The National Defence Strategy (NDS), 2026, was published a couple of days ago by the US Department of War. It is primarily meant to offer guidance to the American senior Pentagon leadership as well as Commanders and Field Activity Directors. Taken by itself, there is nothing hugely earth shaking in the document. However, read in conjunction with the much more detailed National Security Strategy issued by the Trump administration in December 2025, the broad outline of US Foreign and Security Policy becomes apparent.

The NDS begins by making the political point that previous American administrations had squandered military advantage, lives, goodwill and resources for grandiose nation building projects. Asserting that the US has the world’s strongest and most capable military, the NDS states that the Department of War will not be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change and nation building. Instead, the NDS’s underlying motto is “peace through strength”.

The NDS bluntly says it is not in America’s interest, nor is it its duty, to act everywhere on its own. Nor will the US make up for allied security shortfalls arising from their leaders’ own irresponsible choices. American allies, transatlantic or elsewhere in the world, cannot now say they were not forewarned!

Like the NSS, the NDS gives primacy to homeland security and the Western Hemisphere. Securing America’s borders is sought to be done, skies will be defended through the Golden Dome and a robust nuclear deterrent will be maintained. In the Western Hemisphere, the NDS says the US will guarantee military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America and interestingly, Greenland. More comfortingly, the NDS says that the US will engage in good faith with its neighbours from Canada to partners in Central & South America even while ensuring that they respect and do their part to defend shared interests. And if they do not, Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine will kick in.

The NDS declares China as the second most powerful country in the world- behind only the US. By calling China the most powerful state relative to the US since the 19th century, the NDS grudgingly accepts some strategic parity between the US and China. Crucially, the NDS spells out that the American objective is to “maintain a favourable balance of military power” in the Indo-Pacific. However, the NDS adds that this is not for purposes of dominating, humiliating or strangling China. On the contrary, the goal is to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate US or its allies. Ruling out regime change or an existential struggle with China, the NDS seeks “a decent peace” on terms favourable to the US but one that China can also accept and live under. Two questions arise immediately: one, the omission of the words “military overmatch” from the NSS is glaring; two, the NDS does not explain how the US can achieve its objectives without dominating China and at the same time not allowing China to dominate the US. And the key question is whether these terms are acceptable to China in the Indo-Pacific. The question is what constitutes “decent peace” and “a favourable balance of military power” in the Indo-Pacific.

On Taiwan, the NDS argues in favour of sustaining a strong denial defence along the First Island Chain. Again, the NDS says the US will work closely with its allies and partners in the region to incentivize and enable them to do more for collective defence, especially in ways that are relevant to an effective denial defence.

Russia is described by the NDS as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future. Despite a host of problems, the NDS says the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates that Russia still retains deep reservoirs of military and industrial power. It also adds that Russia has shown national resolve. Saying that Russia could employ threats relating to undersea, space and cyber capabilities against US Homeland, the NDS says the US is ready to counter this. Saying the NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia, the NDS makes the critical point that while the US will remain engaged in Europe, it will nevertheless prioritize defending its Homeland and deterring China.

Two specific actions proposed by the NDS will be examined by countries everywhere in the world. One, the NDS specifically calls for increased burden-sharing with not just American allies but also its partners. Thus, the NDS repeats the mantra of the NSS that Europe take primary responsibility for its own conventional defence to the security threat it faces. US support to NATO allies will be critical but “more limited”, the NDS says. In a similar vein, the NDS says that in the Middle East, the US will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies. Israel will be helped to defend itself, cooperation to be deepened with Arab Gulf partners and integration enabled between Israel and the Arab partners through the Abraham Accords. In the Korean Peninsula, the NDS postulates that South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, once again with critical but more limited US support.

The NDS concludes by emphasizing the US Defence Industrial Base and how to supercharge it. The DIB, according to the NDS, must produce, deliver, and sustain critical munitions, systems and platforms. The NDB avers that the effort to supercharge the Defence Indutrial Base will require nothing short of a national mobilization – a call to industrial arms on par with similar revivals of the last century that ultimately powered the US to victory in both the world wars and the Cold War that followed.

Conclusion

The key things that stand out in this iteration of the NDS are:

>US is no longer going to be present in every strategic theatre, all at once;

>Homeland and Western Hemisphere have been given primacy as in the NSS;

>In the Indo-Pacific, where America’s allies share the desire for a free and open regional order, the NDS underlines that allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China;

>An ambiguous defense strategy (perhaps deliberate) to counter China;

>Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defense as well as cope with the threat from Russia;

>South Korea to take charge of deterring North Korea in the Korean Peninsula;

>In the Middle East, allies and partners led by Israel to counter threat from Iran and its proxies; and

>Ambitious plan to supercharge America’s defense industrial base.

In my blog last month entitled ” Trump’s National Security Strategy has evolved” I had made bold to predict that there are signs of American foreign and security policy retrenchment from both institutions and regions. The National Defense Strategy just released provides further evidence of this.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Now that the artificial deadline imposed by newspapers & magazines on “yearend despatches” is over and the dust has settled, it is time to look back calmly at the year gone by. The title for this blog pretty much suggested itself. 2025 can really be reduced to just two words: geopolitical turbulence. No surprises there. But given below are the megatrends thrown up in the last one year or so.

Parity between two Great Powers: If ever historians look back at the point when China attained a degree of parity with the United States of America, it would have to be the year 2025. Strategic and geopolitical parity are notoriously hard to measure. Even so, multiple reports written by various American agencies openly admit there is only one peer competitor to the US and that is China. And President Trump may have given it his seal of approval when he said on social media that “The G2 will be convening shortly” before his October 2025 meeting with President Xi Jinping. China certainly behaved as America’s equal in 2025, whether it is the tariff war, the tech race or defending its core interests. Things could still change quickly. But for now, it is hard to contest that there are two Great Powers in the world, namely, the US and China. Then, there are the rest.

