: While Rubio expressed American support for NATO, he said no such thing about the United Nations. Indeed, on UN, his comments were conspicuous by its absence. The appointment of Elise Stefanik as US Ambassador to UN in New York complicates things. She is a known critic of the international organization and in the past has argued for a “complete re-assessment” of American funding for the UN. Antonio Guterres cannot be too thrilled at the prospect.

Era of multiple strategic hedging: Even before Trump, countries were hedging their bets since the liberal international order was on its last legs and a messy multipolar one was taking its place. What Trump brings to this potent mix is more unpredictability and more opacity. This will inevitably lead all powers, big and samll, to hunker down and hedge their bets even more. Vietnam is the best example of how this is done in practice. The Vietnamese had succeeded in inviting first Joe Biden and then Xi Jinping all in the last quarter of 2024. Now they wish to invite Trump. India while wishing to build on the excellent momentum in its ties with the US, still wishes to hedge its bets by attempting to improve its poor ties with China. China, for its part, will try and have a working relationship with the US, even while strengthening its ties with the EU. EU, not wishing to put all its eggs in the American basket will improve ties with China and perhaps even with India. And so on and so forth. Welcome to the era of multiple strategic hedging where nothing is stable and nothing remains immutable.

Describing 2024 as the year of massive and widespread conflict might be apt. Some fundamental factors underpinned this sombre development.

First, global military expenditure soared. The top ten countries on this metric are listed below:

United States: $811.6 billion

China: $298 billion

India: $81 billion

Saudi Arabia: $73 billion

Russia: $72 billion

United Kingdom: $70 billion

Germany: $57.8 billion

France: $57 billion

Japan: $53.9 billion

South Korea: $49.6 billion

Global defence spending thus grew by 9% to reach a record USD2.4 trillion, driven, in part by NATO member states boosting budgets in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Non-US NATO members now spend 32% more on defence since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ flagship report Military Balance 2024, shows the deteriorating security environment which is exemplified by a mounting number of conflicts, such as the Hamas–Israel war, Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s takeover of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, coups in Niger and Gabon, as well as China’s more assertive manoeuvres around Taiwan, in the South China Sea and elsewhere. The year 2024 confirmed a troubling trend: an increasing reliance on war to address the challenges of a world in flux, seeking to adapt to a new global order. From the Middle East to Ukraine, Sudan, and the Sahel, at least 59 conflicts persist worldwide.

Second and as a corollary, revenues from sales of arms and military services by the 100 largest companies in the industry reached $632 billion in 2023, a real-terms increase of 4.2 per cent compared with 2022, according to data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), available at www.sipri.org. It proves the old adage, war is good business!

Third, conflict-affected areas across the world have grown 65% since 2021 to encompass 4.6% of the entire global landmass, up from 2.8% three years ago. That is equivalent to 6.15 million km2, nearly double the size of India, that is now afflicted by fighting between or within states, according to the Conflict Intensity Index (CII) issued by The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.

Fourth, from the widespread human cost and increased migration to the widening of geopolitical fault lines, the damaging economic impacts and threats to international trade and supply chains, the consequences of the upsurge in conflict are globally significant. The spread of violence is mirrored by rising casualty rates, with conflict deaths on course to breach 200,000 by the end of 2024, up 29% on 2021. The UN has also estimated that the number of people displaced by conflict, violence or persecution exceeded over 120 million by the end of April 2024.

Fifth, the Middle East and Ukraine remain the most intense theatres of war, and both have the capacity to escalate. The spread of conflict in these geographies is well documented, in part because of their geopolitical significance. However, the Conflict Intensity Index, which measures the severity of armed conflict at subnational levels across 198 countries, also provides valuable insights into countries and regions that are less well reported on. In total, 27 countries, including the emerging markets of Ecuador, Colombia, Indonesia and Thailand, have experienced a significant increase in risk since 2021.

Sixth, in terms of areas affected by conflict, sub-Saharan Africa has seen a greater expansion than any other region. Africa’s ‘conflict corridor,’ which now spans 4,000 miles from Mali in the west to Somalia in the east, has doubled in size since 2021. As a result, areas affected by conflict in 14
countries across the Sahel and East Africa now equate to around 10% of sub-Saharan Africa’s overall land mass or 2.5 million km2 , more than 10 times the size of the UK.

