2023 must be labelled as the year of the summits. The G7 and Quad just held their summit-level meetings in Hiroshima. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS follow in India (July) and South Africa (August) respectively. India then gets to host the G20 summit in September. And if you wish to be technically correct, the APEC summit is scheduled to take pace in California in November.

With the exception of APEC, India will participate at the highest level in all the above summit meetings. It is the most visible sign of India’s arrival on the world stage. Equally, it is an admission by the international community that it is well nigh impossible to discuss and resolve any of the world’s biggest issues without India being present.

Participation in summits is both an opportunity and a challenge. To begin with, India has an advantage in a Prime Minister who is both shrewd and savvy about strategic issues. He has charisma and commands respect. And he invests tremendously in personal relationships. I was witness to this when I was India’s Ambassador to France and saw the friendship between our PM and President Macron flourish. Other than the late Japanese leader Abe, the PM’s closest friend among foreign leaders is Macron. And diplomats will tell you that this does make a huge difference when it comes to foreign policy and international relations. This undoubtedly serves as a strategic opportunity. But the challenge is also to ward off pressure from friends and partners and enhance strategic space for one’s own country. It boils down to the ability and skill of the leader to manage pulls and pressures.

It is worth noticing that in all the summits listed above, the United Nations is conspicuous by its absence. So, what to make of it? Perhaps, the UN has outlived its utility. At a minimum, it is a wake up call for the UN which has stubbornly refused calls for reform and change.

Academics and practitioners of diplomacy will not fail to observe that “summit diplomacy” – diplomacy practiced at the highest level by Heads of State/Government – is back in vogue. This is no bad thing since the world is largely messy and disorderly and deserves the attention of people at the highest level. The importance of summit diplomacy cannot be overemphasized and can often determine the difference between war and peace in the world.

The last US-China summit meeting was the one between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in November last year in the margins of the G20 meeting in Bali. The conversation was cordial enough; but important issues were raised as well. Biden for example raised concerns of China’s practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and human rights more broadly. On Taiwan, Biden stuck to the party line saying that US opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and the world has an interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. A Chinese readout of the same meeting stated that current state of ties between US and China are neither in the interest of the two countries nor the world at large. Both Biden and Xi agreed that US Secretary of State Tony Blinken will undertake a visit to China in the near future.

The visit by Blinken proposed above never happened for a variety of reasons. But the main reason was perhaps the “affaire spy balloon” in February, when the US shot the alleged Chinese spy balloon with a lot of fanfare. In April, the Taiwanese President visited California to meet with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. This was a case of if the mountain does not come to Mohamed, then Mohamed will go to the mountain! It is bizarre, to put it mildly, that at a time like when the world is going through severe disorder, the two Great Powers were not even on talking terms. It is worth recalling that the Chinese side declined to take the call of the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in February this year.

This hiatus in dialogue has now ended. On 10 and 11 of May, in Vienna, the US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi met for eight hours! The choice of venue was practical since the recent bad blood between the two countries may have prevented either man from making the visit to the other side. But the choice of Jake Sullivan is interesting because both Biden and Xi had earlier agreed last year that it is Tony Blinken who would make the trip to China. It is possible that the Chinese side expressed a preference for Sullivan over Blinken, given the latter’s hawkish remarks on issues including possible weapons supply by China to Russia. Sullivan may have to play good cop for now; it is not clear who will play bad cop for the US vis a vis China.

Eight hours is a lot of time for diplomatic conversations and this cannot be spent on repeating each others’ country positions, even allowing for translation. So, it must be assumed that talks were not just substantive but also included a discussion on putting in place “guard rails” to prevent Sino-American relations from nosediving as they did following the spy balloon incident. The choice of subjects was unsurprising: Taiwan, Ukraine, Indo-Pacific and of course bilateral ties. A Chinese readout said: The two sides held candid, in-depth, substantive, and constructive discussions on removing obstacles and stabilising the China-US relations. This Chinese approbation (describing talks as constructive) for the eight-hour talks may be interpreted as a sign of flexibility, especially compared to the sulk into which they went following the spy incident. The most important, concrete outcome was perhaps the willingness of the two sides to maintain “strategic communication” (like the one in Vienna) at all times.

