It is becoming increasingly clear that there is some reordering of the world which is under way. Some of it had begun well before President Trump took office in 2025. It is nevertheless fair to conclude that his actions are expediting matters in this regard. While the broad contours of a fragmented multipolar world are discernible, it is hard to know what the end product will look like.

Monroe Doctrine Lite: After decades of limited engagement, the US under President Trump 2.0 has once again started focusing on the Western Hemisphere. US appears to have three strategic objectives in mind. First, immigration and border security. Second, drug trafficking, with specific focus on Fentanyl. Last, but not least, China’s strategic and economic presence in Latin America which is a source of great concern for the US. In response, the Trump administration has used a carrot and stick approach to countries in the region. For example, Mexico’s National Guard was deployed to intercept migrants travelling northward, essentially serving as an extension of the U.S. border. On drug trafficking, Canada is taking significant action to stop the production and devastating impacts of illegal fentanyl and other illegal drugs on public health and public safety. The Canadian Government is investing over $30 million to launch a Precursor Chemical Risk Management Unit (PCRMU) and $48 million to establish the Canadian Drug Analysis Centre (CDAC). Canada is working closely with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration to enhance existing collaboration and information sharing between our governments. But it is China’s increasing trade, investment and infrastructure imprint in the Western Hemishpere that is most concerning to the US. As a result of not-so-subtle pressure from the US, Panama was the first Latin American country to pull out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The issue of Panama Canal illustrates American concerns about Chinese influence. Though the Canal itself is operated by Panama, the ports on either side of the crucial maritime passage are owned by China. President Trump has repeatedly threatened to take control of the Panama Canal. BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, was to buy controlling share of the two ports on either side of the canal, but Chinese regulators have reportedly put the sale on hold. Recent reports also highlight Chinese ownership of ports in Jamaica, Peru and Mexico.

In May 2025, China hosted the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum in Beijing. Colombia signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative. Public opinion polling showed the United States is ceding ground to China in South America. Last year, trade between Latin America and China exceeded $ 500 billion for the first time. Brazil is hoping to take advantage of renewed trade tensions between the United States and China to boost soy exports to China, potentially resulting in an additional $7 billion in profits due to President Donald Trump’s tariffs. Last year, Brazil supplied more than 70 per cent  of China’s soy imports. So far, US efforts to achieve its strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere have met with mixed results. But the US-China tug of war may be expected to continue. Whatever else US does, it will seek to exercise maximum influence in the Western Hemishpere.

Dramatic Power Shift in the Middle East: The real geopolitical change, dramatic even by the region’s volatile standards, has occurred in the Middle East, otherwise known as West Asia. First, there was the horrific terrorist attacks of Hamas on October 7, 2023. Following that, Israel unleashed devastating attacks in Gaza leading to massive destruction of life and property. A complex mix of authorities governs the 5.5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza strip and West Bank. With the destruction of Gaza, the weakening of Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, it is fair to say that Israel holds the strings to the ultimate fate awaiting the Palestinians. Israel has also gone about defenestrating Iran’s proxies i.e. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, with great success. The US has actively helped Israel in achieving this. But it is the latest action by Israel & the US against Iran that represents a pardigm shift in the geopolitics of the Middle East. In the short term, it leaves Israel enormously strengthened at the expense of every other power in the Middle East. Two forces were eternally aligned against Israel in the past i.e. the Palestinian cause for nationhood and the Shia actor Iran. Both were not just implacably opposed to Israel but challenged the very legitimacy of Israel as a state. Today, Israel under Netanyahu can justifiably argue that both these forces have been significantly weakened, if not destroyed altogether. The position of the other powers in the Middle East is disingenuous. On the one hand, they will all pay lip service to the Palestinian cause and express strong criticism of the US/Israel bombing of Iran. But it is hard to see them going beyond that. The only concern for some of these powers will be whether the Arab street rises in anger and fury. So far, there is very little evidence of this occurring. In the long term, it is far from clear that all this will lead to some kind of equilibrium, much less peace, in a region that is notorious for producing more history than it can consume.

Russia back in Europe: When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it seemed at the beginning as though this would be a cake walk for Russia. After all, one was a huge nuclear ex-super power and the other was a relatively small country on the margins of Europe. Russia’s stated objectives were to occupy territory, to de-nazify the regime and render Ukraine free from both NATO and Western influence forever. To everyone’s surprise, Ukraine fought back bravely and resisted for a while. Eventually though, reality imposed itself and Russia not only succeeded in occupying 20 per cent of territory but also inflicted disproportionate damage to Ukrainian lives and property. At the time of writing, there is a war of attrition in which Russia certainly holds the upper hand. President Trump’s arrival in the White House has also changed the dynamics of the Western alliance which supports Ukraine. Europe has been largely left to fend for itself and a diplomatic solution seems the only way out. But Russia can be expected to play hardball, having got the better of Ukraine on the battlefield. In any future European security architecture, Russia can and must be expected to assume a principal role. Europe thus has no choice but to reckon with a resurgent Russia.

China on the sidelines: It is easy to think that China, the other Great Power, would be pleased with all these developments for no other reason than it would keep the US bogged down and take the focus away from the Indo-Pacific. But that would be an incorrect reading of the situation. The fact of the matter is that despite being a Great Power, China has had nothing to do with the above momentous events and is not in a position to shape strategic outcomes in theatres other than its own. A Middle East in turmoil with a weakened Iran is simply not in the long-term interest of China which still depends on crude oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz, not to mention the strategic investment that the Chinese have made in Iran. And Israel has reasons to be miffed with China. Similarly, a resurgent Russia has more strategic room for manoeuvre and is likely to avoid total dependence on China. All things considered, an unstable Middle East and a resurgent Russia works against China’s fundamental interests. In all of this, China’s strategic options are diminshing, not expanding.