Seventh, beyond Africa, several other lesser-known conflicts are also contributing to this upswing. The civil war in Myanmar, which has been raging since the 2021 coup d’état, has seen the South-East Asian state fall from the 19th to the 2nd worst performing country. Haiti and Ecuador have similarly chalked up statistically ‘exceptional’ deteriorations on the Conflict Intensity Index amid surging gang violence, which has escalated from criminality to the declaration of internal conflicts.

Finally, from an economic perspective, the cost of conflict can also be devastating. The latest UN estimate is that the war in Ukraine has caused USD152 billion in direct damage and the cost of reconstruction and recovery will reach nearly USD500 billion. The cost of rebuilding Gaza is estimated at over USD80 billion. In addition, the direct and indirect threats to businesses need to be closely monitored. Data from Asset Risk Exposure Analytics (AREA) – which measures the exposure of over 4 million assets of publicly listed companies to political, human rights, climate and environmental risks – shows that corporate exposure to conflict is currently limited. Only 3.68% of the assets of the highest risk sector, oil & gas, are exposed to conflict, but this could change rapidly if conflict in the Middle East escalates. Global supply chains, on the other hand, are more exposed to war-related impacts. Most notably, the disruption to Red Sea maritime trade caused by the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen attacking Western shipping shows no sign of ending and has led to increased shipping and insurance costs. The fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine likewise roiled global supply chains, from energy to fertiliser through to agri-commodities.

There is little sign that the recent upsurge in armed conflict – and all the tragedy and challenges that go with it – will dissipate in 2025. Indeed, the situation may get worse before it gets better. Against this backdrop, it is impossible to avoid the deduction that international diplomacy is failing the world. A melancholic 2025 thus awaits us all.

It may be said without fear of contradiction that events in Syria took most observers by surprise. In particular, the speed with which the Assad regime collapsed appeared to defy both logic and circumstance. While the principal focus of the commentariat has been to talk of which power won and which one lost, it is incumbent on scholars of International Relations to at least look at the origins and causes of this geopolitical disaster.

The “realist school” supports the hypothesis put forward by Ambassador Talmiz Ahmad that the overthrow of the Assad regime in such quick time could not have happened without the US, Turkey and Israel closely coordinating and orchestrating events in Syria. Ambassador Ahmad is not just a practioner who has spent an awful lot of time in the region but is also at present a scholar-practioner whose knowledge is formidable and therefore deserves to be taken seriously. The theory put forward by him has merit on the face of it, but as with everything else must be examined on the basis of available evidence. There is no doubt that there is total strategic convergence between US and Israel when it comes to Syria and that the overthrow of Assad was a goal shared by the two countries for a long time (see Jeffrey Sachs’ version of events below). But even the US must have mixed feelings of the new leader, Abu Mohd al-Jolani, taking over the reins in Syria; after all, there is still a bounty of $ 10 million on the head of al-Jolani. Turkey, however, is a different kettle of fish. For starters, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a powerful military faction in Syria and this is basically a Kurdish coalition that has governed North-Eastern Syria since 2012 when Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) withdrew from there. It is thus hard to see any strategic convergence whatsoever between Turkey and the SDF. The US support for SDF has also been on and off. And then, there is the Syrian National Army (SNA) backed by Turkey which obviously resents the power of both SAA and more important, SDF. In this latticework of military factions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to think that somehow, suddenly, the US, Israel and Turkey closely orchestrated events in Syria and unseated Assad in December. Because it implies, implausibly, that SDF and SNA have somehow buried their differences, albeit temporarily. This then is a conundrum for those who believe in the US, Israel and Turkey getting together and overthrowing Assad within a relatively short period of time. At a mimimum, it is clear that further factual evidence is needed to support this proposition, which may well be forthcoming in the near future. That said, a respected retired Indian Vice Admiral who is associated with numerous think tanks in Delhi clearly confided, in anonymity, that the “neo-imperialist/zionist” theory is simply implausible at best and hogwash at worst.

