Over the last few months, it has become apparent that large multilateral gatherings have been more in the nature of jamborees with very little to show by way of concrete results. And yet, in what can only be termed as a paradox, there is very little attempt to abandon it by the vast majority of countries. US may well be an exception that proves the rule.

Let us begin with the mother of all international organizations i.e. the United Nations (UN). The demise of the UN has been proclaimed for sometime now; it would seem however that reports of the UN’s demise are exaggerated. China has openly made it known that as the largest contributor to the UN (after the US) it expects either the number one or the number two position in all international organizations. And, by and large, it has succeeded in achieving that objective. The UN General Assembly which took place in September may have been a talk shop, as it always is, but President Trump still found it important to find time and to come and speak at the forum, if only to belittle it. But even President Trump has sent his former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz as American Ambassador to the UN. The UN may be utterly dysfunctional and the UN Security Council totally unrepresentative of contemporary power reality, and yet countries tend to take it seriously than otherwise. And it is not like countries are threatening to leave the UN, quite the contrary. So, what helps explain the allure of the UN? One explanantion is basically a variation of the FOMO or the Fear of Missing Out, and nations as much as individuals are subject to this pervasive logic. The other substantive reason is that leaving a multilateral institution may be easy, but rejoining it at a later time may not always be a cakewalk. Ask the Chinese how long it took for them to accede to the WTO.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been moribund of late. Yet the US has appointed a new Ambassador to WTO i.e. Joseph Barloon just a few months ago who during his senate confirmation hearings said that while the WTO is not perfect, it could be useful in advancing American trade interests. This from a country that has singlehandedly blocked the appointment of Judges to the WTO Appellate Body. So, it is clear that even the US does not wish to abandon the WTO altogether.

The case of BRICS, though not technically a multilateral forum, is curious. The Western press previously used to trash BRICS as a talk shop and an anti-Western outfit. But look at the countries queuing up to join BRICS. In 2023 Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and UAE joined. It is hard to see any geopolitical similarity in this group of countries. Some, like Iran, cannot even be qualified as non-West, since they are clearly anti-West! If the BRICS was a useless talk shop, it is hard to see why these countries want to belong to it. As if this were not enough, another 32 countries are reportedly waiting in the queue to join BRICS!

The G20 had a tough meeting recently under South African leadership. Tough, because the US made it clear that it would not send any high-ranking member of its Government to the meeting. The main reason of course was a bilateral dispute between the US and South Africa. Nevertheless, the US has announced that it would be happy to host the G20 meeting next year. While some observers have argued that the G20 has lost a bit of its relevance, the opposite is also arguable. In the absence of the UNSC which is dysfunctional, it is only the G20 which can, if nothing else, pronounce itself on a host of international issues with some credibility.

Climate Change negotiations happen under the umbrella framework of the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) through Conference of Parties,called COP. The 30th edition of COP just concluded in Brazil recently. This is a multilateral forum from which the US has withdrawn altogether. It may perhaps be a combination of ideology and a firm conviction among some in the US that climate change is a hoax and that fossil fuels are essential for America’s growth and prosperity. The COP 30 meeting in Brazil could not offer a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels and the COP itself will doubtless continue to soldier on from one place to the next, year after year. Meanwhile, climate change is not waiting for COP meetings and proceeding at a furious gallop.

How to make sense of all this? The inclination of nations to belong to a grouping, any grouping, is atavistic. This primeval diplomatic instinct along with a proliferation of global problems that no one country can solve on its own, will ensure that multilateralism does not simply fade away from the international relations landscape. Multilateralism may have suffered a setback for various reasons, but it is not about to disappear. From India’s perspective, the mantra must be reform of multilateral institutions and a concrete plan to garner support from the Global South whom we can represent and on whose behalf we can then negotiate. In an impending multipolar world order where power is more widely distributed than before, it is only a matter of time before multilateralism rediscovers its mojo and relevance.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

At long last, we may be seeing the beginning of the end of the conflict in Ukraine. The problem lies in determining the eventual terms under which the conflict is likely to come to an end. Wars are not just cruel, they are also fundamentally unfair. And Ukraine is proving to be no exception to that rule.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it was natural for the world to sympathize with a small European country whose territorial integrity was violated in open breach of the UN Charter. In parallel, there was also an immediate demonization of Russia by the West at the time, with the EU leading the charge. There was very little attempt to understand the causes of the conflict and even less understanding of the security stakes involved for Russia.

Two arguments made by the West were fallacious at best, and perfidious at worst. First, Ukraine, EU and the West argued that the conflict in Ukraine was completely “unprovoked”. Second, there was no attempt at either acknowledging or understanding the legitimate “security interests” of Russia in the matter. To argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was “unprovoked” is to betray a very poor understanding of history as it unfolded after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. NATO’s actions in the 2000s upto and including the Bucharest summit in 2008, constituted a series of provocations, all of which have been well documented. Indeed, the American scholar John Mearsheimer addressed the European Parliament as recently as November 18 with a talk entitled “Europe’s Bleak Future” and the full transcript of his speech, available on the web, is well worth reading. As for the “security interests” of Russia, it should have been obvious to any reasonable observer that stationing of NATO weapons and troops within a particular perimeter would be a matter of existential security concern for Russia. All this is not to condone Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was certainly illegal from the point of view of international law. But confronting and resolving a conflict requires prior understanding of the causes which led to the conflict in the first place. John Mearshimer is by far the best author to read in this regard.

