It is a well known secret that Sino-Indian ties could not possibly be worse. The two leaders Modi and Xi Jinping had met at least 18 times before 2019; following the Ladakh border conflict, the two leaders have met just once in Bali in November 2022. Until recently, everyone thought this was a face to face meeting involving exchange of mere pleasantries. But now there are reports that the two leaders did go beyond pleasantries. The readout by the two sides makes interesting reading. First, it was the Chinese Foreign Ministry that put out a statement following a meeting at Johannesburg this week between India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign policy Czar Wang Yi. The statement suggested that these talks were a follow up on the “consensus reached by Modi and Xi Jinping on stabilizing bilateral relations” following their face to face meeting at Bali. Since this is the first time many Indians were hearing about this, the Ministry of External Affairs through its spokesman confirmed that there was indeed a ” general discussion on the need to stabilise bilateral relations” between the two leaders. You do not have to be a professional diplomat to see the difference in the two sides’ characterisation of the face to face meeting between Modi and Xi Jinping. The Chinese side is talking of a “consensus” and the Indian side is referring to a “general discussion”. Both sides, to be fair, agree that the subject matter of the limited talks were about stabilising bilateral ties.

At one level, this difference in perception should not come as a surprise. Right from the onset of the conflict in Ladakh, the Chinese side has stubbornly insisted that the border problem must be set aside and not allowed to interfere with the development of bilateral ties in other areas. India, on the other hand, has steadfastly maintained that the border area must be tackled by China through de-escalation and disengagement for bilateral ties to resume in a normal fashion. As the External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar has said repeatedly, having thousands of troops on the border is not normal and this abnormal situation must end. He also put the onus for this on China, since the problem was precipitated by them and not us.

So, why is China talking in terms of a “consensus” having been reached by the two leaders at Bali. Has anything changed fundamentally? Not by the looks of it. One way of interpreting this is that China may be extending an olive branch to India. Evidence that this may be true, comes from a number of Chinese scholars and people like Kishore Mahbubani (who is close to the powers that be in China) who have been putting forward the proposition that the Ladakh incidents were an “accident” and that both countries should now kiss and make up. This seems hardly credible, but there it is.

It has been hard to gauge China’s motives as to why it did what it did in Ladakh in 2020. A variety of theories have been floated by experts, but the “accident theory” seems like a new one. Regardless of the merit of this explanation, one thing is clear: it is hard to understand what China has really achieved by poking a sleeping elephant and opening up another front with India. Perhaps China realizes this fact now; equally perhaps, China wishes to focus exclusively on its battle with the US. Who knows? After all, we are dealing with a country where the Foreign Minister is here today and gone tomorrow!

Chinese explanation of India’s China policy is interesting, as gauged from Global Times, which serves as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party. First, it says India often plays the victim card following the heavy defeat it suffered in 1962. Second, it accuses India for having a superiority complex due to it being the “world’s largest democracy”. Third, it says India wishes to catch up with China as the future factory of the world. Lastly, the Chinese believe India is good at playing the game of “balance of power”. Interestingly, Global Times admits that before 2020 India did not “openly take sides between US and China”. This is as close to an admission by China as it can, that the Ladakh events provoked by it have pushed India into a closer embrace of the US. This is arguably the opposite of what was intended by China.

Regardless of the above, it would appear that in the short term Sino-Indian ties will remain frosty at best and inimical at worst. Witness the emergence again of the issue of stapled visas for Indian nationals belonging to Arunachal Pradesh. It is going to be a long haul for both sides before a semblance of normalcy is restored in the relationship.

Sino-American ties are again the talk of the town. Since the marathon conversation lasting hours between US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese foreign policy czar Wang Yi in May 2023 in Vienna, there has been a flurry of bilateral meetings between the two countries. But here is the thing. All visits have been unidirectional i.e. from US to China. Consider this. Secretary of State Tony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Climate Envoy John Kerry have all made visits to China over the last two months. But there have been no reciprocal visits from China to the US. What is more, the Chinese have still not responded to the US request for talks between the two militaries. This last is a cause for concern given the tense relations between the two countries and the possibility of a flare-up in the Taiwan Strait or the South China sea. What is more, in all the above conversations, the unmistakeable impression that emerges is that the Americans want the dialogue with China much more than the Chinese themselves do. Janet Yellen bowing before the Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng will be the enduring optics for a while.