In direct contrast to the above school, is the theory put forward by the respected journalist Praveen Swami in “The Print” on 10 December in an article entitled: The Assad regime fell due to its own failures, not geopolitical plots. As the title indicates, this “constructivist school” (my phraseolgy and I am taking liberties here) lays the blame squarely on Assad. The key portion of his article is reproduced below: “Although some accounts have cast the collapse of the regime as an Imperialist-Zionist plot, Assad knew the real problem faced him in the mirror. For two generations, the al-Assad family used cold cash and raw terror to hold together a complex ethnic-religious mosaic. Today, Sunni, Shia, Alawi, Armenian, Christian, and Kurd could fracture into warring communal-based emirates.” Among the sins of the Assad regime that Swami points out, the following stands out:

The Ba’ath regime stamped out the Islamists, killing tens of thousands in a brutal counter-insurgency campaign. To secure his regime against future threats, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad staffed key positions in his regime with loyalists picked from his own sect, the Alawi. Large-scale development projects and revenues from oil, geographer Fabrice Balanche records, allowed Hafez to rent—not buy—the local tribes. The communal demographics of Syria explain how this happened. In 2010, the last year for which figures are available, some 65 per cent of the population was Sunni Arab, 15 per cent Kurdish, 10 per cent Alawi, 5 per cent Christian, 3 per cent Druze, 1 per cent Ismaili, and 1 per cent Shia. In other words, the Assad regime was not representative at all, was backed by outside powers like Russia and Iran (not counting Hezbollah) and had scant regard for human rights. The key contention is this: Without the domestic situation in Syria providing a fertile environment, there is no way the cookie could have crumbled the way it did.

Lastly, the redoubtable Jeffrey Sachs, who has emerged as a bitter critic of his own country’s foreign policy, puts forward his version by arguing how the “US and Israel destroyed Syria and called it peace”. He not only talks of Israel’s longstanding strategy to overthrow Assad, but also refers to “Operation Timber Sycamore” which was reportedly a billion-dollar CIA covert program launched by former President Obama to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. This they did through the CIA by funding, training, and providing intelligence to radical and extreme Islamist groups in Syria. This then is the “historical theory of IR” explaining how the US and Israel set about their goal to carry out regime change in Syria. Assuming this was true, the question still needs to be posed as to why the collapse happened when it did in Syria. And the one possible explanation is that the regime’s backers such as Russia, Iran and Hezbollah were arguably too weak to bail out Assad this time around.

A far easier assessment concerns which powers won and which ones lost. Conventional wisdom suggests that while Turkey has emerged as the biggest winner followed by Israel and the US, the biggest losers would appear to be Russia and Iran. As to whether this is a win for ordinary Syrians, only time will tell.

So, where does this leave us in answering the fundamental question: why did Syria collapse like a house of cards? It seems to me that there is some validity in all the three different explanations given above (there could be others as well). It would be highly irrational for a International Relations scholar to exclusively support one theory and ignore the others. An objective methodology would suggest attaching different weight to the various theories and then come to a rational conclusion about recent events in Syria. The bottom line, however, is this: the domestic situation in Syria was of paramount importance and therefore a necessary factor, even if not entirely a sufficient factor, in explaining the serious geopolitical events that occurred in Syria in the first week of December.

While the whole focus of the commentariat has been on whether Trump will be a hawk or not on China, there has been much less emphasis on implications of the Trump presidency for the European Union. In actual fact, it is the transatlantic alliance that may come under pressure and may call in question the whole notion of the “Western alliance”. This, in my view, has important implications for the World Order, at least as important as the US-China realtionship. Here is an attempt to list the major policy areas which need watching:

(1) Ukraine: Now that we know the appointment of Lt General Keith Kellogg as Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, it is useful to know his views about how to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. He wrote an article for America First Policy Institute on 11 April, 2024 entitled: America First, Russia and Ukraine which should be mandatory reading for those interested in the subject. The main takeaways are summarised below:

> This was an avoidable crisis, made worse by Biden;

>It was in America’s best interest to maintain peace with Putin and not provoke and alienate him with aggressive human rights and pro-democracy campaigns or an effort to promote Ukrainian membership in NATO;

>Importantly, it was in America’s interest to make a deal with Putin on Ukraine joining NATO, especially by January 2022, when there were signs that a Russian invasion was imminent. This was the time when the Biden Administration should have dropped its obsession with publicly criticizing Putin and worked toward a compromise. A U.S. offer to delay Ukraine’s admission into NATO for a decade might have been enough to convince Putin to call off the invasion, but Biden Administration officials refused to make such an offer.

>Kellogg argues that Ukraine lost the counteroffensive because of US reluctance to offer military assistance in time;

>The Biden Administration began in late 2022 to use the Ukrainian military to fight a proxy war to promote U.S. policy goals of weakening the Putin regime at home and destroying its military. It was not a strategy, but a hope based on emotion and was not a plan for success, Kellogg says.

