With the Middle East (aka West Asia) going up in flames, it is no longer an exaggeration to say that the world is on the brink. The more difficult question to answer is what happens now?

Major continents are in the throes of upheaval. The Western Hemisphere is already facing the full force of the “Donroe Doctrine” (alternatively styled as the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine) as we saw in the events unfolding in Venezuela. It is fair to say that things have not yet settled in Venzuela following the overthrow of the former President Maduro. American ties with both Canada and Mexico may have gotten civil, but not yet chummy as they ought to be. US has imposed a fuel blockade of Cuba, and President Trump let it be known intriguingly that there may be a “friendly takeover” of Cuba. Suffice it to say that the Western Hemisphere is producing more headlines than it can consume these days.

The African continent has been home to violent conflicts for a long time. At the time of writing, wars rage in Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, The Sahel trio of Mali, Burkina Faso & Niger, and Mozambique. Need one say more about the dark continent?

Europe has been in the throes of a conflict since February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. Despite the best efforts of President Trump and others, the conflict shows no sign of abating. It has truly taken on the character of a war of attrition, with enormous death and destruction bang in the middle of Europe. At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that the conflict in Ukraine will end anytime soon.

While Asia has had episodic conflicts, it has been generally free of large-scale and destructive wars. That said, the war between Pakistan and Afghanistan now seems seriously worrisome. Gulf countries have had a go at mediation in the past, but the two neighbours seem more antagonistic than ever. And in the Himalayas, it is worth recalling that India and China maintain some 50,000 troops each, in eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The situation in the Taiwan Strait, South and East China Sea is also far from normal.

But it is the Middle East that has, justifiably, occupied airtime and headlines for the last 48 hours or so. It has thus dubiously lived up to its reputation of being a permanently unsettled region. The joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran have the potential to dramatically alter the strategic landscape in not just the Middle East, but in the world at large. The question, however, on everyone’s mind is how long the conflict will last? This is important for a variety of reasons. But the most important has to do with the global economy and with the sea lanes of communication in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has already retaliated against the US-Israeli attacks. But will it have the wherewithal to survive, resist and retaliate for a meaningful period of time? As for US objectives, it certainly would not want to get sucked into a quagmire, which is what Iran may prove to be. President Trump must be acutely aware of voices in his MAGA constituency which detest “forever” wars. Curiously, the reaction from China and Russia to the US-Israeli attempt at regime change in Iran has been muted, to put it mildly. This will be the subject of much analysis and dissection among foreign policy wonks.

So, what explains all of the above? That is not an easy question to answer. Rather than resort to facile explanantions attributable to the actions of one country’s leader or the other, answers must be sought in structural factors that affect international relations at this point. The truth of the matter is that, geopolitically and geoeconomically, the world appears multipolar albeit with strong binary characterstics, underpinned by the dominance of both the US and China. But geomilitarily, the world is still very much unipolar with the US calling the shots. In the final analysis, it is only the US which seems capable of projecting hard power across continents. In order to achieve global strategic equilibrium, a certain degree of multipolarity is essential not just in the geopolitical and geoeconomic spheres, but also in the geomilitary sphere. That might bring an element of balance of power and long-term stability in international relations. Easier said than done, you say. Well, you would be right.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

With the AI (Artificial Intelligence) international summit in full swing in Delhi, the question occurred to me as to how many people know the basics of this hugely complex subject. I certainly did not know too much; but after some research, this is what I discovered. Domain experts may stop right here and need not proceed further. Others, hopefully, may find it of some value.

Definition: There are tons of definitions on the subject. The simplest one is that AI is a technology that enables machines and computers to perfom tasks that typically require human intelligence. In other words, it is a set of technologies that empowers computers to learn, reason and to perform a variety of advanced tasks in ways that previously used to require human intelligence, such as understanding language, analysing data, and even providing helpful suggestions.

Importance of AI: AI can be applied to a wide range of sectors, namely, IT, healthcare, finance, marketing, manufacturing, tourism and transportation. But more than anything else, AI enhances efficiency, promotes data-driven decision making, improves accuracy, promotes savings in costs and encourages personalization.

Inevitability of AI: AI penetration has moved well beyond experiments; a whopping 88 per cent of organizations worldwide are already using AI in some form or the other. Roughly 1 in 6 people used AI products by the end of 2025, a figure set to rise exponentially in the months and years ahead. In terms of per capita AI adoption, UAE and Singapore lead the world. Other countries are following suit. Whether one likes it or not, AI is here to stay.

Infrastructure: The US ranks first in terms of AI infrastructure, but ranks lower (28th) in per capita adoption. In terms of the main infrastructure i.e. the data centers, there are key components to it: GPUs (Graphic Processing Units), networking, storage, cooling and scalable power systems. There are at present 10,800-odd data centers around the world. US leads the way with 3960, followed by UK with 498, Germany with 470, China with 365, France with 335 and India with 275. The current AI summit in Delhi has two strategic objectives from India’s point of view: to attract substantial investments into India and to shape, to the extent possible, the regulatory landscape in AI.

Regulation: Everyone (including Mark Zuckerberg) agrees that there is need for regulating AI. The question is how far countries wish to go in regulating AI. Key issues that policy makers will have to grapple include: liability – who is responsible when AI systems cause harm; data privacy/ safety – AI requires vast datasets often violating privacy; Intellectual Property – copyrighted data is often used without authorization; and algorithmic bias – AI systems can amplify societal biases leading to unfair outcomes in hiring and law enforcement. For Governments, striking the right regulatory balance between a regime which prevents abuse of AI on the one hand and promotes innovation and investment on the other, is of vital importance. There is global regulatory divergence already: EU seems to prefer binding risk-based regulations while other countries like Japan focus on flexibility and laissez-faire. India has released AI governance guidelines focusing on safety, trust, and inclusion, tending towards the EU model.

Inclusion: AI, like any other transformative technology, can either benefit humanity or completely rupture it. In countries like India, it can also cause a deep and unbridgeable divide. This is really the central challenge for countries of the global south. Microsoft has come up with its “AI Diffusion Report” which states unambigously that AI usage in the Global North is roughly twice that in the Global South. There is no option, the above Report says , except for Governments and other stakeholders to undertake the following:

• Building the infrastructure needed for AI diffusion
• Empowering people through technology and skills for schools and nonprofits
• Strengthening multilingual and multicultural AI capabilities
• Enabling local AI innovations that address community needs
• Measuring AI diffusion to guide future AI policies and investments

The ongoing AI Summit in Delhi may be expected to come up with recommendations on the subject of inclusive AI.