Uncertainty around traditional alliance structures: The most dramatic example of this phenomenon is obviously the transatlantic alliance, embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But other individual alliances such as the one that the US has with Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia and Philippines, to name a few, all appear to be under some form of pressure or the other. Part of the uncertainty stems from the American sentiment that treaty allies must share much more of the burden than they have done so far and may also be a consequence of the American strategic retrenchment expressed by its National Security Strategy that the Western Hemisphere will, more than others, be a priority theatre. No one is yet predicting a total breakdown of the alliance structure itself; but it is difficult to see the status quo being maintained. Interestingly, loose alliance-like relations such as those between Russia/China on the one hand and Venzuela/Iran on the other, will also need to be reworked or rethought by the parties concerned, in light of recent events. Last but not least, the “friendship without limits” between Russia and China did have some limits after all. Could the limits to the relationship expand with time?

Total collapse of MFN: Since the end of World War II and the advent of first GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and then the WTO (World Trade Organization), the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle has been the bedrock of all international trade. But now, the most powerful trading player in the world i.e the US, has formally proposed to the WTO that the practice of MFN should end and is not fit for purpose. Regardless of the validity of this claim, this constitutes a huge departure from how most of the world traded with each other. Some 69 per cent of all existing global trade is still based on MFN. But, this may be expected to see a steep decline in the years ahead. International trade in the future will most certainly be strategic, preferential, reciprocal and most certainly non-MFN. Weaponisation of strategic trade is a brutal reality: look at the issue of controls on semiconductor chips on the one hand, and rare earths on the other. Meanwhile, expect Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and bilateral trade agreements to grow exponentially, undermining MFN further.

RIP Multilateralism: For some years now, multilateralism has been in terminal decline. The reasons are too well known to bear any repetition here. On January 7 this year, the US which is invariably the principal funder of both UN and non-UN organizations, decided to pull out of some 66 international organizations. And without the US, many of these organizations will lose their raison détre. It is too early to say what will replace multilateralism. Some speak of US minus one, but that is easier said than done, as the WTO has now started to realize. Plurilateral institutions such as G20, BRICS, SCO seem to have limits to their functioning as well.

Military Expenditure Soars as conflicts prevail: One defining feature of 2025 has been the continuation of old conflicts and the advent of new ones. The war in Ukraine has continued for the fourth year running; the bombing may have stopped in Gaza but strife persists; Yemen is restless; Sudan is restive; Venezuela is on edge; and China is militarily assertive in its backyard. There were also limited wars elsewhere in the world. The net result of all this is that the rise in annual military expenditure in 2024 (the last year for which data is available) was the steepest in the last 30 years with a ten per cent increase touching 2.8 trillion dollars. This will almost certainly rise in 2025 for reasons mentioned above. War is hugely profitable, as the saying goes!

Technological Disruption: For tech buffs, it is fair to say that 2025 was the year of “irrational exuberance”. The kind of investment made in Artificial Intelligence is truly scary and it is hard not to think of it as a bubble. The American lead in matters tech is incontestable; but what is true is also the fact that China is fast catching up. Witness the emergence of DeepSeek! The tech war will play itself out over the next few years. But 2025 may well have been a turning point.

Multiple Strategic Hedging: There is no index to measure the degree of trust between nations. But if there was one, it would be very very low. This lack of trust between countries, translates into a foreign and security policy characterised by strategic hedging. And when every country hedges against the other, then it constitutes multiple strategic hedging leading to a spaghetti bowl of strategic partnerships of bewildering shapes and colours.

Multipolar but unruly world disorder: Policy wonks have already pronounced the death of the liberal international order which was established in the aftermath of World War II. That is probably true. Equally, people have hastened to announce the advent of a multipolar world based on spheres of influence. This seems a little less certain, if only because there are two Great Powers in serious contestation with one another and then you have the rest which are jostling for space and influence. Yet, the nomenclature “multipolar world” gives a certain degree of assurance to policy wonks who need comforting words to describe the world they see in front of them. The trouble is that the expression “multipolar world order” denotes a certain number of identifiable poles by common agreement and a reasonable semblance of order based on consensus. Both of those simply do not exist as of now. The world is therefore arguably multipolar and is most certainly disorderly, unruly and fractious. And therein lies the problem for decision makers who have to craft meaningful foreign and security policy for their countries.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

As directed by the US Congress, the Department of War (the new appellation for the former Pentagon) provides an annual report on military and security developments relating to the People’s Republic of China. These reports have traditionally chronicled the development of China’s military capabilities and strategy. Consequently, the latest report was issued by Pentagon in the last week of December. Policy wonks and China hands will do well to go through the 100-page report with a fine tooth comb.

It is my recommendation that this report (hereinafter referred to as the Pentagon Report or just the Report) must be read in conjunction with the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025 issued just a few weeks ago. The Trump administration gave the clear impression in the NSS 2025 that China was viewed from the geoeconomic or tech lens rather than as a serious geopolitical threat, and much less as a revisionist power. What this Pentagon Report does is to correct this and slightly reorient the US approach towards China. The Report is still at pains to point out that President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China. However, the Pentagon Report argues that steps will be taken to ensure that President Trump is able to achieve the above objectives from a position of military strength.

Counterintuitively, the Report argues that Sino-American relations are stronger than they have been in many years, and that the Pentagon will support efforts to build on this progress. It proposes to do so in part by opening a wider range of military-to-military communications with the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) with a focus on strategic stability as well as deconfliction and de-escalation, more broadly. The Report says the US will also seek other ways to make clear its peaceful intentions vis-a-vis China.

The Report states clearly that China’s military focus is currently the First Island Chain that runs from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay Peninsula. It argues that Beijing recognizes this region as the strategic center of gravity for its goals in the region. The Report nevertheless takes cognizance of the fact that while China’s strategic center of gravity remains the First Island Chain, it is logical that China’s military power will also continue to grow towards a force capable of projecting power worldwide. The Report acknowledges Beijing’s stated ambition to field a “worldclass” military by 2049.

Despite the above, the Report says the Pentagon will ensure that the Forces are always ready and able to defend American interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Report says it bears emphasizing that U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are fundamental—but also scoped and reasonable. The US does not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China, the Report underscores tellingly. Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s NSS 2025, the Pentagon seeks only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate the US or its allies. This is the NSS idea of military overmatch! That means being so strong that aggression is not even considered, and that peace is therefore preferred and preserved. The Pentagon will therefore prioritize bolstering deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation. It seeks to do this by forging and sustaining a balance of power that will enable all countries to enjoy a decent peace in an Indo-Pacific—one in which trade flows openly and fairly, all can prosper, and all nations’ interests are respected. What happens if interests clash or how this balance of power will be achieved, is not dealt with at any length in the Report.

