Speaking Notes
Check Against Delivery
Hon’ble Minister PT Rajan, Ambassador Tirumurti, Excellencies, Ladies
and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure and honour to be here in Chennai on this happy
occasion.
I can think of no one more qualified to lead the Deccan Centre for
International Relations than Ambassador Tirumurti.
I congratulate the organizers for this excellent initiative for one obvious
reason and for another one which is less obvious.
The obvious one is that there is no rational reason why Centres of IR
and Think Tanks should be based primarily in Delhi. In fact, to the
contrary.
The less obvious reason is that when it comes to business and
technology, the two vectors that the proposed Deccan Centre hopes to
address, it is the South of India which has played a leading role. Yet, the
South has not weighed in as much as it should have, in policy
formulation. If India has a conservative and defensive trade policy for
instance, it is because the South has not played its full part. I hope the
Deccan Centre will change this and emerge as an ardent advocate of
both the business and tech interests of the southern states.
My talk today will be divided into two parts: one, current state of
geopolitics and two, India’s response to it.
In geopolitics, there are decades when nothing happens and then there
are weeks when decades happen. 2025 was one such year. It was
characterised by cascading strategic turbulence, leading to “geopolitics
on steroids”, as it were.
The Liberal International Order, some might say is on its last legs, but it
really has ended for all intents and purposes.
We may well see a settled multipolar world order at some point in the
future, but the present situation is undoubtedly one of commotion,
confusion and chaos.
The actions of the two Great Powers, i.e. US and China on the one hand
and actions of the major power Russia, on the other hand, bear scrutiny.
It is fashionable to attribute the current geopolitical turbulence
exclusively to the US and to the mercurial occupant of the White House.
That would be a strategic error. The fact is that for most of the world’s
history, there was never any settled global order. The Liberal
International Order thus was largely an exception to the rule. The world
is normally characterised by chaos, so in some ways we are back to the
“normal” state of affairs in the world.
That said, there is no gainsaying the fact that the US Foreign, Security
and Trade Policy have undergone a dramatic shift under the Trump
Administration, no question about it.
The disdain for multilateralism in general and the UN in particular, is
obvious and hard to miss. After all, US has withdrawn from scores of
international organizations. And with the “Board of Peace” proposal, it is
hard to see the US actively returning to the UN anytime soon. The UN
Security Council remains dysfunctional and a UN that is both politically
and financially weakened is something the world must contend with.
The UN is not the only casualty. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
remains in limbo, and the US has formally conveyed to the WTO’s
highest body that it no longer thinks the MFN (Most Favoured Nation
Clause) is fit for purpose. The EU and China have since followed suit.
Bear in mind that the MFN was hitherto the bedrock of the multilateral
trading system.
On defence and security, both the NSS (National Security Strategy) and
the NDS (National Defence Strategy) make abundantly clear what has
been clear on the ground: American retrenchment. Thus, the primary
focus henceforth will be on homeland security and on the Western
Hemisphere.
But the real impact of American policy is on the traditional alliance
structure. The transatlantic alliance and the NATO have been thebulwark of Western security and defence since at least World War II. No
longer. The US has made clear that it expects NATO allies to do
substantially more and its support henceforth may be critical but
certainly much more limited. Individual alliance partners such as Japan,
South Korea and The Philippines have also been served notice that they
must do more.
As American military bandwidth is shrunk deliberately, the ripples will be
felt in Europe and Middle East. The big question is what happens to the
Indo-Pacific? The US NDS talks of maintaining a favourable balance of
power in the Indo-Pacific, again urging allies and partners to do more.
But US policy towards China is still to emerge clearly. For instance, the
US NDS says the US does not seek to strangle, humiliate or dominate
China. At the same time, it says the US cannot allow China or any other
power to dominate it in the Indo-Pacific. What this will entail and how this
delicate balance of power is achieved remains to be seen. The meeting
between President Xi Jinping and President Trump in April may reveal
clues to this question.