Impact on Environment: One of the biggest worries for countries of the global south is the colossal energy and water requirements that AI will require.  The proliferating data centres that house AI servers produce electronic waste. They are large consumers of water, which is becoming scarce in countries of the global south. They rely on critical minerals and rare elements, which are often mined unsustainably and which are in short supply. And they use massive amounts of electricity, spurring the emission of planet-warming greenhouse gases.  When establishing data centres, companies must disclose the environmental impact and all stake holders must join hands to tackle the above problems. The UNESCO way back in 2021 had come up with “Recommendation on the ethics of artificial intelligence” which is well worth looking at. It is available on UNESCO’s website.

Job Losses: Backed by the exponential diffusion of AI, one view is that the impact might be more dramatic than expected in Africa and South Asia and for rural and remote communities. Emerging markets and low-income developing countries are less prepared for AI and may be more affected than others. Cross-country studies of labour market exposure to AI  reveal that advanced countries face a higher risk to congnitive jobs ; but they are also better positioned to exploit the benefits of AI compared to emerging and developing economies.

India faces, potentially, a double whammy. The digital divide and the gender divide both feeding on each other and complicating things. Also, the IITs producing batch after batch of software coders who then seek jobs in the US or elsewhere, may be threatened. The biggest risk may however not be mass unemployment, but widening inequality.

The good news is that AI’s trajectory is not pre-determined and could yet be influenced by a country’s choices. The charter for action must include: proactive policy interventions, taking into account ethical considerations and massive investment in human capital. Seen from this perspective, the AI Summit in Delhi could not have come at a more appropriate time.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

It has been suggested from time to time that India, an emerging if not a global power, must issue a National Security Strategy (NSS). It is understood that a classified, internal document approximating a NSS exists for policy makers. But that is not the same as an unclassified version which is available for the wider public. While there has been understandable reluctance on the part of the authorities to do so, nothing prevents others from doing it. This is an initial attempt to do so. For ease of understanding, there are three sections: objectives, principles and strategy.

Objectives

There can be little doubt that the most important objective of any national security strategy is to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Equally, protection of its citizens and advancing their interests is a no-brainer. This requires a modern military on both the continental and the maritime sphere. What is perhaps less understood is that economic security is of paramount importance. Lifting millions of people from poverty, giving them jobs and providing them substantial access to affordable health, housing and education is an imperative necessity. The Indian economy which is a 4 trillion dollar one must therefore become a 10 trillion one with a relatively high per capita income which will put us in the bracket of an upper middle-income country. Only this and this alone can enable India to become Viksit Bharat by 2047. A multipolar world order with a fairer distribution of power is preferable, for obvious reasons.

Principles

At one level, the oft-repeated expression “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” can guide foreign and security policy. But this is more like motherhood and apple pie, to which no one can object. More specifically, India has always subscribed to some unexceptionable principles when it comes to practicing its foreign and security policy. One is the sovereign equality of nations. India has always believed that no matter how big or small, rich or poor, all countries are equal and their sovereignty must be respected in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. Second, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign and independent countries. Third, a clear preference for dialogue and peaceful resolution of issues rather than the use of force. Fourth, India has always favoured international cooperation to deal with global challenges such as climate change and public health. Fifth, India has been long committed to multilateralism and to the ideals of institutions like the United Nations, even while flagging the need for fundamental reform. Sixth, India has striven to be the voice of the Global South wherever it can, articulating its priorities and negotiating on its behalf. Seventh, there is no question that technology, AI and Quantum computing will drive the economy of the world. India believes that technology and AI must be accessible, open and non-discriminatory. Eighth, India still favours the goal of global nuclear disarmament, no matter how unrealistic that may sound today. Ninth, the war against terrorism must be a principled and unconditional one; there are no good terrorists and bad terrorists. Tenth and last, India has benefitted enormously from globalization. The importance of free trade, open markets for our goods and services, access to rare earths, foreign direct investment and the legal migration of our citizens across borders cannot be overstated. This also entails open sea lanes of communication as well as safe undersea cables.   

Strategy

It is accepted that strategic autonomy practiced through a foreign policy based on multi-alignment has stood India in good stead. The distinction between strategic autonomy and strategic hedging is worth underlining. The former is about securing valuable policy space. The latter is about using the space so acquired, judiciously, to advance national interest.

Based on the above broad framework, the foreign and security strategy of India regarding major powers and regions are delineated below.

It should be obvious that those who contest the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India must be considered the main strategic threat for India. China, because of its various territorial claims on the border and particularly the one relating to Arunachal Pradesh, is an obvious candidate in this regard. Because the comprehensive national power differential between China and India is huge, India has no choice but to engage in both internal balancing and external balancing for the foreseeable future. The former relates to building serious internal capacity and the latter relates to building alliances with major powers. However, constructive engagement with China is not merely an option for India; it is an imperative.

The other country which falls in the threat category is of course Pakistan which may not be a pacing threat anymore but a serious rogue threat, nevertheless.

“Neighbourhood First” policy, thoughtful as it is, is work in progress. Bangladesh may prove to be a bellwether in this regard.

In terms of the 42 strategic partnerships that India has, the USA continues to be the most important one despite recent setbacks. One hears talk about trust being broken, but diplomacy is unsentimental and about permanent interests. The decision by the US to do away with the punitive tariffs and reduce the reciprocal tariffs, has not come a day too soon. It now remains for both sides to work hard to regain the time lost and to realize the full potential of the most consequential strategic partnership of the twenty-first century.  

Russia will remain a strategic partner for India in its own right. But the war in Ukraine is a drag on ties and Russia must do everything to end it as quickly as possible.  

EU is critical for India, and both share a fundamental conviction about multipolarity in the world order.  The recently concluded FTA (Free Trade Agreement) and the Security & Defence Partnership between India and the EU is a paradigmatic shift in this regard. Both the EU and India do fancy themselves in pole position in a multipolar world. EU may be an economic giant, but a geopolitical minnow. India faces a different problem: its economic heft has simply not kept pace with its rising geopolitical clout. Can the EU and India help each other achieve their full potential?

Japan and Australia are not just part of the Quad but provide fulcrum points for India’s Act East policy. South Korea will remain a crucial trade and investment partner of India.  ASEAN centrality is work in progress. GCC countries are vital for India’s prosperity.

Finally, India cannot afford to ignore Africa and Latin America in the medium to long term.  