But having sounded dovish, the Report seamlessly switches to combat mode in part. After all it is a Report written by the Pentagon. It states baldly that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has for decades marshaled resources, technology, and political will to achieve its vision of a world-class military. The PLA, it states, is a key component of China’s ambition to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful nation. The PLA measures its concepts and capabilities against the “strong enemy” of the United States.
Moreover, the Report points out that China’s top military strategy focuses squarely on overcoming the United States through a whole-of-nation mobilization effort that Beijing terms “national total war.” The Report talks of China’s historic military buildup that has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable. It adds China maintains a large and growing arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities able to directly threaten Americans’ security. In 2024, the Report notes that Chinese cyberespionage campaigns such as Volt Typhoon burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, demonstrating capabilities that could disrupt the U.S. military in a conflict and harm American interests. The Report notes that the PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan, “strategic counterbalance” against the United States in the nuclear and other strategic domains, and “strategic deterrence and control” against other regional countries. In other words, the Report predicts somewhat ominously that China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.
The Report clarifies that China claims three “core interests,” defined as issues so central to China’s national rejuvenation that its official position is not subject to negotiation or compromise. These include: 1) the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) control; 2) promoting China’s economic development; and 3) defending and expanding China’s sovereignty and territorial claims. The Report clarifies that China’s leadership has extended the term “core interest” to cover Taiwan and sovereignty claims amid territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (emphasis mine). The inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh is noteworthy especially in light of the statement above that these are issues where the Chinese official position is not subject to negotiation or compromise.

The Report deals at some length about China’s ties with other regions of the world. It is detailed but not very original in content. It also covers a lot of ground on China’s pressure tactics vis-a-vis Taiwan, China’s competition with US and PLA’s role in China’s foreign policy. In other words, a lot of open source material.

The Report has interesting things to say about Sino-Russian ties. Despite continued growth in their relationship, the Report notes that Beijing and Moscow remain unwilling to establish a formal defense alliance with mutual security guarantees. China and Russia continue to harbor a mutual distrust of each other, which likely prevents cooperation on areas each side perceives as
sensitive, the Report believes. China also has stopped short of providing Russia with lethal aid for use in its war against Ukraine, the Report admits. This has allowed Beijing to preserve its close ties with Moscow while mitigating reputational or economic costs associated with Russia’s global behavior, the Report concludes.

There is a paragraph on Sino-Indian ties entitled : Developments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. The Report recalls that in October 2024, India announced an agreement with China to disengage from remaining standoff sites along the LAC two days before a meeting between President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. The Report says the Xi-Modi meeting marked the onset of monthly high-level engagements between the two countries, where parties discussed border management and next steps for the bilateral relationship, including direct flights, visa facilitation, and the exchange of academics and journalists. According to the Report, China probably seeks to capitalize on decreased tension along the LAC to stabilize bilateral relations and prevent the deepening of U.S.-India ties; however, the Report adds India probably remains skeptical of China’s actions and motives. Continued mutual distrust and other irritants almost certainly limit the bilateral relationship, the Report avers.

The Report talks of China following a three-step development strategy for military modernization. At present, China’s goals for modernizing its armed forces are publicly noted as follows:
● By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.
● By 2035: “Comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national defense and the
military.”
● By 2049: “Fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”

On military bases abroad, the Report says China has built two military facilities outside its territory: a support base in Djibouti established in 2017, and a joint logistics and training center in Cambodia opened in April 2025. The East African base supports Chinese naval escort missions  in the region, while the Southeast Asian site helps maintain Chinese presence  in the South China Sea.

Explaining further, the Report says as of 2024, the PLA Support Base in Djibouti has had minimal participation in the protection of China’s citizens or investments, the publicly stated purpose of the base. To date, the support base has not supported noncombatant evacuations and has not provided support to the ongoing Red Sea crisis. Instead, the facility has enabled persistent PLA regional presence under the auspices of support to counter-piracy, and increasingly supports regional military diplomacy.

As for Cambodia the Report says in April 2025, the Cambodian Prime Minister and a PLA delegation inaugurated the Joint Logistics and Training Center at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. China’s Ministry of National Defense insists that the center is to support joint operations in areas like counterterrorism, disaster prevention, humanitarian assistance, and training. Cambodia and China deny that China will have the ability to station PLA forces at the facility, although Phnom Penh and Beijing acknowledge that both nations will maintain essential personnel for the training center’s operations. Preceding the official opening at Ream, the PLA continuously stationed two naval combatants—rotated a total of three times—at the facility’s pier, the Report concludes.

The Report lists locations in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean that China has “likely considered” for bases as well. According to the Report, these locations are Angola, Bangladesh, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu and Zambia. The Report adds that Kenya, Pakistan and Thailand are Washington’s major non-NATO allies.

The Pentagon Report states that China is “probably most interested” in military access along the sea lines of communication, including the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, which each account for over 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids transported per day. The Report goes on to warn that an overseas military logistics network could enable China to spy on the US military supporting its broader awareness of U.S., allied and partner activities.

The rest of the Report is extremely technical and detailed, covering subjects such as corruption in the PLA, its capabilities in cyber warfare, outer space and even AI. It also covers defence spending, ship building capacity, arms exports, espionage and contains a table entitled Taiwan-China Military Balance Matrix.

So, what to make of the latest Pentagon Report submitted to the US Congress? The two words that spring to mind after going through the Report are: diffuse and disparate. The Report sure is full of facts and figures but lacks an overarching and coherent theme which ought to have been about how China’s military capability poses specific threats to US interests, both in traditional and non-traditional security domains, and how the US proposes to counter them. The trillion dollar question that arises therefore is this: Is this deliberate equivocation on the part of the drafters of this Report so as to allow for the fact that a clear China policy is yet to be delineated at the highest levels in the current US administration?

Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

One of the advantages of being an extinguished diplomat (all diplomats are distinguished while in service, subsequently they stand extinguished!) but one who is desperately trying to be a distinguished academic, is that one can give free rein to one’s imagination, especially if it is one’s own blog. So here goes. All grades are out of 10, purely subjective and thus cannot be appealed against. Adverse comments are therefore NOT welcome!

