A small number of observers of the current global landscape feel strongly that World War III may be upon us. The vast majority of thinkers and writers, however, consider this fanciful and have every confidence that somehow the major powers and its leaders will pull back from the brink. But is the notion of a World War all that fanciful in the current context?

First, the question of definition. There are already three theatres of what may be called “hot war”. One, obviously is the war being fought in Ukraine, currently well into its third year. Two, the war in Gaza which shows no sign of abating. Three, the little noticed but equally destructive maritime war being prosecuted by the Houthis with deadly effect in the Red Sea. Conventional wisdom points to anything around three theatres or more, qualifying as a World War. This may sound academic but cannot be ignored, if only because it draws attention to the precarious state of the world order.

Any hope that the parties to the conflict in Ukraine will exhaust themselves on the battlefield has simply not borne fruit. If anything, the parties are doubling down. Ukraine has been pressing its masters in the West to allow use of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and the Storm Shadow Missiles to strike deep inside Russian territory. Ukraine already hits targets deep inside Russia with drones, but the use of the above missiles would amount to clear and dangerous escalation. Indeed, Putin has already said that should the above missiles be used then it is equivalent to NATO declaring war against Russia, not least because without NATO personnel and its navigation satellites, these missiles simply cannot be used. Putin has also repeatedly warned that if Russia’s very existence is at stake, he will be forced to consider use of nuclear weapons. So far, most people in the West seem to think Putin is bluffing. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary that a bunch of retired American Ambassadors and Generals have written to President Biden that he should authorise the use of the missiles by Ukraine against Russia because Putin is bluffing. Coming from retired Ambassadors, this is dangerous nonsense, to put it mildly. But this is election season in the US and who can tell what might happen. Not to be outdone, Russia has reportedly deployed 16 ships, including seven carriers equipped with 48 Kalibr cruise missiles, to the Black Sea in the past one week. In this scenario, if things get out of hand then a full-fledged war between NATO and Russia is not beyond the realm of possibility. If that does not qualify as a world war, then what does?

The situation in Gaza, meanwhile, is deteriorating by the day. Plans for a ceasefire and a hostage deal look as bleak as ever with every week bringing further military escalation by Israel with plenty of provocation from the other side. If Ukraine is characterised by imploding bombs, the Middle East is now characterised by exploding pagers! Israel’s Defence Minister Gallant said not long ago that his country was being attacked in seven different theatres: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran. The fundamental point to note is the war in Gaza has already spread to a much wider region in the Middle East. Again, Israel’s leader does not appear to be interested in a ceasefire, even as it is highly doubtful if Hamas and Hizbollah sincerely wish it. Iran is under severe pressure to act militarily as is Hizbollah. A wrong move could set off a series of retaliatory steps which would then spiral out of control. The Middle East has seldom been this close to a catastrophic conflict, which is saying something.

Yemen’s Houthis are still harassing shipping and lobbing increasingly advanced missiles at the Israelis to support the Palestinians in the Gaza war. For the West which boasts a serious navy, it is odd that no one has been able to deter the Houthis prompting the British paper “Telegraph” to declare that the Houthis have defeated the US Navy! What is the use of having numerous aircraft carriers and frigates, if the Houthis cannot be neutralised in the Red Sea.

Indo-Pacific is not seeing a hot war, at least not yet. But events between China and The Philippines in the past few weeks should alert us to what might happen if one side or the other miscalculates badly. In all of this, we have not even talked about North Korea and the unpredictable behaviour of its leader.

So, where does all this leave us with the question as to whether a world war is upon us? Christopher Clark’s book on the outbreak of World War I, “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914,” is a masterly analysis of what went arong in 1914 and may well be pertinent in today’s context. The million dollar question therefore is: Are we again sleepwalking our way to a world war?

If there was any doubt that the “state” was back and the “market” stood discredited, COVID-19 put paid to that. Surgical masks were in short supply, essential medicines disappeared and most of all, vaccines were unavailable to those who needed it most. India came through with shining colours, but the same cannot be said for Africa.

China was one power which never really gave up on industrial policy. Even before Xi Jinping dramatically changed its trade policy after assuming office in 2013, state owned enterprises (SOEs) occupied pride of place in the Chinese scheme of things. A CCP member is invariably embedded in the board of important Chinese companies. And in all instances of forced transfer of technology and “theft” of IPRs, the Chinese state has played an important part. Besides, the system of state subsides offered to domestic companies is so non-transparent that the WTO system has simply failed to identify them, much less take China to task. It is customary to say that China is politically communist and economically capitalist, but that description is too facile and overlooks the complexity and the opacity of the Chinese system.