India’s Challenge: India’s primary challenge emanates from South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. There is a tendency in India to obsess about Pakistan and follow every move it makes. This is indicative of strategic insecurity which must be overcome. Frankly, there is no comparison between India and Pakistan at present and at least we must be sure of this, even if others are not. Yes, the US is encouraging Pakistan for its own strategic expedience, whether it is pursuing its interests in the Afpak region or indeed to try and drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. We can and should monitor Pakistan’s strategic moves in this regard but I hardly think there is justification for fretting and fuming. I think India’s principal challenge lies in the Indo-Pacific region in coping with China and conquering its own internal demons: the latter having to do with economic growth and social cohesion. If India does that successfully, other things will follow.

There is wide consensus among foreign policy wonks that the Liberal International Order established in the aftermath of World War II has well and truly ended. There is also substantial agreement that a new and settled order is yet to take its place. So, what are we witnessing at present and how can countries navigate this turbulent period?

Politically, the great institutions set up immediately after the end of World War II are displaying signs of irreversible atrophy. The main among these is the United Nations (UN) set up with enormous idealism in 1945. The UN Charter stood the test of time with articles of faith such as national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and refraining from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a member state. Looking at the world today, it is hard to imagine any of the above principles being scrupulously observed by even the so-called permanent members of the UN Security Council, the P5 as it were. If the P5 cannot set an example, why should other member states follow the UN Charter? In a situation where it is each country to its own and the devil take the hindmost, the world has quickly moved from relative order to utter disorder. Examples abound: Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, South Sudan, Myanmar — the list is endless.

The paralysis of the UN has been accompanied by a real tumult in the transatlantic alliance between US and Europe and the coming into being of new alliance-like ties between China and Russia. This is putting tremendous strain on the regulatory architecture that had hitherto kept peace in the world for much of the cold war period.

From an economic and trade perspective, the guardian was the World Trade Organization (WTO) which came into being with fanfare in 1995. After successfully fulfilling its mandate for about a decade, the organization began a process of terminal decline which now appears unstoppable. All three functions of the WTO, namely, negotiations, dispute settlement and trade monitoring have ground to a halt. And the WTO has little to show now for the 30 years it has existed. The result has been a free for all in which there has been a tariff war, a rush to sign Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which are not necessarily WTO-compatible, weaponisation of trade, investment and technology and a mad rush to acquire critical minerals and rare earths.

From a military perspective, world military expenditure reached a little under 2.8 trillion dollars in 2024, rising by about 10 per cent compared to 2023, which is the steepest year-on-year rise since the end of cold war. There are as many as 22 conflicts in the world classified as wars. Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East all have serious ongoing conflicts and the UN Security Council, specifically tasked to resolve matters involving war and peace, appears impotent to both putting an end to existing wars or indeed preventing new ones from occurring. Institutions like the NATO are wobbly and dialogue between the Great Powers such as US, China and Russia is either absent or highly inadequate. 2025 may well be the most violent year that mankind has seen since the end of World War II.

The stability of the international relations system depends, inter alia, on the distribution of power among the major countries, such as US, China and Russia. The system is likely to be stable when either there is a single hegemon which has the potential to impose its will in any part of the world (unipolar moment) or there is a concert among the major powers , signifying a balance of power (better part of the cold war period). Today’s world resembles neither of the above scenarios.

US is doubtless the most pre-eminent power in the world today. But China is catching up fast and there are a plethora of middle powers who can swing one way or the other. This essentially means that the US, despite being the most powerful country in the world, cannot always have its way in every region of the world. Indeed, the Great Powers, namely, US, China and Russia are challenged even in what may be considered their own backyard. The current world order is therefore characterised by “fragmented multipolarity” which by definition entails instability and unpredictability. This makes it challenging for decision-makers and statesmen to formulate viable foreign and security policies which can withstand the turbulence inherent in the existing strategic landscape. There is really no alternative for a majority of the countries except to hedge their bets, say a prayer and hope for the best.

It is perhaps too soon to dissect the intricate details of the conflict that was triggered by the horrific terrorist attacks that took place at Pahalgam on April 25. Yet, some lesssons can be learnt and some inferences drawn even at this preliminary stage.

Change in military doctrine: By declaring to the outside world that any future terrorist attack will be deemed an act of war, India has signalled a fundamental change in its military doctrine vis-a-vis Pakistan. This should act as a serious deterrence but only time will tell. Having announced this doctrine, we must do everything to implement it fully and unreservedly, should an eventuality occur in the future.

Airpower: In terms of the number of fighter aircrafts, India only enjoys a slight numerical advantage i.e. 513 for India as opposed to 328 for Pakistan. This plus the fact that our initial attacks had lost all element of surprise helped matters for Pakistan. Pakistan may have had lesser drones, overall, than India, but it is a fact that 300 to 400 drones were used just on the night of 8 and 9 May alone, as confirmed by our military. This may be kept in mind for the future. There must be an audit, in due course, of how effective our fighter aircrafts were, how many we lost and more crucially, the role of Chinese fighter aircrafts and Turkish drones in this conflict. Remedial measures after proper evaluation cannot be postponed any further.

Air Defence: This is one area where India came out absolutely on top. S 400 missile defense system deserves praise, perhaps the best in the business. With its ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously (as many as 36) it probably saved a lot of lives and property for us. The Barak-8 used by us, was jointly developed by India and Israel, and is a versatile surface-to-air missile system designed for both land and naval platforms and offers a range of 70 to 100 kilometers. Finally, we also used the indigenous Akash which is a short range defence system  to protect vulnerable areas and vulnerable points from air attacks. The attack by the Pakistan Fatah-II missile on India was thwarted in Sirsa (Haryana) and that was dangerously close to Delhi. All three missile defense systems therefore deserve praise, but the “Sudarshan Chakra S-400” system takes the cake.