All of the above could be part of Chinese power play. It may also be based on an assessment, right or wrong, by China that the US does not have the bandwidth to take on two military fronts: one in Ukraine and the other, hypothetically, in the Taiwan Strait or the East/South China sea. There is no gainsaying the fact that the longer the conflict in Ukraine drags on, the better it is for China. This is particularly the case since recent reports talk of some Russian success on the battlefield. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly bestowed more strategic space to China; for most others, it has had the reverse effect of diminution of strategic space, which certainly has been the case for the US and for countries like India.

It is against this backdrop that the grand old man of diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, undertook a visit to China. Kissinger was treated like a King and met President Xi Jinping, not to mention others who matter in China. Xi Jinping was fulsome in his praise for Kissinger and the reasons are not far to seek. Kissinger is of the firm view that it is incumbent upon the US to carry out a rapprochement with China as soon as possible. What is more, Kissinger is absolutely convinced that confrontation with China does not serve America’s national interest. If you think this line of reasoning and his own visit undermines American policy towards China, then you would be absolutely right. Hence the clarification from State Department that Kissinger was in China as a private citizen and not on behalf of President Biden. But Kissinger is no ordinary citizen and the Chinese know that only too well. Xi Jinping had done his homework when he said that not only is Kissinger 100 years old, but that this was also his hundredth visit to China. Xi Jinping also said that China does not forget its old friends.

The question on everyone’s mind is: can Kissinger pull it off for a second time? After all, he was the architect of the policy in 1971 when US successfully courted China altering the geopolitical landscape forever. The truth however is that the Americans probably understand China much better now than they did back in 1971. And if there is an issue on which there is bipartisan consensus inside the Beltway, it is China. This may not change anytime soon.

The best that can happen to the Sino-American relationship in the medium-term is the establishment of some guardrails so that the ties don’t deteriorate into outright conflict. The desire for this outcome however may be more from the American side since the Chinese are still playing hardball. The evolving situation in this regard bears close watching.

While the media has understandably devoted lot of attention to the PM’s successful visit to the US, the one which is now about to take place i.e. PM Modi’s visit to France on July 13/14 is, in my view, of even more importance for India.

India has about thirty-odd strategic partnerships with various countries. But if there is one partnership which is undergirded by complete strategic convergence, that is indisputably the Franco-Indian one. Consider this. India wishes to follow an independent foreign policy; so does France. India practices strategic autonomy; so does France. India wishes to see a stable, multipolar world; so does France. Over and above all this, India and France are committed to values such as democracy, pluralism and secularism. Small wonder then that when the whole Western world had declared India a pariah following the 1998 nuclear tests, it was France and France alone which understood India’s actions and established the first-ever strategic partnership with India. This year, India and France are thus celebrating the 25th anniversary of that significant moment in history. It is fitting that PM Modi will make the trip to take part in the Bastille Day parade on July 14; even more symbolically, Indian armed forces will march past alongside their French brothers and sisters on Champs Elysees. And if that were not enough, the famous Rafale Aircraft will dominate the skyline.

If you think the visit is all about pomp and circumstance, you are mistaken. Substantive conversations and meetings are expected and progress will doubtless be made in the so-called tripod which forms the bedrock of the relationship: defence, nuclear and space. In defence, we may see agreements which will finally help the hitherto buyer-seller relationship between the two countries move to that between an investor and investee, with substantial transfer of technology. A bilateral dialogue on space has been recently instituted; the two leaders will take stock of it and provide political guidance. Nuclear cooperation has admittedly stalled with regard to the building of 6 nuclear power plants in Jaitapur, Maharashtra. Both sides are guilty in various degrees. Both must recommit to the ultimate goal with renewed vigour.

The new areas are exciting as well. Green Hydrogen may well become the lynchpin of the future Franco-Indian relationship. So will areas like quantum computing, artificial intelligence and cyber security. France has some of the best green technology; India must actively seek and acquire it.

Trade and Investment are well below potential. We could appeal to France to help us with the Free Trade Agreement negotiations that India is undertaking with EU, keeping in mind the competence of the European Commission in the matter. India’s own trade and investment with France needs political impetus, we have left it for too long in the hands of the private sector of the two countries.

People-to-people ties must be given a fillip. Indian students are missing a trick in not looking more seriously at France for higher studies. (Full disclosure: the author obtained his PhD from Sciences Po University in Paris). France has set itself the goal of welcoming many thousands of Indian students on its soil; Indian students must grab the opportunity with both hands. French language is beautiful; but it is no longer a barrier since a lot of courses are offered in English.