The above list is not exhaustive but meant as a starting point for India’s National Security Strategy. It is about time the country had a debate.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and currently Dean/Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Speaking Notes

Check Against Delivery

Hon’ble Minister PT Rajan, Ambassador Tirumurti, Excellencies, Ladies
and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure and honour to be here in Chennai on this happy
occasion.
I can think of no one more qualified to lead the Deccan Centre for
International Relations than Ambassador Tirumurti.
I congratulate the organizers for this excellent initiative for one obvious
reason and for another one which is less obvious.
The obvious one is that there is no rational reason why Centres of IR
and Think Tanks should be based primarily in Delhi. In fact, to the
contrary.
The less obvious reason is that when it comes to business and
technology, the two vectors that the proposed Deccan Centre hopes to
address, it is the South of India which has played a leading role. Yet, the
South has not weighed in as much as it should have, in policy
formulation. If India has a conservative and defensive trade policy for
instance, it is because the South has not played its full part. I hope the
Deccan Centre will change this and emerge as an ardent advocate of
both the business and tech interests of the southern states.
My talk today will be divided into two parts: one, current state of
geopolitics and two, India’s response to it.
In geopolitics, there are decades when nothing happens and then there
are weeks when decades happen. 2025 was one such year. It was
characterised by cascading strategic turbulence, leading to “geopolitics
on steroids”, as it were.

The Liberal International Order, some might say is on its last legs, but it
really has ended for all intents and purposes.
We may well see a settled multipolar world order at some point in the
future, but the present situation is undoubtedly one of commotion,
confusion and chaos.

The actions of the two Great Powers, i.e. US and China on the one hand
and actions of the major power Russia, on the other hand, bear scrutiny.
It is fashionable to attribute the current geopolitical turbulence
exclusively to the US and to the mercurial occupant of the White House.
That would be a strategic error. The fact is that for most of the world’s
history, there was never any settled global order. The Liberal
International Order thus was largely an exception to the rule. The world
is normally characterised by chaos, so in some ways we are back to the
“normal” state of affairs in the world.
That said, there is no gainsaying the fact that the US Foreign, Security
and Trade Policy have undergone a dramatic shift under the Trump
Administration, no question about it.
The disdain for multilateralism in general and the UN in particular, is
obvious and hard to miss. After all, US has withdrawn from scores of
international organizations. And with the “Board of Peace” proposal, it is
hard to see the US actively returning to the UN anytime soon. The UN
Security Council remains dysfunctional and a UN that is both politically
and financially weakened is something the world must contend with.
The UN is not the only casualty. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
remains in limbo, and the US has formally conveyed to the WTO’s
highest body that it no longer thinks the MFN (Most Favoured Nation
Clause) is fit for purpose. The EU and China have since followed suit.
Bear in mind that the MFN was hitherto the bedrock of the multilateral
trading system.
On defence and security, both the NSS (National Security Strategy) and
the NDS (National Defence Strategy) make abundantly clear what has
been clear on the ground: American retrenchment. Thus, the primary
focus henceforth will be on homeland security and on the Western
Hemisphere.
But the real impact of American policy is on the traditional alliance
structure. The transatlantic alliance and the NATO have been thebulwark of Western security and defence since at least World War II. No
longer. The US has made clear that it expects NATO allies to do
substantially more and its support henceforth may be critical but
certainly much more limited. Individual alliance partners such as Japan,
South Korea and The Philippines have also been served notice that they
must do more.
As American military bandwidth is shrunk deliberately, the ripples will be
felt in Europe and Middle East. The big question is what happens to the
Indo-Pacific? The US NDS talks of maintaining a favourable balance of
power in the Indo-Pacific, again urging allies and partners to do more.
But US policy towards China is still to emerge clearly. For instance, the
US NDS says the US does not seek to strangle, humiliate or dominate
China. At the same time, it says the US cannot allow China or any other
power to dominate it in the Indo-Pacific. What this will entail and how this
delicate balance of power is achieved remains to be seen. The meeting
between President Xi Jinping and President Trump in April may reveal
clues to this question.
We turn to China. There is absolutely no doubt that China faces serious
domestic headwinds. These head winds pertain to turmoil in the military,
youth unemployment, the real estate bubble, massive industrial
overcapacity and a shrinking population. Add to this an external
environment which is protectionist and wary of China. But China is
nothing if not resilient. For now, China is on a wait and watch mode vis-
à-vis Trump and the US. There is mixed messaging from both countries
towards one another.
Russia, which qualifies as a major power, feels extremely betrayed by
the West and has hence turned disruptive. In a war of attrition in
Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated it has the upper hand. Russia’s
legitimate security interests must be met and it is clear that it is
impossible to have a stable European Security Architecture without
Russia. That said, the onus now is on Russia to find a way to end the
conflict.
All other powers, big and small, have had to cope with the actions of the
above big powers, the only way they could: engage in strategic hedging.
And when all powers do it, it leads to multiple strategic hedging.
India’s response to this geopolitical turbulence has not been easy.
Before assessing the same, it is important to remember that theturbulence is not necessarily of India’s making. But a country must deal
with the world as it is, not as it wishes it to be. Be that as it may, in my
view India deserves a 6.5 out of 10 for the way it has performed.
With the US, there is no denying that there are issues, particularly
relating to trade. But the policy followed by India: no confrontation, no
capitulation and continued conversation, has been the best one so far.
Also, in areas other than trade, bilateral contacts and progress has
continued. Two questions are critical: (1) How much longer before a
trade deal? (2) How will India be required to cope if and when the US-
China ties reach some equilibrium? We will know soon enough.
With China, India has not yielded at the border, but full de-escalation has
not happened. Trade has continued and our exports have done better,
but the deficit continues. People to people ties are showing signs of
picking up. China with the domestic headwinds and friction with the US,
does not wish to open another active front with India. India for its part,
cannot take on China entirely on its own. Given this, a temporary
détente is in the interest of both countries.
Russia has been a challenge for India. The war in Ukraine has hurt us.
So, India can and should try harder with President Putin to persuade him
to end the war in Ukraine. As for our dependence on Russian weapons
and platforms, the best guess is that for the foreseeable 10 years or so,
legacy dependence will continue. PM Modi has said on more than one
occasion that this is not the era of war, and it is in India’s interest that the
war comes to an end. India has already paid a price in this regard.
The present geopolitical turbulence offers India a 1991- Redux moment.
India’s geopolitical clout is hugely weakened by its lack of economic,
trade and technological heft. A 4 trillion-dollar economy is insufficient for
a population of 1.5 billion people. We need inclusive growth and we
need to get to at least 10 trillion dollars asap.
The FTA with EU was a big step in the right direction by India. But we
need to carry out deep structural reforms in Agriculture, Land, Labour,
Power and Regulations if we are to fully benefit from this and other
FTAs. It is worth noting that we have also signed a Security and Defence
Partnership with the EU. There is a point to note here. All countries will
henceforth have to bring their trade policy in broad alignment with their
security and geopolitical strategy. The days of having a comprehensive security partnership with one power and a full-fledged trade partnership with another power, may be numbered.
Let me conclude with the following observations:
(1) There is simply no going back to the Liberal International Order.
(2) There is no going back either to a unipolar moment with a single
hegemon.
(3) I do not see any realistic prospect for a G-2, involving the US and
China.
(4) Trade, Technology and Investment will be based on trust,
resilience and reciprocity. By the same token, it has the potential to
be weaponised.
(5) Military conflicts will continue to proliferate. Military expenditure will
continue to soar, even among middle powers. The nuclear order is
in danger of unravelling. Between Ukraine and North Korea, which
one would countries rather be? And what if Ukraine had
possessed nuclear weapons? The Saudi-Pak military deal is
evidence of this.
(6) Technology will disrupt and will create a new divide. How countries
like India cope with Tech and AI, will offer lessons for the Global
South.
(7) Global problems like climate change, public health, and even the
laudable SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) will take a back
seat, much to humanity’s detriment.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me conclude by quoting that inscrutable Chinese saying: We live in
interesting times!