Tipping point? It is too early to confirm this, but the tipping point in this conflict may well have been our attack targeting the Nur Khan, Murid and Rafiqui airbases. Nur Khan base, Rawalpindi, is a mere 10 Kms from Islamabad. More importantly, it is not that far from Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Headquarters. The existential fear of Pakistan is that India, through a strike, can decapacitate this nuclear command centre. Is it possible that this was conveyed by the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir to American Secretary of State Marco Rubio? The IMF loan to Pakistan may have also played a secondary role.

US Role: It is hard to deny a substantive, if not exclusive, role played by the US in all of this. There have been telephonic conversations not just between Rubio and Indian interlocutors, but Vice President JD Vance seems to have talked to PM Modi as well. This after saying previously that the Indo-Pak conflict was “fundamentally not the business” of the US. Again, what made the US change its mind so quickly? The above fear of nuclear conflagration may have been one reason; second, it is good for the Trump administration to score a diplomatic success while facing headwinds in both Ukraine and Gaza.

Support for India: Israel’s support for India was unconditional and that was good to see. US certainly supported our right to defend ourselves against terrorist attacks, before getting involved in some kind of mediation. Our other partners such as EU, Japan and more broadly the G7 countries made it a point to condemn the terrorist attacks before calling on both sides (emphasis mine) to exercise restraint, thus creating a morally false equivalence. Worse still, no one really called out Pakistan by name. This requires detailed scrutiny and introspection by us. Could it have been any different if we had furnished some proof of Pak involvement? What about the five eyes’ countries and their evidence gathering ability? We must hold them to this at least in the future. Also, if we had proof that two of the terrorists were Pakistanis, could we have shared this with the world at large. May be we did with select partners, but international press coverage may have been a tad better if we had done that without compromising our sources. That said, the Western press coverage of the Pahalgam incidents themselves were abysmally one-sided and misleading.

Future Scenarios: We have made it clear that while we accept the cease fire, all other measures announced in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist attacks such as our holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance etc will remain. For now, we must maintain only military level contacts at the level of DGMO which is essential for maintaing peace. During the conflict, there were unconfirmed reports of the National Security Advisers of both countries being in touch. There was a curious reference in the message on “X” by Secretary Marco Rubio that both India and Pakistan have consented to start talks on a “broad set of issues at a neutral site”. This has since been denied by Indian sources. Be that as it may, what did Secretary Rubio have in mind? Back-channel talks? Either way, this will be problematic for India and may be widely perceived as Pakistan being “rewarded” for carrying out terrorist attacks. In any case, in the immediate future the goal must be on maintaining peace and tranquility between the two countries.

Big Picture: I had said earlier that for India, Pakistan must remain a sideshow. It cannot take its eye off the ball when it comes to achieving economic heft, military dominance and maintaining social cohesion. The last mentioned point was admirably displayed by the nation during the conflict. Political parties in India also spoke with one voice. But India is at a crossroad. A lot of nation building is still required on the political, economic, social and military front. The country must now move on from this sad episode and hunker down to achieve the ultimate goal of overwhelming and comprehensive national power.

It is hugely risky to write anything definitive about a kinetic military operation which is still ongoing. And yet, something deserves to be said about India’s diplomatic and military moves in the past one week. There was absolute consensus within the country that the terrorist attacks in Pahalgam were horrific and condemnable. One does not need to be a strategic affairs expert to infer where the terrorists got their support from. Equally, the strong sentiment in India was that something needed to be done by our armed forces by way of retaliation.

Two excellent moves by India to begin with. First, to call it “Operation Sindoor” was brilliant for all the connotation that it entailed. Second, getting two wonderful armed forces personnel i.e. Wing Commander Vyomika Singh and Colonel Sofiya Qureshi to brief the nation on the military operation was a real masterstroke. The professionalism and symbolism of that briefing was noteworthy and there for the world to see. The larger strategic calculus is that “Operation Sindoor” may be part of a long term plan by India to tackle Pakistan in particular and terrorism in general.

The operation itself was characterised by restraint and precision. Restraint, because the Pak military was deliberately not targeted. Precision, because of the kind of activities that went on in the buildings that were targeted. Two key questions suggest themselves: (1) Would it be right to say India has achieved escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan? (2) Can things still spiral out of control? On the first, this is as close to escalation dominance that India has come, keeping in mind all similar episodes in the past. The reasons are not far to seek. We now enjoy an economy ten times the size of Pakistan, overwhelming conventional superiority and an Air Force which is more than a match. That said, Pakistan is also in a bad way both economically and politically, thus helping matters for us. It is my assessment that total escalation dominance can be attained when India becomes the third largest economy with some 10 Trillion dollars worth of GDP with a commensurate per capita income. The terrorist attacks had two immediate objectives and one that was long term. The two immediate ones were to demonstrate to the world that Kashmir was anything but normal and the other was to disrupt internal cohesion in India, particularly from a Hindu-Muslim angle. The long term objective of the attacks was to somehow prevent or slow down India from achieving international political clout and overall economic heft necessary for total escalation dominance. For all these reasons, India’s stakes in avoiding a regional conflagration are much higher than Pakistan’s. We can all be proud of the internal cohesion that India has demonstrated so far in this period of crisis.

One indication that there are elements in Pakistan that realize the stakes for them are also high is the reported statement by the Pak Premier that it has already “given a befitting response” to “Operation Sindoor”. Regardless of whether or not one or two of our aircrafts have been downed, if matters can be allowed to rest here, it is no bad thing. Whether this is mere wishful thinking, we will all know soon enough.