The US, to be fair, tried hard complaining to China for years hoping that the latter would take remedial measures. China stalled successfully and played for time. The “Made in China 2025” plan was released in 2015, but the World did not give it adequate attention. The main features of the plan were:

• To have manufacturing which is innovation-driven, emphasize quality over quantity, achieve green growth
• To comprehensively upgrade Chinese industry, making it more efficient and integrated so that it can occupy the highest parts of global production chains with the goal of raising domestic content of core components and materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025
• To focus on 10 priority sectors: 1) New advanced information technology; 2) Automated machine tools & robotics; 3) Aerospace and aeronautical equipment; 4) Maritime equipment and high-tech shipping; 5) Modern rail transport equipment; 6) New-energy vehicles and equipment; 7) Power equipment; 8) Agricultural equipment; 9) New materials; and 10) Biopharma and advanced medical products.

The scary thing about the above plan is that China is on track to achieve substantially all the goals listed above.

This is the main reason why the US frets about China being the pacing challenge and overtaking it as the preeminent superpower. The response of the US has been to put in place technology-denial regimes based on the principle of “small yard, tall fence”. Most importantly, the US in 2022 unveiled its own industrial policy: The Inflation Reduction Act and The CHIPS Act both of which were based on granting huge subsidies for domestic manufacturers in the US and putting Chinese and other producers at a severe disadvantage. In typical American fashion, the legislation passed was geopolitically blind in the sense that Europe, Japan and Korea which were after all American allies, were also penalised. They are now in conversation with the US to get exemptions for their firms.

The EU, not to be left behind, has just unveiled a 400-page report made by former EU politician Mario Draghi who has called for radical steps to restore EU’s competetiveness. He has recommended annual state subsidies amounting to a whopping 1 Trillion USD for an indefinite period. He has also recommended a host of other steps, especially in the defence arena which will ostensibly make the EU a more autonomous power viv-a-vis the US. It still remains to be seen how the EU will fund such a mammoth industrial policy. Seen in conjunction with the infamous Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), it is hard to avoid the impression of EU going fully protectionist.

With the three main global economic actors, namely, the US, China and the EU completely abandoning the Washington consesnsus and opting for massive industrial policy, two major implications are noteworthy: (1) The trade and investment landscape hitherto based on globalisation and global value chains is sought to be dismantled bit by bit and a new resilient value chain put in its place. How successful this enterprise will be remains to be seen, but the portents are ominous. (2) More crucially, how do countries like India cope with this panoply of measures put in place by the big players, when they neither have the wherewithal nor the clout to meaningfully counter it. This should serve as a wake-up call for countries of the Global South.

It has long been accepted by scholars that economic security is an integral part of national security. In India’s case, it could even be argued that economic security is perhaps the most important part of national security. After all, if 800 million people have to be taken care of through the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana (extended till December 2028) and at least 500 million (admittedly a guessestimate) are really poor, then it becomes hard to carry out a foreign and strategic policy aimed at becoming a Great Power. There are things we need to do to set our house in order and the Government is doing a lot of it. This blog is aimed mainly at explaining the external environment which has become very challenging.

(1) There have been three phases (at least) of setback to globalization, now referred to as “slowbalization” or “de-globalization”. The first around 2015-16 when Brexit happened and Trump got elected in the US. Trade protectionism then became rampant and the WTO’s impotence set in. The second phase was post-COVID when talk of “supply chain resilience” began and people started to talk of de-coupling and de-risking. Again, this was shorthand for changing the rules of globalization. The third phase (and the current one) was post-Russian invasion of Ukraine with markets in energy, food and fertilizers getting impacted and more generally, affecting trade and investment. The upshot of all this is that trade, investment and capital flow has become intensely geopolitical. It can no longer be taken for granted. India will need to trade more with the world, it needs massive foreign direct investment and will need to watch out for both capital inflow and capital flight: all this at a difficult juncture for its own economy and that of the world.

(2) Anti-immigration sentiment has grown in the West and now threatens to be part of the permanent political landscape. This will have huge implications for our youth who desperately want to go abroad for higher education and emigrate for better economic opportunities.