We turn to China. There is absolutely no doubt that China faces serious
domestic headwinds. These head winds pertain to turmoil in the military,
youth unemployment, the real estate bubble, massive industrial
overcapacity and a shrinking population. Add to this an external
environment which is protectionist and wary of China. But China is
nothing if not resilient. For now, China is on a wait and watch mode vis-
à-vis Trump and the US. There is mixed messaging from both countries
towards one another.
Russia, which qualifies as a major power, feels extremely betrayed by
the West and has hence turned disruptive. In a war of attrition in
Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated it has the upper hand. Russia’s
legitimate security interests must be met and it is clear that it is
impossible to have a stable European Security Architecture without
Russia. That said, the onus now is on Russia to find a way to end the
conflict.
All other powers, big and small, have had to cope with the actions of the
above big powers, the only way they could: engage in strategic hedging.
And when all powers do it, it leads to multiple strategic hedging.
India’s response to this geopolitical turbulence has not been easy.
Before assessing the same, it is important to remember that theturbulence is not necessarily of India’s making. But a country must deal
with the world as it is, not as it wishes it to be. Be that as it may, in my
view India deserves a 6.5 out of 10 for the way it has performed.
With the US, there is no denying that there are issues, particularly
relating to trade. But the policy followed by India: no confrontation, no
capitulation and continued conversation, has been the best one so far.
Also, in areas other than trade, bilateral contacts and progress has
continued. Two questions are critical: (1) How much longer before a
trade deal? (2) How will India be required to cope if and when the US-
China ties reach some equilibrium? We will know soon enough.
With China, India has not yielded at the border, but full de-escalation has
not happened. Trade has continued and our exports have done better,
but the deficit continues. People to people ties are showing signs of
picking up. China with the domestic headwinds and friction with the US,
does not wish to open another active front with India. India for its part,
cannot take on China entirely on its own. Given this, a temporary
détente is in the interest of both countries.
Russia has been a challenge for India. The war in Ukraine has hurt us.
So, India can and should try harder with President Putin to persuade him
to end the war in Ukraine. As for our dependence on Russian weapons
and platforms, the best guess is that for the foreseeable 10 years or so,
legacy dependence will continue. PM Modi has said on more than one
occasion that this is not the era of war, and it is in India’s interest that the
war comes to an end. India has already paid a price in this regard.
The present geopolitical turbulence offers India a 1991- Redux moment.
India’s geopolitical clout is hugely weakened by its lack of economic,
trade and technological heft. A 4 trillion-dollar economy is insufficient for
a population of 1.5 billion people. We need inclusive growth and we
need to get to at least 10 trillion dollars asap.
The FTA with EU was a big step in the right direction by India. But we
need to carry out deep structural reforms in Agriculture, Land, Labour,
Power and Regulations if we are to fully benefit from this and other
FTAs. It is worth noting that we have also signed a Security and Defence
Partnership with the EU. There is a point to note here. All countries will
henceforth have to bring their trade policy in broad alignment with their
security and geopolitical strategy. The days of having a comprehensive security partnership with one power and a full-fledged trade partnership with another power, may be numbered.
Let me conclude with the following observations:
(1) There is simply no going back to the Liberal International Order.
(2) There is no going back either to a unipolar moment with a single
hegemon.
(3) I do not see any realistic prospect for a G-2, involving the US and
China.
(4) Trade, Technology and Investment will be based on trust,
resilience and reciprocity. By the same token, it has the potential to
be weaponised.
(5) Military conflicts will continue to proliferate. Military expenditure will
continue to soar, even among middle powers. The nuclear order is
in danger of unravelling. Between Ukraine and North Korea, which
one would countries rather be? And what if Ukraine had
possessed nuclear weapons? The Saudi-Pak military deal is
evidence of this.
(6) Technology will disrupt and will create a new divide. How countries
like India cope with Tech and AI, will offer lessons for the Global
South.
(7) Global problems like climate change, public health, and even the
laudable SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) will take a back
seat, much to humanity’s detriment.
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me conclude by quoting that inscrutable Chinese saying: We live in
interesting times!
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 