US reaction has been unsurprising. They have so many irons in the fire that their only wish is to see that this does not lead to a wider regional conflict. After all, they have no Assistant Secretary for South Asia in place and do not have envoys in either New Delhi or Islamabad. Still, America’s implicit support for India was all too obvious. Israel’s support for India, on the other hand, was all too explicit. Today is Israel’s national day and one can expect warm sentiments pouring in for it from Indians in all walks of life. EU’s reaction was arguably meek as was Japan’s. Both of them wanted nothing more than for the two parties to exercise restraint. The External Affairs Minister stated, somewhat testily, that India was seeking partners not preachers! But it is also important for Indians to recognize that with so much of strategic turbulence ( Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen and the Indo-Pacific, not to mention the tariff imbroglio), the world at large does not wish to see another theater of conflict between two nuclear powers.

China’s reaction has been most interesting. It has made the appropriate amount of noise supporting its “iron brother” Pakistan, but has sounded like a Great Power calling for restraint from both India and Pakistan. Their media has gone overboard giving credence to mischievous reports from the Pak side, which was properly countered by our Mission in Beijing. Still, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas is quiet, despite massive troop presence maintained by either country. The importance of this in the current context cannot be overstated. Maybe, just maybe, the Chinese are serious about a rapprochement with India.

To conclude, this is an ongoing episode and so it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions just yet. It is however vital that India not take its eye off the ball. The overall strategic objective for India must be to achieve economic heft, to acquire military superiority and to maintain absolute internal cohesion. Important as it is, Pakistan must remain a sideshow for India.

The two-front scenario that India might face has been analyzed to death by both military and strategic scholars. This is commonly understood to mean that India may be forced into a situation where it has no choice but to tackle China and Pakistan, both at once. The Late Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat as far back as September 2020 had said: “Chinese economic cooperation with Pakistan, in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, along with continued military, economic and diplomatic support mandate high levels of preparation by us. This also poses the threat of coordinated action along the northern and western fronts, which we have to consider in our defence planning”. In October 2020, the then Air Force Chief RKS Bhadauria stated in a press conference that his “force was ready for a two-front war”. In January 2021, the then Army Chief General Naravane said: “There is increased cooperation between Pakistan and China, both in military and non-military fields. A two-front situation is something we must be ready to deal with”. Thus, it is fair to say that the top Indian military leadership has been carefully considering and seriously preparing for a two-front security threat. But preparation is one thing; confronting it in reality is another.

The real question at present is whether the two-front nightmare has come true for India? It is easy to forget that following the deadly clashes in Ladakh in June 2020, there was massive mobilization of troops by both China and India. Since then, there have been numerous parleys between the two countries leading to some military disengagement of troops especially in Eastern Ladakh. But the fundamental fact remains that as many as 50,000 Chinese soldiers and an equal number of Indian troops are in a “eyeball to eyeball” situation. The Sino-Indian border, fortunately, is not “hot” and a thaw in Sino-Indian ties is both evident and welcome. Even so, it is hard to deny that there is a strategic threat confronted by India at its Himalayan border with China.

On 22 April 2025, a group of five armed terrorists attacked tourists in the picturesque Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam, Kashmir. 26 innocent tourists lost their lives and at least twenty others were injured. This was by far the deadliest terrorist attack that India has endured since the horrific 2008 events in Mumbai. A little known offshoot of the well known Pak-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, called The Resistance Front, initially claimed responsibility, only to retract it four days later. That does not change the fact of Pakistan’s involvement which India announced to the world at large, before taking a series of punitive measures: Holding of the bilateral Indus Waters Treaty (1960) in abeyance, closing the Integrated Check Post Attari, cancelling the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme for Pak nationals, declaring defence personnel posted at the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi as Persona Non Grata and bringing the overall strength of the High Commissions down to 30 from 55. Pakistan took retaliatory action, mirroring most of India’s measures. Most imortantly, Pakistan suspended the Simla Agreement of 1972. It seems unlikely that the matter will end here. There is almost a presentiment of some military action that India might undertake, at a time and place of its choosing. It is fair to say that the Indian subcontinent is on edge.

With fifty thousand troops each from China and India continuing to remain in Ladakh and the Indo-Pak border seeing live exchange of fire over the last few days, both the LOC (the Line of Control which separates India from Pakistan as the de facto border) and the LAC (the Line of Actual Control which separates India from China as the de facto border) are in an abnormal state. For India therefore, there is little doubt that a two-front strategic threat now emanates from both the LOC and the LAC. This is probably the first time in independent India that this has come about. Some go as far as to say that there might be a three-front threat, given the linkages developing between the Pak and Bangladesh armies, but I will desist from going there.

It will be interesting to see how China deals with the emerging crisis between India and Pakistan. On the one hand, China is Pakistan’s all weather friend and it is easy to see unconditional support for Pakistan coming from China. On the other hand, there is an ensuing thaw in Sino-Indian ties and India will want to know whether China is willing to risk it all by throwing its weight behind Pakistan in the unfortunate eventuality of hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan.

How the Trump Administration reacts to all of this is crucial as well. Two statements by President Trump may be revelatory in this regard. One, when PM Modi was visiting DC in February this year and in the joint press conference with President Trump, a question was posed about events in Bangladesh. While the question was directed at President Trump, he responded by saying that PM Modi will take the question on Bangladesh. In reaction to the events in Pahalgam, President Trump called the terrorist attacks a “bad one”, mischaracterised the Kashmir issue as going on for 1000 years and when asked whether he would intervene, President Trump declined and said “they (meaning India and Pakistan) will get it figured out one way or the other.” With US focusing its efforts on resolving the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza, pursuing the tariff war and monitoring the emerging threats in Indo-Pacific, it should hardly surprise anyone that the US may neither have the inclination nor the bandwidth to tackle conflict in South Asia, should it arise.