(3) The principal challenge with the Indian economy at present, despite having the fastest economic grawth tag, is jobless growth. The million dollar question is where the jobs for our youth are going to come from? More jobs appear to be available in the rural areas and agriculture, which is counter intuitive to say the least. Raghuram Rajan and Rohit Lamba have controversially suggested that India has missed the manufacturing bus and that therefore it should focus on services instead. This, by definition, is long term because services requires a different skill set and this in turn requires huge investment in vocational and skill-based education.

(4) Chinese overcapacity will be a problem and will not go away in a hurry. But the more troubling fact from our view is also that China is not really vacating lower end manufacturing even while tightening its grip on the “new productive forces” such as semi-conductors, solar panels and critical minerals. This will have serious implications for India’s trade policy.

(5) The WTO and MFN-based international trade has become passe and what we are seeing is a proliferation of FTAs. India is lagging behind in this regard so we will need to get our act together on ongoing and forthcoming FTA negotiations with Europe, UK and GCC.

(6) China plus one has substantially benefited countries like Vietnam and Mexico and not so much countries like India. So, we are faced with a conundrum. If we do open up our markets significantly, there is a good chance we will be flooded with Chinese and other goods with disastrous implications for our domestic indsutry. But if we don’t open up, our manufacturing will continue to be uncompetetive and we may miss out on reciprocal market access for badly needed exports. This is the Catch 22 situation we find ourseleves in.

(7) We are the only major economy being told to follow a low-carbon pathway to development. China has followed an unacceptably high carbon pathway to development, burning fossil fuels along the way with impunity. China burns more coal than the rest of the world put together. There are reports it will achieve peak emissions next year, when it should have achieved it at least ten years ago. As pointed out by climate scholars like Sunita Narain, it is not about giving India flexibility anymore, it is about whether there is going to be any carbon space left for use by countries like India (and Africa) to achieve its legitimate developmental goals.

China’s economic rise, not to compare but to merely provide perspective, took place with a very fortuitious & favourable external environment, and they were smart enough to capitalize on it. India’s economic prospects, on the other hand, will be determined by a much more challenging external environment.

Conventional wisdom on the American presidential election has changed in a matter of weeks. While Trump was considered by many, if not all, as a shoo-in a couple of months ago, the race now is considered either a tight one or Kamala’s to lose, depending on who you talk to. India may be one of the few countries in the world which is not losing sleep over who ultimately makes it to the American presidency.

The headline grabbing news over the past week has been PM Modi’s visit to Ukraine and that is understandable. But the really momentous visit has been the one which has stayed under the radar; the visit by Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to the United States. The Minister had extensive discussions not just with his counterpart, American Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, but also with the American National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. The talks reportedly covered the regional security situation, broadening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and deepening defence industrial collaboration. On the last point, there was indeed something concrete. And that was the signing of the Security of Supplies Arrangement (SOSA) which is considered a pivotal agreement that allows both the US and its partners to request priority support for defence-related goods and services, basically to ensure that either country can maintain the necessary supply chain resilience in times of need. Consequently, India will be deploying the first Liaison Officer to the American Headquarters Special Operations Command based in Florida. The SOSA is not legally binding; on the other hand, the reciprocal defence procurement agreement (RDP) if concluded in the future, would be legally binding and arguably a game changer for both countries.

A real fillip to the ties can be the opportunities arising for American defence companies to invest in India for co-development and co-production of defence goods and services. The Defence Minister said as much when he expressed confidence that Indian and American companies will co-develop and co-produce for the world. Lest people think all this is one-sided, it is worth noting that the United States has emerged as the single largest destination for Indian defence exports, according to the latest data available.

The Defence Minister’s visit was preceded by the visit to India of Jake Sullivan in June this year when he met with his counterpart but also called on the PM. More crucially, EAM has been in touch with Secretary of State Blinken since the Modi 3.0 government took over. Indeed, on August 23 even while the Defence Minister was just commencing his visit to the US, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to India of Anti-Submarine Warfare Sonobuoys. The American Defence Security Cooperation Agency notified the required certificate to the American Congress the same day of this sale to India.

