The last week saw the unveiling of a Trump doctrine, if there is one such. President Trump made important moves with regard to two major theatres. One, the European theatre, with major implications for the trans-atlantic partnership and for the war in Ukraine. It may be recalled that President Trump began by being very harsh on Ukraine and its leader, President Zelensky, with the infamous slanging match and subsequent meltdown in the their meeting witnessed by all and sundry in February this year at the Oval Office. Then, President Trump had said Ukraine held no cards in the conflict with Russia. Fast forward to August this year when the Alaska summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin took place. The summit had the effect of rehabilitating Putin and led to rising hopes of a breakthrough in the war in Ukraine in the form of a lasting ceasefire. Instead, what has happened is Putin has decided to hang tough and both sides i.e. Russia and Ukraine have militarily attacked each other with relative impunity. The intensity of Russian attacks seems to be on the rise, if anything. The fact that Putin has steadfastly refused a ceasefire appears to have irritated Trump no end, leading the latter now to make a policy U-turn and say on September 23 (following the meeting with President Zelensky on the margins of the UNGA): “After seeing the economic trouble the war is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union (emphasis mine), is in a position to fight and win all of Ukraine back in its original form.” This is a radical departure from Trump’s previous position that Ukraine had no cards to play with and simply had no alternative but to trade land for peace. But the operative part of President Trump’s statement above is: ” with the support of the European Union”, highlighted by me. This has been widely interpreted to mean that Trump is actually “withdrawing” the US from direct involvement in any future conflict in the European theatre. If that is true, it is hugely significant for not just Ukraine but also for all of Europe. As for Russia, it will continue to face Trump’s ire through punitive tariffs and potential sanctions. But it is hard to avoid the impression that Ukraine and the Europeans are on their own, at least for now.

The Middle East (West Asia) saw its fair share of political earthquake emanating from President Trump’s actions. Trump announced a 20-point (no less!) plan on September 29 after meeting Israeli leader Netanyahu. The plan was suitably titled thus: President Donald J Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to end the Gaza Conflict. The integral text of the plan is now available on the web and it is worth going through in full. The main points are summarized below:

>Gaza to be de-radicalised and free of terror

>Hostilities to end immediately followed by release of some 48 hostages held by Hamas in return for Israel releasing 250 life-sentence prisoners and 1700 Palestinians held in detention

>Hamas to be disarmed and its members given amnesty, but Hamas to have no role in the future governance of Gaza

>Aid to resume for Gaza

>Gaza to be governed by a technical committee of Palestinians but overseen by a “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump and people like former UK Premier Tony Blair

> An “International Stabilization Force” to deploy in Gaza, its composition is unclear

>Israel has agreed to the above plan, but Hamas is yet to agree

>There is mention of Palestinian Statehood, but it is contingent on many things like reform of Palestinian Authority (PA) , the defanging of Hamas and development taking off in Gaza

>The plan is fragile for sure, but it has to be considered as “progress” given the nature of the Middle East.

The plan leaves quite a few things vague. Its full implementation hinges on not just Hamas accepting it in toto, but also handing over all its weapons and basically calling it quits. No sooner than the plan was announced by President Trump, the Israeli leader Netanyahu expressed his opposition to a palestinian state. There is also no deadline for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Last but not least, it was impossible not to notice the return of President Trump’s son in law, Jared Kushner, who was sitting in the front row with Secretary of State Rubio and Vice President Vance. Indeed, this plan is being dubbed the Kushner-Blair plan which was apparently in the works for weeks now.

It is hard to predict whether the above plan will be successful. But President Trump deserves some credit and has surprised one and all by providing the outline of a peace deal. It is worth noting that the US has not explicitly committed either to troops on the ground as part of the International Stabilization Force or to any developmental aid. That will be left to countries in the region, to international organizations and to other donors. President Trump, despite his nominal role as Chair of the “Board of Peace”, is in effect signalling his intent to “unpivot” from the quagmire that is the Middle East.

Now that President Trump’s policy is more or less clear towards the two major theatres, namely, Europe and the Middle East, the main other thing that bears close watching is what he eventually decides vis-a-vis Indo-Pacific in general and China, in particular. That will arguably be the most momentous decision with serious implications for countries like India and others in Asia. An early indication may come in the next two weeks in the form of the National Security Strategy which will be released by the White House. We may also get a hint of things when a decision is taken on the Trump-Xi summit meeting, when & where this will take place and more crucially, what the outcome of that meeting will be. Other consequential things will also follow such as the Quad summit and who will represent the US at the summit when it does take place in India.

Slowly but surely, the bits and pieces of President Trump’s foreign and security policy are falling into place. On current evidence, it is fair to conclude that when President Trump is done and dusted, he may well have changed the course of the World.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The Pentagon’s readout said the following:

“On September 9, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth spoke with China’s Minister of National Defense, Admiral Dong Jun. Secretary Hegseth made clear that the United States does not seek conflict with China nor is it pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC. At the same time, however, he forthrightly relayed that the U.S. has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific, the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests. Overall, the Secretary and Minister exchanged views in a candid and constructive manner. They agreed to further discussions.”