On Ukraine, the key question is how the US views Chinese attempts at mediation. There is serious re-think in the US about giving diplomacy a chance sometime after the so-called counter-offensive by Ukraine. Regardless of the outcome of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, diplomacy is expected to gain traction by the end of the year. This is also because the Europeans know that a lot can change if the occupant of the White House changes next year. The window between now and the end of the year is therefore crucial for the future of Ukraine and thus for Europe itself.

On Taiwan, the best that can be expected is avoidance of unilateral action by either side that could worsen the security scenario. Contrary to common perception, China is not in the best possible position to act unilaterally on Taiwan now. There are simply too many political and economic headwinds facing China. So, China may wait it out by taking the long-term view on this matter.

The Chinese side appears to have made a pitch for removal of tech restrictions, easing visa restrictions and generally promoting people-to-people ties. The Global Times, considered the propaganda arm of the CCP, let it be known that it was US which was eager to have this dialogue and mend ties with China. That said, it is clear both sides wished for a resumption of bilateral dialogue for different reasons.

Other bilateral talks have also begun. The US Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, appears to have had good meetings with both the Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Commerce Minister Wang Wentao. It has also been reported that USTR Katherine Tai will meet Wang Wentao in the margins of the APEC meeting of Trade Ministers in Detroit next month.

It will be interesting to see if Biden meets with Xi at the Delhi G20 Summit meeting in September. And of course, Biden plays host to APEC summit in California in November of this year, which will be another opportunity for Biden and Xi to meet and continue serious discussions. The good news is that the US and China have started talking again. The less good news is that they are still far apart on a range of issues, both global and bilateral.

Indo-Pak ties continue to be in deep freeze. That is the only inference to be drawn after the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Foreign Ministers meet held in Goa on 4/5 May, 2023.

As is often the case with Indian media, more attention was showered on the Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto than on the Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. It is worth noting that it is China which has stationed thousands of troops in Ladakh forcing us to do likewise at the border. It is China which, by all accounts, is the main threat facing India today. Yet not one Indian news channel succeeded in interviewing the Chinese Foreign Minister to ask him about Chinese policy regarding disengagement in Ladakh, claims on Arunachal Pradesh or even the Sino-Russian alliance.

This obsession with Pakistan is difficult to fathom. The interview of Bilawal Bhutto to a leading Indian TV channel threw no fresh light on anything and ended up providing a platform for Pakistan to purvey its views and opinions. Most of the media commentary during the SCO meet was focused on the form of greeting used by the two Ministers, whether or not there was a handshake between them and their respective body language. Could it possibly be more frivolous? Not one word about the importance of India’s ties with Central Asia in the context of SCO!

Bilawal Bhutto’s motives for undertaking the trip to India are easy to understand. Pakistan is not part of G20, BRICS, RIC and cannot be expected to be invited to G7 meetings. So, for Pakistan SCO is an important regional game (if not the only one) in town. Its chief patron, China, has influence over SCO. It also provided an opportunity for Pakistan to curry favour with Russia. It is worth noting that last year at the Samarkand SCO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Russians declined to meet with Pakistan. This year was different and the relative warmth between Bhutto and Lavrov was there for all to see. Finally, Pakistan may have also wanted to send a signal to the world at large that it is ready to sit and talk to India, but the latter is reluctant to do so.

The level of mistrust between India and Pakistan is perhaps more severe than previously believed. Bhutto made a provocative statement when he said: let us not get caught up in weaponizing terrorism for diplomatic point scoring. To make this statement on Indian soil was both imprudent and impudent. The Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar, not one to hold back, responded in brutal fashion: Victims of terrorism do not sit with perpetrators of terrorism to discuss terrorism. Bhutto was referred to as a promoter, justifier and a spokesperson of a terrorism industry, the mainstay of Pakistan whose positions were called out by India at the SCO meeting.

Where do we go from here? An official dialogue may be safely ruled out for the foreseeable future. In any case, there is no democratically elected government in Islamabad and there is no valid interlocutor. So, it may be prudent to say that an official dialogue will have to wait until elections are over in Pakistan. Meanwhile, there are reasons to believe back-channel contacts are continuing, if sporadically, and more importantly, the ceasefire is holding. Perhaps, that is the best thing possible under the circumstances.