The above equipment will presumably be used by India in the Indian Ocean where the Chinese have gained a permanent foothold. As I have also noted elsewhere, the full fledged Indian participation in the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is significant. The press release following the Defence Minister’s visit says that both Ministers welcomed the ongoing Indian participation in the CMF and noted that India shall deploy Indian Navy personnel in the CMF’s Combined Task Force 150 headquarters in 2025. The proposal for India to be a full part of CMF was sent by me in 2013 when I was Ambassador of India to Bahrain, based of course on the advice of my Defence Attache. It has taken more than a decade for MOD to act on that proposal. There has to be a framework for expedited decision making in MOD!

It is abundantly clear from the above that the Modi Government is not treating the Biden Administration as lame-duck. This is a smart move and the strategic objective of both sides seems to be to “lock-in” as many things as possible so that it becomes immutable, regardless of whether it is Kamala Vilas or Trump Tower. This makes eminent sense since there is anyway a broad American bipartisan consensus on strengthening strategic ties with India.

US and India are two rough and tumble democracies and thus it is naive to expect complete harmony between the two countries on all issues. There will be issues like democracy, human rights or even Bangladesh where there will be differences. The challenge is to ensure that these differences do not disrupt the irreversible, upward trajectory of our strategic partnership. On current evidence, both the countries seem to be doing a good job on this front.

Whichever way you look at it, foreign policy wonks will be forced to consider the month of November 2024 as a crucial time. First and foremost, there is the all-important American presidential election on November 5. The US may be in relative decline, but even a geopolitical greenhorn will concede that the election outcome will have implications far beyond American shores. Soon thereafter, the COP 29 meeting on Climate Change will take place from November 11 to 22 in Azerbaijan. And then to top it all, the G 20 Summit will happen in Rio on November 18/19. The APEC Summit is scheduled to take place in the first week of November and unless the organizers want it to be a non-event, they would be well advised to postpone it after the American elections.

In democracies, there is supposed to be continuity, especially in foreign policy, when elections happen and power is transferred peacefully from one government to another. The American elections scheduled to take place in November may bust both of the above assumptions. First, you may anticipate some kind of continuity if Kamala Harris makes it as President, but one would have to be naive to expect any continuity at all if Trump makes it. This applies particularly to issues like climate change and to the conflict in Ukraine. Countries have tried to “Trump-proof” their foreign policy, but really there is only so much you can do. This is already beginning to make an impact on the preparations for the COP and G20 Summits. The COP meeting in Azerbaijan hopes to be a “truce COP” (?) and is expected to call for a one month long truce to all military conflicts based on the calculus that military activities contribute to 5 to 6 per cent of all global CO2 emissions. The COP is already having a curious run with meetings now being held in fossil fuel capitals of the world. There was UAE and now there is Azerbaijan. Perhaps there is logic to this. No matter what the COP 29 seeks to do, or not do, everything kind of depends on the outcome in the American elections.

If COP organizers are looking wearily at the election dynamics in the US, the Brazilians who are organizing the G 20 summit in Rio may be petrified at the prospect of Trump coming back. Can you even attempt a consensus document on Ukraine with Trump at the helm of affairs? Two months ago, Trump winning the election was, to use an American expression, a “slam dunk” affair. The entry of Kamala Harris has changed everything; the race is so tight it is anybody’s guess from here. Like many others, I was wrong in thinking that it was too late for a democratic candidate to replace Biden and create momentum. Kamala Harris has changed the game.

A more worrying thing would be if Trump lost the election and the MAGA crowd does not accept the outcome, questioning the second assumption that in democracies, power changes peacefully. That would lead the US into uncharted territory. For the sake of the US, its well wishers, here is hoping that does not happen.

Like other countries, India will wait out the American election, even while dousing fires in its neighborhood. It is somewhat ironic that while Indian foreign policy is going great guns everywhere else, problems in its neighborhood show no sign of abating. We may not have been fundamentally responsible for the problems that arise, but we have no choice but to shield ourselves from the negative repercussions.

At the risk of stating the obvious, a lot is riding on the American election on November 5. At the risk of hyperbole, geopolitics may change significantly after the results are known in the American elections.

The External Affairs Minister of India, Dr S Jaishankar has been repeating incessantly that Sino-Indian ties must be guided by the three “mutuals” as it were: mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity. The Chinese side obviously must have taken note of this, but has barely ever acknowledged it in their statements. Now comes the counter from China which has spelt out five “mutuals” which should guide Sino-Indian ties.