France has proved to be a reliable and a trusted strategic partner. It has given us solid support whether it is India’s candidature for the UN Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group or indeed enabling us in joining groups like the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Missile Technology Control Regime. France has provided solid support for India’s demarches in the UN Security Council for counter-terrorism efforts including listing of terrorists.

There are no serious differences between France and India, that is for sure. But there are at least two subjects on which our respective positions are nuanced. One is Ukraine, where the position of the two countries is somewhat different. France certainly understands where India is coming from; still, the Indian side can benefit from a detailed assessment by the French side on the current situation in Ukraine. China is the other subject that will be discussed. Our relationship with China is at an all time low; but France does actively engage with China (witness recent Macron visit to Beijing) and has close ties of trade and investment with it. The Indian side could benefit from the current thinking in France and EU about the “de-risking” strategy being contemplated and the long-term prospects for Sino-Russian cooperation.

I have been asked, as a former Indian Ambassador to France, whether the recent unfortunate events in France will affect the Indian PM’s impending visit. First, they are all the more reason for PM Modi to go to France now to express solidarity. Second, France is perfectly capable of handling its domestic affairs and I have no doubt that it will bounce back, as it always does. Third, these unfortunate events will have no impact whatsoever on the bilateral ties, which are exemplary. Last, but not least, France never comments officially on the internal affairs of India; the least we can do is reciprocate this in full measure, which we have done.

There is every reason to be confident that PM Modi’s visit will provide a huge fillip to the existing bilateral ties and take it to the next level. In an uncertain world, it would be no exaggeration to say that the Franco-Indian relationship is a force for good and stability.

The world order was already characterised by a “polycrisis”. But recent developments in Russia can best be described as a “grey rhino” event (Wagner imbroglio) superimposed on top of a “black swan” event (Russian invasion of Ukraine). Discerning trends, much less forecasting events, has become next to impossible in this international scenario. Is Putin stronger or weaker after the Wagner rebellion? Have Russia’s war efforts been hindered irreparably? Will Ukraine’s counter offensive get a shot in the arm? So many questions and so few answers! India must closely watch what is going on in Russia for the implications are more serious than what may appear on the surface.

One reason for the current world disorder is the complete lack of balance of power in any part of the world leading to general and global disequilibrium. The unipolar moment is long gone, though the US still remains the pre-eminent power. China which until very recently was hurtling towards superpower status, is facing unexpected headwinds, economic and social, if not political. For the very first time, observers are beginning to ask questions regarding what was once considered totally inevitable: Can China ever overtake the US in terms of comprehensive national power? Europe is mired in its own misery, some of its own making and the rest thanks to goings-on in Ukraine. That leaves middle powers such as Japan, India, Australia and Korea which ironically enough are not doing so badly. These are typically “swing states” which actually have a tremendous opportunity in the current circumstances to punch above their weight, if they know how to play it right.

India’s move to align itself closer to the US, exemplified by the hugely successful visit of PM Modi to Washington is a good example of India “playing it right”. For India, a multipolar Asia is a sine qua non for a multipolar world. At present, India by itself cannot ensure (though it can contribute to ) a multipolar Asia, much less a multipolar world. Hence, the need for what foreign policy experts call “external balancing” which is what PM Modi’s US visit was about. It is not possible for Asia to be multipolar as long as China believes in a hegemonic role for itself. And it is no rocket science that if there is one country that can potentially measure up to China, it is India. In this fundamental sense, China was the “dragon in the room” during the recent summit meeting between PM Modi and President Biden. But for India there were other substantive reasons as well: defence, security, technology and people-to-people ties, to name a few.

It was interesting to see the reaction to the visit by PM Modi to Washington in the CCP mouthpiece Global Times. Reacting to one American media report that the US had placed a huge bet on India, the Global Times proclaimed loudly that the “US will lose its huge bet”. If that wasn’t clear enough, the paper went on to say that the “close” Indo-American ties were “temporary, unstable and unreliable”. Intriguingly, it went on to say that India is a strategically independent country and it was therefore unlikely to follow the script written by Washington. The paper expressed the belief that India would make calm and sober choices, as history had proven. It added, for good measure, that becoming a “pawn” in the US containment of China does not align with either India’s national interest or indeed with the dignity of India as a major power. All this is extraordinary coming from a country that is entirely and solely credited by some observers for driving India into the arms of the US!