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and is currently Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

The National Defence Strategy (NDS), 2026, was published a couple of days ago by the US Department of War. It is primarily meant to offer guidance to the American senior Pentagon leadership as well as Commanders and Field Activity Directors. Taken by itself, there is nothing hugely earth shaking in the document. However, read in conjunction with the much more detailed National Security Strategy issued by the Trump administration in December 2025, the broad outline of US Foreign and Security Policy becomes apparent.

The NDS begins by making the political point that previous American administrations had squandered military advantage, lives, goodwill and resources for grandiose nation building projects. Asserting that the US has the world’s strongest and most capable military, the NDS states that the Department of War will not be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change and nation building. Instead, the NDS’s underlying motto is “peace through strength”.

The NDS bluntly says it is not in America’s interest, nor is it its duty, to act everywhere on its own. Nor will the US make up for allied security shortfalls arising from their leaders’ own irresponsible choices. American allies, transatlantic or elsewhere in the world, cannot now say they were not forewarned!

Like the NSS, the NDS gives primacy to homeland security and the Western Hemisphere. Securing America’s borders is sought to be done, skies will be defended through the Golden Dome and a robust nuclear deterrent will be maintained. In the Western Hemisphere, the NDS says the US will guarantee military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America and interestingly, Greenland. More comfortingly, the NDS says that the US will engage in good faith with its neighbours from Canada to partners in Central & South America even while ensuring that they respect and do their part to defend shared interests. And if they do not, Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine will kick in.

The NDS declares China as the second most powerful country in the world- behind only the US. By calling China the most powerful state relative to the US since the 19th century, the NDS grudgingly accepts some strategic parity between the US and China. Crucially, the NDS spells out that the American objective is to “maintain a favourable balance of military power” in the Indo-Pacific. However, the NDS adds that this is not for purposes of dominating, humiliating or strangling China. On the contrary, the goal is to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate US or its allies. Ruling out regime change or an existential struggle with China, the NDS seeks “a decent peace” on terms favourable to the US but one that China can also accept and live under. Two questions arise immediately: one, the omission of the words “military overmatch” from the NSS is glaring; two, the NDS does not explain how the US can achieve its objectives without dominating China and at the same time not allowing China to dominate the US. And the key question is whether these terms are acceptable to China in the Indo-Pacific. The question is what constitutes “decent peace” and “a favourable balance of military power” in the Indo-Pacific.

On Taiwan, the NDS argues in favour of sustaining a strong denial defence along the First Island Chain. Again, the NDS says the US will work closely with its allies and partners in the region to incentivize and enable them to do more for collective defence, especially in ways that are relevant to an effective denial defence.

Russia is described by the NDS as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future. Despite a host of problems, the NDS says the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates that Russia still retains deep reservoirs of military and industrial power. It also adds that Russia has shown national resolve. Saying that Russia could employ threats relating to undersea, space and cyber capabilities against US Homeland, the NDS says the US is ready to counter this. Saying the NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia, the NDS makes the critical point that while the US will remain engaged in Europe, it will nevertheless prioritize defending its Homeland and deterring China.

Two specific actions proposed by the NDS will be examined by countries everywhere in the world. One, the NDS specifically calls for increased burden-sharing with not just American allies but also its partners. Thus, the NDS repeats the mantra of the NSS that Europe take primary responsibility for its own conventional defence to the security threat it faces. US support to NATO allies will be critical but “more limited”, the NDS says. In a similar vein, the NDS says that in the Middle East, the US will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies. Israel will be helped to defend itself, cooperation to be deepened with Arab Gulf partners and integration enabled between Israel and the Arab partners through the Abraham Accords. In the Korean Peninsula, the NDS postulates that South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, once again with critical but more limited US support.

The NDS concludes by emphasizing the US Defence Industrial Base and how to supercharge it. The DIB, according to the NDS, must produce, deliver, and sustain critical munitions, systems and platforms. The NDB avers that the effort to supercharge the Defence Indutrial Base will require nothing short of a national mobilization – a call to industrial arms on par with similar revivals of the last century that ultimately powered the US to victory in both the world wars and the Cold War that followed.

Conclusion

The key things that stand out in this iteration of the NDS are:

>US is no longer going to be present in every strategic theatre, all at once;

>Homeland and Western Hemisphere have been given primacy as in the NSS;

>In the Indo-Pacific, where America’s allies share the desire for a free and open regional order, the NDS underlines that allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China;

>An ambiguous defense strategy (perhaps deliberate) to counter China;

>Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defense as well as cope with the threat from Russia;

>South Korea to take charge of deterring North Korea in the Korean Peninsula;

>In the Middle East, allies and partners led by Israel to counter threat from Iran and its proxies; and

>Ambitious plan to supercharge America’s defense industrial base.

In my blog last month entitled ” Trump’s National Security Strategy has evolved” I had made bold to predict that there are signs of American foreign and security policy retrenchment from both institutions and regions. The National Defense Strategy just released provides further evidence of this.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

Now that the artificial deadline imposed by newspapers & magazines on “yearend despatches” is over and the dust has settled, it is time to look back calmly at the year gone by. The title for this blog pretty much suggested itself. 2025 can really be reduced to just two words: geopolitical turbulence. No surprises there. But given below are the megatrends thrown up in the last one year or so.

Parity between two Great Powers: If ever historians look back at the point when China attained a degree of parity with the United States of America, it would have to be the year 2025. Strategic and geopolitical parity are notoriously hard to measure. Even so, multiple reports written by various American agencies openly admit there is only one peer competitor to the US and that is China. And President Trump may have given it his seal of approval when he said on social media that “The G2 will be convening shortly” before his October 2025 meeting with President Xi Jinping. China certainly behaved as America’s equal in 2025, whether it is the tariff war, the tech race or defending its core interests. Things could still change quickly. But for now, it is hard to contest that there are two Great Powers in the world, namely, the US and China. Then, there are the rest.