>Kellogg quotes national security expert and retired Army Colonel Kurt Schlichter: “Ukraine is not losing because America hasn’t given it enough shells. Ukraine is losing because there aren’t enough Ukrainians. –“

>On how to end the war, Kellogg says: Specifically, it would mean a formal U.S. policy to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict. The United States would continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement. Future American military aid, however, will require Ukraine to participate in peace talks with Russia.

>To convince Putin to join peace talks, US and NATO should offer to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.

>In exchange for abiding by a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone, and participating in peace talks, Russia could be offered some limited sanctions relief. Ukraine would not be asked to relinquish the goal of regaining all its territory, but it would agree to use diplomacy, not force, with the understanding that this would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office. Until that happens, the United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine. Levies will be placed on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.

The above is in direct contradiction to the “whatever it takes policy” followed by the EU in its support for Ukraine. The EU can flail its arms as much as it wants, but it has to simply suck it up, as the Americans would say.

(2) NATO: Trump’s plans on NATO may be evolving. While it may be inconceivable that Trump decides to quit NATO altogether, it seems clear that he will go beyond merely asking the NATO members to pay up. What this “re-orientation” of NATO will be, we will have to wait and see. One speculative report is that the U.S. would keep its nuclear umbrella over Europe during a second Trump term by maintaining its airpower and bases in Germany, England and Turkey, and its naval forces as well. But the bulk of infantry, armor, logistics and artillery would ultimately pass from American to European hands. The shift would involve significantly and substantially downsizing America’s security role and stepping back instead of being the primary provider of combat power in Europe, and a country which provides support only in times of crisis. In addition to the above, NATO will have to come to grips with the fact that Ukraine can never really be part of it.

(3) Gaza: Biden has achieved a ceasefire in Lebanon, but it is anyone’s guess how long it will last. On Gaza, the Americans under Trump will diverge sharply with EU (and much of the world) when it comes to civilian casualties and more crucially, on the principle of a two-state solution. Conventional wisdom is that almost all of Trump’s appointees are staunchly pro-Israel. Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State designate has said:  I want Israel to destroy every element of Hamas it can get their hands on. These people are vicious animals who did horrifying crimes. Pete Hegseth, the Defence Secretary designate is reported to have said: Israel is not some mystical land that can be dismissed, it is the story of God’s chosen people. He also added for good measure: There is no such thing as an outcome of a two-state solution, there is one state! But the best remarks (or the worst, depending on your perspective) are arguably those of Mike Huckabee who is slated to be the US Ambassador to Israel: There is really no such thing as a Palestinian, you have Arabs and Persians. And you have such complexity within that. There is no such thing as a Palestinian really. That’s been a political tool to try to force land away from Israel.

If this is the policy that is enforced by Trump and there is little reason to believe he won’t, then this will directly contradict EU’s well-crafted policy on the subject. Not to mention the fact that it will also antagonize much of the world, including the Global South and the Arab countries.

(4) Trade and Tariffs: Trump’s statements on tariffs so far offer a clue, but it remains to be seen how much he loves this word, which he calls the most beautiful word (tariff that is) in the english language. And so far the signals are ambiguous. While he has said that he will impose 20 per cent duty on products from Canada and Mexico, leading Trudeau to rush to Mar-a-Lago hat in hand, Trump has also said in the same breath that products from China will initially attract 10 per cent duty. This, on the face of it, would suggest that it is better to be in China’s shoes than in Canada’s or Mexico’s. India has mercifully not figured so far, but who is to tell? The problem for EU is also what will happen to two crucial things: one, will Trump really dismantle the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act, as he said during the campaign? And what is the level of tariffs he will impose on products from the EU. Only time will tell.

(5) Climate Change: Trump and his belief that climate change is basically a “hoax” is too well known to bear any repetition here. Even under Biden, the US had expressed concern at the WTO about EU’s impending CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) which will be fully operational by 2026. Trump may be expected to oppose it tooth and nail. This too could create strain in the US-EU relationship.

It would be highly naive to think that the transatlantic relationship can go back to status quo ante with Trump as President. The million dollar question is how Trump’s policies will change the idea of the “Western alliance” that we have all understood so far and what inference powers such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran will draw from all this. Interesting times ahead!

The Baku climate conference, somewhat incongruously called COP 29, concluded in turbulence. The verdict nevertheless is out. The rich countries will not assume fiscal responsibility for their legacy CO2 emissions. The poor countries did the only thing they could do, namely, walk out of the meeting in protest but were dragged back; they have now been handed crumbs and left largely to their own devices. Meanwhile, the fossil fuel industry can rejoice that the slogan “drill, baby, drill” could well have been the leitmotiv for COP 29 in Baku. After all, the President of Azerbaijan reportedly said “oil and gas”was a gift from God!