The comparison of this statement needs to be made with the following readout by Pentagon in May 2024 after the meeting between former American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and the same Chinese interlocutor i.e. Chinese Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun. It is worth quoting in full:

“Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Admiral Dong Jun, Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), met today (May 31, 2024) in Singapore on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue to discuss U.S.-PRC defense relations, as well as regional and global security issues.

Secretary Austin emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication between the United States and the PRC. Secretary Austin reaffirmed the announcement by President Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping in November 2023 that both sides will resume telephone conversations between theater commanders in the coming months, and the Secretary welcomed plans to convene a crisis-communications working group by the end of the year.  

The Secretary expressed concern about recent provocative PLA activity around the Taiwan Strait, and he reiterated that the PRC should not use Taiwan’s political transition — part of a normal, routine democratic process — as a pretext for coercive measures.  The Secretary underscored that the United States remains committed to its longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He also reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The Secretary made clear that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate — safely and responsibly — wherever international law allows.  He underscored the importance of respect for high seas freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law, especially in the South China Sea. He also discussed Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine and the PRC’s role in supporting Russia’s defense industrial base. The Secretary also expressed concerns about recent provocations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including its direct contributions to Russia’s ongoing assault on Ukraine.”

A clear reading of both statements illustrates a subtle shift in the US position vis-a-vis China. Some things like the change in nomenclature from Department of Defense to Department of War are probably superficial. But it is certainly the first time that an official of the Trump administration 2.0 (and probably any American Secretary in a long time) has made two solemn commitments to China. One, that the US does NOT seek conflict with China. Two, and arguably more important from the Chinese perspective, that the US is not pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC. The implications of the above statement are quite far-reaching. On not seeking conflict with China, is one to understand that even if (and it is a big if) China were to carry out reunification with Taiwan by force (something China has not ruled out) then the US will not intervene militarily. If this understanding is correct, there would appear to be no strategic ambiguity any more about the US position on Taiwan. On the point about not pursuing regime change, this will be welcomed in China because they have been saying loud and clear for a long time that actions by the US in the past were aimed at regime change in China. After all, it is no secret that the US facilitated the entry of China into the WTO so that economic liberalisation required by the WTO could eventually lead to political liberalisation in China. This of course did not happen.

Finally, the point about US not pursuing “strangulation of PRC” can be interpreted to mean that the US will ease up on sanctions and tech denial regimes against China so as not to prevent the latter’s economic and social rise.

The above must be read in conjunction with reports about the first draft of the National Defense Strategy which has apparently landed on the desk of Secretary Hegseth. This draft apparently makes clear that the US will focus on homeland security and security in the Western Hemisphere above all else. If this is true, then this too certainly indicates a shift in American strategy vis a vis China. Of course, in the latest readout of the meeting Secretary Hegseth does make it clear to his Chinese interlocutor that the US has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific (I am assuming what he meant was the Indo-Pacific), the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests. Similarly, in the Senate Hearing Committee for Ambassador-designate Sergio Gor, Secretary of State Marco Rubio did say that the story of the twenty first century will be written in the Indo-Pacific and that India will be at the core of that.

Be that as it may, it is hard to see Undersecretary of War, Elbridge Colby’s imprint in all of this. His prior views on China were much more hawkish than the current statements suggest.

In sum, this is an area of American foreign and security policy that needs close watching. It would seem that President Trump is quite keen to meet President Xi Jinping (whether this would be on the margins of the APEC meeting in South Korea or whether it would be a stand-alone visit to Beijing remains to be seen) with a view to arriving at a “big, beautiful deal” with Xi Jinping. Either way, we will find out soon enough.

It is now clear that the Alaska Summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin on August 16 followed by the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) Summit in Tianjin on 31 August/1 September, marks a turning point when a new world order may be gradually beginning to take shape. In geopolitical terms, the two Summits taken together may represent profound developments: one, the end of the construct “West” as we know it; two, the obvious re-establishment of Russia as a great power after a hiatus and three, the strategic signalling to President Trump by countries like China and Russia that they are not bereft of options.

The notion of the “West” may be traced back in history even to the nineteenth century, but its more recent conceptualization begins with the World Wars and with the United States of America arguing for a political, economic and military union of all democracies. There are several fora such as the WTO, UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank etc which were used to pursue the interests of the “West”. It is a fact that these institutions have been weakened to a great degree. The ballast for the “West” was nevertheless the transatlantic alliance between the US and Europe.  The Alaska Summit meeting which seeks to lay the foundations of a new European security architecture did not see the direct participation of EU and this is strategically significant. President Trump’s foreign policy has forever altered the conception of the Western construct. The picture of the major European leaders sitting in rapt attention in the Oval Office in front of Trump will haunt Europeans for a long time to come.  

