Dynamics of warfare

Two big wars have occurred in this decade. First, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which is still wreaking havoc. Second, the ongoing US-Israel war against Iran which has unleashed a wider war in the Middle East. The purpose of this blog is not to discuss the merits and demerits of the two wars. There is enough commentary on that already. Instead, the idea is to look at the dynamics of warfare, based on these two conflicts. It would be no exaggeration to say that warfare is changing in significant ways.

The most important legal implication though is for Article 51 of the UN Charter which says: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” By this token, India’s “Operation Sindoor” may be justified since a terrorist attack did occur in Pehalgam and India’s actions may be construed as self-defence. But in both the other conflicts referred to above, the case becomes much more tenuous. The fact of the matter is that in the case of both impending attacks and especially potential attacks involving nuclear weapons, the State at the receiving end cannot be expected to wait for an armed attack to take place and then exercise its right of self defence. The challenge therefore is to assess credible and tangible security threats faced by a State and then determining its right to self-defence. The sooner the international community gets around this issue, the better. Otherwise, we will continue to have a situation where the UN Charter is honoured more in breach than in observance.

The use of airpower seems cardinal in the evolving dynamics of warfare. The idea that invasion takes place on the land border with tanks rolling backed by shells and artillery conjures up an image of the famous movie “Patton”. This may have been how the war in Ukraine started, but since then it is airfare which has determined the course of the conflict. With the conflict in Iran, this is even more the case, what with airpower dominating the narrative.

The story of missiles and drones in these conflicts is worth noting. First, the difference. Drones and missiles are both unmanned aerial vehicles used for military purposes, but they have distinct differences. Drones are typically smaller, more maneuverable, and can be controlled remotely by a human operator. They are often used for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes. Missiles, on the other hand, are larger, faster, and are usually launched from a stationary platform or aircraft. They are designed to deliver a payload to a specific target with precision and are often used for long-range attacks. Overall, drones offer more flexibility and versatility in their operations, while missiles are more specialized in their capabilities.

Now about the cost of waging warfare. The cost of missiles varies hugely from one to another. For instance, an Akash missile costs Rs 2 Crores (210,000 USD) each. Brahmos on the other hand costs Rs 34 Crores (3.7 million USD). The S 400 missile system which is versatile engages 36 targets at once and carries some 100-odd missiles. The cost of a single S 400 missile system is a whopping Rs 35,000 crores (3.81 billion USD), with each missile in it costing apprximately Rs 8 crores (870,000 USD). The costliest missile is arguably the Trident missile from the United States with a staggering cost of 90 million USD each. This ballistic missile is launched from submarines and is recognized as the most advanced of its kind in the U.S. arsenal. To prevent these missiles from reaching their targets, missile interceptors are used. Missile interceptors (as opposed to drone interceptors which is dealt with below) are expensive. For instance a patriot missile interceptor costs 4 million USD, a THAAD interceptor costs up to 15 million USD, SM interceptor costs a whopping 20 million USD! This is referred to among military analysts as “missile math” and is a subject of much discussion since huge finances are at stake.

Enter cheap drones into the picture. In fact the famous Iranian Shahed drone costs just 30,000 USD. About 11 feet long, they emit a loud buzz and carry explosives in the nose, detonating on impact. Compact enough to be launched from trucks, they are easy to conceal and difficult to track.The longer-range Shahed-136 variant can travel roughly 2,500 km, enabling strikes across much of the Middle East. To counter them, the US has sometimes used multimillion dollar missile interceptors. The Patriot missile defence system — widely considered a benchmark in air defence — relies on interceptors that can cost more than 3 million USD per launch and are produced in limited numbers. In 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 interceptors, a record output for the company. The US military has deployed alternative counter-drone technologies aimed at reducing costs. Raytheon’s Coyote system, which uses drones to hunt and destroy other drones, carries an estimated price tag of about 126,500 USD per interceptor, according to a report from the Center for a New American Security. Though far less expensive than a PAC-3 missile, it still costs four or five times more than a Shahed drone.

The war in Ukraine has thrown up interesting possibilities. Ukraine has massive experience dealing with Shahed drones used by Russia, and has mass produced cheap drone interceptors. Ukraine has reportedly dispatched drone interceptors and military personnel to Jordan as Middle Eastern countries fend off Iranian strikes on infrastructure and United States military assets during the current US-Israel war on Tehran. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that a Ukrainian team departed recently for Jordan, which has US military assets at its Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. The move followed a request from the US, President Zelenskyy said, as Washington seeks cheaper technology for intercepting Iranian missiles targeting Israeli and US defence assets as well as other infrastructure across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ukrainians have been fighting against Shahed drones  for years now, and no other country in the world is said to have this kind of experience. “We are ready to help,” Zelenskyy wrote on X recently, adding that Ukraine has asked for advanced US defence systems, such as the Patriot system, in exchange.

If there was a major lesson for India from Operation Sindoor, it was the need to upgrade its drone power—both in terms of a strike force and in defending itself against enemy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In fact, battlefields have been transformed by drones, which are now indispensable for ISR (Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance) through medium/ high altitude drones, or for precise strike missions through battlefield support UAVs armed with bombs and missiles. During the brief and sharp conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, another form of attack drones gained prominence. Known as loitering munitions or fire-and-forget ‘kamikaze’ UAVs, these are armed with warheads that ‘loiter’ over an area before identifying and swooping down on targets—often used in ‘swarms’ to overwhelm air defences and pulverise enemy assets. The high level of integration of these range of drones in modern warfare is now essential to ensure the success of the Indian armed forces. While India acquitted itself well with the limited range but highly precise, expensive and powerful drones, apart from successfully carrying out a range of counter measures to destroy incoming cheap Turkish- and Chinese-made Pakistani UAVs, experts believe that there is need for an urgent review of the country’s drone warfare capability which was lacking on several fronts. India can’t depend only on expensive platforms. India should fast-track induction of low-cost drones and loitering munitions for mass deployment, build domestic production lines, adapt air-defence and electronic warfare to counter saturation attacks and develop tactics for combined use of high-end and expendable drones. Israel’s Iron Beam drone interceptor is a game-changing system with an operational cost of only 2 to 3.5 USD per shot, providing a great alternative to missile-based defence. Small wonder then that India is in advanced negotiations with Israel to acquire the Iron Beam laser-based interception system to strenthen its air defence.

Dr Mohan Kumar is a former Indian Ambassador to France and the inaugural Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.