As widely expected, French President Emmanuel Macron accompanied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen paid a visit to China on 6 April, 2023. This was a state visit, so there was both pomp and circumstance.

From the EU’s perspective there were three strategic objectives for the visit:

(a) Engage China at a time when the US-China bilateral relations have hit rock bottom and thus demonstrate EU’s “strategic autonomy”;

(b) To try and see if China can be persuaded to bring Russia back to its senses, as President Macron put it and urge President Xi to talk to Ukraine’s President Zelensky; and

(c) Convey to China that any move by it to supply lethal weapons to Russia will adversely affect its ties with the EU.

China, for its part, had some strategic objectives as well:

(a) To drive a wedge, if possible, between the US and the EU;

(b) Welcome further consolidation of economic and commercial ties with EU at a time when the US is seeking “de-coupling” from China. President Macron went with a busload of French CEOs belonging to Airbus, Veolia, EDF, Alstom, to name a few. This is close on the heels of the German Chancellor who also took a bunch of CEOs to China in November last year; and

(c) The visit provides President Xi Jinping with the right optics after his “no limits” friendship with Russia and demonstrates to his domestic audience that China is sought after by Western powers, in spite of US attempts to isolate China.

So, what about the outcome of this double-barrelled European visit of Macron and von der Leyen? It is hard to see either side gain significantly from the visit. So, it is probably a tie, with the situation marginally in favour of China. French President Macron can content himself that he made an attempt at peace and engaged with China. Ursula von der Leyen can say she warned President Xi Jinping about supplying lethal weapons to Russia. Good cop, bad cop routine but I do not think China was fooled.

China can take comfort from the fact that President Macron implored Xi to help “mediate” a political solution to the war in Ukraine. EU seeking economic and commercial ties with China bestows Xi Jinping with valuable leverage. And, from Xi’s perspective, it is also a relief to know that EU is far from “de-coupling” from China and it is not even clear that EU is attempting to “de-risk” the China factor. Either way, the diplomatic waltz has begun. First round probably to China.

Interestingly, Ukraine seems to be hinting at “conditional” negotiations especially centring on Crimea. This is the first time since March last year that Ukraine has uttered the word “negotiations”. Russia, on the other hand, has politely made it known today that there are no realistic prospects of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Ukraine. But sooner or later, the two sides must realize that this war is not winnable and that negotiations are the only way out. The question is when?

Whether or not China’s diplomacy is working and regardless of whether or not it is wolf or warrior or both, there is no gainsaying the fact that every major or middle power’s object of attention these days is the People’s Republic of China.

The US considers China a consequential, long term threat and is doing all it can to “de-couple” from it. This is no easy task since it involves reversing years and years of doing business together and being joined at the hip. Yet, there appears bipartisan consensus that the “de-coupling” must go ahead and that this will indeed be the case regardless of next year’s election results. The same cannot be said for the war in Ukraine, going by what some Republican leaders are saying.

The US has taken concrete measures, so the “de-coupling” is not just a matter of mere rhetoric. Two examples are noteworthy in this regard. One is the “Entity List” which is a trade restriction list published by the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), consisting of certain foreign persons, entities, or governments. It is no secret that a number of key Chinese firms and persons are notified as part of this list. The second is that the United States has imposed the most sweeping export controls on China to date. The rules seek to curtail China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology, including chips and the tools and expertise to make chips or to produce China’s own semiconductor manufacturing equipment. There is reason to believe the US will do more in this regard.

While the US seeks to “de-couple”, the EU seeks to “de-risk” the Chinese factor. There is a key difference between the two strategies since the latter implies that for the EU, “de-coupling” is not an option with China. So, what does “de-risking” entail? For instance, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between China and the EU has stalled since 2021. This is directly related to potential Chinese investment in certain strategic sectors of the European economy which may pose a threat to economic and/or national security, especially in the context of China’s explicit fusion of its military and commercial sectors. This goes especially for sensitive technologies, dual-use goods and investment that entails forced technology transfers. European Commission President Von der Leyen stated, ahead of a trip to China, that EU will be stress-testing its relationship to see where the greatest threats to Europe’s resilience, long-term prosperity and security lie. That said, a stream of visitors are making a beeline to go to Beijing: these include French President Emmanuel Macron, Spain’s President Pedro Sanchez (who holds the rotating EU presidency at present) and of course EC President Von der Leyen. These visits will be watched closely.