When the conflict began in February 2022, Ukraine made some gains which turned out to be ephemeral and even illusory. But then, it is also true that Russia’s initial war objectives spelt out by President Putin were successfully thwarted by Ukraine. To be fair to Russia, in March 2022 there was a willingness on its part to draw the outline of a possible settlement and by all accounts, Ukraine too was willing to look at these proposals. Unfortunately, this so-called “Istanbul peace process” was aborted by the West, led in particular by the then British PM Boris Johnson. The West persuaded Ukraine that it should fight on and not settle with Russia. In retrospect, this was a fatal error on the part of Ukraine and its Western allies. It was clear from the very beginning that the longer the conflict in Ukraine persisted, it would turn into a war of attrition. And if it did, Russia could never lose the war (given the overwhelming superiority in manpower and firepower) and conversely, Ukraine could never win such a war! This realization has now dawned on people after millions of people have perished on both sides, millions of refugees have been displaced and when there has already been large-scale destruction of property.

Fast forward to November 2025. President Trump is certainly demonstrating indecent haste in putting an end to the conflict in Ukraine. His 28-point peace plan, worked out apparently between his envoys and Russia’s, now available on the web, bears some resemblance to parts of the draft agreement that reportedly emerged from the Istanbul process in March 2022. In fact, some may argue that the terms of the Istanbul draft of March 2022 were better for Ukraine than the current 28-point plan. For instance, Ukraine was not necessarily required to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in that draft. Now, under the latest plan, Crimea, Luhansk and Doentsk will be recognized as de facto Russian.

While the 28-point plan is too long a document to be recounted in full here, the main features are listed below:

> The territorial issue is sought to be resolved, arguably in favour of Russia. There has been enough commentary of how Crimea and Donbas will now be deemed to be part of Russia. Ukraine will have serious difficulty accepting this, especially with regard to land that it currently occupies in Donbas region. So will EU, which backs Ukraine on this issue.

>The security interests of Russia have been spelt out and thus substantially taken into account. There is a stipulation that the strength of Ukraine’s armed forces will be pegged at 600,000. Obviously, Ukraine can never be part of NATO and this would be enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution. In addition, NATO will not station any troops in Ukraine.

>It is only “expected” that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further! So, the potential for future conflict exists.

>Russia to be integrated into the global economy and invited to be part of G8. Lifting of sanctions on Russia to be discussed and done on a case by case basis.

>On the other hand, Ukraine is to get “reliable security guarantees” but there are no specific details as to what they might be. Curiously, if Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee provided to it will be deemed invalid.

>Frozen Russian funds to be used for reconstruction of Ukraine but with a 50 per cent share of the profits for the US. EU which is the keeper of these funds, was apparently not consulted and is ballistic at this clause.

>There are many other elements in the peace plan, but the main point is that it leaves aspects of the final political and security settlement hanging in the air.

In terms of reaction, Russia has been cautious, but that could be posturing more than anything else, since this is a plan that is generally skewed in its favour. Conversely, the Europeans have been neuralgic in their reaction to the 28-point peace plan, deeming it as “capitulation” to Russia. It is also particularly galling to the EU that they seem excluded from the peace process for a region that is in their backyard. President Zelensky, once bitten, has been careful not to antagonize President Trump and has said Ukraine will discuss the peace plan with him. But he has also spoken to his nation saying for Ukraine it is a choice between keeping its dignity and keeping the support of the US as an ally. The 28-point Trump peace plan could yet unravel. But pressure on Ukraine and the EU is immense to agree to the peace plan as early as next week. It is difficult not to think of the whole thing as an exercise in realpolitik, geopolitics and hard power, all at once.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies housed in the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

So, G2 is back in the news. For the uninitiated, G2 was first used by the American economist Fred Bergsten in 2005 to suggest macroeconomic coordination between US and China. What was curious about Bergsten’s proposal was that in 2005 when he made the proposal, US GDP was close to 13 trillion dollars, as opposed to China’s which was barely 2.3 trillion dollars. Also, Bergsten’s proposal for a G2 predated the financial crisis and the great recession of 2008. So, what was really behind Bergsten’s thinking?

The global economy had declined noticeably during 2005 compared to a strong and broad expansion in 2004, and projections of future growth were fraught with uncertainty and risk. The decline was due partly to enormous global imbalances, including the rising external deficit of the United States on the one hand, and growing surpluses in the Asian, European and oil-exporting economies on the other.  Taken together with rising oil prices, and exacerbated by natural disasters and geopolitical instability, the global economic environment was precarious, to say the least. Fred Bergsten saw this and felt strongly that US and China must seriously coordinate on international economic issues. Bergsten’s foresight lay in the fact that he knew China’s economic trajectory was on the rise; this was important because at a time when China’s GDP was around 2.3 trillion dollars in 2005, Japan, Germany and the UK had higher GDPs. But China between 1995 and 2005 had tripled its GDP and Bergsten drew his inference from that.

While the G2 began with “international economic coordination”, the financial crisis and the subsequent recession in 2008 strengthened the G2 like never before both within and outside the G20. By 2009, China also became the second ranked economy of the world by GDP, vindicating Bergsten’s theory. Also, by then, G2 had mutated to coordination on strategic issues with both Kissinger and Brzezinski arguing strongly that China and the US must work together not just on economic issues but also global challenges like climate change. In 2009, Hillary Clinton, the then Secretary of State on a visit to Beijing declared that the opportunities for US and China to work together are unmatched anywhere in the world!