US: 7. Because other than China which has enormous leverage to deal with the US, we are probably the only country which has not folded and held its line. First quarter of 2026 should see stability return to bilateral ties.

China: 7. Again, it is a question of putting up resistance to China despite a huge difference in comprehensive national power between our two countries. We are not giving up on the border either.

EU: 6. The moot point is whether India could have done more to try and end the war in Ukraine. Be that as it may, efforts to conclude an FTA must be brought to fruition in 2026!

Russia: 8. No better manifestation of India’s foreign policy based on multialignment than the way we have dealt with Russia, that too against odds.

Pakistan: 4. India may have decisively won the war but perhaps lost the global narrative. Gallingly, it must also be admitted that Pakistan is back in the game, albeit with flattery, deception and its own brand of multialignment. Fortunately for India, the power differential between our two countries is practically unbridgeable, so it should not worry us at all in the long run. India should behave and act like a “Dhurandhar” !

Bangladesh: 4. The overthrow of Sheikh Hasina was a grey swan event, not a black swan one. So, we are guilty to some extent. Subsequent events in Bangladesh are probably beyond our control; but we do have leverage (both positive and negative) and we must use it.

Rest of Neighbourhood: 7. We were first responder in the case of Sri Lanka, pulled Maldives back into our zone of influence and stayed out of Nepal’s internecine politics and maintained the status quo in Bhutan. Not too bad!

Japan: 6. Japan is particularly vulnerable at this point: pressure from Beijing and uncertainty from the US. India could have made a big move vis-a-vis Japan, can we do one now?

Australia: 7. Can we do something monumental on critical minerals and rare earths?

ASEAN: 5. Suffered from mutual and benign neglect. Are we missing a trick?

Canada: 8. To sense an opening after the departure of Trudeau and grabbing it with both hands. Congratulations on a job well done.

Gulf: 7. Relations strengthened with both UAE and Saudi Arabia. But the latter’s defence tie-up with Pakistan was a bit of a dampener. We must have a frank conversation about this with the Saudis.

Israel: 7. We must strengthen our ties even further in the light of an adverse strategic scenario confronting us from many directions.

Africa: 5. We seem to lack a big bang idea which can take ties to the next level. Ignoring Africa would be a mistake.

UN & WTO: 4. From being champions of yore with regard to multilateralism, we seem to have consciously moved away from it, whether it is UN or WTO, at a time when those institutions need India most. 2026 may be difficult from this perspective: G 20 already faces trouble and we should expect India’s BRICS Presidency to be challenging.

Overall Score: 6.5 This may not seem outstanding but in a year characterised by distinct political and economic turbulence, this should count as a 8, no less.

Happy New Year full of geopolitical strife and strategic discord!

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies and Dean/ Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

After years of dilly-dallying at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States of America (US) has finally submitted a formal communication on 15 December, to the WTO General Council, the supreme decision-making body, on the need to reform the institution. It is a brief but succinct document and clearly indicates where the US stands on crucial issues. The gist of the issues raised by the US is given below.

Fair or free trade? The expression “trade liberalization” does not figure in the US submission. Nor does the expression “the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”. Both these figure in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. Instead, the overarching principle in the US submission is “a global economy of fair and reciprocal trade”. Not surprising in light of the Trumpian tariffs.

No more MFN: The US submission is nothing short of derisive when it comes to the basic principle of the multilateral trading system i.e. the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause. The US argues this was meant for a bygone era which it says has passed. It goes as far as to argue that MFN “impedes welfare-enhancing liberalization” and pushes WTO Members to a one-size fits all approach. It therefore recommends a fundamental break from the basic principle of MFN underlying the multilateral trading system.  Again, unsurprising.

Economic Security Interests: The American submission is clear: Judgements on matters of national security are the prerogative of Governments and the WTO has no authority to decide on the security exception provided in the rules.

Decision-making: The US agrees that no obligation should be imposed on any country without the latter’s consent. However, it strongly argues that countries which wish to go ahead and take on new obligations should be able to forge a new agreement among themselves. This is known as plurilateral agreement, in WTO-speak. The US submission declares that if the WTO is to have any future as a negotiating forum, it is likely to be for plurilateral negotiations.

Special and Differential Treatment: In the WTO, a country that declares itself a developing one, is entitled to “Special and Differential Treatment”. Clearly, this has been abused in the past, with Singapore at one time claiming it was a developing country. The US now wishes to see this treatment eliminated altogether. It allows for Least Developed Countries to benefit from some flexibilities but argues that Special and Differential Development must be viewed as a tool to enable Members to achieve the capability to follow the same rules that others do.

Overcapacity and Overconcentration of Production: The pervasive use of non-market policies and practices is the root cause, according to the US, of two systemic problems in the global trading system: overcapacity and overconcentration of production in numerous industrial sectors. Clearly, the US has China in mind. Interestingly, the US submission makes it clear that the WTO system has shown itself incapable of resolving these two issues.

Supply Chain Resilience: In a similar vein, the US submission says the WTO system is incapable of resolving issues related to supply chain resilience. It suggests countries deal with this outside the WTO.

Role of the Secretariat: The US believes that the role of the Secretariat is fundamentally administrative and not substantive. Which is why the WTO is often referred to as a member-led organization. The US in its submission says the Secretariat has usurped to itself a substantive role, not foreseen in the WTO Agreements. It says any WTO reform effort should address the role of the Secretariat.

In many ways, the above views should not come as any surprise to anyone with knowledge of the American negotiating position at the WTO over the last few years. But this is the first time that the US has put pen to paper, and this is significant. It also reveals a willingness, albeit reluctant, of the US to negotiate with other Members on the future of the WTO. Crucially, it comes against the backdrop of the next Ministerial meeting in Cameroon in March when the main agenda is likely to be reform of the WTO.

For India, the following questions arise:

•  What kind of a WTO does India wish to see? Are we ready to accept a trading system which is explicitly NOT based on MFN?
• Are we ready to agree to plurilateral negotiations in the WTO, even if we are not ready to be part of it?
• Are we ready for a fundamental re-interpretation of the Special and Differential Treatment rule in the WTO?