India, which admittedly is not in the same league as the US and the EU, is nevertheless trying to “de-escalate” tensions at its border with China. It would seem that Wang Yi (former Foreign Minister of China and currently the top foreign policy chief sitting on the Communist Party’s Politburo) had agreed with India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar on the need to take concrete measures to “dis-engage” from certain parts of Eastern Ladakh so that the troops can be withdrawn on both sides. This is yet to happen, for reasons best known to the Chinese side. It may be part of Chinese strategy to keep India off balance. Or it may be a delaying tactic to wangle more concessions from India at a time and place of their choosing. Meanwhile, India holds firm in its position that there can be no normalcy in bilateral ties if the border does not return to status quo ante. The Goa Foreign Minister-level meetings of the Shanghai cooperation Organization in the first week of May 2023 will provide yet another opportunity for the Chinese Foreign Minister and his Indian counterpart to jaw-jaw!

No matter how much one tries therefore, there is no wishing away China!

The visit by the Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow to meet his “old friend” Russian President Vladimir Putin led to another substantive Joint Statement. The visit and the outcome has several strategic dimensions, some of which are highlighted below:

(1) Xi Jinping has not just doubled down on Russia but has thrown his considerable weight behind Putin, to the extent of wishing that he be re-elected in the Presidential elections in Russia in March next year.

(2) This is a poke in the eye for the West and the ICC which has just issued an arrest warrant for Putin.

(3) The two leaders, Xi and Putin, have decided to support their respective country’s core interests: Russia will support China on Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. It must be therefore be assumed that China will support Russia in its core interests, including Ukraine!

(4) It is becoming abundantly clear that China will be loath to seeing Russia fail in Ukraine. Consequently, China will definitely go all out to support Russia economically, sanctions or no sanctions!

(5) The issue of hardcore defence cooperation was obviously not part of the Joint Statement. But the question is will China after all this, stand idly by if Russia faces potential defeat in the war in Ukraine. The situation needs close watching.

(6) For India, this may mean a diminution of its strategic space. It may also mean that India may have to align itself more to the West, if only to counter China with regard to its core interests.

(7) While Russia has called China’s peace proposals for Ukraine “constructive” it appears dead on arrival for Ukraine. We will wait and see how the phone call between Xi and Zelensky goes.

(8) There is a pincer movement in the international strategic landscape with China throwing its weight behind Russia on the one hand and the US/EU trying to garner support from its allies and partners, on the other.

P.S. The above is an abridged version of a longer article by the author with the same title in the newspaper ” The Indian Express” dated March 24, 2023.

So, the French President Emmanuel Macron has been true to his word. In his election manifesto when he was voted to a second term, he had stated unambiguously that he would seek to increase the statutory minimum age for retirement in France to 64 from the current 62. Macron tried doing it the traditional way, that is to get his Prime Minister and Government to introduce a bill in the French parliament. There was only one problem: Macron lacked a majority in parliament. So, while the bill passed muster in the upper house i.e. the Senate, it ran the risk of failing in the lower house i.e. the National Assembly. Once that became obvious, Macron used the “nuclear option”, that is Article 49.3 of the French Constitution to push the bill without a vote on the floor of the National Assembly. The bill to increase the statutory minimum retirement age to 64 from the current 62 is thus law in France as of yesterday. This is no mean achievement considering past Presidents in France have failed abysmally in reforming the pension system.

So, why this hullabaloo about the increase of retirement age in France. Well, for one thing, the cost of maintaining the current generous system of pension in France is proving to be unsustainable for the state. Rather than increase taxes or borrow more money, the easiest and logical way to do this is to increase the retirement age so that those savings can help share the cost burden. But why do the French oppose the logical extension of the retirement age especially since everyone lives longer these days. Mind you, it is true that the French retire earlier than others in Europe. One reason is the French concept of the welfare state and the idea that workers’ rights have been won over time. The idea of work-life balance is also taken seriously by the French. In 2016, there was a report which said it was illegal in France to check work related e-mails over the weekend. There are also historical reasons. The French President Mitterrand in 1981, against trends in Europe, decreased the retirement age from 65 to 60 and increased annual vacation for all in France. The other reason has to do with those who begin work as early as 20 years. The idea that a garbage collector or a waiter or a construction worker has to work more than 44 years to get full pension at say 64 years is anathema to the French notion of liberty, equality and fraternity.