By the middle of 2010 though, experts were enthusiastically pronouncing the demise of G2. Interestingly, China sitting down with India, Brazil and South Africa ( remember the BASIC coalition) at the Copenhagen climate change conference was not taken kindly by the US. America’s approval of arms sales to Taiwan in 2010 and the Dalai Lama’s visit to meet President Obama in February 2010 was a setback and returned both China and the US to old suspicions and friction.

Elizabeth Economy, the American political scientist and China specialist wrote in May 2010 in Foreign Affairs that: The sticking points in U.S.-China relations are mirrored in China’s relations with rest of the world. The European Union and Japan, for example, find it no easier to negotiate with China on issues such as trade, climate change, cyber conflict, and the Dalai Lama. As a result, the United States is more likely to make progress when it spends time and energy cultivating allies throughout the rest of the world. We shouldn’t shed any tears for the G-2. Its demise enables us to make real progress with China by looking elsewhere.

The question is therefore why President Trump surprised everyone by putting out the social media message on 29th October 2025 that: The G2 will be convening shortly.   On November 2, 2025, President Trump posted “My G2 meeting with President Xi of China was a great one for both of our countries. This meeting will lead to everlasting peace and success. God bless both China and the USA!” On the same day,  the US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth posted “As President Trump said, his historic G2 meeting set the tone for everlasting peace and success for the U.S. and China.” It is therefore fair to assume that G2 has now become part of the Trump administration lexicon.

As always, words matter in diplomacy. So, it is important to understand what the Trump administration really means when it talks of G2. The following interpretations are worthy of consideration:

> One interpretation may be that it simply means a meeting of the two most important powers in the world. No other meaning may have been attached to it. President Trump’s words must always be taken seriously, but almost never literally. Observers have noted that China has not used the G2 formulation but said more broadly that China and the US must be friends and partners working together.

> Perhaps the most widely shared interpretation is one of the US accepting strategic parity with China. This is crucial since China has been demanding this as a matter of right for quite sometime now. In fact, the biggest gain for President Xi Jinping, especially from a domestic audience perspective, is that China has finally attained strategic parity with the US.

> The most substantive interpretation of the use of G2 by President Trump is the inherent assumption that US and China will first and foremost ensure their bilateral ties are back on track thus subsequently enabling the two sides to engage in far-reaching cooperation to tackle global challenges. Basic to this interpretation is that both US and China are seeking a balance of power leading to some kind of strategic equilibrium. Jeffrey Sachs has made an interesting distinction between “spheres of influence” and “spheres of security” suggesting that while the former is detrimental to the sovereignty of small states, the latter may be compatible with the sovereignty of small states. The suggestion is that the US and China, respectively, could have their own spheres of security (if not influence) in the Western Hemisphere and the Western Pacific. It is not clear at all that the US at present concerns itself with such niceties. Be that as it may, this implies, at a minimum, that the US stands ready to fundamentally reset its ties with China. If true, it would be a striking departure from the US strategy towards China, not only from the Biden era but from Trump 1.0 when China was considered an implacable adversary by the US establishment.

President Trump is nothing if not capricious. So it is hard to make predictions on his watch. But on current evidence, the last interpretation above seems a stretch and a tad implausible. There are just too many imponderables and too many flash points in the relationship between US and China. The forthcoming US National Security Strategy may provide a hint or two. But then again, it may not be the last word on the subject.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Almost a year into Trump 2.0, we are getting a fair glimpse into the negotiating strategy adopted by various powers, big and small vis-a-vis the US. It offers lessons both in psychology and leadership. Countries can be broadly divided into the following categories. Obviously the list is illsutrative and not exhaustive.

(1) Leverage: There are very few powers at this point which have real leverage vis-a-vis President Trump and the US. But China is certainly one of them. Two of the most potent levers that it has (among many) is the large amount of Agriculture products that it buys from the US (Soy for example) or the fact that it has near-total control over rare earth elements and is willing to use it for negotiating purposes with the US. All this has meant that the American team negotiating with China has had to be extremely flexible and reasonable. Indeed, even before Trump and Xi Jinping are to meet in a couple of days from now, the Americans have had to concede that the 100 per cent tariffs threatened by Trump is off the table. This kind of negotiating tactic from Trump and his team is unprecedented, but entirely undertsandable given the extraordinary leverage possessed by China.

(2) Tough Love: US allies like the EU, Japan and Korea have been subject to what can only be described as “tough love”. President Trump’s prescription has been straightforward to these allies: no more free riding and please pay for services rendered ( tangible, intangible and with retrospective effect) to you by the US. In the process, President Trump has single-handedly shaken-up the “alliance system” in place for several years. Australia which was intially impacted, has gotten away with it only because of the critical minerals and rare earths that it has and has signed a deal with the US.

(3) Flattery: Some countries have decided, ab initio, that flattery, capitulation and behaving obsequiously is the best way to deal with President Trump. Pakistan best exemplifies this strategy and has used it to its apparent benefit. Whether this is a viable long-term strategy that will continue to pay is something that only time will tell.

(4) The put-down: Countries like Canada, Panama and Denmark have had to suffer public “put-down” by President Trump. Canada has often been asked to become the 51st State of the US, Panama has been asked to disown a canal and Denmark has been told to part with Greenland. Despite this, these countries have continued to negotiate with the US, even while maintaining their national dignity.

