As directed by the US Congress, the Department of War (the new appellation for the former Pentagon) provides an annual report on military and security developments relating to the People’s Republic of China. These reports have traditionally chronicled the development of China’s military capabilities and strategy. Consequently, the latest report was issued by Pentagon in the last week of December. Policy wonks and China hands will do well to go through the 100-page report with a fine tooth comb.
It is my recommendation that this report (hereinafter referred to as the Pentagon Report or just the Report) must be read in conjunction with the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025 issued just a few weeks ago. The Trump administration gave the clear impression in the NSS 2025 that China was viewed from the geoeconomic or tech lens rather than as a serious geopolitical threat, and much less as a revisionist power. What this Pentagon Report does is to correct this and slightly reorient the US approach towards China. The Report is still at pains to point out that President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China. However, the Pentagon Report argues that steps will be taken to ensure that President Trump is able to achieve the above objectives from a position of military strength.
Counterintuitively, the Report argues that Sino-American relations are stronger than they have been in many years, and that the Pentagon will support efforts to build on this progress. It proposes to do so in part by opening a wider range of military-to-military communications with the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) with a focus on strategic stability as well as deconfliction and de-escalation, more broadly. The Report says the US will also seek other ways to make clear its peaceful intentions vis-a-vis China.
The Report states clearly that China’s military focus is currently the First Island Chain that runs from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay Peninsula. It argues that Beijing recognizes this region as the strategic center of gravity for its goals in the region. The Report nevertheless takes cognizance of the fact that while China’s strategic center of gravity remains the First Island Chain, it is logical that China’s military power will also continue to grow towards a force capable of projecting power worldwide. The Report acknowledges Beijing’s stated ambition to field a “worldclass” military by 2049.
Despite the above, the Report says the Pentagon will ensure that the Forces are always ready and able to defend American interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Report says it bears emphasizing that U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are fundamental—but also scoped and reasonable. The US does not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China, the Report underscores tellingly. Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s NSS 2025, the Pentagon seeks only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate the US or its allies. This is the NSS idea of military overmatch! That means being so strong that aggression is not even considered, and that peace is therefore preferred and preserved. The Pentagon will therefore prioritize bolstering deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation. It seeks to do this by forging and sustaining a balance of power that will enable all countries to enjoy a decent peace in an Indo-Pacific—one in which trade flows openly and fairly, all can prosper, and all nations’ interests are respected. What happens if interests clash or how this balance of power will be achieved, is not dealt with at any length in the Report.
But having sounded dovish, the Report seamlessly switches to combat mode in part. After all it is a Report written by the Pentagon. It states baldly that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has for decades marshaled resources, technology, and political will to achieve its vision of a world-class military. The PLA, it states, is a key component of China’s ambition to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful nation. The PLA measures its concepts and capabilities against the “strong enemy” of the United States.
Moreover, the Report points out that China’s top military strategy focuses squarely on overcoming the United States through a whole-of-nation mobilization effort that Beijing terms “national total war.” The Report talks of China’s historic military buildup that has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable. It adds China maintains a large and growing arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities able to directly threaten Americans’ security. In 2024, the Report notes that Chinese cyberespionage campaigns such as Volt Typhoon burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, demonstrating capabilities that could disrupt the U.S. military in a conflict and harm American interests. The Report notes that the PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan, “strategic counterbalance” against the United States in the nuclear and other strategic domains, and “strategic deterrence and control” against other regional countries. In other words, the Report predicts somewhat ominously that China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.
The Report clarifies that China claims three “core interests,” defined as issues so central to China’s national rejuvenation that its official position is not subject to negotiation or compromise. These include: 1) the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) control; 2) promoting China’s economic development; and 3) defending and expanding China’s sovereignty and territorial claims. The Report clarifies that China’s leadership has extended the term “core interest” to cover Taiwan and sovereignty claims amid territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (emphasis mine). The inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh is noteworthy especially in light of the statement above that these are issues where the Chinese official position is not subject to negotiation or compromise.