The other big implication is that Russia is back as a great power. In the past, the US and EU have done everything in their power to marginalize Russia and render it impotent following its invasion of Ukraine. It is fair to conclude that these attempts have come to nought with the one everlasting image from the Alaska Summit of Putin walking the red carpet and Trump waiting to receive him. The other enduring image is that of American marines bending down to straighten the red carpet for Putin.  Russia will henceforth be a paramount factor in any security architecture being crafted for Europe.

To the extent President Trump has adopted a stable foreign and security policy doctrine, it is this: he tends to seek grand bargains with great powers, he puts American interests over everything else and consequently, he does not necessarily concern himself too much about the interests of lesser powers. But it is interesting that both China and Russia at the China Victory Day Parade on 3 September, were essentially signalling to President Trump that they will stay the course and not necessarily buckle under his pressure.

Where does all this leave India? India is not yet a great power so it will have to go back to the drawing board and reconfigure its ties with each of the great powers. It will doubtless seek to advance its vital national interests based on its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy. Doing so may require serious adjustments in India’s strategic calculus. With the US for example, India should stop expecting any leverage deriving from the fact of it being used as a counterweight to China, largely because the US and President Trump do not necessarily see it in those terms anymore. India should therefore start laying the foundation for a consequential and enduring relationship with US on its own merit, regardless of third country interests. There is enough convergence of strategic interests between the world’s oldest and largest democracies to do this. Looking at the medium to long term must inevitably be part of this exercise.

It is a truism that any détente in ties between US and Russia is good for India. It gives India that much more strategic space for advancing its interests by working closely to build on its legacy relationship with Russia. India argued long back that the solution to the Ukraine problem lay not in the battlefield but in dialogue and diplomacy. India was also the first to state that the “legitimate security interests” of Russia must be considered, for which it took a good deal of flak from EU and others. US-Russian ties are now at a serious inflection point. The famous Limousine ride between PM Modi and President Putin in Tianjin is the subject of much speculation. But since this comes close on the heels of PM Modi’s telephonic conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky, it must be assumed that a good part of that conversation was about how to bring the war to an end in Ukraine.  

If the US is ambivalent about looking at ties with India through the lens of its own relationship with China, then India too believes that its ties with China “should not be seen through a third country lens”.  This bestows on India more strategic space and flexibility in its own dealings with China. India must therefore lay a fresh and enduring basis for its own ties with China, a neighbour with whom it shares a long and disputed border and faces strategic competition in South Asia. India must strive for a multipolar Asia and in this it needs to convince China that stability in Asia is vitally linked to this single factor. The meeting on August 31 in Tianjin between Xi Jinping and Modi saw the two leaders agree that they are development partners, not rivals, which is a huge statement to make. But truth be told, structural impediments like the border issue continue to bedevil bilateral ties. Indian foreign policy was undoubtedly aligning itself closer to the “West” over the last two decades or so. President Trump, through his actions, may have brought this shift to an abrupt halt. What is more, there may be no “West” to align with, at least not the way we understood “West”.     

The world is far from experiencing any strategic equilibrium or balance of power. Instead, the evolving world order seems, on the surface, like three great powers i.e. US, China and Russia jostling to delineate and carve out their own spheres of influence. That, however, would be an overly simplistic assessment. Sooner or later, middle powers like EU, India, ASEAN and Japan will make their presence felt within their geographies and by allying themselves with one or more of the great powers. Meanwhile, get used to a multipolar world that so many people had wished for. Multipolar the world order may be, but it is also one that is messy and fragmented.  

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador and Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies and Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

So, the much-vaunted India-US ties has cratered, at least for now. As Hindi speakers might be wont to say: nazar lag gaya! But longtime observers will hasten to point out that the relationship has weathered worse storms before and there is no reason to believe that eventually this too shall pass. The question is how long it will take to recover and what residual trust will then govern the relationship when that occurs. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated somewhat helpfully that: we will come together at the end of the day. This reminds me of a story. I remember hosting an investors meet as India’s Ambassador in Paris when a lot of people present underlined the difficulty of doing business with India. An American investor piped up and said he had no problem doing business with India. I asked him the secret and he had a humorous response. He said to me: In the end, it always works out with India. If you find something is not working, then it probably is not the end, so keep at it! This may be good advice for both countries at this crisis point in their relationship.

It is no secret that India was one of the first countries to engage with the Trump administration for a trade deal. So, the question naturally arises: what happened? Three plausible reasons suggest themselves. One, President Trump is piqued with India. Two, the case of India buying Russian oil. And three, the redlines outlined by India in the trade talks with the US. Of the three, the personal pique of President Trump may have anything to do from his claimed mediation in the Indo-Pak conflict, attempts to secure a Nobel Prize or indeed to perceived slight over something else that India said or did. It is meaningless to speculate on this without full knowledge of facts but at some point Indian policymakers will have to deal with it one way or another. With President Trump there is only a thin line between what is personal and what is official.