(5) Non-capitulation and passive resistance: Brazil and India may not have retaliated against some of the highest punitive tariffs imposed on them by President Trump, but they have not capitulated either and continue to negotiate in good faith. Brazil and India may lack the leverage possessed by China, but they do have some geopolitical clout and not inconsiderable economic heft. Whether their negotiating strategy based on passive resistance will succeed, we will know sooner rather than later.

(6) Confrontation: That leaves Russia, the recalcitrant big power that appears determined not to allow President Trump a diplomatic victory in the matter of the conflict in Ukraine. But then, it could also be argued that Russia’s case is sui generis since there are already sanctions against it and it has very little to lose by taking a tough line against President Trump and the US. This has caused a fair bit of angst (if not anger) in Trump who has consequently flip-flopped on his approach to Putin and Russia.

In conclusion, it is difficult to contend that there is one successful negotiating strategy vis-a-vis President Trump. Sure, if you have real leverage and are ready to use it, Trump gets that almost immediately and reacts accordingly. This is unsurprising, since his diplomacy has been described by many as transactional in nature. For the others without substantial leverage, negotiating strategy is a function of whatever strengths they have, how much strategic resilience they possess and the extent of loss they are willing to tolerate.

Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies housed in OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

When President Trump unleashed the tariff war on “liberation day” in April of this year, many economists stayed true to their vocation of belonging to the “dismal science”. Catastrophic scenarios were forecast and economic doomsday was freely predicted. Six months on, what is the state of affairs?

Well, it must be admitted that things could have been a lot worse. Indeed, the IMF in its World Economic Outlook released on October 14, 2025 stated that the good news is that the growth downgrade is at the modest end of the range, with global growth projected at 3.2% this year and 3.1% next year, while inflation has increased modestly and is proving more persistent now. More importantly, the IMF stated that the impact of tariff measures was milder than expected due to trade exemptions, increased stocking up, restrained retaliation, and swift private-sector adjustments. Loose financial conditions, expansionary fiscal policies in key economies, and booming U.S. investment in AI and technology further softened the impact. This then is the good news. The bad news is that the IMF also went on to add : The tariff shock is here and it is further dimming already-weak growth prospects. This is clear even in the US; growth is revised down from last year. The labor market is weakening and inflation has been revised up and is persistently above target, signs that the economy has been hit by a negative supply shock. So, is this the proverbial calm before the storm?

The former IMF Chief Economist, Gita Gopinath, has in fact warned (in an article in “The Economist”) recently that the current rally in American stock markets, fuelled by Artificial Intelligence, may be setting the stage for a subsequent painful market correction. Indeed she goes as far as to predict that the impending crash, should it come to pass, could torch a whopping $ 35 trillion of wealth. Some economists argue that the irrational exuberance we are seeing now is reminiscent of the late 1990s, which ultimately led to the dotcom crash of 2000. Gita Gopinath makes the important point that the sheer scale of exposure, both domestic and international, to American equities now, as opposed to 2000, points to unprecedented interconnectedness and that any sharp downturn in American markets will reverberate around the world.

Against this backdrop, it is hard to overestimate the importance of the trade ties between the two biggest players of the global trading system: the US and China. It may be recalled that China has imposed fresh restrictions on exports of rare earths and critical minerals to the US, beginning December of this year. In response, President Trump, as is his wont, has threatened to impose a whopping extra tariff of 100 per cent on Chinese products to the US beginning 1 November. Both sides know the repercussions of this brinkmanship. So, it must be hoped that there will indeed be a meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping on the margins of the APEC Summit in South Korea, end of this month. One might say, without fear of contradiction, that the fate of the global economy hangs in the balance. As the latest edition of ” The Economist” points out, this spat between the two biggest players reveals a dangerous dynamic and a “balance of economic terror” cannot serve as the basis for stable economic ties between the US and China.

The Director General of WTO is at pains to point out that 70 per cent of global trade still happens on an MFN (Most Favoured Nation) basis although that share is decreasing every year. The WTO Secretariat also points out that the global import share of the US is about 13 to 14 per cent, so there is no need to exaggerate the impact of Trumpian tariffs. But this is easier said than done. There is the impact on global trade sentiment and investment is guided by non-quantifiable factors as well. As Gita Gopinath notes the spat between US and China would damage not just their bilateral trade but also global trade, since a number of countries are exposed to the world’s two largest economies via complex supply chains. She notes, ominously, that the structural vulnerabilities and macroeconomic context are more perilous today and that countries should therefore prepare for severe global consequences.

India is doing the right thing by trying hard to conclude a tariff deal with the US, doing everything in its power to conclude an FTA with the EU and recalibrate its economic and investment ties with China. It is also making attempts to diversify its trade with other partners in the world. This is all to the good. The one area where India could perhaps do more is in domestic economic reform. It is understood that India is a rough and tumble democracy and deep-seated economic reforms are easier said than done. But reform we must, for the alternative may be yet another missed opportunity for India. It is worth noting that 2025 has not been catastrophic for countries of the Gobal South including India. There is no reason, however, to think 2026 will follow suit.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O P Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The four post-communist countries that form an informal grouping of the European Union are known as the Visegrad Four. These are: Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic. By a combination of political cirumstances, all the four countries now appear to have reservations of varying degrees about EU’s policy of prosecuting the war in Ukraine. This is an important development since it is bound to have implications for European unity at a time when the security architecture in Europe is under tremendous stress.