Such then is the state of the world where nothing is what it seems on the surface. To paraphrase Churchill, international relations appears to be a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. And we may be passing through a moment in time when decades happen in weeks as Lenin famously proclaimed!

The annual Shangri-La dialogue organized by the London-based, renowned think tank International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) takes place in Singapore and this year’s edition concluded only today. Normally, it is an occasion for security and defence Ministers, domain experts and leading academics to get together and dwell on the international strategic landscape. In this sense, it rivals the annual Munich Security Conference.

This year’s event was attended by both the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin and the Chinese Defence Minister General Li Shangfu, not to mention several others. But the focus was on these two Gentlemen because the Chinese have steadfastly refused meetings with the Americans at this level. In the event, the Shangri-La dialogue had to content itself with a smile and handshake between the two men. No substantive conversation took place. The Chinese rammed home the message of no talks, by ensuring that their Defence Minister met virtually every other Defence Minister attending the event, including the Australian and the Japanese Defence Minister.

So, what lies behind this latest Chinese stratagem? Well for starters, China wishes to send a signal to the world that it is not desperate for a security dialogue and that it is the US which is the supplicant here. Two, the Chinese Defence Minister has been subject to American sanctions since 2018 related to weapons purchases from Russia. That did not prevent the Chinese Minister from shaking hands with Lloyd Austin at a dinner, but talks are another matter. The Chinese are also waiting for the FBI report on the “balloon incident”. It would be embarrassing to the Chinese, to say the least, if the report were to demonstrate beyond doubt that the balloon was indeed actually spying in American air space. Third, the Chinese are engaging in “selective dialogue” with the US. So, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan met the Chinese foreign policy czar Wang Yi for eight hours in Vienna. Other conversations such as the one between USTR Tai, Commerce Secretary Gaimondo with the Chinese Commerce Minister happened recently in Detroit on the sidelines of an APEC meeting. But the most significant of them all was the quiet trip undertaken by CIA Director William Burns to China in May where he is reported to have emphasized the need to keep channels of communication open between the two sides.

But it is not just the Defence Ministers meeting that is yet to take place. The much-vaunted Anthony Blinken trip to China is yet to take place. And as far back as February, President Biden had hinted he will chat on the phone with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the near future. This has not happened so far.

Just before the speech by the Chinese Defence Minister at the Shangri-La dialogue, there was drama in the Taiwan Strait. A US destroyer and a Canadian frigate were staging a rare joint sailing in the Taiwan Strait when a Chinese warship sailed in their path, barely avoiding collision. The Chinese side defended this by saying that “freedom of navigation” was a provocation for China and that the latter considered it “hegemony of navigation”. The Chinese Minister’s blunt message to the US and others was: mind your business and do not come near our shores!

The respective speeches of the Defence Ministers of US and China sounded like a slanging match. US Secretary of Defence stated that the US would not flinch in the face of bullying or coercion from China and would continue regularly sailing through and flying over the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea to emphasize they are international waters. The Chinese Defence Minister who spoke after his US counterpart did not name the US, but said that the so-called rules-based international order did not make clear what the rules were and who made these rules in the first place. He also accused a particular country of practicing exceptionalism and double standards.

On Taiwan, the Chinese Defence Minister was at his most hawkish saying that it was “the core of Chinese core interests”. He went on to add that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan and how to resolve the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese to decide”. It could not have been articulated more directly. Obviously, Taiwan remains a potential hotspot, along with South and East China sea. India would also do well to take note of Chinese bellicosity.

The war in Ukraine figured on the agenda of the Shangri-La dialogue as well. The Indonesian Defence Minister Subianto proposed a peace plan for Ukraine. It included: immediate cessation of hostilities, freezing of present positions, demilitarized zones and UN peacekeeping forces for possible referenda in contested regions. This immediately drew the ire of the West, with Ukraine dismissing it out of hand.

The most difficult issue when it comes to a diplomatic solution for the war in Ukraine is what to do with around 20 per cent of Ukrainian land that Russia is currently occupying. The key question is this: should the Russian withdrawal occur as a result of negotiations or as a prior condition before negotiations commence. Ukraine, supported by the West, wants Russia to withdraw from these territories before the negotiations even begin. Otherwise, the West believes there can be no just peace and it would be tantamount to rewarding Russia, the aggressor and the invader. On the other hand, it is impossible to see Russia withdrawing from the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, unless it is forced to do so through a military defeat or as a result of tough negotiations, if that. Prospects for peace, whether just or not, in Ukraine therefore appear very bleak indeed.