Of the other two reasons, some wiggle room is possible and India should “keep at it” as the American advised above. It is comforting to know that the two countries continue to talk in the various sectoral dialogues meant for the prupose. So, the two plus two dialogue held recently at the level of the Additional Secretary (Americas) in the MEA, Amb Nagraj Naidu, and the Senior official at the State Department Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Ms Bettany P. Morrison, is very welcome. It is an open secret that Ms Bettany P.Morrison is powerful beyond her pay grade and has worked with Secretary Marco Rubio for a long time. Talks appear to have continued in other areas including on nuclear cooperation and intelligence matters, so that is a good thing too.

On India buying Russian oil, the price differential between Russian crude and Brent crude is diminishing gradually. Our position has been that we will buy crude from wherever it is cheap, given the overriding objective of assuring energy security for millions of Indians. If this understanding is correct, other options may be explored, at least in the medium term. The gross advantage of buying Russian crude for India works out to something like 5 Billion USD per year. The loss of the American export market as a result of punitive tariffs would be eight times that i.e. 40 Billion USD. Some might argue that there is no price worth paying for strategic autonomy, but welcome to realpolitik dilemmas relating to national interest.

On the redlines in trade talks, PM has been very clear that he will never sacrifice the interests of farmers, dairy producers and small entrepreneurs. The Americans probably know this well, but this needs reiteration. It may come as news to some that if you take global trade as a whole, only 10 per cent of it is really in agriculture products. Can we therefore tweak some of our offers made to the US in industrial products? Renowned Indian trade policy experts have suggested this and it is worth exploring from our persepctive. Equally, if we can insist on favourable terms for our industrial exports to the American market that would be great. Again, we need to keep the conversation going, though the postponement of the American trade delegation to India is a regrettable setback.

The effect of the 50 per cent punitive tariffs on GDP and even export revenue is manageable, even if it hurts in the short term. The real worry is loss of employment and possible devastation of livelihoods. Areas like Tiruppur, Surat, Noida and places in AP, Kerala, TN and Gujarat (from where Shrimps are exported to the US) need fiscal support by the Central Government. It is not clear the US policymakers know the extent of this damage, so they need to be sensitised on this as well. The Government must also be commended for exploring 40 other markets for diversifying Indian exports; this has not come a moment too soon.

The next few weeks and months are crucial for India-US ties. Painstaking backchannel talks may already be happening, but if they are not, they should. That alone will prepare the ground for a summit-level meeting between the two leaders at some point. Not so long ago, both countries described India-US ties as the most “consequential”or the most “defining” relationship of the twenty-first century. Geopolitics may have changed some things, but the fundamental logic of that statement remains valid. The challenge is to try and see how the troubled relationship can be salvaged at the earliest. Meanwhile, India should obviously play all sides, play all its cards and play the long game.

Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Jadeja Motwani Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University and a former Indian Ambassador to France. Views are personal.

As summits go, the one in Anchorage, Alaska between Presidents Trump and Putin was terribly significant from a geopolitical perspective. Still, it is important to recognize what the summit achieved and what it did not.

There is widespread consensus that the summit represented the “de-pariahfication” (I am making up this word) of Russia and its return to global centre stage as a great power. President Putin, against whom there is an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court (ICC), also comes in from the cold and almost instantaneously becomes persona grata. The more substantive gains for Russia are also obvious. One, there is no immediate cease fire agreement which would not have made sense for Russia which is still winning the war. Second and more important, there was agreement at least between the two leaders that the “root causes” of the Ukraine conflict must be dealt with. This has been a longstanding demand of President Putin. Third, to quote Putin: “All of Russia’s legitimate concerns must be taken into account, and a fair balance in the security sphere in Europe and the world as a whole must be restored”. India was one of the earliest countries to say at the UN that the “legitimate security interests” of Russia must be taken into account in any final settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. We were then persuaded to drop this expression in our statements at the UN due to Western pressure. It is a matter of ironical satisfaction that this has now been accepted by the US. Note that Putin also talks of “all Russia’s legitimate concerns” which will doubtless include removal of international sanctions against it and re-establishment of normal ties between Russia and the US. There is already talk of resumption of direct air travel and restoration of the strength of the diplomatic missions between Russia and the US.

The Alaska summit must be viewed as an incipient peace process than as a one-off meeting that produced concrete outcomes. For instance, this summit is reportedly to be followed by a one-on-one meeting between Presidents Putin and Zelensky (something the Kremlin is yet to agree to) eventually to be concluded with some kind of a framework peace agreement at a trilateral summit in the near future involving Trump, Putin and Zelensky. The Alaska summit did produce understandings but these are not final and may be reneged upon by the principals at any point in the future. Even so, President Trump stated that he and President Putin had agreed on many things except one or two big things which led him to declare tautologically that “there is no deal until there is a deal”! In the absence of a Joint Statement or written agreements, one can only speculate on the content of the Alaska summit meeting.