The real challenge for India is this: Is it better off staying within the system and shaping the rules or is it better to allow rules to be shaped without us and then subsequently decide whether to join an agreement or not. This issue will become crucial since an overwhelming majority of the WTO Membership may well be prepared to join the plurilateral negotiations on a range of issues, with or without us.  

The Ministry of Commerce and Government of India have some tough decisions to make in the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in March next year in Cameroon.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies and is Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.

Now that the much awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) December 2025 is out, it is interesting to compare the present version with the NSS dated December 2017 which was published by the first Trump administration. A broad-brush assessment is given below. Analysts will no doubt pore over the 33-page document of the NSS 2025 ( the NSS 2017 was 68 pages long!) and give their detailed assessment in the days and weeks ahead.

America First: Both the NSS 2017 and the NSS 2025 put “America First” and this manifests itself through the core foreign policy interest which is protection of homeland security. The 2017 document is clear: The fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland and the American way of life. The 2025 document goes one step further and talks of “full control over borders, over immigration system and over transportation networks through which people come into the country – legally (emphasis mine) and illegally.” By clubbing legal and illegal immigration together, the NSS 2025 makes its intentions clear – to stop “destabilizing population flows” and allow the US full and sovereign control over who is admitted and who is not. The NSS 2025 proclaims that the era of mass migration is over and that a border controlled by the will of the American people as implemented by their government is fundamental to the survival of the US as a sovereign republic.

Western Hemisphere: The big change in emphasis between the two documents relates to the Western Hemisphere. In the 2017 document Western Hemisphere barely got a mention and figured before Africa and well after Indo-Pacific, Europe and even South and Central Asia. The NSS 2025 mentions this region first and foremost, stating categorically that the US will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine Goals for the Hemisphere. This region is categorised as America’s core foreign policy interest. The objective is to ensure that the Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the US. The US wants a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with it against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations, a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets. The NSS 2025 proudly states the US will assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.

Indo-Pacific: The NSS 2017 began the section under regions with Indo-Pacific. In the same edition of the NSS, it must be admitted that India found pride of place ahead of other countries in the region. For instance it stated: We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner. It also added that the US will expand its defence and security cooperation with India, a major defense partner of the US and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region. The NSS 2025 document of course calls the Indo-Pacific a core foreign policy interest – keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical minerals. While maintaining the importance of Asia and Indo-Pacific, the NSS 2025 has one reference to India: “We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through Quad.” US will also work to align the actions of its allies and partners with the joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation – presumably a reference to China. No mention of ASEAN, much less its centrality.

China: The most difficult thing to do is in determining how the two NSS documents differ when it comes to China. The NSS 2017 document bluntly referred to China as a revisionist power (along with Russia) which wanted to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. The NSS 2017 also said China sought to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. The NSS 2025, it must be said, takes a different tack altogether. It focuses exclusively on the economic and trade dimensions of the ties between US and China. It thus says that the US will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence. It adds that trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors. It expresses the hope that if America remains on a growth path—and can sustain that while maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing—the US should be headed from its present $30 trillion economy in 2025 to $40 trillion in the 2030s, putting the country in an enviable position to maintain its status as the world’s leading economy. The NSS 2025 also notes that the following must be tackled from any source, without naming China:

Predatory, state-directed subsidies and industrial strategies;

Unfair trading practices;

Job destruction and deindustrialization;

Grand-scale intellectual property theft and industrial espionage;

Threats against our supply chains that risk U.S. access to critical resources,
including minerals and rare earth elements;

Exports of fentanyl precursors that fuel America’s opioid epidemic; and

Propaganda, influence operations, and other forms of cultural subversion.

All in all, China is seen as an economic, trade and technological challenge, not a “pacing challenge” as characterised previously by Biden Administration officials. Also, the NSS 2025 is careful in eschewing characterisation of China as an ideological threat or a revisionist power, perhaps keeping in mind the forthcoming Xi-Trump meeting in China in April.

Taiwan: The NSS 2017 document proclaimed that the US will maintain strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with the “One China” policy including its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion. The NSS 2025 says the following: There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of
Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. The US will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

One interesting interpretation of the above is that the NSS 2025 goes somewhat further than the NSS 2017 in spelling out the American redlines on Taiwan. The mention of military overmatch may be a red flag for China. Conversely, this may have reassured people in Taiwan that the US is not about to abandon it altogether. China experts will note that the NSS 2025 does not contain the formulation “the US does not support Taiwan independence”, something which used to be in the State Department’s fact sheet on Taiwan, but was quietly dropped in February 2025. This omission at the time drew protests from China. No mention of “One China” policy in NSS 2025 either as was the case in NSS 2017. The Taiwanese Foreign Ministry has welcomed the NSS 2025.

Russia: The NSS 2017 document bunched Russia along with China and called them revisionist powers out to get the US. A big and noticeable shift in the NSS 2025 is discernible with regard to Russia. The NSS 2025 states the following: It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and re-establish strategic stability with Russia (emphasis mine), as well as to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state. The key phrase is “re-establishing strategic stability with Russia”. This is precisely what Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are trying to do in talks with Russian negotiators Yuri Ushakov and in particular, Kirill Dimitriev. I see it as code language for full-spectrum normalisation that the US Seeks with Russia, in the medium term, if not in the short term.

NATO and Europe: The difference between NSS 2017 and NSS 2025 with regard to NATO could not be starker. The former said: The NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of US’s great advantages over its competitors and the US remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty. On the other hand, the NSS 2025 does not mention NATO at all when it talks of core foreign policy interests. It merely says the US wants to support allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe, while restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity. Specifically with regard to NATO, the NSS 2025 has this to say: Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter. The NSS 2025 also calls for an end to the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.

The NSS 2025 serves notice on Europe by saying the US will enable Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by Europe taking primary responsibility for its own defense, without being dominated by any adversarial power. A far cry from the NSS 2017 which stated upfront that a strong and free Europe was of vital importance to the US.

Middle East: There is little doubt that Middle East occupies a lower priority in the current NSS 2025. The NSS 2017 stated that the US will retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect itself and its allies. The latest NSS while noting the Middle East as a core foreign policy interest, states that the US wants to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the “forever wars” that bogged the US down in that region at great cost. Interestingly, no separate and substantive mention of Israel as an iron-clad ally.