How did it all come to this? Well, climate change negotiations have always been less about climate and more about geopolitics. The struggle of the developing and least developed countries has centred around two objectives: first, to get the rich countries to drastically reduce their CO2 emissions and if possible, vacate the carbon space they have unfairly occupied; two, to get them to transfer both monetary resources and technology to poor countries so as to enable the latter to follow a low-carbon pathway to development. After 29 iterations of the COP (Conference of Parties, for the uninitiated!) it can be said without fear of contradiction that the negotiating process has spectacularly failed in meeting either of the above objectives. To put it bluntly, the rich countries have not been able to summon the political will necessary to keep their side of the bargain. And the poor countries have not been able to muster the unity and clout necessary to force the former to deliver on their promises.

The Baku conference was dubbed the “climate finance COP” and was to agree on a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), yet another ludicrous UN acronym. In the event, it was only able to come up with a irrationally modest sum of $ 300 billion for annual transfer to developing and least developed countries from the developed countries by 2035. A number of climate activists and scientists described this as a cruel joke and deemed it grossly insufficient. To put it in context, in 2009 it was agreed that $ 100 billion would be transferred by the rich countries to poor countries. That did not happen till 2020 and that only after a fudge by the OECD! The $ 300 billion agreed now was against the demand of at least $ 1.2 trillion by the poor countries. Besides, the devil also lay in the details. Out of this $ 1.2 trillion demanded, half of this was asked for in grants and concessional loans from Governments. Instead, what has been decided is a much smaller amount and details are notoriously fuzzy about what is from Governments and what is from private funding and multilateral development banks. Indeed, the reputed publication “Down to Earth” asked: Is this $ 300 billion, public or private finance? Public finance refers usually to grants and concessional loans while private & others refer to finance with market rates of interest. There is also a discrepancy in the statement made by UNFCCC and what is in the NCQG text. The former talks of $ 300 billion as “public finance” while the latter text talks of ” $ 300 billion from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources”. No prizes for guessing which version will ultimately prevail. One big concern by activists is the accumulation of climate debt by poor countries. And all this, even before Trump has assumed office. So, it is anyone’s guess what happens after January 2025 to the US, which is the world’s second largest emitter (China is number one), in terms of its position on climate finance in general and Paris agreement in particular. Conventional wisdom is that like the last time around, Trump will pull the US out of the Paris accords and will formulate policies which generally favour the fossil fuel industry.

The US was largely on the sidelines in this COP meeting. The reasons are not far to seek. With the impending arrival of Trump in the White
House, Biden’s climate envoy John Podesta had no credibility to negotiate and no one took him seriously. Indeed, he became the object of public ire when some activists asked him to go back home. This probably suited the lameduck US delegation anyway. It was not as if the Biden Admisnistration was terribly willing to transfer generous amounts of money to poorer countries as climate finance.

China’s role in this COP 29 has been curious and will no doubt be analysed in some detail. At the time of writing, it seemed as if China was torn between two things: one, to keep its “developing country” status intact so that it would not be obliged to transfer money to poorer countries, which it was willing to do in limited amounts but only voluntarily; and two, assume a leadership role in climate negotiations in the discernible absence of the US! China also skilfully rode two camps. One, it continued to belong to G-77 plus China which demanded something like $ 600 billion in public finance from the rich countries. Two, it coordinated its position with the EU and reportedly tried to persuade the poorer countries to agree to the lower figure. Full details of how China played its cards will emerge over the next few days.

India was predictably indignant at the final outcome. The Indian delegate wished to speak before the final decision was gavelled. This request was not granted and India objected vehemently to both the Azerbaijani presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat. I was in Paris when the climate accords were gavelled and there too, it was done over the head of the Nicaraguan delegate. The COP appears to be making a habit of this. More substantively, the Indian delegate called the $ 300 billion a “paltry sum” and described the deal as “nothing more than an optical illusion”. Crucially, India said the agreement does not conform to CBDR-RC (common but differentiated responsibilties and respective capabilities) and the principle of equity.

In an article I wrote recently talking of the megatrends that would define this century and the next, I had predicted that the world had all but lost the battle against climate change. I do not take pleasure in saying “I told you so”, but such is the dystopian world we are staring at.