Uncertainty around traditional alliance structures: The most dramatic example of this phenomenon is obviously the transatlantic alliance, embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But other individual alliances such as the one that the US has with Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia and Philippines, to name a few, all appear to be under some form of pressure or the other. Part of the uncertainty stems from the American sentiment that treaty allies must share much more of the burden than they have done so far and may also be a consequence of the American strategic retrenchment expressed by its National Security Strategy that the Western Hemisphere will, more than others, be a priority theatre. No one is yet predicting a total breakdown of the alliance structure itself; but it is difficult to see the status quo being maintained. Interestingly, loose alliance-like relations such as those between Russia/China on the one hand and Venzuela/Iran on the other, will also need to be reworked or rethought by the parties concerned, in light of recent events. Last but not least, the “friendship without limits” between Russia and China did have some limits after all. Could the limits to the relationship expand with time?

Total collapse of MFN: Since the end of World War II and the advent of first GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and then the WTO (World Trade Organization), the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle has been the bedrock of all international trade. But now, the most powerful trading player in the world i.e the US, has formally proposed to the WTO that the practice of MFN should end and is not fit for purpose. Regardless of the validity of this claim, this constitutes a huge departure from how most of the world traded with each other. Some 69 per cent of all existing global trade is still based on MFN. But, this may be expected to see a steep decline in the years ahead. International trade in the future will most certainly be strategic, preferential, reciprocal and most certainly non-MFN. Weaponisation of strategic trade is a brutal reality: look at the issue of controls on semiconductor chips on the one hand, and rare earths on the other. Meanwhile, expect Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and bilateral trade agreements to grow exponentially, undermining MFN further.

RIP Multilateralism: For some years now, multilateralism has been in terminal decline. The reasons are too well known to bear any repetition here. On January 7 this year, the US which is invariably the principal funder of both UN and non-UN organizations, decided to pull out of some 66 international organizations. And without the US, many of these organizations will lose their raison détre. It is too early to say what will replace multilateralism. Some speak of US minus one, but that is easier said than done, as the WTO has now started to realize. Plurilateral institutions such as G20, BRICS, SCO seem to have limits to their functioning as well.

Military Expenditure Soars as conflicts prevail: One defining feature of 2025 has been the continuation of old conflicts and the advent of new ones. The war in Ukraine has continued for the fourth year running; the bombing may have stopped in Gaza but strife persists; Yemen is restless; Sudan is restive; Venezuela is on edge; and China is militarily assertive in its backyard. There were also limited wars elsewhere in the world. The net result of all this is that the rise in annual military expenditure in 2024 (the last year for which data is available) was the steepest in the last 30 years with a ten per cent increase touching 2.8 trillion dollars. This will almost certainly rise in 2025 for reasons mentioned above. War is hugely profitable, as the saying goes!

Technological Disruption: For tech buffs, it is fair to say that 2025 was the year of “irrational exuberance”. The kind of investment made in Artificial Intelligence is truly scary and it is hard not to think of it as a bubble. The American lead in matters tech is incontestable; but what is true is also the fact that China is fast catching up. Witness the emergence of DeepSeek! The tech war will play itself out over the next few years. But 2025 may well have been a turning point.

Multiple Strategic Hedging: There is no index to measure the degree of trust between nations. But if there was one, it would be very very low. This lack of trust between countries, translates into a foreign and security policy characterised by strategic hedging. And when every country hedges against the other, then it constitutes multiple strategic hedging leading to a spaghetti bowl of strategic partnerships of bewildering shapes and colours.

Multipolar but unruly world disorder: Policy wonks have already pronounced the death of the liberal international order which was established in the aftermath of World War II. That is probably true. Equally, people have hastened to announce the advent of a multipolar world based on spheres of influence. This seems a little less certain, if only because there are two Great Powers in serious contestation with one another and then you have the rest which are jostling for space and influence. Yet, the nomenclature “multipolar world” gives a certain degree of assurance to policy wonks who need comforting words to describe the world they see in front of them. The trouble is that the expression “multipolar world order” denotes a certain number of identifiable poles by common agreement and a reasonable semblance of order based on consensus. Both of those simply do not exist as of now. The world is therefore arguably multipolar and is most certainly disorderly, unruly and fractious. And therein lies the problem for decision makers who have to craft meaningful foreign and security policy for their countries.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the Director General of the newly established Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

As directed by the US Congress, the Department of War (the new appellation for the former Pentagon) provides an annual report on military and security developments relating to the People’s Republic of China. These reports have traditionally chronicled the development of China’s military capabilities and strategy. Consequently, the latest report was issued by Pentagon in the last week of December. Policy wonks and China hands will do well to go through the 100-page report with a fine tooth comb.

It is my recommendation that this report (hereinafter referred to as the Pentagon Report or just the Report) must be read in conjunction with the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025 issued just a few weeks ago. The Trump administration gave the clear impression in the NSS 2025 that China was viewed from the geoeconomic or tech lens rather than as a serious geopolitical threat, and much less as a revisionist power. What this Pentagon Report does is to correct this and slightly reorient the US approach towards China. The Report is still at pains to point out that President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China. However, the Pentagon Report argues that steps will be taken to ensure that President Trump is able to achieve the above objectives from a position of military strength.

Counterintuitively, the Report argues that Sino-American relations are stronger than they have been in many years, and that the Pentagon will support efforts to build on this progress. It proposes to do so in part by opening a wider range of military-to-military communications with the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) with a focus on strategic stability as well as deconfliction and de-escalation, more broadly. The Report says the US will also seek other ways to make clear its peaceful intentions vis-a-vis China.

The Report states clearly that China’s military focus is currently the First Island Chain that runs from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay Peninsula. It argues that Beijing recognizes this region as the strategic center of gravity for its goals in the region. The Report nevertheless takes cognizance of the fact that while China’s strategic center of gravity remains the First Island Chain, it is logical that China’s military power will also continue to grow towards a force capable of projecting power worldwide. The Report acknowledges Beijing’s stated ambition to field a “worldclass” military by 2049.

Despite the above, the Report says the Pentagon will ensure that the Forces are always ready and able to defend American interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Report says it bears emphasizing that U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are fundamental—but also scoped and reasonable. The US does not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China, the Report underscores tellingly. Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s NSS 2025, the Pentagon seeks only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate the US or its allies. This is the NSS idea of military overmatch! That means being so strong that aggression is not even considered, and that peace is therefore preferred and preserved. The Pentagon will therefore prioritize bolstering deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation. It seeks to do this by forging and sustaining a balance of power that will enable all countries to enjoy a decent peace in an Indo-Pacific—one in which trade flows openly and fairly, all can prosper, and all nations’ interests are respected. What happens if interests clash or how this balance of power will be achieved, is not dealt with at any length in the Report.