What could the two big things be that are outstanding? One might be the interpretation of what constitutes Russia’s security interests. The real fundamental Russian security interest relates to preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. So that would be non-negotiable from Putin’s perspective. Having secured that understanding, Putin did make a concession by saying that the security interests of Ukraine would also be taken into account. This could involve the limited presence of Western, non-NATO troops in Ukraine, which Putin may have agreeed to in principle. The EU and Ukraine would ideally want American troops to be part of this and wish to see an “Article 5-kind” of security guarantee. Following the Alaska Summit, alarmed European leaders (who were not part of the Alaska meeting) met with Trump along with Zelensky and issued a joint statement: We are clear that Ukraine must have ironclad security guarantees to effectively defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, Poland, Italy, Finland and the European Union institutions said in the statement and welcomed President Trump’s statement that the US is prepared to give security guarantees. It remains to be seen whether Russia can agree to this or will seek to dilute it. Reports attributed to Putin say that Russia has committed to not attacking or seizing terrritories from other countries on its border. This has been an obsession of the EU which firmly believes that Putin will attack the Baltic states before long and that his ultimate objective is the reconstruction of the erstwhile Soviet Empire.

The second big outstanding issue is the question related to territorial swap. This is arguably the most difficult to achieve for negotiators on both sides. Putin has let it be known that he wants the entire Donbas region for Russia. This means really Donetsk where Russia occupies 70 per cent of the territory. Luhansk is largely under Russian control anyway. In addition to this, Crimea too is non-negotiable for Russia. In return, Ukraine gets to maintain the fontlines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, but little else. This will be tough for Zelensky and EU to swallow, but they may have little choice in the matter. The Ukrainian constitution itself may have to be amended for this purpose and Zelensky’s political future could be on the line.

One may ask what is in it for President Trump (and the US) in all of this. There is talk of Zelensky having agreed to buy American military hardware. The Limousine ride where only Trump and Putin were present may have some hidden deals, who knows. But more than anything else, Trump believes himself to be the ultimate “anti-war” President. His desire for the Nobel Peace Prize is an open secret. But if by some miracle he does bring the intractable conflict in Ukraine to a close, he will have strengthened his claim to that prize.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at OP Jindal Global University.

The quote ” never let a good crisis go to waste” is often attributed, wrongly, to the American politician Rahm Emanuel. But the original author of this quote was the inimitable and formidable American political activist Saul Alinsky who famously wrote the book ” Rules for Radicals” which is still an excellent primer for grassroots organization and revolutionary movements around the world.

That Indian foreign and trade policy faces an unprecendented crisis is unarguable. The full extent of the crisis and why it occurred may be debatable, but not the crisis itself. While the Ministry of External Affairs and the Government of India must be trusted to do its job of managing the geopolitical crisis, the question is what the other actors in the Government of India can and should do. A number of knowledgeable commentators have said that the present crisis has engendered a ” 1991 moment” that India should grab without hesitation. Hence, the salience of Saul Alinsky’s saying which is the title of this blog.

Government must therefore embrace and carry out the most important reforms that the Indian economy desperately needs. These have been known for a long time and hardly bear any repetition here. Land, Labour, Agriculture, Power, Investment, Tariffs and Ease of doing Business are the obvious candidates. There are reams of paper available in Niti Ayog and in the respective line Ministries on what needs to be done in these and other areas. What has been lacking so far is national will. But now is a perfect opportunity that has been presented to us.

Nevertheless, a few home truths about economic reforms that India must remember:

> All economic reforms are painful. The more substantive the reforms , the more painful they are but equally, more rewarding for the country.

> India is done with incremental reforms and low-hanging fruits. The time is for substantive reforms.

>Since there is no such thing as pain-free reform, the fundamental question for India is who is going to bear the pain?

>Obviously, the people at the bottom of the pyramid should not and cannot bear any more pain than what they are enduring already.

>It is therefore the more prosperous sections of the society who ought to bear the pain.

>The ultra-rich, the big corporates and the upper class must pay and how this is to be done is for the Government to decide.

> It is often said that India is complex and even ungovernable. But it is equally true that if the reforms can be properly explained to the people, justified on the basis of national interest and implemented fairly, all reasonable Indians will be willing to sacrifice and accept some pain.

A foreign diplomat told me as far back as 2006: India is a country of immense potential but is likely to remain that way for a long time! I was offended then but that statement has turned out to be largely true. The time to make amends is now. We have nothing to lose except our poverty, our backwardness and the reputed inability to fulfil our true potential.