The newly minted Chinese Ambassador to India, H.E. Xu Feihong, in an op-ed in “The Hindu” today spells out the five mutuals in some detail. He begins the article by saying that the two leaders i.e. President Xi Jinping and PM Modi apparently arrived at an important consensus at their bilateral meeting in Bali in November 2022. This consensus according to the Chinese Ambassador was: “China and India are not rivals or threats to each other, but are partners in cooperation and development opportunities”. With no full readout available of that famous Bali encounter from either side, this is the first time someone is spelling out the contents of the aforesaid meeting between the two leaders. The statement, on the face of it, appears more aspirational than factual and could well be the basis of a future consensus if all goes well. But with thousands of troops confronting each other in the Himalayas, it is somewhat farcical to claim at present that China does not pose a threat to India. Perhaps, if the two sides were to disengage completely at the disputed border and set about restoring trust, there is a chance to realize the vision reportedly set out by the two leaders in Bali.

The Chinese Ambassador states that his Foreign Minister Wang Yi has proposed five mutuals which can help achieve the above vision reportedly agreed upon by the two leaders in Bali. These five mutuals which presumably replace the three mutuals spelt out by our EAM are: mutual respect (the only similar mutual that Dr S Jaishankar also put forward), mutual understanding, mutual trust, mutual accomodation and mutual accomplishment. It is immediately clear that the two other mutuals put forward by EAM Dr S. Jaishankar, namely, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity do not figure in the list of the five mutuals put forward by the Chinese Ambassador. This is significant since it is precisely in the area of core interests and mutual sensitivity that India has found China wanting.

The Chinese Ambassador sticks to the party line when it comes to handling the intractable border dispute between the two countries by achieving “complete disengagement” along our border. He talks of restoring mutual trust but states rhetorically in the same breath that “not even the Himalayas can stop us from strengthening friendly exchanges”. But that is precisely the rub since India believes that the two countries cannot have a normal relationship if the situation at the border continues to remain abnormal. After all, in the Tokyo presser after the Quad meeting on Monday , the EAM was rather blunt: relations with China were not good and that there was a problem but it was for the two countries to find a way out. For good measure, the EAM added that countries which have signed bilateral agreements must abide by it, hinting that China violated provisions of the border agreement. It is worth noting that this press statement was after his meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the margins of the ASEAN meeting in Vientiane, Laos.

The Chinese Ambassador in the article talks of mutual accomplishment by hinting that China could help contribute to the agenda of Viksit Bharat 2047. The recent statement by our Chief Economic Advisor while presenting the Economic Survey that he would welcome Chinese investments gives a valuable opening to the Chinese side to gauge how serious India is in saying that bilateral ties cannot be normal if the status quo at the border continues. To that extent, all wings of the Government must speak in one voice and be careful of the signals they send.

What then to make of the Chinese Ambassador’s article? Well, one way of looking at it is that he is merely doing his job and carrying out a charm offensive. The Hindu has done him a favour by carrying his piece, something our envoy in Beijing may or may not be able to do in a leading Chinese daily. More important, the Chinese envoy in spelling out the five mutuals glosses over the substantive differences between the two countries even while steadfastly maintaining the party line.

It is no secret that Sino-Indian ties have been lately under considerable strain. So, when the External Affairs Minister of India Dr S. Jaishankar and Chinese Communist Party Politbureau member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi end up meeting twice in the same month, then, it is something to think about and ponder.

The first meeting on 4 July between the two men took place in Astana on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. The Indian PM gave the SCO summit a miss and it was EAM who led our delegation. The statement put out by the Chinese side after these talks is long on rhetoric: things like good neighbourliness and friendship and emphasis on the 70th anniversary of “Panchsheel”. Interestingly, the Chinese read-out does not refer to the Indian read-out that “the two Ministers agreed that the prolongation of the current situation in the border areas is not in the interest of either side”. The Indian read out also noted that bilateral ties are best served by following the three mutuals – mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests. While India makes it a point to underline this, it is interesting that the Chinese refrain from referring to this in their readout. The meeting in Astana, at least according to our read-out, decided to continue and step up meetings of the diplomatic and military officials of the two sides to take forward their discussions to resolve the remaining issues at the earliest.