The bottomline therefore is this. The continuing stand-off in Ladakh and recent events in Pahalgam have brought India’s strategic focus back to the LOC and the LAC. India will need to rely both on military deterrence and nimble diplomacy to ensure that what is at present a two-front threat does not escalate into a two-front war in the future.

The US Department of Defense is periodically tasked with preparation of an interim guidance in the form of a memo. It is usually classified and the last known one that I could see online was four years ago. Since this memo is secret and dated March 2025, the only way to get hold of its contents is through newspaper leaks.

The leaked features of the memo, which have not been denied by the US Department of Defense, if true, indicates major shifts in American Defence posturing and strategy. This was only to be expected what with the new Trump adminstration ringing in enormous changes in American foreign and security policy. Given below are the main aspects of the new defense doctrine along with comments:

(1) China is the American Defense Department’s sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan — while simultaneously defending the US homeland — is the Department’s sole pacing scenario.

Comment: This is the first time the US is placing the Chinese threat in Taiwan alongside and on the same level as homeland security. This plus the tariff war unleashed against China ( US has imposed massive triple digit tariffs against Chinese imports, even while not sparing its friends and allies) makes it abundantly clear who the US thinks its main adversary is. Additionally, there will be a heightened focus on bunker-busting bombs and other weapons designed to destroy reinforced targets, which could be crucial in a conflict over Taiwan. The Washington Post noted that these strategic shifts are part of a broader effort to deter China from launching a surprise attack, often referred to as a “fait accompli” seizure of Taiwan.

(2)   US will pressure allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia to spend more on defense to take on the bulk of the deterrence role against threats from Russia, North Korea and Iran.

Comment: It is clear that the US will at best provide a “backstop” (if that) and leave the job of providing Europe’s security to Europe. The big change therefore seems to be a reduced focus in Europe, no question about that.

More crucially, Japan and South Korea should take note: the main job of deterring North Korea (which is supported by China and more recently by Russia) falls on them.

On Iran, the role of deterrence would fall presumably on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Again, these propositions, if confirmed to be true, would indicate that the Middle East would likely get higher priority than Europe in the American scheme of things.

(3) The Trump administration also has a vision for the Indo-Pacific region. It wants Taiwan to sharply increase its defense outlays. The administration also wants to work with Japan and other allies to enhance deterrence against China. The Pentagon’s new plan involves increasing the deployment of submarines, bombers, unmanned ships, and specialized Army and Marine Corps units in the Indo-Pacific.

Comment: Presumably, the deterrence against China by co-opting its allies and partners would be in addition to its own defence posturing against China. US treating Japan and South Korea more favourably than Europe may also be explained by this.

(4) US attaches high importance to protecting American interests in the Western Hemisphere, such as ensuring access to the Panama Canal and combatting drug and human trafficking cartels in Latin America. The White House, according to the leaked memo, has asked for credible military options from the Pentagon to ensure unfettered access to the Panama Canal.

Comment: Monroe doctrine 2.0

(5) US believes that European countries should play a greater role in dealing with the Ukraine situation.

Comment: If the US means this, then Europe should be more involved in the mediation talks being held with Russia and Ukraine. The EU Commission President Von der Leyen is yet to meet President Trump. And its foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas was basically stood up by Secretary Marco Rubio when she went to Washington some weeks ago, causing her to miss the trip of the EU College of Commissioners to India.

None of the above should come as a total surprise. President Trump and his cabinet colleagues have been hinting at all of the above, either implicitly or sometimes even explicitly. Still, if the secret memo is true (and there is no reason to believe it is not), then it has the potential to fundamentally recast the international strategic landscape.

Two significant trilateral meetings went almost unnoticed and under the radar. The first one was a meeting between the Trade Ministers of Japan, Korea and China in Seoul on March 30. The second one, equally important, was a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Japan and Korea, along with the American Secretary of State in Brussels on April 3. While other countries were posturing, Japan and Korea were quietly engaged in strategic hedging of the highest order to protect and promote their national interest. The first meeting took place before the announcement of the Trump tariffs on April 2 and the second one just after. How is that for timing?

The meeting of the Trade Ministers between Japan, South Korea and China on March 30 in Seoul was significant for a variety of reasons. First, they were meeting in this format after five years. Second, the Japanese-Korean rapprochement is now here to stay and it is extraordinary that the two countries which have such serious and unresolved political differences, have managed to put it aside and cooperate for mutual benefit. Third, this meeting was in anticipation of the Trump announcement and clearly, decisions by the Trump administration are at one level pushing powers in Asia to coooperate more among themselves. Indeed, the three trade ministers agreed to speed up negotiations toward a free trade agreement (FTA) between their countries, something they have not been able to do since the negotiations started in 2012. The Joint Statement wished a free, fair, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial FTA betweeen China, Japan and South Korea. It is as if these three countries second-guessed the announcement of reciprocal tariffs by President Trump. The Joint Statement then went on to talk of the importance of WTO reform, of RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of which all three countries are full members) and most crucially enhancing cooperation on maintaining stable supply chains. This last mentioned point is important in view of the disruption to global supply chains caused by the tariffs announced by President Trump. Word is that a trilateral summit level meeting of the Heads of State/Government of China, Korea and Japan will take place before the end of the year. It is therefore abundantly clear that regardless of Trum’s tariffs, regional integration between select partners in Asia is continuing apace.

If Japan and Korea engineered only the above meeting, significant as it is, it would have been understandable. But in a masterclass on strategic hedging, the Japanese and Korean Foreign Ministers also met with the American Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Brussels on April 3. This meeting was thus soon after the announcement of the reciprocal tariffs by President Trump which shook the world. The Joint Statement issued after this trilateral meeting was, arguably, the polar opposite of the one issued after the meeting of the Trade Ministers referred to above. The statement begins by talking of shared principles including rule of law in the Indo-Pacific. The Secretary and Foreign Ministers strongly opposed unlawful maritime claims or any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the waters of the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea. They emphasized their commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific and ensuring international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, prevails.