It was customary to say when President Trump assumed office that trade was one area worth watching. After all, Trump loved the word “tariffs” and threatened to use it massively against one and all. But fast forward 6 months, Trump has surprised everyone. Consider the deals he has made: with china in May, with Japan in July and now with EU. These are significant, since US, China, EU and Japan not only top the global GDP charts but also top the share of global trade. With these deals, it may even be argued, somewhat counterintuitively, that a certain amount of security and predictability has been injected by Trump into the global economy.

The one with China was perhaps the most important, at least from a geopolitical perspective. Foreign policy wonks were keen to know how he would deal with China. In the event, Trump agreed a deal with China, with both countries making compromises. The White House Fact Sheet said the following:

. Both US and China affirmed the importance of the critical bilateral economic and trade relationship between both countries and the global economy.

• For too long, unfair trade practices and America’s massive trade deficit with China have fueled the offshoring of American jobs and the decline of our manufacturing sector.
• In reaching an agreement, the United States and China will each lower tariffs by 115% while retaining an additional 10% tariff. Other U.S. measures will remain in place.
• Both sides will take these actions by May 14, 2025.
• This trade deal is a win for the United States, demonstrating President Trump’s unparalleled expertise in securing deals that benefit the American people.

The fact of the matter, however, is that both countries wanted a truce in the matter. But maybe, just maybe, the US wanted it more since China’s restrictions of rare earths to the American market had the potential to seriously hurt the US economy.

Japan, a treaty ally of the US, was next. Western analysts were concerned that Japan was being treated not as an ally but like any other country. But the deal announced on July 22 again called a truce between the two countries. The most important feature was the promised commitment by Japan to invest USD $550 billion directed by the United States to rebuild and expand core American industries. The following points are noteworthy:

• This is the single largest foreign investment commitment ever secured by any country in a trade deal and may generate U.S. jobs, expand domestic manufacturing, and secure American prosperity.
• These funds will be targeted toward the revitalization of America’s strategic industrial base, including:
  • Energy infrastructure and production, including LNG, advanced fuels, and grid modernization;
  • Semiconductor manufacturing and research, rebuilding U.S. capacity from design to fabrication;
  • Critical minerals mining, processing, and refining, ensuring access to essential inputs;
  • Pharmaceutical and medical production, ending U.S. dependence on foreign-made medicines and supplies;
  • Commercial and defense shipbuilding, including new yards and modernization of existing facilities.
• The United States will retain 90% of the profits from this investment.

Japan may have found it convenient to agree to this massive investment in the US, rather than risk a trade war with an important ally. Japan has also agreed to a baseline 15 per cent tariff and has agreed to open up its market for American agriculture products, US autos and also agreeed to buy commercial aircrafts and LNG from the US.

Last, but not least, US has also agreed to a trade deal with its most important transatlantic partner i.e. the EU on July 27. The White House Fact Sheet calls it a “massive trade deal”. Again, the US has emphasized the fact that the EU will purchase USD 750 billion in US energy and will make investments amounting to USD 600 billion in the US, both by 2028. With the exception of steel, aluminum and copper where the EU will pay 50 per cent tariffs, all other EU exports to the US will attract a baseline tariff of 15 per cent. There has been some criticism from some EU countries, mainly France against the deal agreed with the US by the Commission. It is doubtful however that any country will derail the deal reached with the US.

It is worth recalling that in April of this year President Trump declared a national emergency in response to the “large and persistent U.S. goods trade deficit caused by a lack of reciprocity in bilateral trade relationships, unfair tariff and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages and consumption”. The question is has Trump managed to find answers to the difficult question of America’s persistent trade deficit? Whatever the answer, it is clear that Trump’s negotiating strategy is based on two main objectives: one, securing market access using tariffs as an instument and two, seeking massive foreign investment from its trading partners into the US to create jobs and a manufacturing base to make America great again. Will it work? Only time will tell.

June 5 was the world environment day. But it came and went without a trace. If there is one area where it is hard to make Cassandra-like predictions, it is climate change. The incontrovertible evidence is all round us. Intense rainfall and flooding has been observed in several southern provinces of China, not to mention unprecedented heatwaves in Beijing. Devastating floods in Texas recently took precious lives. Searing heat and water shortage, the likes of it one has never heard of in Europe. And the latest data makes it clear that 2024 was a watershed moment for India, and not in a good way. It was India’s warmest year on record, with 25 Indian states experiencing record-breaking rainfall.

To put things in perspective, the top Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emitters in the world are China, US, India and EU (taken as one country). For the year 2023, China was responsible for a whopping 30 per cent of total GHG emissions in the world, followed by USA with 12 per cent, India with 7.8 per cent and EU with about 7 per cent. Combined, these four entities are responsible for over 55 per cent of global GHG emissions. So, if the fight against climate change is to be meaningful, it is this category of countries which have to make a difference.