Hungary under its leader Victor Orban has always had the reputation of being the “enfant terrible” of the EU, proving to be a thorn in its flesh. Orban has made no bones about his general support for Russia. In fact in July, Orban vetoed Ukraine’s bid to join the EU, although later his delegation walked out of the meeting allowing the other EU members to decide on the issue. In the past, Orban has also blocked EU funding for Ukraine. Behind all of this is Orban’s basic conviction that Ukraine cannot win the war, and should therefore be persuaded by its allies and friends to seek an immediate ceasefire, followed by negotiations with Russia. For the same reasons, Orban has also opposed EU sanctions on Russian oil and gas.

Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico closely tracks Hungary’s Victor Orban in his attitude towards Ukraine. He has said the West’s approach to the war is “an absolute failure.” Fico has stated that he does not believe in a military solution to the conflict in Ukraine, and has instead argued that the EU should have a peace plan for Ukraine. Fico has previously agreed with Russia’s narrative about the causes of the Ukraine war, including Putin’s claim that the current Ukrainian government runs a Nazi state from which ethnic Russians living in the country’s east needed protection. Fico has also opposed EU sanctions on Russia, and seeks to block Ukraine from joining NATO and is disinclined to let it join EU. Finally, Fico is convinced that no amount of Western weapons can change the course of the war which Ukraine is losing.

Poland falls in a slightly different category than Hungary or Slovakia. The overwhelming political sentiment is anti-Russia, but undercurrents of antipathy to Ukraine have surfaced recently. In 2023 and 2024, following the European Commission’s proposed safeguard mechanism to protect European farmers from the impacts of its liberalized trade support for Ukraine, Polish farmers initiated a complete blockade of the Ukraine-Poland border in a move that Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky  termed as “the erosion of solidarity on a daily basis.” As Polish farmers dumped Ukrainian grain along the blockaded border and called  for the resignation of Janusz Wojciechowski, the European commissioner for agriculture, representatives from Poland, Ukraine, and the European Union tried to negotiate a resolution for farmers’ concerns over cheap Ukrainian grain imports to local European Union markets. Since the war in Ukraine began in 2022, Poland has taken in some 1 million refugees from Ukraine. Now, the strain is beginning to show with some in Poland arguing why Ukrainian refugees are being treated so generously. In an important opinion poll, half of those surveyed said that state support given to Ukrainian refugees was unjustified. Many in Poland feel that Ukrainian refugees’ expectations regarding welfare benefits and wages are unreasonably high. Another widely held opinion in Poland is that the Ukrainians “behave as if they own the place,” and are loud & dishonest. There is no question therefore that Polish attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees are souring. The recently elected Polish President Karol Navrocki is on record as having said that Ukraine should not be allowed to join either NATO or the EU.

The other important development has been in Czech Republic, traditionally a staunch supporter of Ukraine. Indeed, when President Zelensky was humiliated by President Trump at the oval office in February this year, there was a spate of donations from Czech Republic for both humanitarian aid and weapons to Ukraine. All that may be about to change. Billionaire businessman Andrej Babis and his populist party have secured victory in Czech Republic’s general election last week, potentially steering the European Union and NATO member nation, Czech Republic, toward a more Russia-friendly stance as the war in Ukraine continues. After all, the party of Andrej Babis ran for elections on the basis of a manifesto which called for a halt to aid for Ukraine. Now that he has won, one might expect changes vis-a-vis Czech policy towards Ukraine. His potential return to power (political negotiations are still on in Prague) could also align Czech Republic more closely with Hungary and Slovakia, EU members that have refused military aid to Ukraine and opposed EU sanctions on Russia.

The bottom line is that Hungary’s Victor Orban will no longer cut a lonely figure in future EU meetings on the issue of Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether the above developments will lead to a policy impasse in EU over Ukraine; or unlikely as it sounds, could it lead to a policy shift in EU towards Ukraine and consequentially towards Russia?

The last week saw the unveiling of a Trump doctrine, if there is one such. President Trump made important moves with regard to two major theatres. One, the European theatre, with major implications for the trans-atlantic partnership and for the war in Ukraine. It may be recalled that President Trump began by being very harsh on Ukraine and its leader, President Zelensky, with the infamous slanging match and subsequent meltdown in the their meeting witnessed by all and sundry in February this year at the Oval Office. Then, President Trump had said Ukraine held no cards in the conflict with Russia. Fast forward to August this year when the Alaska summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin took place. The summit had the effect of rehabilitating Putin and led to rising hopes of a breakthrough in the war in Ukraine in the form of a lasting ceasefire. Instead, what has happened is Putin has decided to hang tough and both sides i.e. Russia and Ukraine have militarily attacked each other with relative impunity. The intensity of Russian attacks seems to be on the rise, if anything. The fact that Putin has steadfastly refused a ceasefire appears to have irritated Trump no end, leading the latter now to make a policy U-turn and say on September 23 (following the meeting with President Zelensky on the margins of the UNGA): “After seeing the economic trouble the war is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union (emphasis mine), is in a position to fight and win all of Ukraine back in its original form.” This is a radical departure from Trump’s previous position that Ukraine had no cards to play with and simply had no alternative but to trade land for peace. But the operative part of President Trump’s statement above is: ” with the support of the European Union”, highlighted by me. This has been widely interpreted to mean that Trump is actually “withdrawing” the US from direct involvement in any future conflict in the European theatre. If that is true, it is hugely significant for not just Ukraine but also for all of Europe. As for Russia, it will continue to face Trump’s ire through punitive tariffs and potential sanctions. But it is hard to avoid the impression that Ukraine and the Europeans are on their own, at least for now.