Pakistan: Pakistan finds no mention at all in the NSS 2025 document, except in the context of President Trump having solved eight raging conflicts, one of them being the Indo-Pak one. In contrast, the NSS 2017 had references to Pakistan, for instance, as a country from which the US faces transnational terrorists and militants operating in its soil.

Tech Talk: The NSS 2025 identifies Tech as a core foreign policy interest and wishes to ensure that US Technology and US standards – particularly in AI, Biotech and Quantum computing – drive the world forward.

Multilateralism: There was a separate chapter in NSS 2017 on advancing American influence through diplomacy and achieving better outcomes in multilateral forums by exercising American leadership in the UN, WTO and even the IMF/ WB. No such thing at all in the current NSS 2025. This should hardly surprise anyone.

Conclusion: The NSS 2017 had a chapter entitled “conclusion”; the NSS 2025 ends abruptly without one, following the last section on Africa.

In conclusion, the NSS 2017 still had identifiable threads of continuity with previous American administrations. The NSS 2025, on the other hand, is a marked departure in terms of strategic priorities and represents unquestionable American foreign policy retrenchment from regions and institutions, both of which will have profound ramifications for countries around the world.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views expressed are personal.

Over the last few months, it has become apparent that large multilateral gatherings have been more in the nature of jamborees with very little to show by way of concrete results. And yet, in what can only be termed as a paradox, there is very little attempt to abandon it by the vast majority of countries. US may well be an exception that proves the rule.

Let us begin with the mother of all international organizations i.e. the United Nations (UN). The demise of the UN has been proclaimed for sometime now; it would seem however that reports of the UN’s demise are exaggerated. China has openly made it known that as the largest contributor to the UN (after the US) it expects either the number one or the number two position in all international organizations. And, by and large, it has succeeded in achieving that objective. The UN General Assembly which took place in September may have been a talk shop, as it always is, but President Trump still found it important to find time and to come and speak at the forum, if only to belittle it. But even President Trump has sent his former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz as American Ambassador to the UN. The UN may be utterly dysfunctional and the UN Security Council totally unrepresentative of contemporary power reality, and yet countries tend to take it seriously than otherwise. And it is not like countries are threatening to leave the UN, quite the contrary. So, what helps explain the allure of the UN? One explanantion is basically a variation of the FOMO or the Fear of Missing Out, and nations as much as individuals are subject to this pervasive logic. The other substantive reason is that leaving a multilateral institution may be easy, but rejoining it at a later time may not always be a cakewalk. Ask the Chinese how long it took for them to accede to the WTO.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been moribund of late. Yet the US has appointed a new Ambassador to WTO i.e. Joseph Barloon just a few months ago who during his senate confirmation hearings said that while the WTO is not perfect, it could be useful in advancing American trade interests. This from a country that has singlehandedly blocked the appointment of Judges to the WTO Appellate Body. So, it is clear that even the US does not wish to abandon the WTO altogether.

The case of BRICS, though not technically a multilateral forum, is curious. The Western press previously used to trash BRICS as a talk shop and an anti-Western outfit. But look at the countries queuing up to join BRICS. In 2023 Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and UAE joined. It is hard to see any geopolitical similarity in this group of countries. Some, like Iran, cannot even be qualified as non-West, since they are clearly anti-West! If the BRICS was a useless talk shop, it is hard to see why these countries want to belong to it. As if this were not enough, another 32 countries are reportedly waiting in the queue to join BRICS!

The G20 had a tough meeting recently under South African leadership. Tough, because the US made it clear that it would not send any high-ranking member of its Government to the meeting. The main reason of course was a bilateral dispute between the US and South Africa. Nevertheless, the US has announced that it would be happy to host the G20 meeting next year. While some observers have argued that the G20 has lost a bit of its relevance, the opposite is also arguable. In the absence of the UNSC which is dysfunctional, it is only the G20 which can, if nothing else, pronounce itself on a host of international issues with some credibility.

Climate Change negotiations happen under the umbrella framework of the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) through Conference of Parties,called COP. The 30th edition of COP just concluded in Brazil recently. This is a multilateral forum from which the US has withdrawn altogether. It may perhaps be a combination of ideology and a firm conviction among some in the US that climate change is a hoax and that fossil fuels are essential for America’s growth and prosperity. The COP 30 meeting in Brazil could not offer a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels and the COP itself will doubtless continue to soldier on from one place to the next, year after year. Meanwhile, climate change is not waiting for COP meetings and proceeding at a furious gallop.

How to make sense of all this? The inclination of nations to belong to a grouping, any grouping, is atavistic. This primeval diplomatic instinct along with a proliferation of global problems that no one country can solve on its own, will ensure that multilateralism does not simply fade away from the international relations landscape. Multilateralism may have suffered a setback for various reasons, but it is not about to disappear. From India’s perspective, the mantra must be reform of multilateral institutions and a concrete plan to garner support from the Global South whom we can represent and on whose behalf we can then negotiate. In an impending multipolar world order where power is more widely distributed than before, it is only a matter of time before multilateralism rediscovers its mojo and relevance.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

At long last, we may be seeing the beginning of the end of the conflict in Ukraine. The problem lies in determining the eventual terms under which the conflict is likely to come to an end. Wars are not just cruel, they are also fundamentally unfair. And Ukraine is proving to be no exception to that rule.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it was natural for the world to sympathize with a small European country whose territorial integrity was violated in open breach of the UN Charter. In parallel, there was also an immediate demonization of Russia by the West at the time, with the EU leading the charge. There was very little attempt to understand the causes of the conflict and even less understanding of the security stakes involved for Russia.

Two arguments made by the West were fallacious at best, and perfidious at worst. First, Ukraine, EU and the West argued that the conflict in Ukraine was completely “unprovoked”. Second, there was no attempt at either acknowledging or understanding the legitimate “security interests” of Russia in the matter. To argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was “unprovoked” is to betray a very poor understanding of history as it unfolded after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. NATO’s actions in the 2000s upto and including the Bucharest summit in 2008, constituted a series of provocations, all of which have been well documented. Indeed, the American scholar John Mearsheimer addressed the European Parliament as recently as November 18 with a talk entitled “Europe’s Bleak Future” and the full transcript of his speech, available on the web, is well worth reading. As for the “security interests” of Russia, it should have been obvious to any reasonable observer that stationing of NATO weapons and troops within a particular perimeter would be a matter of existential security concern for Russia. All this is not to condone Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was certainly illegal from the point of view of international law. But confronting and resolving a conflict requires prior understanding of the causes which led to the conflict in the first place. John Mearshimer is by far the best author to read in this regard.