The French also love taking to the streets to voice their protests. Once a cause is found, people will show solidarity and express support especially for the underdog. The weather plays its part too; spring is beautiful in France and ideal for street protests. Small wonder, millions have descended on the streets to say “no” to the increase in retirement age.

So, where does one go from here? Legally speaking, the minimum age has been raised to 64 by the Government of Macron. If the opposition parties wish, they can bring a no-confidence motion against the Government. It is doubtful if that will succeed. But if it does, President Macron will simply dissolve the current government led by his PM and appoint another one in its place.

President Macron cannot stand for a third term as President. He thus wants the pension reform to be his lasting legacy. This is significant because past Presidents have been spectacularly unsuccessful in carrying out this reform. From this perspective, he needs to be commended for taking this political risk. It does put him in the category of a few political leaders who are willing to demonstrate strength of purpose and courage of conviction.

Will the street protests continue in France thereby weakening Macron politically? That will depend on many factors, including the ability of the opposition parties (which include strange bedfellows like the far-right and the extreme left) to forge a common front and take the fight to the streets. But perhaps, the weather will also play its part!!

It has become a cliche to suggest that today’s world confronts a “polycrisis” – perhaps best defined as simultaneous and overlapping crises confronting the world. It is simply not possible, even for the pre-eminent power in the world, the United States, to try and solve these problems. So, there is a dire need for global cooperation and for countries to sink their differences. However, what we are witnessing is an approach by most powers best described as : to each his own and devil take the hindmost!

First, the international security scenario. The Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community dated February 2023 makes sober reading. It clearly states that the war in Ukraine could escalate into a NATO/West versus Russia war with disastrous consequences not just for Europe but for the wider region and indeed the world.

In Asia, Taiwan remains a potential hotspot. If American Generals are to be believed it is not a question of whether China will use military force in Taiwan, but when. As if this were not enough in Asia, there may be an acute security crisis in North-East Asia triggered by North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons and use of ballistic missiles. The Sino-Indian border remains tense, if not hot, and the fact that there are thousands of troops on either side in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation provides for a combustible situation. South China and East China Sea are tense maritime theatres and remain unpredictable. Possibilities of a conflict between India and Pakistan always remain, even if probability is low. So much for this being an Asian Century!

The Middle East has always been a turbulent region. It is not about to change soon, despite the unexpected deal brokered by China between arch rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran to resume diplomatic ties. Nevertheless, the above report by the US Intelligence Community considers Iran as a serious threat. Other reports also speak of a possible military confrontation between Israel and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.

Africa has made significant progress. But there are serious conflicts involving Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso and South Sudan; and this list is not even complete.

Further afar, a migration surge to the US due to increased violence, political unrest aggravated by climate events could lead to tension and disquiet in an election year.

And then there are global challenges which are clearly transborder. Climate Change is clearly the foremost. Some action world wide is being taken, but not nearly enough to confine global warming to 2 degrees celsius over pre-industrial times. Very soon, it may be too late to save the only planet we have. Cyber attacks are a serious threat and the US threat assessment report talks of both China, Russia and Iran possessing the capability to disrupt cyber networks and data.

Food (in)security in low income countries has taken on crisis-like proportions, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. Human security is also a major casualty with the dead now numbering thousands in Russia and Ukraine. Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation are key “gray rhino” threats that are not receiving the attention they deserve.

In an ideal world, the UN Security Council would have reformed itself and tackled (if not resolved) the war in Ukraine, the UN Conference in disarmament would have dealt with non-proliferation, UN itself would have come up with a counter-terrorism treaty, WTO would have ensured smooth trade & investment flows, Food and Agriculture Organization (and the World Food Programme) would have dealt with food insecurity and regional organizations like the African Union would have come up with peace plans for its continent. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. The multilateral institutions set up in the aftermath of WW II have failed us and become near-defunct.

It is therefore obvious from the above that the “polycrisis” will be with us for a long time. The question is how many countries can emerge unscathed from all this?