The Middle East (West Asia) saw its fair share of political earthquake emanating from President Trump’s actions. Trump announced a 20-point (no less!) plan on September 29 after meeting Israeli leader Netanyahu. The plan was suitably titled thus: President Donald J Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to end the Gaza Conflict. The integral text of the plan is now available on the web and it is worth going through in full. The main points are summarized below:

>Gaza to be de-radicalised and free of terror

>Hostilities to end immediately followed by release of some 48 hostages held by Hamas in return for Israel releasing 250 life-sentence prisoners and 1700 Palestinians held in detention

>Hamas to be disarmed and its members given amnesty, but Hamas to have no role in the future governance of Gaza

>Aid to resume for Gaza

>Gaza to be governed by a technical committee of Palestinians but overseen by a “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump and people like former UK Premier Tony Blair

> An “International Stabilization Force” to deploy in Gaza, its composition is unclear

>Israel has agreed to the above plan, but Hamas is yet to agree

>There is mention of Palestinian Statehood, but it is contingent on many things like reform of Palestinian Authority (PA) , the defanging of Hamas and development taking off in Gaza

>The plan is fragile for sure, but it has to be considered as “progress” given the nature of the Middle East.

The plan leaves quite a few things vague. Its full implementation hinges on not just Hamas accepting it in toto, but also handing over all its weapons and basically calling it quits. No sooner than the plan was announced by President Trump, the Israeli leader Netanyahu expressed his opposition to a palestinian state. There is also no deadline for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Last but not least, it was impossible not to notice the return of President Trump’s son in law, Jared Kushner, who was sitting in the front row with Secretary of State Rubio and Vice President Vance. Indeed, this plan is being dubbed the Kushner-Blair plan which was apparently in the works for weeks now.

It is hard to predict whether the above plan will be successful. But President Trump deserves some credit and has surprised one and all by providing the outline of a peace deal. It is worth noting that the US has not explicitly committed either to troops on the ground as part of the International Stabilization Force or to any developmental aid. That will be left to countries in the region, to international organizations and to other donors. President Trump, despite his nominal role as Chair of the “Board of Peace”, is in effect signalling his intent to “unpivot” from the quagmire that is the Middle East.

Now that President Trump’s policy is more or less clear towards the two major theatres, namely, Europe and the Middle East, the main other thing that bears close watching is what he eventually decides vis-a-vis Indo-Pacific in general and China, in particular. That will arguably be the most momentous decision with serious implications for countries like India and others in Asia. An early indication may come in the next two weeks in the form of the National Security Strategy which will be released by the White House. We may also get a hint of things when a decision is taken on the Trump-Xi summit meeting, when & where this will take place and more crucially, what the outcome of that meeting will be. Other consequential things will also follow such as the Quad summit and who will represent the US at the summit when it does take place in India.

Slowly but surely, the bits and pieces of President Trump’s foreign and security policy are falling into place. On current evidence, it is fair to conclude that when President Trump is done and dusted, he may well have changed the course of the World.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The Pentagon’s readout said the following:

“On September 9, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth spoke with China’s Minister of National Defense, Admiral Dong Jun. Secretary Hegseth made clear that the United States does not seek conflict with China nor is it pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC. At the same time, however, he forthrightly relayed that the U.S. has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific, the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests. Overall, the Secretary and Minister exchanged views in a candid and constructive manner. They agreed to further discussions.”

The comparison of this statement needs to be made with the following readout by Pentagon in May 2024 after the meeting between former American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and the same Chinese interlocutor i.e. Chinese Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun. It is worth quoting in full:

“Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Admiral Dong Jun, Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), met today (May 31, 2024) in Singapore on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue to discuss U.S.-PRC defense relations, as well as regional and global security issues.

Secretary Austin emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication between the United States and the PRC. Secretary Austin reaffirmed the announcement by President Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping in November 2023 that both sides will resume telephone conversations between theater commanders in the coming months, and the Secretary welcomed plans to convene a crisis-communications working group by the end of the year.  

The Secretary expressed concern about recent provocative PLA activity around the Taiwan Strait, and he reiterated that the PRC should not use Taiwan’s political transition — part of a normal, routine democratic process — as a pretext for coercive measures.  The Secretary underscored that the United States remains committed to its longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He also reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The Secretary made clear that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate — safely and responsibly — wherever international law allows.  He underscored the importance of respect for high seas freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law, especially in the South China Sea. He also discussed Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine and the PRC’s role in supporting Russia’s defense industrial base. The Secretary also expressed concerns about recent provocations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including its direct contributions to Russia’s ongoing assault on Ukraine.”

A clear reading of both statements illustrates a subtle shift in the US position vis-a-vis China. Some things like the change in nomenclature from Department of Defense to Department of War are probably superficial. But it is certainly the first time that an official of the Trump administration 2.0 (and probably any American Secretary in a long time) has made two solemn commitments to China. One, that the US does NOT seek conflict with China. Two, and arguably more important from the Chinese perspective, that the US is not pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC. The implications of the above statement are quite far-reaching. On not seeking conflict with China, is one to understand that even if (and it is a big if) China were to carry out reunification with Taiwan by force (something China has not ruled out) then the US will not intervene militarily. If this understanding is correct, there would appear to be no strategic ambiguity any more about the US position on Taiwan. On the point about not pursuing regime change, this will be welcomed in China because they have been saying loud and clear for a long time that actions by the US in the past were aimed at regime change in China. After all, it is no secret that the US facilitated the entry of China into the WTO so that economic liberalisation required by the WTO could eventually lead to political liberalisation in China. This of course did not happen.