Some fundamental truths about Indo-Pak ties appear to suggest themselves at present. One, India and Pakistan are condemned to co-exist and it is really about agreeing on the broad terms of such co-existence. If no terms are agreed upon, the relations are likely to suffer from major vicissitudes. Two, the gap between India and Pakistan, when it comes to trade, investment, GDP and forex reserves are widening by the day, to India’s advantage. Status quo thus suits India. This should worry Pakistan. Three, the first move must come from Pakistan which could provide demonstrable proof to India that it is no longer interested in sponsoring terror. It could also take steps in the areas of trade and commerce, which is actually in its own interest. Finally, there is no denying that Indo-Pak ties vitiate the atmosphere in regional fora. It is a long-running pattern which is not set to change. Bilawal Bhutto could have been the statesman here, but clearly that was too much of an ask.

If you were a Micawber, you would argue that the very fact a Foreign Minister from Pakistan came to India after a decade is a positive sign in itself. But we are still a long way from normalization of ties between the two countries.

In recent weeks, clear policy pronouncements have been made by the US that it does NOT seek to “decouple” its economy from that of China’s. This is a terribly important development that has geopolitical implications.

The idea of “decoupling” was first articulated by former President Donald Trump in September 2020 when he said:

““We will make America into the manufacturing superpower of the world and will end our reliance on China once and for all. Whether it’s decoupling, or putting in massive tariffs like I’ve been doing already, we will end our reliance in China, because we can’t rely on China.” The statement was made in the heat of the presidential campaign and Trump went on to say: ““We lose billions of dollars and if we didn’t do business with them we wouldn’t lose billions of dollars. It’s called decoupling, so you’ll start thinking about it.”

But soon thereafter, Anthony Blinken, then a close adviser to Biden told a meeting hosted by US Chamber of Commerce that “trying to fully decouple from China, as some have suggested, is both unrealistic and ultimately counterproductive”. It was therefore clear that Biden’s approach to China was not the same (at least on paper) as that of Trump even in 2020.

When friction developed more recently between US and China, exacerbated by the spy balloon incident, again there was some talk that US would seek to “decouple” from China. That notion can now be buried once and for all.

On April 20, Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen in an address to the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University stated in unambiguous terms that the US does NOT seek to decouple its economy from that of China’s and that a full separation of the two economies would be disastrous for both countries, apart from being destabilizing to the rest of the world. She went on to emphasize that the health of the Chinese and US economies was closely linked.

If that was not clear enough, the US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made detailed remarks at the Brookings Institution on April 27 on “renewing American economic leadership”. It was odd , to put it mildly, for a National Security Adviser to make a long pronouncement on American trade, economic and industrial policy. This is proof, if proof was needed, that economic policy in general and policy towards China in particular is now seen through the prism of national security. Sullivan, importantly, agreed with EU Council President Ursula van der Leyen and said US too was in favour of de-risking and diversifying, and NOT decoupling. Explaining the de-risking strategy further, Sullivan said: “We’ve implemented carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China.  Those restrictions are premised on straightforward national security concerns.  Key allies and partners have followed suit, consistent with their own security concerns. We’re also enhancing the screening of foreign investments in critical areas relevant to national security.  And we’re making progress in addressing outbound investments in sensitive technologies with a core national security nexus. These are tailored measures.  They are not, as Beijing says, a technology blockade.  They are focused on a narrow slice of technology and a small number of countries intent on challenging us militarily.”