For the Global South, the impact of the war in Ukraine is bad enough as it is with food and energy insecurity, among others. If in addition, trouble were to erupt in the Indo-Pacific, either in Taiwan Strait or elsewhere, it would be nothing short of catastrophic. Against this backdrop, the sooner the US and China begin talking security, the better it is. World peace depends on it, quite literally.

The war in Ukraine has now gone on for more than a year, causing death and destruction in its wake. It is no longer pertinent to ask how this war began, who caused it and which side aggravated it. That is a subject for academics and scholars in the years to come. For now, the incontrovertible facts are:

– Several thousand have lost their lives on both sides;

_ No sign of clear victory or total defeat for either side;

_ Continuation of war is certain to cause further death and destruction in the heart of Europe; and

_ While the war has been confined to a relatively small perimeter in Europe, its negative impact has been felt much wider. Besides, there is every danger of a wider conflagration with the possibility, howsoever remote, of the threat and use of Nuclear Weapons.

Given the above, a time has perhaps come when the international community (however you define it) has to put pressure on both sides to the conflict, namely, Ukraine and Russia to come to the table for negotiations. Hitherto, both sides were entertaining hopes of significant gains in the battlefield which will strengthen their hand in eventual negotiations. But that is a perilous course to follow which cannot be allowed by the international community any longer.

It is clear that the overwhelming majority of the Global South would welcome an end to the war through dialogue and diplomacy. That leaves the West including US and NATO, which appear reluctant to push Ukraine to the negotiating table. No rational person believes Ukraine can last any reasonable length of time without support from the West. Russia, on the other hand, says it is open to dialogue provided it is unconditional, which roughly translated, would mean that they will not vacate any Ukrainian territory they have occupied.

There is a noticeable hardening of the stand by Ukraine. The chief diplomatic adviser to President Zelensky, Ihor Zhovkva, reportedly told Reuters yesterday that Ukraine was not interested in a ceasefire that locks in Russia’s territorial gains. So, how to reconcile these opposing stands by the two sides? It is worth noting that all mediation attempts so far by Turkey, Brazil and China have made very little progress.

One way out would be for the Global South represented by countries like India and Brazil, combined with the West led by the US and EU to issue a joint public appeal to Ukraine and Russia to stop hostilities and resume dialogue. The proposed dialogue will not be based on any peace plan but merely list out the demands of both sides after hearing them out. An international peace conference could be hosted by a country like France to take things forward.

Although positions have hardened on both sides, the following strategic reality should be obvious to all:

(a) Ukraine is too small a country to win this war and Russia too big a country to lose. This has become more and more obvious as the war has dragged on.

(b) The good old formula of land for peace is perhaps the way this conflict will end. A good compromise will leave both Ukraine and Russia equally dissatisfied. Russia cannot be expected to part with Crimea, just as Ukraine cannot be expected to part with the four “oblasts” annexed by Russia in full or part: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

(c) It is clear that Russia’s legitimate security interests as well as those of Ukraine and EU have to be factored in a final settlement.

There are times when problems are intractable and the war in Ukraine is certainly one of them. In such cases, time is the only long-term solution. For now though, the international community has a fundamental obligation to ensure the cessation of hostilities.

2023 must be labelled as the year of the summits. The G7 and Quad just held their summit-level meetings in Hiroshima. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS follow in India (July) and South Africa (August) respectively. India then gets to host the G20 summit in September. And if you wish to be technically correct, the APEC summit is scheduled to take pace in California in November.

With the exception of APEC, India will participate at the highest level in all the above summit meetings. It is the most visible sign of India’s arrival on the world stage. Equally, it is an admission by the international community that it is well nigh impossible to discuss and resolve any of the world’s biggest issues without India being present.

Participation in summits is both an opportunity and a challenge. To begin with, India has an advantage in a Prime Minister who is both shrewd and savvy about strategic issues. He has charisma and commands respect. And he invests tremendously in personal relationships. I was witness to this when I was India’s Ambassador to France and saw the friendship between our PM and President Macron flourish. Other than the late Japanese leader Abe, the PM’s closest friend among foreign leaders is Macron. And diplomats will tell you that this does make a huge difference when it comes to foreign policy and international relations. This undoubtedly serves as a strategic opportunity. But the challenge is also to ward off pressure from friends and partners and enhance strategic space for one’s own country. It boils down to the ability and skill of the leader to manage pulls and pressures.