Finally, the point about US not pursuing “strangulation of PRC” can be interpreted to mean that the US will ease up on sanctions and tech denial regimes against China so as not to prevent the latter’s economic and social rise.

The above must be read in conjunction with reports about the first draft of the National Defense Strategy which has apparently landed on the desk of Secretary Hegseth. This draft apparently makes clear that the US will focus on homeland security and security in the Western Hemisphere above all else. If this is true, then this too certainly indicates a shift in American strategy vis a vis China. Of course, in the latest readout of the meeting Secretary Hegseth does make it clear to his Chinese interlocutor that the US has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific (I am assuming what he meant was the Indo-Pacific), the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests. Similarly, in the Senate Hearing Committee for Ambassador-designate Sergio Gor, Secretary of State Marco Rubio did say that the story of the twenty first century will be written in the Indo-Pacific and that India will be at the core of that.

Be that as it may, it is hard to see Undersecretary of War, Elbridge Colby’s imprint in all of this. His prior views on China were much more hawkish than the current statements suggest.

In sum, this is an area of American foreign and security policy that needs close watching. It would seem that President Trump is quite keen to meet President Xi Jinping (whether this would be on the margins of the APEC meeting in South Korea or whether it would be a stand-alone visit to Beijing remains to be seen) with a view to arriving at a “big, beautiful deal” with Xi Jinping. Either way, we will find out soon enough.

It is now clear that the Alaska Summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin on August 16 followed by the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) Summit in Tianjin on 31 August/1 September, marks a turning point when a new world order may be gradually beginning to take shape. In geopolitical terms, the two Summits taken together may represent profound developments: one, the end of the construct “West” as we know it; two, the obvious re-establishment of Russia as a great power after a hiatus and three, the strategic signalling to President Trump by countries like China and Russia that they are not bereft of options.

The notion of the “West” may be traced back in history even to the nineteenth century, but its more recent conceptualization begins with the World Wars and with the United States of America arguing for a political, economic and military union of all democracies. There are several fora such as the WTO, UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank etc which were used to pursue the interests of the “West”. It is a fact that these institutions have been weakened to a great degree. The ballast for the “West” was nevertheless the transatlantic alliance between the US and Europe.  The Alaska Summit meeting which seeks to lay the foundations of a new European security architecture did not see the direct participation of EU and this is strategically significant. President Trump’s foreign policy has forever altered the conception of the Western construct. The picture of the major European leaders sitting in rapt attention in the Oval Office in front of Trump will haunt Europeans for a long time to come.  

The other big implication is that Russia is back as a great power. In the past, the US and EU have done everything in their power to marginalize Russia and render it impotent following its invasion of Ukraine. It is fair to conclude that these attempts have come to nought with the one everlasting image from the Alaska Summit of Putin walking the red carpet and Trump waiting to receive him. The other enduring image is that of American marines bending down to straighten the red carpet for Putin.  Russia will henceforth be a paramount factor in any security architecture being crafted for Europe.

To the extent President Trump has adopted a stable foreign and security policy doctrine, it is this: he tends to seek grand bargains with great powers, he puts American interests over everything else and consequently, he does not necessarily concern himself too much about the interests of lesser powers. But it is interesting that both China and Russia at the China Victory Day Parade on 3 September, were essentially signalling to President Trump that they will stay the course and not necessarily buckle under his pressure.

Where does all this leave India? India is not yet a great power so it will have to go back to the drawing board and reconfigure its ties with each of the great powers. It will doubtless seek to advance its vital national interests based on its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy. Doing so may require serious adjustments in India’s strategic calculus. With the US for example, India should stop expecting any leverage deriving from the fact of it being used as a counterweight to China, largely because the US and President Trump do not necessarily see it in those terms anymore. India should therefore start laying the foundation for a consequential and enduring relationship with US on its own merit, regardless of third country interests. There is enough convergence of strategic interests between the world’s oldest and largest democracies to do this. Looking at the medium to long term must inevitably be part of this exercise.

It is a truism that any détente in ties between US and Russia is good for India. It gives India that much more strategic space for advancing its interests by working closely to build on its legacy relationship with Russia. India argued long back that the solution to the Ukraine problem lay not in the battlefield but in dialogue and diplomacy. India was also the first to state that the “legitimate security interests” of Russia must be considered, for which it took a good deal of flak from EU and others. US-Russian ties are now at a serious inflection point. The famous Limousine ride between PM Modi and President Putin in Tianjin is the subject of much speculation. But since this comes close on the heels of PM Modi’s telephonic conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky, it must be assumed that a good part of that conversation was about how to bring the war to an end in Ukraine.  