But having sounded dovish, the Report seamlessly switches to combat mode in part. After all it is a Report written by the Pentagon. It states baldly that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has for decades marshaled resources, technology, and political will to achieve its vision of a world-class military. The PLA, it states, is a key component of China’s ambition to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful nation. The PLA measures its concepts and capabilities against the “strong enemy” of the United States.
Moreover, the Report points out that China’s top military strategy focuses squarely on overcoming the United States through a whole-of-nation mobilization effort that Beijing terms “national total war.” The Report talks of China’s historic military buildup that has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable. It adds China maintains a large and growing arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities able to directly threaten Americans’ security. In 2024, the Report notes that Chinese cyberespionage campaigns such as Volt Typhoon burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, demonstrating capabilities that could disrupt the U.S. military in a conflict and harm American interests. The Report notes that the PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan, “strategic counterbalance” against the United States in the nuclear and other strategic domains, and “strategic deterrence and control” against other regional countries. In other words, the Report predicts somewhat ominously that China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.
The Report clarifies that China claims three “core interests,” defined as issues so central to China’s national rejuvenation that its official position is not subject to negotiation or compromise. These include: 1) the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) control; 2) promoting China’s economic development; and 3) defending and expanding China’s sovereignty and territorial claims. The Report clarifies that China’s leadership has extended the term “core interest” to cover Taiwan and sovereignty claims amid territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (emphasis mine). The inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh is noteworthy especially in light of the statement above that these are issues where the Chinese official position is not subject to negotiation or compromise.

The Report deals at some length about China’s ties with other regions of the world. It is detailed but not very original in content. It also covers a lot of ground on China’s pressure tactics vis-a-vis Taiwan, China’s competition with US and PLA’s role in China’s foreign policy. In other words, a lot of open source material.

The Report has interesting things to say about Sino-Russian ties. Despite continued growth in their relationship, the Report notes that Beijing and Moscow remain unwilling to establish a formal defense alliance with mutual security guarantees. China and Russia continue to harbor a mutual distrust of each other, which likely prevents cooperation on areas each side perceives as
sensitive, the Report believes. China also has stopped short of providing Russia with lethal aid for use in its war against Ukraine, the Report admits. This has allowed Beijing to preserve its close ties with Moscow while mitigating reputational or economic costs associated with Russia’s global behavior, the Report concludes.

There is a paragraph on Sino-Indian ties entitled : Developments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. The Report recalls that in October 2024, India announced an agreement with China to disengage from remaining standoff sites along the LAC two days before a meeting between President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. The Report says the Xi-Modi meeting marked the onset of monthly high-level engagements between the two countries, where parties discussed border management and next steps for the bilateral relationship, including direct flights, visa facilitation, and the exchange of academics and journalists. According to the Report, China probably seeks to capitalize on decreased tension along the LAC to stabilize bilateral relations and prevent the deepening of U.S.-India ties; however, the Report adds India probably remains skeptical of China’s actions and motives. Continued mutual distrust and other irritants almost certainly limit the bilateral relationship, the Report avers.

The Report talks of China following a three-step development strategy for military modernization. At present, China’s goals for modernizing its armed forces are publicly noted as follows:
● By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.
● By 2035: “Comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national defense and the
military.”
● By 2049: “Fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”

On military bases abroad, the Report says China has built two military facilities outside its territory: a support base in Djibouti established in 2017, and a joint logistics and training center in Cambodia opened in April 2025. The East African base supports Chinese naval escort missions  in the region, while the Southeast Asian site helps maintain Chinese presence  in the South China Sea.

Explaining further, the Report says as of 2024, the PLA Support Base in Djibouti has had minimal participation in the protection of China’s citizens or investments, the publicly stated purpose of the base. To date, the support base has not supported noncombatant evacuations and has not provided support to the ongoing Red Sea crisis. Instead, the facility has enabled persistent PLA regional presence under the auspices of support to counter-piracy, and increasingly supports regional military diplomacy.

As for Cambodia the Report says in April 2025, the Cambodian Prime Minister and a PLA delegation inaugurated the Joint Logistics and Training Center at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. China’s Ministry of National Defense insists that the center is to support joint operations in areas like counterterrorism, disaster prevention, humanitarian assistance, and training. Cambodia and China deny that China will have the ability to station PLA forces at the facility, although Phnom Penh and Beijing acknowledge that both nations will maintain essential personnel for the training center’s operations. Preceding the official opening at Ream, the PLA continuously stationed two naval combatants—rotated a total of three times—at the facility’s pier, the Report concludes.

The Report lists locations in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean that China has “likely considered” for bases as well. According to the Report, these locations are Angola, Bangladesh, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu and Zambia. The Report adds that Kenya, Pakistan and Thailand are Washington’s major non-NATO allies.

The Pentagon Report states that China is “probably most interested” in military access along the sea lines of communication, including the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, which each account for over 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids transported per day. The Report goes on to warn that an overseas military logistics network could enable China to spy on the US military supporting its broader awareness of U.S., allied and partner activities.

The rest of the Report is extremely technical and detailed, covering subjects such as corruption in the PLA, its capabilities in cyber warfare, outer space and even AI. It also covers defence spending, ship building capacity, arms exports, espionage and contains a table entitled Taiwan-China Military Balance Matrix.

So, what to make of the latest Pentagon Report submitted to the US Congress? The two words that spring to mind after going through the Report are: diffuse and disparate. The Report sure is full of facts and figures but lacks an overarching and coherent theme which ought to have been about how China’s military capability poses specific threats to US interests, both in traditional and non-traditional security domains, and how the US proposes to counter them. The trillion dollar question that arises therefore is this: Is this deliberate equivocation on the part of the drafters of this Report so as to allow for the fact that a clear China policy is yet to be delineated at the highest levels in the current US administration?

Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

One of the advantages of being an extinguished diplomat (all diplomats are distinguished while in service, subsequently they stand extinguished!) but one who is desperately trying to be a distinguished academic, is that one can give free rein to one’s imagination, especially if it is one’s own blog. So here goes. All grades are out of 10, purely subjective and thus cannot be appealed against. Adverse comments are therefore NOT welcome!

US: 7. Because other than China which has enormous leverage to deal with the US, we are probably the only country which has not folded and held its line. First quarter of 2026 should see stability return to bilateral ties.

China: 7. Again, it is a question of putting up resistance to China despite a huge difference in comprehensive national power between our two countries. We are not giving up on the border either.