It is worth noticing that in all the summits listed above, the United Nations is conspicuous by its absence. So, what to make of it? Perhaps, the UN has outlived its utility. At a minimum, it is a wake up call for the UN which has stubbornly refused calls for reform and change.

Academics and practitioners of diplomacy will not fail to observe that “summit diplomacy” – diplomacy practiced at the highest level by Heads of State/Government – is back in vogue. This is no bad thing since the world is largely messy and disorderly and deserves the attention of people at the highest level. The importance of summit diplomacy cannot be overemphasized and can often determine the difference between war and peace in the world.

The last US-China summit meeting was the one between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in November last year in the margins of the G20 meeting in Bali. The conversation was cordial enough; but important issues were raised as well. Biden for example raised concerns of China’s practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and human rights more broadly. On Taiwan, Biden stuck to the party line saying that US opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and the world has an interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. A Chinese readout of the same meeting stated that current state of ties between US and China are neither in the interest of the two countries nor the world at large. Both Biden and Xi agreed that US Secretary of State Tony Blinken will undertake a visit to China in the near future.

The visit by Blinken proposed above never happened for a variety of reasons. But the main reason was perhaps the “affaire spy balloon” in February, when the US shot the alleged Chinese spy balloon with a lot of fanfare. In April, the Taiwanese President visited California to meet with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. This was a case of if the mountain does not come to Mohamed, then Mohamed will go to the mountain! It is bizarre, to put it mildly, that at a time like when the world is going through severe disorder, the two Great Powers were not even on talking terms. It is worth recalling that the Chinese side declined to take the call of the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in February this year.

This hiatus in dialogue has now ended. On 10 and 11 of May, in Vienna, the US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi met for eight hours! The choice of venue was practical since the recent bad blood between the two countries may have prevented either man from making the visit to the other side. But the choice of Jake Sullivan is interesting because both Biden and Xi had earlier agreed last year that it is Tony Blinken who would make the trip to China. It is possible that the Chinese side expressed a preference for Sullivan over Blinken, given the latter’s hawkish remarks on issues including possible weapons supply by China to Russia. Sullivan may have to play good cop for now; it is not clear who will play bad cop for the US vis a vis China.

Eight hours is a lot of time for diplomatic conversations and this cannot be spent on repeating each others’ country positions, even allowing for translation. So, it must be assumed that talks were not just substantive but also included a discussion on putting in place “guard rails” to prevent Sino-American relations from nosediving as they did following the spy balloon incident. The choice of subjects was unsurprising: Taiwan, Ukraine, Indo-Pacific and of course bilateral ties. A Chinese readout said: The two sides held candid, in-depth, substantive, and constructive discussions on removing obstacles and stabilising the China-US relations. This Chinese approbation (describing talks as constructive) for the eight-hour talks may be interpreted as a sign of flexibility, especially compared to the sulk into which they went following the spy incident. The most important, concrete outcome was perhaps the willingness of the two sides to maintain “strategic communication” (like the one in Vienna) at all times.

On Ukraine, the key question is how the US views Chinese attempts at mediation. There is serious re-think in the US about giving diplomacy a chance sometime after the so-called counter-offensive by Ukraine. Regardless of the outcome of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, diplomacy is expected to gain traction by the end of the year. This is also because the Europeans know that a lot can change if the occupant of the White House changes next year. The window between now and the end of the year is therefore crucial for the future of Ukraine and thus for Europe itself.

On Taiwan, the best that can be expected is avoidance of unilateral action by either side that could worsen the security scenario. Contrary to common perception, China is not in the best possible position to act unilaterally on Taiwan now. There are simply too many political and economic headwinds facing China. So, China may wait it out by taking the long-term view on this matter.

The Chinese side appears to have made a pitch for removal of tech restrictions, easing visa restrictions and generally promoting people-to-people ties. The Global Times, considered the propaganda arm of the CCP, let it be known that it was US which was eager to have this dialogue and mend ties with China. That said, it is clear both sides wished for a resumption of bilateral dialogue for different reasons.