In light of the above, the meeting on July 25, close on the heels of the Astana meeting, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Vientiane (Laos) is curious. Normally, a meeting such as the one on July 25 so soon after the last one on July 4 is indicative of one of two things: one, that there is a chance of a breakthrough in ties; or two, to prevent further escalation and to reaffirm the sincerity of both sides in finding a solution which is proving to be difficult. After going through the read-out of both sides following the July 25 meeting, it is a fair guess that the second interpretation is more likely than the first. The Chinese side appears to still harp on the need for both sides to properly handle differences and develop mutually beneficial cooperation, and promote the improvement and development of bilateral relations rationally (emphasis mine). Rational from a Chinese perspective may mean that India should not make the resolution of the border issue a condition for improvement in bilateral ties. The Chinese side in its read-out merely confines itself to stating that the two foreign ministers agreed to make concerted efforts necessary to maintain peace and tranquility along the border areas and work for new progress in consultations on border affairs. Note that the emphasis is on maintenance of peace and security and new progress, not complete disengagement of troops.

The above is very different from our read-out which states categorically that both Ministers agreed on the need to work with purpose and urgency to achieve complete disengagement at the earliest. For good measure, our read-out states: Peace and tranquility on the borders and respect for LAC (Line of Actual Control) are essential for normalcy in bilateral relations. We also affirm that both sides must fully abide by relevant bilateral agreements, protocols, and understandings reached between the two Governments in the past. Finally, our EAM, as he is wont to do, stressed the importance of the three mutuals — mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity — in Sino-Indian ties.

It is hard to know what is going on behind the scenes. Perhaps there is a compromise in sight, who knows? But the proof of the pudding is in the eating – will there be visible and verifiable disengagement of troops? From a geopolitical perspective, both countries have a fundamental interest in finding a mutually acceptable solution. China, so that it can concentrate fully on issues that are more important for it, namely confrontation with the US, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; India, so that it can enhance its strategic space and focus on pressing developmental issues at hand.

The attempted assassination of former President Trump on 13 July changes the fundamental calculus about the impending American elections. Before the horrific event, the election was broadly tied between Trump and Biden. The presidential debate, in which Trump got the better of Biden, may or may not have been a tipping point; but the shooting in Butler city, horrendous as it was, changes everything.

It is not over until it is over, of course. But it is hard to see Trump losing from here. Even if Biden is persuaded to step down, his replacement will have the uphill task of proving that he or she is up to the challenge. And it is almost impossible to get rid of the tag that the person replacing Biden is a second choice of the democrats and was chosen only when Biden became unelectable.

Against the above background, it is perhaps time to look at how geopolitics will change under Trump and Vance. So, here goes:

(1) The most immediate impact will be on the war in Ukraine. If there was any doubt about how a possible Trump administration will deal with it, all doubts were set to rest by Trump’s running mate J.D. Vance, who said: I really don’t care what happens to Ukraine! This should send shivers down the spine of decision makers in NATO and EU.

(2) J.D. Vance has also said the US military should focus on China, affirming in typical Trumpian language: I don’t like China. He added for good measure that China cannot be allowed to build its middle class at America’s expense. Vance hints that American arms to Ukraine are better if diverted to Taiwan.

(3) A possible Trump administration will also push European nations to spend more on defence and take care of themselves. Vance has made some very controversial statements about European nations: he has praised Orban’s policies in Hungary, he has called Germany’s Energy policy idiotic and its defence policy insufficient. He has also lashed out at UK calling it an Islamist state.

(4) Predictably, Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov has welcomed Vance’s statement on Ukraine. It is interesting therefore that while the Russians may well love a future Trump administration and even wish for it, the Chinese will be alarmed by what they are hearing on Taiwan, for instance.

Where does all this leave India? Purely on objective geopolitical criteria, it is hard to deny that a possible Trump administration may actually be better for India than the re-election of Biden. But of course we have no say in the matter. On trade though, we must prepare ourselves regardless of whether it is on party or the other which prevails in the US. Since we have decided to deal with the US bilaterally, it would make sense to start looking at outstanding issues between the two countries and consider mutually acceptable solutions. Tariffs on US products and barriers to services must be on the radar and reviewed. We must also look at securing meaningful concessions for our own exports to the large US market.

A possible Trump administration will be a setback to the emergence of a multipolar world mainly because it will debilitate the EU, even while it seeks to confront China. The weakening of EU may not be in our interest but the US confrontation with China may bestow some much-needed strategic space. This is something that must be factored in while India crafts its foreign and security policy for the impending world of Donald Trump.