When the conflict began in February 2022, Ukraine made some gains which turned out to be ephemeral and even illusory. But then, it is also true that Russia’s initial war objectives spelt out by President Putin were successfully thwarted by Ukraine. To be fair to Russia, in March 2022 there was a willingness on its part to draw the outline of a possible settlement and by all accounts, Ukraine too was willing to look at these proposals. Unfortunately, this so-called “Istanbul peace process” was aborted by the West, led in particular by the then British PM Boris Johnson. The West persuaded Ukraine that it should fight on and not settle with Russia. In retrospect, this was a fatal error on the part of Ukraine and its Western allies. It was clear from the very beginning that the longer the conflict in Ukraine persisted, it would turn into a war of attrition. And if it did, Russia could never lose the war (given the overwhelming superiority in manpower and firepower) and conversely, Ukraine could never win such a war! This realization has now dawned on people after millions of people have perished on both sides, millions of refugees have been displaced and when there has already been large-scale destruction of property.

Fast forward to November 2025. President Trump is certainly demonstrating indecent haste in putting an end to the conflict in Ukraine. His 28-point peace plan, worked out apparently between his envoys and Russia’s, now available on the web, bears some resemblance to parts of the draft agreement that reportedly emerged from the Istanbul process in March 2022. In fact, some may argue that the terms of the Istanbul draft of March 2022 were better for Ukraine than the current 28-point plan. For instance, Ukraine was not necessarily required to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in that draft. Now, under the latest plan, Crimea, Luhansk and Doentsk will be recognized as de facto Russian.

While the 28-point plan is too long a document to be recounted in full here, the main features are listed below:

> The territorial issue is sought to be resolved, arguably in favour of Russia. There has been enough commentary of how Crimea and Donbas will now be deemed to be part of Russia. Ukraine will have serious difficulty accepting this, especially with regard to land that it currently occupies in Donbas region. So will EU, which backs Ukraine on this issue.

>The security interests of Russia have been spelt out and thus substantially taken into account. There is a stipulation that the strength of Ukraine’s armed forces will be pegged at 600,000. Obviously, Ukraine can never be part of NATO and this would be enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution. In addition, NATO will not station any troops in Ukraine.

>It is only “expected” that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further! So, the potential for future conflict exists.

>Russia to be integrated into the global economy and invited to be part of G8. Lifting of sanctions on Russia to be discussed and done on a case by case basis.

>On the other hand, Ukraine is to get “reliable security guarantees” but there are no specific details as to what they might be. Curiously, if Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee provided to it will be deemed invalid.

>Frozen Russian funds to be used for reconstruction of Ukraine but with a 50 per cent share of the profits for the US. EU which is the keeper of these funds, was apparently not consulted and is ballistic at this clause.

>There are many other elements in the peace plan, but the main point is that it leaves aspects of the final political and security settlement hanging in the air.

In terms of reaction, Russia has been cautious, but that could be posturing more than anything else, since this is a plan that is generally skewed in its favour. Conversely, the Europeans have been neuralgic in their reaction to the 28-point peace plan, deeming it as “capitulation” to Russia. It is also particularly galling to the EU that they seem excluded from the peace process for a region that is in their backyard. President Zelensky, once bitten, has been careful not to antagonize President Trump and has said Ukraine will discuss the peace plan with him. But he has also spoken to his nation saying for Ukraine it is a choice between keeping its dignity and keeping the support of the US as an ally. The 28-point Trump peace plan could yet unravel. But pressure on Ukraine and the EU is immense to agree to the peace plan as early as next week. It is difficult not to think of the whole thing as an exercise in realpolitik, geopolitics and hard power, all at once.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies housed in the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

So, G2 is back in the news. For the uninitiated, G2 was first used by the American economist Fred Bergsten in 2005 to suggest macroeconomic coordination between US and China. What was curious about Bergsten’s proposal was that in 2005 when he made the proposal, US GDP was close to 13 trillion dollars, as opposed to China’s which was barely 2.3 trillion dollars. Also, Bergsten’s proposal for a G2 predated the financial crisis and the great recession of 2008. So, what was really behind Bergsten’s thinking?

The global economy had declined noticeably during 2005 compared to a strong and broad expansion in 2004, and projections of future growth were fraught with uncertainty and risk. The decline was due partly to enormous global imbalances, including the rising external deficit of the United States on the one hand, and growing surpluses in the Asian, European and oil-exporting economies on the other.  Taken together with rising oil prices, and exacerbated by natural disasters and geopolitical instability, the global economic environment was precarious, to say the least. Fred Bergsten saw this and felt strongly that US and China must seriously coordinate on international economic issues. Bergsten’s foresight lay in the fact that he knew China’s economic trajectory was on the rise; this was important because at a time when China’s GDP was around 2.3 trillion dollars in 2005, Japan, Germany and the UK had higher GDPs. But China between 1995 and 2005 had tripled its GDP and Bergsten drew his inference from that.

While the G2 began with “international economic coordination”, the financial crisis and the subsequent recession in 2008 strengthened the G2 like never before both within and outside the G20. By 2009, China also became the second ranked economy of the world by GDP, vindicating Bergsten’s theory. Also, by then, G2 had mutated to coordination on strategic issues with both Kissinger and Brzezinski arguing strongly that China and the US must work together not just on economic issues but also global challenges like climate change. In 2009, Hillary Clinton, the then Secretary of State on a visit to Beijing declared that the opportunities for US and China to work together are unmatched anywhere in the world!

By the middle of 2010 though, experts were enthusiastically pronouncing the demise of G2. Interestingly, China sitting down with India, Brazil and South Africa ( remember the BASIC coalition) at the Copenhagen climate change conference was not taken kindly by the US. America’s approval of arms sales to Taiwan in 2010 and the Dalai Lama’s visit to meet President Obama in February 2010 was a setback and returned both China and the US to old suspicions and friction.