In geopolitical terms the above policy pronouncements have important implications. First, there seems to be some rapprochement between the positions of the US and the EU vis-a-vis China. Jake Sullivan quoted Urusula van der Leyen for a reason. Both the US and the EU now seek to de-risk and diversify away from China when it comes to the strategic sectors of the economy. Sullivan gave a number of examples to prove his point. He pointed out that the US now manufactures only around 10 percent of the world’s semiconductors, and production is geographically concentrated elsewhere. This created a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability.  Sullivan argued that thanks to the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, we’ve already seen an orders-of-magnitude increase in investment into America’s semiconductor industry. Sullivan gave another example with regard to critical minerals – the backbone of the clean-energy future.  Today, the United States produces only 4 percent of the lithium, 13 percent of the cobalt, 0 percent of the nickel, and 0 percent of the graphite required to meet current demand for electric vehicles.  Meanwhile, more than 80 percent of critical minerals are processed by one country, China. Sullivan underlined cooperation not just between US and EU (Joint Statement of Biden and van der Leyen refers) but also with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India to coordinate their approach on semiconductors and things like Hydrogen.

Second, it is possible that this is a message also to China that while trade in “normal” goods and services can continue unimpeded, this will not apply to trade in “strategic” goods and services. China does need the American and European markets for the short term while it struggles to implement its dual circulation strategy. Whether all EU countries agree with van der Leyen is another matter. Also, even the dependence on China created by “normal” trade and investment can be huge: witness the $ 10 billion to be invested by the German firm BASF in a plant in Guangdong province and an equal amount by Volkswagen in the Chinese EV market. It is hard arguing there is no risk in these investments.

Third, a broad coalition of countries such as US, EU, Japan, Korea, Australia and India is taking shape which are pursuing resilient supply chains in strategic sectors, be it semiconductors, hydrogen or rare earths.

For India, it is vitally important to get on to this resilient supply chain in the making, having missed the earlier global/regional value chains altogether. In order for us to do this, India must reform faster, put in place an eco system for attracting investment, finalize the FTA with EU and join the trade pillar of the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) without delay. Tall order but if not now, then when?

Chinese President Xi Jinping had let it be known to French President Emmanuel Macron and EU Council President Ursula van der Leyen that he will call Ukrainian President Zelensky when the time was right. That was in the first week of April. By making the call to Zelensky on April 26, Xi was making good his promise. But it is hard to believe conditions in Ukraine have somehow changed dramatically between the first week of April and last. So, what is at work here?

For one thing, China now takes its role as a superpower seriously. It sincerely believes it has a mandate from heaven to construct a new world order, more to its liking. In order to do this, there is a need to acquire legitimacy which it perhaps lacks at the moment. The successful mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran and now the attempt to do so in Ukraine must be seen in this context. Ukraine seems like a long shot at present, but never say never in statecraft.

Indeed, the Chinese have every reason to feel smug for the moment. After all, Xi Jinping’s call to Zelensky has been welcomed by all stakeholders. Ukraine’s President has characterised his telephone call with Xi Jinping as “long and meaningful”. It is intriguing why Zelensky’s tone to Xi Jinping borders on the obsequious. Maybe he wishes to prevent further consolidation of Sino-Russian ties, which is to Ukraine’s disadvantage. Maybe he is looking long term and wishes Chinese assistance for post-war reconstruction in Ukraine. The US has called the phone call “a good thing”. And EU, arguably the most important stakeholder of them all, has also welcomed it calling it an “important, long overdue step” by China. Finnish President went further calling it “good news”. Ironically, the only party somewhat discomfited by the Chinese initiative is its all-weather friend, Russia, which while praising Chinese efforts, made it a point to underline that Ukraine was the impediment to peace, not Russia!

Zelensky also confirmed that he was despatching an Ambassador to Beijing pronto. Xi said he was sending his special envoy to Ukraine for exploratory peace talks. French President Macron, meanwhile. has not given up his ambition to be the ultimate peacemaker in this matter. There are indications he broached the subject of a peace conference with Xi Jinping in his talks in Beijing. Ideally, Macron could do with some foreign policy triumphs, given the political headwinds he is facing at home. What could be better than a meeting this summer at the Versailles Palace between Putin and Zelensky leading to a ceasefire! Sounds like a pipe dream now, but who knows?

The Chinese Ambassador in Paris Lu Shaye almost destroyed everything by making a “Freudian slip” of saying that former Soviet republics do not possess internationally recognized legal sovereignty, causing Beijing to walk back his comments. It is somewhat surprising the matter has died so quickly.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Chinese have been smart by playing all the sides in this matter. It will be interesting to see if the parties to the conflict bite the bait!