Among the four, it is China which really requires global attention but has largely escaped it by hiding behind India at UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) negotiations and by claiming developing country status. For a country the same population (more or less) as India, it emits a huge amount of greenhouse gases, which is unparalleled in the world. In addition, China accounts for approximately 53.8% of global coal consumption which means that it actually burns more coal than the rest of the world combined. And China until recently was building six times more new coal plants than the rest of the world combined. While it is true that China is also the global lead spender on renewables, it is simply showing no sign of admitting that it should have reached peak emissions at least a decade ago. Instead, it has recently committed to peak emissions in the year 2030 although there are several reports saying it has already reached peak in 2023. It has also committed to net zero by 2060, which is simply too late. All this is a complete travesty of China’s commitment to fight against climate change. This is important since the more China takes up the limited carbon space available in the world, the less will actually become available for countries like India and those in Africa.

US has recently sent clear signals that it is no longer interested in taking a leadership role in the fight against climate change. It has pulled out of the Paris Climate Accords. Recent executive decisions suggest there will be more loggging of national forests in America and we all know about “drill, baby, drill” to ramp up oil and gas production. A number of environmental regulations have been rolled back by the US Environmental Protection Agency in March 2025. There has also been a pushback against the use of Electric Vehicles in the US.

The case of the European Union is most interesting. It was supposed to take on the global leadership role as the only “green superpower”. European Council President Ursula Von der Leyen announced the so-called “Green Deal” in 2019 with great fanfare describing the climate plan as a “man on the moon moment,” a revolutionary transformation of the European economy that would lead to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and changes to nearly every sector of the economy. But six years later, the Green Deal is unravelling. Far from charting a path toward climate leadership, the Green Deal has exposed European Union’s structural weakness and its inability to reconcile environmental ambitions with economic, democratic, and geopolitical realities. Over the past two years, opposition to the Green Deal has exploded in Europe—from farmers, industry groups and ordinary citizens and to populist political parties. The 2024 European Parliament elections saw a surge in right-populist representation, unified in their criticism of the green agenda. As a result, the European Commission has quietly but decisively begun to roll back many of the Green Deal’s key provisions. Recent reversals include watering down soil and chemical safety regulations, repurposing climate funds for military spending, watering down biodiversity protections, and removing the phrase “Green Deal” from the European Parliament’s reports. Even the 2040 emissions reduction target, announced recently, includes major loopholes and exemptions, such as allowing EU countries to meet future emissions targets by buying carbon credits from other countries. The signs are clear: Europe’s purported “green revolution” is in retreat.

India finds itself in a quandary. On the one hand, it is likely to come under lesser global pressure than before to take on onerous commitments in the area of climate change. After all, the principal polluters are looking for bailouts from their own climate commitments. On the other hand, India is also a vicitm of climate change and it needs tremendous amounts of finance to tackle both mitigation and adaptation. But finance is not likely to be forthcoming. That said, India may get valuable policy space because of the positions taken by the big polluters, namely, China, US and EU, which has been outlined above. India must put this period to good use by taking on ambitious climate targets, of its own will and volition, something that is in its own national interest. This window of opportunity for India will not be unlimited in scope and time. India chafes at external pressure; perhaps, it can prove to the world that it is capable of taking critical decisions at its own rhythm and pace.

In sum, the global fight against climate change is floundering and there is virtually no power to take on the leadership mantle in this crucial area. It is a sign of the times that the existential issue of climate change is not getting the traction it deserves.

Lenin’s reported quote: There are decades where nothing happens; then there are weeks where decades happen, is terribly apt for the decade of the 2020s so far. And mind you the decade is only half way through.

It all began with the COVID which broke by the end of 2019. It was as black swan as they come. The world ground to a halt and the global economy tanked. The word “zoom” became commonplace as did “work from home”. Most of all, wearing masks became ubiquitous, out of fear if nothing else. Millions perished, including in developed countries. For those of us born post-World War II, the idea of people dying in peacetime due to disease and illness was a first and a disturbingly novel experience. COVID had lasting impacts. First, the idea of resilient supply chains was born since the global value chains simply failed to deliver. Second, I wonder what would have happened if COVID had broken out not in China but say, in the African continent. Would the world have reacted the same way as it did? But then, no one said things were fair in this world. Third, the marvel of Science by which a vaccine was developed in record time and produced for mass consumption was very impressive. Last, but not least, India proved to the world that its rough and tumble democracy, for all its alleged dysfunctionality, can deliver results – after all, vaccinating a billion people twice over was no mean achievement.

Just as the world showed signs of recovering from the disruption caused by COVID, Russian President Putin decided to invade Ukraine in February 2022. This one act upended the security architecture of europe and created such geopolitical mayhem that the former German Chancellor Scholz was constrained to use the word “Zeitenwende”. For once, this was not customary hyperbole by a politician. “Zeitenwende” it certainly was with Ukraine initially supported to the hilt by the US and more broadly the West, resulting in short term gains for it. But Russia and reality imposed themselves on Ukraine soon enough and a war of attrition ensued. This, inevitably, played to Russia’s advantage.