You have to hand it to French psephologists and pollsters. They have an envious track record when it comes to predicting elections in France. First, the polls said that in the European elections on June 9, Le Pen’s party will win and it did. Then, in the first round of the legislative elections held on June 30, the polls said Le Pen’s party will come first and it did. That said, in the second round of the legislative elections scheduled to take place on July 7, things are more difficult to predict. That is because of the complicated French system where it allows not just the top two candidates of the first round to go through, but also others who polled 12.5 per cent of the registered voters.

The poll scenario is also complicated by two other factors. First, the voter turnout has been high in the first round. This means getting 12.5 per cent of the voters is not a difficult threshold to cross and there may be three-cornered or even four-cornered contests in many of the 577 legislative constituencies up for grabs. Second, there are calls for forging a common “republican front” so as to stop the National Rally (Le Pen’s Party) in its tracks and prevent it from gaining an absolute majority in the French parliament, which it will if it secures 289 out of 577 seats. One way this is sought to be prevented is for all parties other than National Rally to field the best candidate against Le Pen’s nominee and for others to withdraw. It is not immediately clear that the far-left and the conservative right will necessarily heed the call of Macron and his Prime Minister who have appealed that “not one vote” should go to the National Rally. In an exceptional move, more than a hundred French diplomats have appealed, anonymously of course, to the people not to let Le Pen’s party win.

Despite the above, two outcomes look likely on 7 July, both detrimental to Macron’s political future. One, perhaps the more likelier, is a hung parliament. Two, a less probable but certainly plausible one, that is an absolute majority for Le Pen’s party which will mean that for the first time a far-right party will assume power in France since the infamous Vichy regime in the 1940s.

If there is a hung parliament, President Macron has the onerous task of calling on someone to assume the office of the Prime Minister. The charismatic nominee of Le Pen, Jordan Bardella has smartly made it known that he is not interested in the PM post, unless his party gets an absolute majority. The problem is compounded by the fact that Macron cannot dissolve parliament again for one more year. So, he will have to convince someone to become PM or resort to a technocratic government for the period there is a hung parliament, both of which will increase political uncertainty in the second largest European economy. Either way, Macron’s predicament is unenviable.

If however, the National Rally does end up getting an absolute majority on July 7 then that would be tantamount to a political earthquake in France. This may lead to an arrangement called co-habitation i.e. the President and the PM from two different political dispensations. It is not that France has not seen co-habitation before. But this time would be different because of the divergence between the election manifesto of Le Pen’s party the National Rally and that of Macron’s centrist party. First, on immigration, the views of Le Pen and her colleagues are bound to be hardline. Indeed, her party has propounded the concept of “national preference” which is based on controversial things like: no automatic citizenship for those born in France, illegal migrants not entitled to France’s famous social safety net, no sensitive government posts for those with dual nationality and mass deportations. All this will bring France into direct conflict with Brussels and may be even with the European Human Rights Commission. Second, Le Pen opposes defence arrangements within EU, something Macron is passionate about. Third, relations with Germany will come under the scanner if the National Rally has its way. Indeed, this is why the German Chancellor has expressed the wish for the French electorate to vote for any party other than Le Pen’s. Fourth, Le Pen’s party hopes to spend a lot more on energy and other subsidies that will cause a much bigger deficit in France than the current one which is 5.5 per cent of GDP. EU which prescribes a limit of 3 per cent has already warned France about it. It is highly doubtful if Le Pen and her party give a damn about EU in this regard.

All in all, France which is the second most important power in EU (first, if you take into account its nuclear deterrence) could potentially hamstring the EU. Franco-German motor may be expected to sputter and eventually stop running. Le Pen has moderated her comments somewhat on Ukraine and NATO. But it is clear where she is coming from; for her there are serious limits to French support for Ukraine. Russia cannot but be pleased at the prospect of Le Pen gaining political clout in France.

What about China? Le Pen and her party have said little. But she will be inclined to give China the benefit of doubt and not toe the
American line on “de-coupling”, for instance. That has the potential to create transatlantic friction as well.

All in all, the second round of legislative elections in France on July 7 are momentous not just for France but for the world at large. The real imponderable, however, is how the man or woman in the French street sees it. We will know soon enough!