The election of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva as President of Brazil in January 2023 certainly signalled some changes in its foreign and security policy. At a minimum, Lula was expected to roll back some of the more egregious “tilts” his predecessor had sought to make in Brazil’s foreign policy. But Lula’s trip to China and the subsequent statements he made from there point to much more substantive changes in Brazil’s foreign and security policy.

First, Brazil’s stance on the war in Ukraine. In February 2023 (after Lula’s assumption of office as President) the U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a resolution calling for an end to the war in Ukraine and demanding that Russia leave Ukrainian territory. Brazil along with the West and 140 other countries voted in favour of the above resolution, implicitly condemning Russia for its actions. In the beginning of April however Lula sent his most trusted foreign policy adviser, Celso Amorim, to Moscow. Details of the trip are hard to come by, but the fact that Amorim met Russian President Putin is significant. Putin is a recluse these days and rarely meets visitors. For him to meet Amorim particularly after Brazil voted for the above UNGA resolution is an important sign and may have to do with Lula sending a message to Putin. Again in the first week of April, Lula made a statement which caught people by surprise. He said Ukraine should be willing to give up Crimea in order to make peace with Russia. Ukraine’s reaction was swift and negative. The diplomatic waltz continued with Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov making a visit to Brasilia, no doubt carrying messages from Putin to Lula. Lavrov said that Moscow was “grateful to our Brazilian friends for their clear understanding of the genesis of the situation”.

Lula also paid a state visit to China in April. But perhaps most surprising of all, was the statement made by Lula that the US “needs to stop encouraging war and start talking about peace”. It is worth pointing that these comments of Lula came after a trip to China where he met with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping and where he appeared to endorse the Chinese peace plan for Ukraine.

Lula also questioned the dominance of the American dollar and asked why it is that all countries should trade in the dollar. This came close on the heels of a bilateral agreement between China and Brazil to use their respective currencies and eschew the dollar. Lula asked rhetorically: Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar? While in China, Lula stated that no one can prevent Brazil from improving its ties with China. The Minister for Finance added that Brazil’s goal was to “reindustrialize” Brazil with Chinese capital.

Reaction from the US was not long in coming. US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby accused Lula of “parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda”.

So, what to make of all this? Well, Brazil is back to practicing its brand of non-alignment. The fact that it is able to do this even after voting for the UNGA resolution is revelatory and speaks of its deft diplomacy. But whether Lula can be the ultimate peacemaker in the Ukraine imbroglio is something that only time will tell.

As widely expected, French President Emmanuel Macron accompanied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen paid a visit to China on 6 April, 2023. This was a state visit, so there was both pomp and circumstance.

From the EU’s perspective there were three strategic objectives for the visit:

(a) Engage China at a time when the US-China bilateral relations have hit rock bottom and thus demonstrate EU’s “strategic autonomy”;

(b) To try and see if China can be persuaded to bring Russia back to its senses, as President Macron put it and urge President Xi to talk to Ukraine’s President Zelensky; and

(c) Convey to China that any move by it to supply lethal weapons to Russia will adversely affect its ties with the EU.

China, for its part, had some strategic objectives as well:

(a) To drive a wedge, if possible, between the US and the EU;

(b) Welcome further consolidation of economic and commercial ties with EU at a time when the US is seeking “de-coupling” from China. President Macron went with a busload of French CEOs belonging to Airbus, Veolia, EDF, Alstom, to name a few. This is close on the heels of the German Chancellor who also took a bunch of CEOs to China in November last year; and

(c) The visit provides President Xi Jinping with the right optics after his “no limits” friendship with Russia and demonstrates to his domestic audience that China is sought after by Western powers, in spite of US attempts to isolate China.

So, what about the outcome of this double-barrelled European visit of Macron and von der Leyen? It is hard to see either side gain significantly from the visit. So, it is probably a tie, with the situation marginally in favour of China. French President Macron can content himself that he made an attempt at peace and engaged with China. Ursula von der Leyen can say she warned President Xi Jinping about supplying lethal weapons to Russia. Good cop, bad cop routine but I do not think China was fooled.