As if the above were not enough, the Hamas carried out horrific attcks in Israel in Octber 2023 which unleashed a train of events in that most volatile of regions i.e. Middle East. With Iran under attack from both Israel and the US, the Middle East is up in flames at the time of writing. Pakistan, as is its wont, did what it does best: carry out terrorist attacks in Kashmir which brought the two countries to blows in May 2025. And China, against the run of play, attacked India in May 2020 along the Himalayan border to provoke a bloody conflict which disrupted peace that had largely held for decades.

But it was in January 2025, that the unthinkable (at least for many people if not all) happened and Trump won a convincing victory in elections to become the 47th President of the United States of America. It was a remarkable victory against all odds. A lot of people had written him off. Yet others predicted a narrow victory. In the event, it was close to a landslide. With President Trump, what you see is what you more or less get. So, in the 6 months he has spent in office, he has transformed the American judiciary, its executive, its economy and its foreign & security policy. And because it is the United States of America that we are talking about, the impact of the Trump presidency was felt all over the world in small or big measure. Every major and middle power has had to make adjustments to its foreign and security policy vis-a-vis the US. Perhaps no other power more so than Europe. Not to put too fine a point on it, the transatlantic relationship is under enormous stress and it is not clear what strategic outcome can be expected in the future. The NATO just concluded its summit in The Hague and while it just about managed to preserve itself, the proof of the funding commitments by many European countries is in the eventual coughing up of money. President Trump means it when he says America comes first for him and is totally determined to try and make America great again. History will judge him solely on how successful he is in this endeavour.

By middle of 2025, if one were to sum up the geopolitical mid-term report, it would be this: We are clearly in a post-Western world order!

The NATO Summit concluded on 25 June and the Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in The Hague is a remarkable one for what it does not say, rather than what it does. The following points suggest themselves.

The length of the declaration appears to be strongly influenced by President Trump. It has exactly five short paragraphs. Compare this with the thirty eight paragraphs last year at the Washington Summit (July 2024) and ninety paragraphs, yes ninety, in Vilnius, Lithuania (July 2023). Even so, this year’s NATO Declaration is ridiculously brief since it has nothing to say on recent geopolitical developments.

On Russia, the relevant language is “long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security” which is then linked to the commitment of all NATO Members to increase their defence expenditure to 5 per cent of GDP, a subject close to Trump’s heart. Compare this to last year’s language on Russia:

“Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and gravely undermined global security. Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” The language in 2023 read thus: “The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” So, the question is what has changed for NATO? Is it the fact that President Trump is still mediating an end to the war in Ukraine? It is also interesting that NATO now believes the threat from Russia is “long term” rather than “direct”.

The most interesting thing about this year’s Declaration is that there is hardly anything substantial about Ukraine. It says “Allies reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine, whose security contributes to ours, and, to this end, will include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry when calculating Allies’ defence spending.” It makes it sound like an accounting methodology, rather than a solid commitment. A far cry from past declarations which stated clearly: Ukraine’s future is in NATO. President Zelensky cannot be thrilled.

The NATO Summit Declarations of 2024 and 2023 also had critical references to China. The 2024 Declaration said among other things that: ” China continues to pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security. We have seen sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation, stemming from China”. Similarly, the 2023 NATO Declaration said: “China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The current Declaration has no reference whatsoever to China. China will be relieved that NATO is no longer focusing on its activities, whether benign or malignant.

In the past, North Korea came in for severe condemnation at NATO Summits. For instance: “We condemn in the strongest terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) WMD and ballistic missile programmes which violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions.” This time there is radio silence on DPRK.

Past NATO Declarations have referred to the strategic nuclear force of the Alliance, particularly that of the United States, calling it the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance. The current Declaration makes no reference to this, perhaps indicating a subtle shift in policy from the US?

Past NATO Declarations have talked of EU-NATO cooperation and how the European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. Again, the current NATO Declaration is silent on this aspect.

Considering Iran and Israel have been at each other’s throats and the US has used bunker busters against Iran just a few days before the Summit, one might have expected the NATO to say something on this earthshaking geopolitical event in the Middle East. But no, it is as though the events of the past few days in the Middle East never happened.

In conclusion, this NATO Summit in The Hague on June 25 was focused on achieving one single objective i.e. ensuring that President Trump is committed to the collective security of the Alliance outlined in Article 5. Indeed the very first paragraph of The Hague Declaration talks of this: “We reaffirm our ironclad commitment to collective defence as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – that an attack on one is an attack on all.” In return, the NATO Members have all made a solemn commitment to raising their annual defence expenditure to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035. It should be clear to all that NATO at its recent summit meeting wanted, above all, to guarantee its survival & relevance by ensuring continued American support. Nevertheless, a total of just five paragraphs for the final declaration of a summit-level meeting involving 32 Heads of State/Government must be a first in global diplomacy.