The Ministers also emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community.  They expressed concern about provocative actions, particularly the recent military drills around Taiwan, and called for an end to further destabilizing actions. They encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo, including by force or coercion even while expressing support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.

The American Secretary of State and the two Foreign Ministers then emphasized the importance of NATO’s cooperation with Indo-Pacific Partners to ensure the ability to swiftly respond to security developments and challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. They neither named China nor Russia but you would have to be daft to miss it. Crucially, Marco Rubio reiterated American ironclad commitments to the defense of Japan and South Korea , backed by America’s unmatched military strength, including its nuclear capabilities.  All sides confirmed that U.S.-extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea remain critical to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region. The three Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to bolstering defense and deterrence by advancing robust security cooperation and strengthening their respective defense capabilities.

It is hard to overlook the Trump Administration’s difference in approach to their allies in Asia, as opposed to their allies in Europe. It would seem that US is much more forthcoming about respecting its security commiments towards its Asian allies. This issue is worth watching in the days and months ahead, as President Trump reveals his cards about how he will eventually handle the People’s Republic of China.

But for now, just marvel at the way two middle powers from Asia i.e. Japan and South Korea, have gone about enhancing their strategic options and protecting their national interest. These countries have had best of both the worlds i.e. flourishing trade and economic ties with China on the one hand and an iron-clad security commitment from the US, on the other. They are not about to give up on this ideal arrangement anytime soon.

It can now be said without fear of contradiction that a Sino-Indian rapprochement is well and tuly under way. In June 2020, when border clashes occurred in the Himalayas and India lost 25 of its soldiers, the relationship between the two countries sunk to an all time low. It broke a long and uninterrupted peace maintained at the border for 45 long years. The incident led to mutual recrimination with both sides accusing each other of having broken bilateral agreements to maintain peace and tranquility at the border. A period of chill followed with no top level meetings between the leaders and specific measures taken which adversely affected people-to-people ties, air connectivity, trade and investment. This Sino-Indian estrangement also spilled over into multilateral fora like the UN, WTO, BRICS, UNFCCC and SCO.

The first sign of Sino-Indian thaw was the famous “pull aside” between PM Modi and President Xi at the Bali G20 Summit in November 2022. The move for this initial rapprochement was ostensibly made by China. While the “pull aside” meeting happened in November 2022, the Chinese Foreign Ministry talked about it for the first time only in July 2023 and stated that Prime Minister  Modi and President Xi Jinping had reached a significant “consensus” on stabilizing India-China bilateral relations during the G20 meeting in Bali back in November 2022. According to the Chinese statement, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to not posing a threat to each other and recognized each other’s development opportunities. The statement went on to say that the focus was on implementing this consensus into specific policies and actions across various departments to foster strategic mutual trust and cooperation. The ultimate goal, the statement concluded, was to steer India-China relations back to a path of healthy and stable development at the earliest. The Indian side, taken somewhat by surprise, sheepishly clarified the situation in a media briefing, confirming that both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping exchanged pleasantries and spoke about the need to stabilize the bilateral relations during a dinner hosted by the Indonesian President on the margins of the G20 Summit.

Yet another meeting between Modi and XI took place on the margins of the BRICS meeting in Johannesburg in August 2023. The Chinese said this time that the meeting was requested by the Indian side. Be that as it may, the two leaders appear to have agreed in principle to “de-escalate” border tensions. This was a clear message from the two leaders to the ground level negotiators.

Following this, a flurry of meetings happened in late 2024 and early 2025 between Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and Minister Jaishankar as well as the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. In September 2024, Minister Jaishankar said, to the mild surprise of observers, that India has made progress in its border negotiations with China with about 75% of disengagement problems sorted out. In October 2024, there was a full fledged meeting between Modi and Xi on the margins of the BRICS summit meeting in Kazan, Russia and they welcomed steps to resume dialogue between their countries. The two leaders appear to have agreed to boost cooperation and resolve differences betweeen their respective countries.

By December 2024, when the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the time was ripe for some kind of understanding. So, it was no surprise when announcement was made on a six point consensus, which was put out by the chinese side first:

>Positively evaluated the resolution in eastern Ladakh and agreed to work for peace on the ground

> Commitment for a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable package solution on the border issue

> Strengthen confidence building measures

>Resume Kailash Yatra, river cooperation and border trade

>Strengthen SRs (Special Representatives) mechanism , diplomatic and military talks mechanism

> SRs to meet again in India in 2025

The latest phase in this saga relates to PM Modi’s podcast to Lex Friedman and his remarks on Sino-Indian ties. While underlining that both China and India were ancient civilisational states, PM said that they had always learnt from each other. Remarkably, PM Modi says that if you look back several centuries, there was really no history of conflict between the two countries. By choosing to take a long view of bilateral ties and not focus on the 1962 Sino-Indian war or the Ladakh incidents of 2020, was the PM trying to send a message? He nevertheless acknowedged that differences were common between neighbours and even within a family. He said India’s objective was to ensure that competition between India and China, which was natural, did not veer into conflict. Predictably, the Chinese foreign office spokesperson enthusiastically welcomed the remarks of PM Modi and reciprocated the sentiment to work for stronger bilateral cooperation.

The most difficult question to answer at this stage is why China chose initial rapprochement with India and why India seems to have grabbed it with both hands. It is interesting that a lot of these diplomatic moves were made before it was clear that Trump would be the next President of the United States. So, prima facie, Trump was not the main reason.