Elizabeth Economy, the American political scientist and China specialist wrote in May 2010 in Foreign Affairs that: The sticking points in U.S.-China relations are mirrored in China’s relations with rest of the world. The European Union and Japan, for example, find it no easier to negotiate with China on issues such as trade, climate change, cyber conflict, and the Dalai Lama. As a result, the United States is more likely to make progress when it spends time and energy cultivating allies throughout the rest of the world. We shouldn’t shed any tears for the G-2. Its demise enables us to make real progress with China by looking elsewhere.

The question is therefore why President Trump surprised everyone by putting out the social media message on 29th October 2025 that: The G2 will be convening shortly.   On November 2, 2025, President Trump posted “My G2 meeting with President Xi of China was a great one for both of our countries. This meeting will lead to everlasting peace and success. God bless both China and the USA!” On the same day,  the US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth posted “As President Trump said, his historic G2 meeting set the tone for everlasting peace and success for the U.S. and China.” It is therefore fair to assume that G2 has now become part of the Trump administration lexicon.

As always, words matter in diplomacy. So, it is important to understand what the Trump administration really means when it talks of G2. The following interpretations are worthy of consideration:

> One interpretation may be that it simply means a meeting of the two most important powers in the world. No other meaning may have been attached to it. President Trump’s words must always be taken seriously, but almost never literally. Observers have noted that China has not used the G2 formulation but said more broadly that China and the US must be friends and partners working together.

> Perhaps the most widely shared interpretation is one of the US accepting strategic parity with China. This is crucial since China has been demanding this as a matter of right for quite sometime now. In fact, the biggest gain for President Xi Jinping, especially from a domestic audience perspective, is that China has finally attained strategic parity with the US.

> The most substantive interpretation of the use of G2 by President Trump is the inherent assumption that US and China will first and foremost ensure their bilateral ties are back on track thus subsequently enabling the two sides to engage in far-reaching cooperation to tackle global challenges. Basic to this interpretation is that both US and China are seeking a balance of power leading to some kind of strategic equilibrium. Jeffrey Sachs has made an interesting distinction between “spheres of influence” and “spheres of security” suggesting that while the former is detrimental to the sovereignty of small states, the latter may be compatible with the sovereignty of small states. The suggestion is that the US and China, respectively, could have their own spheres of security (if not influence) in the Western Hemisphere and the Western Pacific. It is not clear at all that the US at present concerns itself with such niceties. Be that as it may, this implies, at a minimum, that the US stands ready to fundamentally reset its ties with China. If true, it would be a striking departure from the US strategy towards China, not only from the Biden era but from Trump 1.0 when China was considered an implacable adversary by the US establishment.

President Trump is nothing if not capricious. So it is hard to make predictions on his watch. But on current evidence, the last interpretation above seems a stretch and a tad implausible. There are just too many imponderables and too many flash points in the relationship between US and China. The forthcoming US National Security Strategy may provide a hint or two. But then again, it may not be the last word on the subject.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Almost a year into Trump 2.0, we are getting a fair glimpse into the negotiating strategy adopted by various powers, big and small vis-a-vis the US. It offers lessons both in psychology and leadership. Countries can be broadly divided into the following categories. Obviously the list is illsutrative and not exhaustive.

(1) Leverage: There are very few powers at this point which have real leverage vis-a-vis President Trump and the US. But China is certainly one of them. Two of the most potent levers that it has (among many) is the large amount of Agriculture products that it buys from the US (Soy for example) or the fact that it has near-total control over rare earth elements and is willing to use it for negotiating purposes with the US. All this has meant that the American team negotiating with China has had to be extremely flexible and reasonable. Indeed, even before Trump and Xi Jinping are to meet in a couple of days from now, the Americans have had to concede that the 100 per cent tariffs threatened by Trump is off the table. This kind of negotiating tactic from Trump and his team is unprecedented, but entirely undertsandable given the extraordinary leverage possessed by China.

(2) Tough Love: US allies like the EU, Japan and Korea have been subject to what can only be described as “tough love”. President Trump’s prescription has been straightforward to these allies: no more free riding and please pay for services rendered ( tangible, intangible and with retrospective effect) to you by the US. In the process, President Trump has single-handedly shaken-up the “alliance system” in place for several years. Australia which was intially impacted, has gotten away with it only because of the critical minerals and rare earths that it has and has signed a deal with the US.

(3) Flattery: Some countries have decided, ab initio, that flattery, capitulation and behaving obsequiously is the best way to deal with President Trump. Pakistan best exemplifies this strategy and has used it to its apparent benefit. Whether this is a viable long-term strategy that will continue to pay is something that only time will tell.

(4) The put-down: Countries like Canada, Panama and Denmark have had to suffer public “put-down” by President Trump. Canada has often been asked to become the 51st State of the US, Panama has been asked to disown a canal and Denmark has been told to part with Greenland. Despite this, these countries have continued to negotiate with the US, even while maintaining their national dignity.

(5) Non-capitulation and passive resistance: Brazil and India may not have retaliated against some of the highest punitive tariffs imposed on them by President Trump, but they have not capitulated either and continue to negotiate in good faith. Brazil and India may lack the leverage possessed by China, but they do have some geopolitical clout and not inconsiderable economic heft. Whether their negotiating strategy based on passive resistance will succeed, we will know sooner rather than later.

(6) Confrontation: That leaves Russia, the recalcitrant big power that appears determined not to allow President Trump a diplomatic victory in the matter of the conflict in Ukraine. But then, it could also be argued that Russia’s case is sui generis since there are already sanctions against it and it has very little to lose by taking a tough line against President Trump and the US. This has caused a fair bit of angst (if not anger) in Trump who has consequently flip-flopped on his approach to Putin and Russia.

In conclusion, it is difficult to contend that there is one successful negotiating strategy vis-a-vis President Trump. Sure, if you have real leverage and are ready to use it, Trump gets that almost immediately and reacts accordingly. This is unsurprising, since his diplomacy has been described by many as transactional in nature. For the others without substantial leverage, negotiating strategy is a function of whatever strengths they have, how much strategic resilience they possess and the extent of loss they are willing to tolerate.

Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies housed in OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.