In retrospect, the fact that there was a consensus document in the form of the G20 Bali Leaders’ Declaration in November last year under the Indonesian Presidency seems miraculous. The formulation on the war in Ukraine was merely factual, but captured the essence accurately. The question is what has happened since then that two countries in the G20 grouping, namely, Russia and China, have disassociated themselves from the statement concluded in Bali which after all was agreed to by their leaders then.

In the case of Russia, the reasons may be simpler to fathom though harder to justify. Russia’s views have simply hardened between Bali and now and they feel more and more isolated in the world at large. This does not mean, contrary to perception in some quarters, that they are losing the war. As one of my colleagues put it, Russia is too weak to win the war and Ukraine is too strong to lose it! This is a classic recipe for a never-ending military stalemate. Both Russia and Ukraine are digging in and mobilizing more resources for subsequent military action for territorial gain. Meanwhile, Russia wants its diplomacy to be in sync, and Russia may have even felt that it made a mistake in Bali which it is now trying to correct. Whatever the reasons, Lavrov’s outburst at the Raisina Dialogue tells you Russia is ratcheting it up, rather than dialling it down.

China’s support for Russia at the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting is more curious. After all, China too agreed to the Bali Leaders’ Declaration on Ukraine, so why disagree now? The only way this can be interpreted is that China is doubling down on its “no limits” partnership with Russia, knowing full well this strategy will not be cost-free. This is important for the world, but even more for India whose strategic calculus is now fraught.

Also note that, India is increasingly distancing itself, ever so subtly, from the position taken by China on the Ukraine issue. If ever there is a country that is non-partisan and neutral at the present time, it is India. This does make it ideally suited to be a “bridge” between the geopolitical adversaries.

The Indian G20 Presidency however just got more complicated. This is not surprising at all. It may also be noted that this is indeed the first time the G20 Foreign Ministers are issuing any kind of document at all! In Bali in July 2022 there was not even a Chair’s Summary with Lavrov walking off in a huff after saying his piece. But what remains to be seen is how much of a shadow the Ukraine war will cast on the rest of the G20 meetings planned by India. More crucially, can India repeat the feat of the Indonesian G20 Presidency by coming up with a consensus document at the summit meeting in Delhi in September 2023. There is still a lot of time and Indian diplomacy, led by its formidable External Affairs Minister, should be up for the challenge.

Against that backdrop, it is hard to overlook the Quad Joint Statement issued in Delhi on March 3 just after the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting. It is remarkably lucid and has a paragraph on Ukraine which merits close scrutiny. It makes three points:

>The inadmissibility of nuclear weapons;

>The need for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter; and

>The rules-based international order must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, transparency, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

This can and should provide a template for the G 20 Delhi Leaders’ Declaration in September. The words “comprehensive, just and lasting peace” provide enough leeway to take into account the legitimate concerns of both Russia and Ukraine. It is well known that Russia and China dislike a phrase used above: rules-based international order. But a way must be found to get around this. I have had the honour in the last few days to interact with some key Foreign Ministers who were here for G20/Raisina Dialogue, and my unmistakeable sense is that no one, especially in Europe, expects the war to end anytime soon. But diplomats are nothing if not inveterate optimists. Attempts must therefore be made by India and other like-minded countries to try and mediate an end to this horrific war!

The focus of the entire world is on the first year anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24. But there is another anniversary which just went by in early February without much comment from observers of global diplomacy. That was the one year anniversary on February 4 of the famous Sino-Russian Joint Statement which boasted a “no limits” friendship between the two countries. How does this relationship measure up after one year?

Well, the relationship has certainly not withered away as some thought it would when Russia suffered serious losses on the battlefield in Ukraine. With no sign of recalibration, China is actually showing every sign of doubling down on its “alliance” with Russia. On the other hand, the notion that it can be a “no limits” friendship and that there are no “forbidden areas of cooperation” between China and Russia, is being severely tested. So, in the Munich Security Conference a a couple of days ago, American Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned the top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi of “consequences” if China contemplated supplying weapons to Russia. Chinese firms are already facing the heat from the US, and they would not want further problems by materially aiding Russia.