Firstly, from China’s perspective it is hard to avoid the impression that this was “course correction” on their part after the bloody events of Ladakh in June 2020. China is now a leading military power and it beggars belief that India would attack it with a view to gaining territory. That might explain a lot. Second, it is in China’s abiding interest to have suitably normal ties with India, while it concentrates its efforts on meeting its main strategic challenge: the United States and the West. Third, it is now well known that India would have most certainly allowed Huawei and China significant access to the huge Indian market for 5G and data, if Ladakh had not intervened. While China remains a vastly superior economic and technological power, the lure of the Indian market cannot be overlooked, especially if US and EU start restriciting entry of Chinese products and services into their markets. Fourth, India is the only neighbouring country with which China has not settled its land border. Again, it would be in China’s strategic interest to do so, since that will free up its resources for more existential objectives like South China Sea or even Taiwan. Last, it is not in China’s interest to have India as America’s cat’s paw in the Indo-Pacific, regardless of India’s unwillingness to be one. Good ties with India can serve this strategic objective of China’s.

From India’s perspective, the reasons for rapprochement with China are not far to seek. First among the reasons would be the Sino-Russian entente and the consequent diminution in India’s strategic space. A head-on clash with China would not help matters for India in this regard. Second and quite bluntly, India cannot afford a long war of attrition on its border with China. Indeed, India will seek to remove the large number of Chinese and Indian troops on both sides of the border asap. It is only then that full normalcy can be declared by both sides. Third, even during Biden’s time the US had a dualism to its China policy. A part of the US deep state was confrontational vis-a-vis China considering it as a “pacing challenge”. Another part felt that the US should cooperate with China where possible and manage its rise. This has accentuated under Trump who actually embodies this dualism and is yet to decide which side of the argument he will fall. With this in mind, India appears to have enthusiastically welcomed the thaw in ties with China. Fourth, there has also been a fair amount of pressure from our economic operators about loosening the restrictions placed on our trade and economic ties with China. Policy makers, expecially in eocnomic ministries, have also argued for encouraging selective Chinese investment as being essential for India’s development. Lastly, what China and India are doing is really strategic hedging of their respective bets. You can be sure other countries are doing exactly the same, leading to multiple strategic hedging as a policy to counter geopolitical turbulence.

There is just one other matter which needs emphasis. India has stated emphatically that full normalisation of bilateral ties in all areas, depends on normalcy at the border. It is of course for India (and China) to decide what constitutes normalcy at the border. PM Modi in his podcast says that both countries are working to restore ties to what they were before 2020. That should give us an idea of what India is thinking about. China may or may not necessarily see things this way. One way of breaking this logjam is to have a roadmap with clear benchmarks for resolution of the border “package” with definitive timelines. Simultaneously, there can also be a roadmap for restoration of full normalcy in trade, investment, connectivity, people-to-people relations in bilateral ties. These two roadmaps can run in parallel. The fact is the border issue has poisoned bilateral ties for too long and cannot be left for the next generation of Indians and Chinese to resolve. China as the bigger and more powerful neighbour should summon the necessary political will and take the initiative on the border issue. At the end of the day, that alone will be the most important confidence building measure in the chequered history of the Dragon and the Elephant.

Consider this for a minute. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its newly found independence, Ukraine possessed the third largest nuclear arsenal after US and Russia. It reportedly had as many as 5000 nuclear warheads and intercontiental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Imagine if Ukraine had kept those weapons, would Putin have dared to do what he did in February 2022? That said, Ukraine may have found it difficult to keep them for two reasons. First, it was not just expensive but the keys for launching the nuclear weapons were with Moscow. Second, it faced serious economic and social issues which were more of a priority than nuclear weapons at the time. Ukraine then trusted the Great Powers at the time and signed the so called Budapest Memorandum whose signatories, apart from Ukraine, were US, UK and Russia. This memorandum pretty much guaranteed the territorial integrity and security of Ukraine including its borders. But again, look what happened. So much for guarantees of great powers. It is a matter of supreme irony that Ukraine is still seeking security guarantees from the US, after what the latter has done to the transatlantic relationship.

One scholar clearly foresaw the problem Ukraine faces today. As far back as 1993, John Mearsheimer argued that it was imperative for Ukraine to hold onto nuclear weapons to maintain peace as these nuclear weapons would be a deterrent and would ensure that Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it . How prescient was that?

Ukraine’s story will have huge implications for the aspirations of countries to possess nuclear weapons. They will now seriously weigh the pros and cons of going nuclear. That, if it happens, will have serious repercussions for the NPT and the exisiting non-proliferation regime.

The problem is compounded by President Trump’s threat to withdraw the nuclear security umbrealla for Europe, if they do not meet conditions such as significantly increasing their defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP. The French leader Charles de Gaulle may have anticipated this several years back. It is interesting to ask why France got the bomb when it was already covered by the American nuclear umbrella? Quite simply because French President Charles de Gaulle simply didn’t trust Washington to live up to its security guarantees. Extended deterrence was a sham, he felt, and for Paris to be truly secure, it had no choice but to acquire a nuclear capability of its own. As he put it in 1963, “American nuclear weapons remain the essential guarantee of world peace. . . But the fact remains that American nuclear power does not necessarily respond immediately to all the eventualities concerning Europe and France. So, we decided to equip ourselves with an atomic force that is unique to us.” Again, how prescient was that?