Other bilateral talks have also begun. The US Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, appears to have had good meetings with both the Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Commerce Minister Wang Wentao. It has also been reported that USTR Katherine Tai will meet Wang Wentao in the margins of the APEC meeting of Trade Ministers in Detroit next month.

It will be interesting to see if Biden meets with Xi at the Delhi G20 Summit meeting in September. And of course, Biden plays host to APEC summit in California in November of this year, which will be another opportunity for Biden and Xi to meet and continue serious discussions. The good news is that the US and China have started talking again. The less good news is that they are still far apart on a range of issues, both global and bilateral.

Indo-Pak ties continue to be in deep freeze. That is the only inference to be drawn after the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Foreign Ministers meet held in Goa on 4/5 May, 2023.

As is often the case with Indian media, more attention was showered on the Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto than on the Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. It is worth noting that it is China which has stationed thousands of troops in Ladakh forcing us to do likewise at the border. It is China which, by all accounts, is the main threat facing India today. Yet not one Indian news channel succeeded in interviewing the Chinese Foreign Minister to ask him about Chinese policy regarding disengagement in Ladakh, claims on Arunachal Pradesh or even the Sino-Russian alliance.

This obsession with Pakistan is difficult to fathom. The interview of Bilawal Bhutto to a leading Indian TV channel threw no fresh light on anything and ended up providing a platform for Pakistan to purvey its views and opinions. Most of the media commentary during the SCO meet was focused on the form of greeting used by the two Ministers, whether or not there was a handshake between them and their respective body language. Could it possibly be more frivolous? Not one word about the importance of India’s ties with Central Asia in the context of SCO!

Bilawal Bhutto’s motives for undertaking the trip to India are easy to understand. Pakistan is not part of G20, BRICS, RIC and cannot be expected to be invited to G7 meetings. So, for Pakistan SCO is an important regional game (if not the only one) in town. Its chief patron, China, has influence over SCO. It also provided an opportunity for Pakistan to curry favour with Russia. It is worth noting that last year at the Samarkand SCO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Russians declined to meet with Pakistan. This year was different and the relative warmth between Bhutto and Lavrov was there for all to see. Finally, Pakistan may have also wanted to send a signal to the world at large that it is ready to sit and talk to India, but the latter is reluctant to do so.

The level of mistrust between India and Pakistan is perhaps more severe than previously believed. Bhutto made a provocative statement when he said: let us not get caught up in weaponizing terrorism for diplomatic point scoring. To make this statement on Indian soil was both imprudent and impudent. The Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar, not one to hold back, responded in brutal fashion: Victims of terrorism do not sit with perpetrators of terrorism to discuss terrorism. Bhutto was referred to as a promoter, justifier and a spokesperson of a terrorism industry, the mainstay of Pakistan whose positions were called out by India at the SCO meeting.

Where do we go from here? An official dialogue may be safely ruled out for the foreseeable future. In any case, there is no democratically elected government in Islamabad and there is no valid interlocutor. So, it may be prudent to say that an official dialogue will have to wait until elections are over in Pakistan. Meanwhile, there are reasons to believe back-channel contacts are continuing, if sporadically, and more importantly, the ceasefire is holding. Perhaps, that is the best thing possible under the circumstances.

Some fundamental truths about Indo-Pak ties appear to suggest themselves at present. One, India and Pakistan are condemned to co-exist and it is really about agreeing on the broad terms of such co-existence. If no terms are agreed upon, the relations are likely to suffer from major vicissitudes. Two, the gap between India and Pakistan, when it comes to trade, investment, GDP and forex reserves are widening by the day, to India’s advantage. Status quo thus suits India. This should worry Pakistan. Three, the first move must come from Pakistan which could provide demonstrable proof to India that it is no longer interested in sponsoring terror. It could also take steps in the areas of trade and commerce, which is actually in its own interest. Finally, there is no denying that Indo-Pak ties vitiate the atmosphere in regional fora. It is a long-running pattern which is not set to change. Bilawal Bhutto could have been the statesman here, but clearly that was too much of an ask.

If you were a Micawber, you would argue that the very fact a Foreign Minister from Pakistan came to India after a decade is a positive sign in itself. But we are still a long way from normalization of ties between the two countries.

In recent weeks, clear policy pronouncements have been made by the US that it does NOT seek to “decouple” its economy from that of China’s. This is a terribly important development that has geopolitical implications.