If the US is ambivalent about looking at ties with India through the lens of its own relationship with China, then India too believes that its ties with China “should not be seen through a third country lens”.  This bestows on India more strategic space and flexibility in its own dealings with China. India must therefore lay a fresh and enduring basis for its own ties with China, a neighbour with whom it shares a long and disputed border and faces strategic competition in South Asia. India must strive for a multipolar Asia and in this it needs to convince China that stability in Asia is vitally linked to this single factor. The meeting on August 31 in Tianjin between Xi Jinping and Modi saw the two leaders agree that they are development partners, not rivals, which is a huge statement to make. But truth be told, structural impediments like the border issue continue to bedevil bilateral ties. Indian foreign policy was undoubtedly aligning itself closer to the “West” over the last two decades or so. President Trump, through his actions, may have brought this shift to an abrupt halt. What is more, there may be no “West” to align with, at least not the way we understood “West”.     

The world is far from experiencing any strategic equilibrium or balance of power. Instead, the evolving world order seems, on the surface, like three great powers i.e. US, China and Russia jostling to delineate and carve out their own spheres of influence. That, however, would be an overly simplistic assessment. Sooner or later, middle powers like EU, India, ASEAN and Japan will make their presence felt within their geographies and by allying themselves with one or more of the great powers. Meanwhile, get used to a multipolar world that so many people had wished for. Multipolar the world order may be, but it is also one that is messy and fragmented.  

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador and Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies and Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

So, the much-vaunted India-US ties has cratered, at least for now. As Hindi speakers might be wont to say: nazar lag gaya! But longtime observers will hasten to point out that the relationship has weathered worse storms before and there is no reason to believe that eventually this too shall pass. The question is how long it will take to recover and what residual trust will then govern the relationship when that occurs. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated somewhat helpfully that: we will come together at the end of the day. This reminds me of a story. I remember hosting an investors meet as India’s Ambassador in Paris when a lot of people present underlined the difficulty of doing business with India. An American investor piped up and said he had no problem doing business with India. I asked him the secret and he had a humorous response. He said to me: In the end, it always works out with India. If you find something is not working, then it probably is not the end, so keep at it! This may be good advice for both countries at this crisis point in their relationship.

It is no secret that India was one of the first countries to engage with the Trump administration for a trade deal. So, the question naturally arises: what happened? Three plausible reasons suggest themselves. One, President Trump is piqued with India. Two, the case of India buying Russian oil. And three, the redlines outlined by India in the trade talks with the US. Of the three, the personal pique of President Trump may have anything to do from his claimed mediation in the Indo-Pak conflict, attempts to secure a Nobel Prize or indeed to perceived slight over something else that India said or did. It is meaningless to speculate on this without full knowledge of facts but at some point Indian policymakers will have to deal with it one way or another. With President Trump there is only a thin line between what is personal and what is official.

Of the other two reasons, some wiggle room is possible and India should “keep at it” as the American advised above. It is comforting to know that the two countries continue to talk in the various sectoral dialogues meant for the prupose. So, the two plus two dialogue held recently at the level of the Additional Secretary (Americas) in the MEA, Amb Nagraj Naidu, and the Senior official at the State Department Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Ms Bettany P. Morrison, is very welcome. It is an open secret that Ms Bettany P.Morrison is powerful beyond her pay grade and has worked with Secretary Marco Rubio for a long time. Talks appear to have continued in other areas including on nuclear cooperation and intelligence matters, so that is a good thing too.

On India buying Russian oil, the price differential between Russian crude and Brent crude is diminishing gradually. Our position has been that we will buy crude from wherever it is cheap, given the overriding objective of assuring energy security for millions of Indians. If this understanding is correct, other options may be explored, at least in the medium term. The gross advantage of buying Russian crude for India works out to something like 5 Billion USD per year. The loss of the American export market as a result of punitive tariffs would be eight times that i.e. 40 Billion USD. Some might argue that there is no price worth paying for strategic autonomy, but welcome to realpolitik dilemmas relating to national interest.

On the redlines in trade talks, PM has been very clear that he will never sacrifice the interests of farmers, dairy producers and small entrepreneurs. The Americans probably know this well, but this needs reiteration. It may come as news to some that if you take global trade as a whole, only 10 per cent of it is really in agriculture products. Can we therefore tweak some of our offers made to the US in industrial products? Renowned Indian trade policy experts have suggested this and it is worth exploring from our persepctive. Equally, if we can insist on favourable terms for our industrial exports to the American market that would be great. Again, we need to keep the conversation going, though the postponement of the American trade delegation to India is a regrettable setback.

The effect of the 50 per cent punitive tariffs on GDP and even export revenue is manageable, even if it hurts in the short term. The real worry is loss of employment and possible devastation of livelihoods. Areas like Tiruppur, Surat, Noida and places in AP, Kerala, TN and Gujarat (from where Shrimps are exported to the US) need fiscal support by the Central Government. It is not clear the US policymakers know the extent of this damage, so they need to be sensitised on this as well. The Government must also be commended for exploring 40 other markets for diversifying Indian exports; this has not come a moment too soon.

The next few weeks and months are crucial for India-US ties. Painstaking backchannel talks may already be happening, but if they are not, they should. That alone will prepare the ground for a summit-level meeting between the two leaders at some point. Not so long ago, both countries described India-US ties as the most “consequential”or the most “defining” relationship of the twenty-first century. Geopolitics may have changed some things, but the fundamental logic of that statement remains valid. The challenge is to try and see how the troubled relationship can be salvaged at the earliest. Meanwhile, India should obviously play all sides, play all its cards and play the long game.

Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Jadeja Motwani Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University and a former Indian Ambassador to France. Views are personal.