Another sign of China doubling down on its ties with Russia is Wang Yi travelling to Moscow on 22 February to meet Russian President Putin. After the meeting, Wang Yi gushed that the two sides would deepen mutual trust and strategic cooperation. He added for good measure that “Sino-Russian relations have withstood pressure from the international community and are developing in a very stable manner against the backdrop of a very complex, changing international situation”.

Ahead of his meeting with Putin, Wang Yi also met the influential Russian national security official Nikolai Patrushev who affirmed solemnly that Russia would support China on Taiwan and on Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong!

Against the above background, it is somewhat intriguing that China has hinted at announcing a peace plan for Ukraine on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion i.e. February 24. Intriguing, because China has thrown its lot with Russia and it is not clear it has the necessary standing in the matter to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Russia may welcome a peace plan put forward by China for obvious reasons, but it is far from certain that Ukraine will enthusiastically welcome any proposal emanating from China!

If it is true that China has doubled down on its ties with Russia, then it is also in China’s strategic interest to see that Russia does not completely fail in Ukraine. The question for China is how to achieve this goal even while not antagonizing the West, whose market, finance and technology China needs in the short to medium term. This then is the strategic dilemma that confronts China.

India’s ties with Canada have not always been what they ought to be. They should have always been warm, friendly and substantive. It is a matter of irony that they have not always been that way. Which is why the visit of Canada’s Foreign Minister Ms Melanie Joly to Delhi on February 6 must be welcomed by all well-wishers of this relationship. The fact that Ms Joly undertook this visit when she could have easily combined her talks with her Indian counterpart in March when she is due again in Delhi for the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting, is evidence of Canadian sincerity to “reset” the ties which ran the risk of languishing.

In the event, the visit by the Canadian FM went well and has managed to begin a process of “reset” in ties which were clearly beginning to fray. The first thing it did was to re-establish the strategic dialogue between the two sides which is so crucial to avoid misunderstanding. Second, Canada did a smart thing by releasing its Indo-Pacific strategy in November last year well before the current visit, leading the Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar to “welcome” it. Canada as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy called China an increasingly “disruptive power”, which will not have gone unnoticed in Delhi. India will also need Canada’s cooperation for a successful G20 Summit in Delhi in September 2023 and support for the same was readily provided by the visiting Canadian FM. Canada’s increasing naval presence in the Indo-Pacific will also be welcomed by India. The eventual goal should be to have Indo-Canadian joint naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific if all goes well. After all, Canada and India do share a common vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, anchored in the shared values of democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law.

The ballast for the relationship, hitherto sorely lacking, will come hopefully from the conclusion of the Early Progress Trade Agreement. The operative word here is “early”. The Political leadership in both countries will need to monitor progress in this regard and give the negotiations some push, if need be. Leaving it entirely in the hands of the mandarins of both countries would run the risk of inordinate delay, which is clearly not in the interest of either Canada or India. It is also noteworthy that Canada can be a reliable supplier of rare earths/critical minerals, a strong partner in India’s green transition and a major investor in India.

There is no gainsaying the fact that people-to-people ties are central to the Indo-Canadian relationship. The Canadian statement therefore speaks of facilitating mobility and migration between the two countries, which is very welcome. Not too many Western countries will speak openly of “facilitating” migration from India, and this must be noted positively by us. That said, we do not know whether the elephant in the room (the Khalistani issue) was raised and if so, how the discussions went. It must be hoped that there was a frank discussion on this issue with clear “guardrails” erected so that the relationship does not get derailed when something goes wrong in this regard. It would be useful if Canada outlined what it could do in this regard and what it cannot, because it is not clear that most people in India understand the contours of the problem. More importantly, if India can be alerted in advance of any adverse development in this regard, it would help both countries manage the situation better. The key is to avoid any unpleasant surprises which can potentially thwart progress in the bilateral ties.

The Indo-Canadian relationship has for too long been underwhelming and in a spiral of self-fulfilling prophecy on both sides, has been characterised by one step forward and two steps backward. It is imperative to put this behind and take the relationship forward. It is great that Ministerial visits are happening ahead of the visit of Canadian PM Trudeau for the Delhi G20 Summit in September 2023 which could provide the perfect opportunity for the two leaders to reset the relationship, making up for lost time!

Just when all observers unanimously felt that the scheduled Blinken visit will lower the tension between the US and China, the “L’Affaire Balloon” put paid to all such hopes at least in the short term.