The idea of “decoupling” was first articulated by former President Donald Trump in September 2020 when he said:

““We will make America into the manufacturing superpower of the world and will end our reliance on China once and for all. Whether it’s decoupling, or putting in massive tariffs like I’ve been doing already, we will end our reliance in China, because we can’t rely on China.” The statement was made in the heat of the presidential campaign and Trump went on to say: ““We lose billions of dollars and if we didn’t do business with them we wouldn’t lose billions of dollars. It’s called decoupling, so you’ll start thinking about it.”

But soon thereafter, Anthony Blinken, then a close adviser to Biden told a meeting hosted by US Chamber of Commerce that “trying to fully decouple from China, as some have suggested, is both unrealistic and ultimately counterproductive”. It was therefore clear that Biden’s approach to China was not the same (at least on paper) as that of Trump even in 2020.

When friction developed more recently between US and China, exacerbated by the spy balloon incident, again there was some talk that US would seek to “decouple” from China. That notion can now be buried once and for all.

On April 20, Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen in an address to the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University stated in unambiguous terms that the US does NOT seek to decouple its economy from that of China’s and that a full separation of the two economies would be disastrous for both countries, apart from being destabilizing to the rest of the world. She went on to emphasize that the health of the Chinese and US economies was closely linked.

If that was not clear enough, the US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan made detailed remarks at the Brookings Institution on April 27 on “renewing American economic leadership”. It was odd , to put it mildly, for a National Security Adviser to make a long pronouncement on American trade, economic and industrial policy. This is proof, if proof was needed, that economic policy in general and policy towards China in particular is now seen through the prism of national security. Sullivan, importantly, agreed with EU Council President Ursula van der Leyen and said US too was in favour of de-risking and diversifying, and NOT decoupling. Explaining the de-risking strategy further, Sullivan said: “We’ve implemented carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China.  Those restrictions are premised on straightforward national security concerns.  Key allies and partners have followed suit, consistent with their own security concerns. We’re also enhancing the screening of foreign investments in critical areas relevant to national security.  And we’re making progress in addressing outbound investments in sensitive technologies with a core national security nexus. These are tailored measures.  They are not, as Beijing says, a technology blockade.  They are focused on a narrow slice of technology and a small number of countries intent on challenging us militarily.”

In geopolitical terms the above policy pronouncements have important implications. First, there seems to be some rapprochement between the positions of the US and the EU vis-a-vis China. Jake Sullivan quoted Urusula van der Leyen for a reason. Both the US and the EU now seek to de-risk and diversify away from China when it comes to the strategic sectors of the economy. Sullivan gave a number of examples to prove his point. He pointed out that the US now manufactures only around 10 percent of the world’s semiconductors, and production is geographically concentrated elsewhere. This created a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability.  Sullivan argued that thanks to the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, we’ve already seen an orders-of-magnitude increase in investment into America’s semiconductor industry. Sullivan gave another example with regard to critical minerals – the backbone of the clean-energy future.  Today, the United States produces only 4 percent of the lithium, 13 percent of the cobalt, 0 percent of the nickel, and 0 percent of the graphite required to meet current demand for electric vehicles.  Meanwhile, more than 80 percent of critical minerals are processed by one country, China. Sullivan underlined cooperation not just between US and EU (Joint Statement of Biden and van der Leyen refers) but also with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India to coordinate their approach on semiconductors and things like Hydrogen.

Second, it is possible that this is a message also to China that while trade in “normal” goods and services can continue unimpeded, this will not apply to trade in “strategic” goods and services. China does need the American and European markets for the short term while it struggles to implement its dual circulation strategy. Whether all EU countries agree with van der Leyen is another matter. Also, even the dependence on China created by “normal” trade and investment can be huge: witness the $ 10 billion to be invested by the German firm BASF in a plant in Guangdong province and an equal amount by Volkswagen in the Chinese EV market. It is hard arguing there is no risk in these investments.

Third, a broad coalition of countries such as US, EU, Japan, Korea, Australia and India is taking shape which are pursuing resilient supply chains in strategic sectors, be it semiconductors, hydrogen or rare earths.

For India, it is vitally important to get on to this resilient supply chain in the making, having missed the earlier global/regional value chains altogether. In order for us to do this, India must reform faster, put in place an eco system for attracting investment, finalize the FTA with EU and join the trade pillar of the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) without delay. Tall order but if not now, then when?