EU: 6. The moot point is whether India could have done more to try and end the war in Ukraine. Be that as it may, efforts to conclude an FTA must be brought to fruition in 2026!

Russia: 8. No better manifestation of India’s foreign policy based on multialignment than the way we have dealt with Russia, that too against odds.

Pakistan: 4. India may have decisively won the war but perhaps lost the global narrative. Gallingly, it must also be admitted that Pakistan is back in the game, albeit with flattery, deception and its own brand of multialignment. Fortunately for India, the power differential between our two countries is practically unbridgeable, so it should not worry us at all in the long run. India should behave and act like a “Dhurandhar” !

Bangladesh: 4. The overthrow of Sheikh Hasina was a grey swan event, not a black swan one. So, we are guilty to some extent. Subsequent events in Bangladesh are probably beyond our control; but we do have leverage (both positive and negative) and we must use it.

Rest of Neighbourhood: 7. We were first responder in the case of Sri Lanka, pulled Maldives back into our zone of influence and stayed out of Nepal’s internecine politics and maintained the status quo in Bhutan. Not too bad!

Japan: 6. Japan is particularly vulnerable at this point: pressure from Beijing and uncertainty from the US. India could have made a big move vis-a-vis Japan, can we do one now?

Australia: 7. Can we do something monumental on critical minerals and rare earths?

ASEAN: 5. Suffered from mutual and benign neglect. Are we missing a trick?

Canada: 8. To sense an opening after the departure of Trudeau and grabbing it with both hands. Congratulations on a job well done.

Gulf: 7. Relations strengthened with both UAE and Saudi Arabia. But the latter’s defence tie-up with Pakistan was a bit of a dampener. We must have a frank conversation about this with the Saudis.

Israel: 7. We must strengthen our ties even further in the light of an adverse strategic scenario confronting us from many directions.

Africa: 5. We seem to lack a big bang idea which can take ties to the next level. Ignoring Africa would be a mistake.

UN & WTO: 4. From being champions of yore with regard to multilateralism, we seem to have consciously moved away from it, whether it is UN or WTO, at a time when those institutions need India most. 2026 may be difficult from this perspective: G 20 already faces trouble and we should expect India’s BRICS Presidency to be challenging.

Overall Score: 6.5 This may not seem outstanding but in a year characterised by distinct political and economic turbulence, this should count as a 8, no less.

Happy New Year full of geopolitical strife and strategic discord!

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies and Dean/ Professor at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.

After years of dilly-dallying at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States of America (US) has finally submitted a formal communication on 15 December, to the WTO General Council, the supreme decision-making body, on the need to reform the institution. It is a brief but succinct document and clearly indicates where the US stands on crucial issues. The gist of the issues raised by the US is given below.

Fair or free trade? The expression “trade liberalization” does not figure in the US submission. Nor does the expression “the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”. Both these figure in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. Instead, the overarching principle in the US submission is “a global economy of fair and reciprocal trade”. Not surprising in light of the Trumpian tariffs.

No more MFN: The US submission is nothing short of derisive when it comes to the basic principle of the multilateral trading system i.e. the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause. The US argues this was meant for a bygone era which it says has passed. It goes as far as to argue that MFN “impedes welfare-enhancing liberalization” and pushes WTO Members to a one-size fits all approach. It therefore recommends a fundamental break from the basic principle of MFN underlying the multilateral trading system.  Again, unsurprising.

Economic Security Interests: The American submission is clear: Judgements on matters of national security are the prerogative of Governments and the WTO has no authority to decide on the security exception provided in the rules.

Decision-making: The US agrees that no obligation should be imposed on any country without the latter’s consent. However, it strongly argues that countries which wish to go ahead and take on new obligations should be able to forge a new agreement among themselves. This is known as plurilateral agreement, in WTO-speak. The US submission declares that if the WTO is to have any future as a negotiating forum, it is likely to be for plurilateral negotiations.

Special and Differential Treatment: In the WTO, a country that declares itself a developing one, is entitled to “Special and Differential Treatment”. Clearly, this has been abused in the past, with Singapore at one time claiming it was a developing country. The US now wishes to see this treatment eliminated altogether. It allows for Least Developed Countries to benefit from some flexibilities but argues that Special and Differential Development must be viewed as a tool to enable Members to achieve the capability to follow the same rules that others do.

Overcapacity and Overconcentration of Production: The pervasive use of non-market policies and practices is the root cause, according to the US, of two systemic problems in the global trading system: overcapacity and overconcentration of production in numerous industrial sectors. Clearly, the US has China in mind. Interestingly, the US submission makes it clear that the WTO system has shown itself incapable of resolving these two issues.

Supply Chain Resilience: In a similar vein, the US submission says the WTO system is incapable of resolving issues related to supply chain resilience. It suggests countries deal with this outside the WTO.

Role of the Secretariat: The US believes that the role of the Secretariat is fundamentally administrative and not substantive. Which is why the WTO is often referred to as a member-led organization. The US in its submission says the Secretariat has usurped to itself a substantive role, not foreseen in the WTO Agreements. It says any WTO reform effort should address the role of the Secretariat.

In many ways, the above views should not come as any surprise to anyone with knowledge of the American negotiating position at the WTO over the last few years. But this is the first time that the US has put pen to paper, and this is significant. It also reveals a willingness, albeit reluctant, of the US to negotiate with other Members on the future of the WTO. Crucially, it comes against the backdrop of the next Ministerial meeting in Cameroon in March when the main agenda is likely to be reform of the WTO.

For India, the following questions arise:

•  What kind of a WTO does India wish to see? Are we ready to accept a trading system which is explicitly NOT based on MFN?
• Are we ready to agree to plurilateral negotiations in the WTO, even if we are not ready to be part of it?
• Are we ready for a fundamental re-interpretation of the Special and Differential Treatment rule in the WTO?

The real challenge for India is this: Is it better off staying within the system and shaping the rules or is it better to allow rules to be shaped without us and then subsequently decide whether to join an agreement or not. This issue will become crucial since an overwhelming majority of the WTO Membership may well be prepared to join the plurilateral negotiations on a range of issues, with or without us.  

The Ministry of Commerce and Government of India have some tough decisions to make in the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in March next year in Cameroon.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies and is Dean/Professor at O.P. Jindal Global University.

Now that the much awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) December 2025 is out, it is interesting to compare the present version with the NSS dated December 2017 which was published by the first Trump administration. A broad-brush assessment is given below. Analysts will no doubt pore over the 33-page document of the NSS 2025 ( the NSS 2017 was 68 pages long!) and give their detailed assessment in the days and weeks ahead.