China can take comfort from the fact that President Macron implored Xi to help “mediate” a political solution to the war in Ukraine. EU seeking economic and commercial ties with China bestows Xi Jinping with valuable leverage. And, from Xi’s perspective, it is also a relief to know that EU is far from “de-coupling” from China and it is not even clear that EU is attempting to “de-risk” the China factor. Either way, the diplomatic waltz has begun. First round probably to China.

Interestingly, Ukraine seems to be hinting at “conditional” negotiations especially centring on Crimea. This is the first time since March last year that Ukraine has uttered the word “negotiations”. Russia, on the other hand, has politely made it known today that there are no realistic prospects of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Ukraine. But sooner or later, the two sides must realize that this war is not winnable and that negotiations are the only way out. The question is when?

Whether or not China’s diplomacy is working and regardless of whether or not it is wolf or warrior or both, there is no gainsaying the fact that every major or middle power’s object of attention these days is the People’s Republic of China.

The US considers China a consequential, long term threat and is doing all it can to “de-couple” from it. This is no easy task since it involves reversing years and years of doing business together and being joined at the hip. Yet, there appears bipartisan consensus that the “de-coupling” must go ahead and that this will indeed be the case regardless of next year’s election results. The same cannot be said for the war in Ukraine, going by what some Republican leaders are saying.

The US has taken concrete measures, so the “de-coupling” is not just a matter of mere rhetoric. Two examples are noteworthy in this regard. One is the “Entity List” which is a trade restriction list published by the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), consisting of certain foreign persons, entities, or governments. It is no secret that a number of key Chinese firms and persons are notified as part of this list. The second is that the United States has imposed the most sweeping export controls on China to date. The rules seek to curtail China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology, including chips and the tools and expertise to make chips or to produce China’s own semiconductor manufacturing equipment. There is reason to believe the US will do more in this regard.

While the US seeks to “de-couple”, the EU seeks to “de-risk” the Chinese factor. There is a key difference between the two strategies since the latter implies that for the EU, “de-coupling” is not an option with China. So, what does “de-risking” entail? For instance, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between China and the EU has stalled since 2021. This is directly related to potential Chinese investment in certain strategic sectors of the European economy which may pose a threat to economic and/or national security, especially in the context of China’s explicit fusion of its military and commercial sectors. This goes especially for sensitive technologies, dual-use goods and investment that entails forced technology transfers. European Commission President Von der Leyen stated, ahead of a trip to China, that EU will be stress-testing its relationship to see where the greatest threats to Europe’s resilience, long-term prosperity and security lie. That said, a stream of visitors are making a beeline to go to Beijing: these include French President Emmanuel Macron, Spain’s President Pedro Sanchez (who holds the rotating EU presidency at present) and of course EC President Von der Leyen. These visits will be watched closely.

India, which admittedly is not in the same league as the US and the EU, is nevertheless trying to “de-escalate” tensions at its border with China. It would seem that Wang Yi (former Foreign Minister of China and currently the top foreign policy chief sitting on the Communist Party’s Politburo) had agreed with India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar on the need to take concrete measures to “dis-engage” from certain parts of Eastern Ladakh so that the troops can be withdrawn on both sides. This is yet to happen, for reasons best known to the Chinese side. It may be part of Chinese strategy to keep India off balance. Or it may be a delaying tactic to wangle more concessions from India at a time and place of their choosing. Meanwhile, India holds firm in its position that there can be no normalcy in bilateral ties if the border does not return to status quo ante. The Goa Foreign Minister-level meetings of the Shanghai cooperation Organization in the first week of May 2023 will provide yet another opportunity for the Chinese Foreign Minister and his Indian counterpart to jaw-jaw!

No matter how much one tries therefore, there is no wishing away China!

The visit by the Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow to meet his “old friend” Russian President Vladimir Putin led to another substantive Joint Statement. The visit and the outcome has several strategic dimensions, some of which are highlighted below:

(1) Xi Jinping has not just doubled down on Russia but has thrown his considerable weight behind Putin, to the extent of wishing that he be re-elected in the Presidential elections in Russia in March next year.