With the US behaving the way it is under Trump, the Europeans have started openly discussing extension of nuclear deterrence based on weapons possessed by France and the UK. Germany’s new leader Merz was the first to openly talk about it. Others like Poland have said it is definitely worth looking at. The trouble is the French “force de frappe” as they call it, is exclusively and uniquely French and there is no consensus in France to share this with others. The far right leader Marine Le Pen has already ruled out this possibility. There is also the question of how much UK will be involved in extending its nuclear deterrence to countries of continental Europe, and how comfortable they will be with that. Poland, fast emerging as a major European defence power, has also differeing views on this. The Polish PM (the other Donald as it were) Tusk stated in parliament recently that there has been a profound change in American geopolitics and he is happy for Poland to look at possibilities related to possession of nuclear weapons. The Polish President Duda however remains a steadfast fan of Trump and has argued in favour of American nuclear weapons being stationed in Poland which could act as a deterrence against Russia. Either way, it is fair to conclude that countries like Poland are scrambling to look at nuclear weapons. In all of this, no one is even asking the question of how countries like Poland can acquire nuclear weapons unless they withdraw from the “venerable” Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty!

Poland is not the only power seeking nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has for long felt that it should have nuclear weapons, especially if Iran is on the verge of getting one. Turkey, which hosts U.S. nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, signaled a policy shift in 2019 when President Erdogan criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in nuclear energy could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so. South Korea is another candidate with 70 per cent of the population supporting the development of nuclear weapons, obviously in reponse to the North Korean threat. Japan is toying with the idea but public support is still not forthcoming. In any case, Japan has the wherewithal to quickly go nuclear if it decides to do so. It very recently did a volte-face on the full use of nuclear power, so do not rule out anything yet.

One or more of the above countries going nuclear could open the floodgates for others. It will then lead to a situation where the non-proliferation regime as we know it will unravel quite quickly. The political scientist Kenneth Waltz is said to have famously observed that when it comes to spread of nuclear weapons, more may actually be better. The world may be about to find out!

Two treaties provide the legal basis for what is commonly referred to as the European project. These are the “Treaty of Rome” (1957) and the ” Maastricht Treaty” (1992). In view of President Trump’s recent actions, it is pertinent to ask what the chances are of the European project surviving and continuing in its present form.

But first, what is the European project? It is interesting that when the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957, there was no mention of defence and security. That is because in 1949, NATO was set up by the US along with eleven allies: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the US. So, it was well understood that the European project at that time was a political and economic one, not a military one. The Treaty of Rome therefore, talks of a common market, common economic and competition policies and political unification. This last mentioned point is important. The Treaty of Rome which established the European Community had as its objective stated in the preamble: Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. This has since become a loaded expression in terms of European integration and how much countries should surrender a bit of their sovereignty to Brussels. Indeed, one of the arguments in favour of Brexit was precisely this “ever closer union”, a term vehemently objected to by Brexiteers. The irony is the expression was about ever closer union of peoples, not administrations or bureaucracies.

It is however the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, that fleshed out the concept of the European project and in that sense updated the Treaty of Rome. This Treaty outlined a three pillar system: economic integration, common foreign & security policy and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. The Treaty not only established the European Union (as opposed to the European Economic Community) but also set the foundation for a common currency, common citizenship, common agricultural & industrial policy, common European parliament and most of all, a common foreign and security policy. This had a profound impact on European integration which has since come to be known, in layman’s terms, as the European project.

It is interesting to note that the European project made huge advances in every single area, namely, common currency (euro), common citizenship (Schengen), common agricultural & industrial policy and of course a common European parliament. Where the European project did not make sufficient progress is in the area of common foreign and security policy. There were substantive reasons for this. In 1954 a European Defence Community was attempted, but the French parliament refused to ratify it, ensuring the proposal was dead on arrival. Individual countries like France but also the UK (at that time) had nuclear deterrence and were keen to safeguard it. While they were members of NATO, they were not willing to completely submit to a supranational authority, when it came to defence. Meanwhile, the US underwrote the security expenditure of the EU to a substantial extent, cementing the transatlantic alliance.

As countries of Europe started taking the American security umbrella as a given, they started implementing the other aspects of the European project in full. Foreign and in particular, security policy, consequently lagged behind. Kissinger is reported to have famously asked what is the telephone number of the person in EU that he can call if there is a crisis. In view of all this, it has become common to call EU, an economic giant but a military pigmy. European states (not all but many of them) also built a massive and expensive social safety net for their citizens when it came to healthcare, education and pension.

President Trump, in just a matter of few weeks, has called into question the entire European project. He has done this mainly by threatening to withdraw the American security umbrella which has protected Europe from 1949 onwards. As if to prove he is not bluffing, he has completely sidelined Europe when it comes to the conflict in Ukraine (by talking directly to Russia and Ukraine) and has threatened to stop military and financial aid to Ukraine. For the EU, this has been a rude shock and has sent them scurrying for action. Partly in response to this, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a European defence plan i.e. ” ReArm Europe” amounting to a whopping 800 billion euros. It remains to be seen how the Member States will react to this. For one thing, this will mean suspending EU’s Stability and Growth Pact rules which limit budget deficits of Member States to 3 per cent of GDP, limit national debt to 60 per cent of GDP and promote fiscal discipline. Even countries like France are already close to 5 per cent of GDP as budget deficit. With this plan for a defence fund of 800 billion euros, all fiscal discipline will go out of the window. The other big change that Trump’s policy has brought about in Europe is on the nuclear question. The new German Chancellor Merz has already requested that the French nuclear deterrence be extended to his country. French President Macron has stated in response that while the French nuclear deterrence is comprehensive, sovereign and entirely French, he is open to discussing the question of extending this deterrence to allies in Europe. Far-right French leader Marine Le Pen has vehemently objected to this, thus exposing the faultlines that are likely to occur.

American leaders like Trump and Vance firmly believe the bloated welfare state in Europe is made possible by and is in fact financed because of the US security umbrella. They are therefore determined to pull back the security umbrella, substantially, if not wholly. It is also true that many Europeans will agree that expenditure on their welfare state is excessive and must be scaled back. The question is if the proposed European defence plan takes up most of the monetary resources available, then there will be very little left for the welfare state and consequently, for the European project as it was originally envisaged.

Europe truly confronts a hinge moment in its history.