America First: Both the NSS 2017 and the NSS 2025 put “America First” and this manifests itself through the core foreign policy interest which is protection of homeland security. The 2017 document is clear: The fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland and the American way of life. The 2025 document goes one step further and talks of “full control over borders, over immigration system and over transportation networks through which people come into the country – legally (emphasis mine) and illegally.” By clubbing legal and illegal immigration together, the NSS 2025 makes its intentions clear – to stop “destabilizing population flows” and allow the US full and sovereign control over who is admitted and who is not. The NSS 2025 proclaims that the era of mass migration is over and that a border controlled by the will of the American people as implemented by their government is fundamental to the survival of the US as a sovereign republic.

Western Hemisphere: The big change in emphasis between the two documents relates to the Western Hemisphere. In the 2017 document Western Hemisphere barely got a mention and figured before Africa and well after Indo-Pacific, Europe and even South and Central Asia. The NSS 2025 mentions this region first and foremost, stating categorically that the US will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine Goals for the Hemisphere. This region is categorised as America’s core foreign policy interest. The objective is to ensure that the Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the US. The US wants a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with it against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations, a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets. The NSS 2025 proudly states the US will assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.

Indo-Pacific: The NSS 2017 began the section under regions with Indo-Pacific. In the same edition of the NSS, it must be admitted that India found pride of place ahead of other countries in the region. For instance it stated: We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner. It also added that the US will expand its defence and security cooperation with India, a major defense partner of the US and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region. The NSS 2025 document of course calls the Indo-Pacific a core foreign policy interest – keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical minerals. While maintaining the importance of Asia and Indo-Pacific, the NSS 2025 has one reference to India: “We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through Quad.” US will also work to align the actions of its allies and partners with the joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation – presumably a reference to China. No mention of ASEAN, much less its centrality.

China: The most difficult thing to do is in determining how the two NSS documents differ when it comes to China. The NSS 2017 document bluntly referred to China as a revisionist power (along with Russia) which wanted to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. The NSS 2017 also said China sought to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. The NSS 2025, it must be said, takes a different tack altogether. It focuses exclusively on the economic and trade dimensions of the ties between US and China. It thus says that the US will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence. It adds that trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors. It expresses the hope that if America remains on a growth path—and can sustain that while maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing—the US should be headed from its present $30 trillion economy in 2025 to $40 trillion in the 2030s, putting the country in an enviable position to maintain its status as the world’s leading economy. The NSS 2025 also notes that the following must be tackled from any source, without naming China:

Predatory, state-directed subsidies and industrial strategies;

Unfair trading practices;

Job destruction and deindustrialization;

Grand-scale intellectual property theft and industrial espionage;

Threats against our supply chains that risk U.S. access to critical resources,
including minerals and rare earth elements;

Exports of fentanyl precursors that fuel America’s opioid epidemic; and

Propaganda, influence operations, and other forms of cultural subversion.

All in all, China is seen as an economic, trade and technological challenge, not a “pacing challenge” as characterised previously by Biden Administration officials. Also, the NSS 2025 is careful in eschewing characterisation of China as an ideological threat or a revisionist power, perhaps keeping in mind the forthcoming Xi-Trump meeting in China in April.

Taiwan: The NSS 2017 document proclaimed that the US will maintain strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with the “One China” policy including its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion. The NSS 2025 says the following: There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of
Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. The US will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

One interesting interpretation of the above is that the NSS 2025 goes somewhat further than the NSS 2017 in spelling out the American redlines on Taiwan. The mention of military overmatch may be a red flag for China. Conversely, this may have reassured people in Taiwan that the US is not about to abandon it altogether. China experts will note that the NSS 2025 does not contain the formulation “the US does not support Taiwan independence”, something which used to be in the State Department’s fact sheet on Taiwan, but was quietly dropped in February 2025. This omission at the time drew protests from China. No mention of “One China” policy in NSS 2025 either as was the case in NSS 2017. The Taiwanese Foreign Ministry has welcomed the NSS 2025.

Russia: The NSS 2017 document bunched Russia along with China and called them revisionist powers out to get the US. A big and noticeable shift in the NSS 2025 is discernible with regard to Russia. The NSS 2025 states the following: It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and re-establish strategic stability with Russia (emphasis mine), as well as to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state. The key phrase is “re-establishing strategic stability with Russia”. This is precisely what Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are trying to do in talks with Russian negotiators Yuri Ushakov and in particular, Kirill Dimitriev. I see it as code language for full-spectrum normalisation that the US Seeks with Russia, in the medium term, if not in the short term.

NATO and Europe: The difference between NSS 2017 and NSS 2025 with regard to NATO could not be starker. The former said: The NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of US’s great advantages over its competitors and the US remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty. On the other hand, the NSS 2025 does not mention NATO at all when it talks of core foreign policy interests. It merely says the US wants to support allies in preserving the freedom and security of Europe, while restoring Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity. Specifically with regard to NATO, the NSS 2025 has this to say: Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter. The NSS 2025 also calls for an end to the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.

The NSS 2025 serves notice on Europe by saying the US will enable Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by Europe taking primary responsibility for its own defense, without being dominated by any adversarial power. A far cry from the NSS 2017 which stated upfront that a strong and free Europe was of vital importance to the US.

Middle East: There is little doubt that Middle East occupies a lower priority in the current NSS 2025. The NSS 2017 stated that the US will retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect itself and its allies. The latest NSS while noting the Middle East as a core foreign policy interest, states that the US wants to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the “forever wars” that bogged the US down in that region at great cost. Interestingly, no separate and substantive mention of Israel as an iron-clad ally.

Pakistan: Pakistan finds no mention at all in the NSS 2025 document, except in the context of President Trump having solved eight raging conflicts, one of them being the Indo-Pak one. In contrast, the NSS 2017 had references to Pakistan, for instance, as a country from which the US faces transnational terrorists and militants operating in its soil.

Tech Talk: The NSS 2025 identifies Tech as a core foreign policy interest and wishes to ensure that US Technology and US standards – particularly in AI, Biotech and Quantum computing – drive the world forward.

Multilateralism: There was a separate chapter in NSS 2017 on advancing American influence through diplomacy and achieving better outcomes in multilateral forums by exercising American leadership in the UN, WTO and even the IMF/ WB. No such thing at all in the current NSS 2025. This should hardly surprise anyone.

Conclusion: The NSS 2017 had a chapter entitled “conclusion”; the NSS 2025 ends abruptly without one, following the last section on Africa.

In conclusion, the NSS 2017 still had identifiable threads of continuity with previous American administrations. The NSS 2025, on the other hand, is a marked departure in terms of strategic priorities and represents unquestionable American foreign policy retrenchment from regions and institutions, both of which will have profound ramifications for countries around the world.

Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the O.P. Jindal Global University. Views expressed are personal.