(2) This is a poke in the eye for the West and the ICC which has just issued an arrest warrant for Putin.

(3) The two leaders, Xi and Putin, have decided to support their respective country’s core interests: Russia will support China on Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. It must be therefore be assumed that China will support Russia in its core interests, including Ukraine!

(4) It is becoming abundantly clear that China will be loath to seeing Russia fail in Ukraine. Consequently, China will definitely go all out to support Russia economically, sanctions or no sanctions!

(5) The issue of hardcore defence cooperation was obviously not part of the Joint Statement. But the question is will China after all this, stand idly by if Russia faces potential defeat in the war in Ukraine. The situation needs close watching.

(6) For India, this may mean a diminution of its strategic space. It may also mean that India may have to align itself more to the West, if only to counter China with regard to its core interests.

(7) While Russia has called China’s peace proposals for Ukraine “constructive” it appears dead on arrival for Ukraine. We will wait and see how the phone call between Xi and Zelensky goes.

(8) There is a pincer movement in the international strategic landscape with China throwing its weight behind Russia on the one hand and the US/EU trying to garner support from its allies and partners, on the other.

P.S. The above is an abridged version of a longer article by the author with the same title in the newspaper ” The Indian Express” dated March 24, 2023.

So, the French President Emmanuel Macron has been true to his word. In his election manifesto when he was voted to a second term, he had stated unambiguously that he would seek to increase the statutory minimum age for retirement in France to 64 from the current 62. Macron tried doing it the traditional way, that is to get his Prime Minister and Government to introduce a bill in the French parliament. There was only one problem: Macron lacked a majority in parliament. So, while the bill passed muster in the upper house i.e. the Senate, it ran the risk of failing in the lower house i.e. the National Assembly. Once that became obvious, Macron used the “nuclear option”, that is Article 49.3 of the French Constitution to push the bill without a vote on the floor of the National Assembly. The bill to increase the statutory minimum retirement age to 64 from the current 62 is thus law in France as of yesterday. This is no mean achievement considering past Presidents in France have failed abysmally in reforming the pension system.

So, why this hullabaloo about the increase of retirement age in France. Well, for one thing, the cost of maintaining the current generous system of pension in France is proving to be unsustainable for the state. Rather than increase taxes or borrow more money, the easiest and logical way to do this is to increase the retirement age so that those savings can help share the cost burden. But why do the French oppose the logical extension of the retirement age especially since everyone lives longer these days. Mind you, it is true that the French retire earlier than others in Europe. One reason is the French concept of the welfare state and the idea that workers’ rights have been won over time. The idea of work-life balance is also taken seriously by the French. In 2016, there was a report which said it was illegal in France to check work related e-mails over the weekend. There are also historical reasons. The French President Mitterrand in 1981, against trends in Europe, decreased the retirement age from 65 to 60 and increased annual vacation for all in France. The other reason has to do with those who begin work as early as 20 years. The idea that a garbage collector or a waiter or a construction worker has to work more than 44 years to get full pension at say 64 years is anathema to the French notion of liberty, equality and fraternity.

The French also love taking to the streets to voice their protests. Once a cause is found, people will show solidarity and express support especially for the underdog. The weather plays its part too; spring is beautiful in France and ideal for street protests. Small wonder, millions have descended on the streets to say “no” to the increase in retirement age.

So, where does one go from here? Legally speaking, the minimum age has been raised to 64 by the Government of Macron. If the opposition parties wish, they can bring a no-confidence motion against the Government. It is doubtful if that will succeed. But if it does, President Macron will simply dissolve the current government led by his PM and appoint another one in its place.

President Macron cannot stand for a third term as President. He thus wants the pension reform to be his lasting legacy. This is significant because past Presidents have been spectacularly unsuccessful in carrying out this reform. From this perspective, he needs to be commended for taking this political risk. It does put him in the category of a few political leaders who are willing to demonstrate strength of purpose and courage of conviction.

Will the street protests continue in France thereby weakening Macron politically? That will depend on many factors, including the ability of the opposition parties (which include strange bedfellows like the far-right and the extreme left) to forge a common front and take the fight to the streets. But perhaps, the weather will also play its part!!