The big question is whether this was a honest mistake by China, as it claims, or whether there was malicious intent, as the US believes. Either way, the main casualty is trust, which is a rare commodity in Sino-American ties. Optimists are clutching at straws, by saying the visit has only been “postponed” and not “cancelled”. Diplomats have a way with words but they also attach inordinate importance to them. Be that as it may, Blinken is expected to reschedule the visit in the next few weeks.

The questions why a Balloon and why now, are tough to answer and is best left to spooks and posterity. For instance, advanced spy satellited are available so why use a nineteenth century instrument to gather information. As for the timing, either it was an accident or there are some in China who are dead opposed to a rapprochement with the US. Either way, China has egg on its face and that explains its angry reaction when the balloon was shot down off the South Carolina coast by an American fighter aircraft.

Another intriguing question is why the US waited as long as it did to bring the balloon down. Perhaps, the US did want to acquire the balloon intact to examine the Chinese surveillance equipment inside. After all, the balloon was the size of three buses and was therefore carrying quite a payload. Debris will still be collected by the US and we will know in due course whether something of significance is found.

Bipartisan sentiment in the US Congress has hardened vis-a-vis China. This will make it difficult for the Biden Administration to take initiatives to lower tensions for fear of being seen as “soft” on China. It will be interesting to see what China’s next steps are, for it does seem as though it needs the detente with US more than the US does.

The year 2023 has a busy diplomatic calendar. Biden and Xi Jinping are expected to be together at least on two occasions: one the G20 summit in Delhi in September and the other when Biden hosts the APEC summit meeting in November in San Francisco. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping will visit Moscow to meet his “best friend” Putin and all eyes will on how the two leaders translate the “no limits partnership” rhetoric into concrete steps. This is important because, the war in Ukraine is showing no signs of slowing down and a diplomatic resolution is looking more and more unlikely by the day.

This triangular relationship between US, China and Russia is becoming increasingly complicated with diplomatic implications not just for the parties involved but for others as well. A “menage a trois” of a completely different kind, one might say!

The most important visit of the diplomatic calendar for the year 2023 is arguably the one which will be undertaken by American Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to Beijing on February 5 and 6, 2023. The visit follows the olive branch extended by China with the appointment of the new Foreign Minister Qin Gang who made conciliatory gestures as he was leaving Washington saying that the two countries should not see their ties as a zero sum game. Earlier, President Xi Jinping himself conveyed to President Biden in Bali in November 2022 that the world is big enough for the two countries to develop and prosper together.

So, what is cooking between the two Great Powers? For one thing, it is in China’s interest to ease tensions with the US while it copes with serious problems back home. In that sense, this could be tactical move aimed at gaining time. From the American perspective, a detente, howsoever brief with China would be helpful in allowing it to focus on the main near term threat, namely, Russia. US too needs time back home to focus on economic and social issues. So, there is tactical convergence between US and China for a detente that, ironically, suits both of them.

Because these are two Great Powers, any detente or otherwise between them will have implications for the rest of us. For India there is a twin risk that directly flows from this detente in ties between the two Great Powers: one, it frees up China to flex its muscles, if it so chooses, vis-a-vis India in the Himalayas and this is a clear security risk. Two, could the US be distracted from the Indo-Pacific as a result of its immediate focus on Russia and the detente it may be pursuing with China. This then is the second strategic risk for India.

For this reason alone then, the visit by Blinken to Beijing will be closely followed in India. As part of the tactical “ceasefire” between China and US, some other global issues may get attention. For instance, cooperation in areas such as climate change, transnational crimes (think Fentanyl) and nuclear proliferation (think North Korea) may provide the basis for non-acrimonious discussions.

Blinken will be keen to gauge the Chinese view on the present status of the Ukraine conflict. Are the Chinese discomfited by the trajectory of the war in Ukraine? If so, is there going to be a recalibration of their “no limits” relationship with Russia? Can China be given messages to be passed on to Russia? And can China weigh in with Russia on the dreaded “N” word? All these are valid questions. But the biggest imponderable is whether the two top diplomats can build guardrails so as to stabilize bilateral relations and if they do, what those guardrails will be? A visit worth watching in the new year.