The Report deals at some length about China’s ties with other regions of the world. It is detailed but not very original in content. It also covers a lot of ground on China’s pressure tactics vis-a-vis Taiwan, China’s competition with US and PLA’s role in China’s foreign policy. In other words, a lot of open source material.
The Report has interesting things to say about Sino-Russian ties. Despite continued growth in their relationship, the Report notes that Beijing and Moscow remain unwilling to establish a formal defense alliance with mutual security guarantees. China and Russia continue to harbor a mutual distrust of each other, which likely prevents cooperation on areas each side perceives as
sensitive, the Report believes. China also has stopped short of providing Russia with lethal aid for use in its war against Ukraine, the Report admits. This has allowed Beijing to preserve its close ties with Moscow while mitigating reputational or economic costs associated with Russia’s global behavior, the Report concludes.
There is a paragraph on Sino-Indian ties entitled : Developments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. The Report recalls that in October 2024, India announced an agreement with China to disengage from remaining standoff sites along the LAC two days before a meeting between President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. The Report says the Xi-Modi meeting marked the onset of monthly high-level engagements between the two countries, where parties discussed border management and next steps for the bilateral relationship, including direct flights, visa facilitation, and the exchange of academics and journalists. According to the Report, China probably seeks to capitalize on decreased tension along the LAC to stabilize bilateral relations and prevent the deepening of U.S.-India ties; however, the Report adds India probably remains skeptical of China’s actions and motives. Continued mutual distrust and other irritants almost certainly limit the bilateral relationship, the Report avers.
The Report talks of China following a three-step development strategy for military modernization. At present, China’s goals for modernizing its armed forces are publicly noted as follows:
● By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.
● By 2035: “Comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national defense and the
military.”
● By 2049: “Fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”
On military bases abroad, the Report says China has built two military facilities outside its territory: a support base in Djibouti established in 2017, and a joint logistics and training center in Cambodia opened in April 2025. The East African base supports Chinese naval escort missions in the region, while the Southeast Asian site helps maintain Chinese presence in the South China Sea.
Explaining further, the Report says as of 2024, the PLA Support Base in Djibouti has had minimal participation in the protection of China’s citizens or investments, the publicly stated purpose of the base. To date, the support base has not supported noncombatant evacuations and has not provided support to the ongoing Red Sea crisis. Instead, the facility has enabled persistent PLA regional presence under the auspices of support to counter-piracy, and increasingly supports regional military diplomacy.
As for Cambodia the Report says in April 2025, the Cambodian Prime Minister and a PLA delegation inaugurated the Joint Logistics and Training Center at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. China’s Ministry of National Defense insists that the center is to support joint operations in areas like counterterrorism, disaster prevention, humanitarian assistance, and training. Cambodia and China deny that China will have the ability to station PLA forces at the facility, although Phnom Penh and Beijing acknowledge that both nations will maintain essential personnel for the training center’s operations. Preceding the official opening at Ream, the PLA continuously stationed two naval combatants—rotated a total of three times—at the facility’s pier, the Report concludes.
The Report lists locations in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean that China has “likely considered” for bases as well. According to the Report, these locations are Angola, Bangladesh, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu and Zambia. The Report adds that Kenya, Pakistan and Thailand are Washington’s major non-NATO allies.
The Pentagon Report states that China is “probably most interested” in military access along the sea lines of communication, including the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, which each account for over 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids transported per day. The Report goes on to warn that an overseas military logistics network could enable China to spy on the US military supporting its broader awareness of U.S., allied and partner activities.
The rest of the Report is extremely technical and detailed, covering subjects such as corruption in the PLA, its capabilities in cyber warfare, outer space and even AI. It also covers defence spending, ship building capacity, arms exports, espionage and a contains a table entitled Taiwan-China Military Balance Matrix.
So, what to make of the latest Pentagon Report submitted to the US Congress? The two words that spring to mind after going through the Report are: diffuse and disparate. The Report sure is full of facts and figures but lacks an overarching and coherent theme which ought to have been about how China’s military capability poses specific threats to US interests, both in traditional and non-traditional security domains, and how the US proposes to counter them. The trillion dollar question that arises therefore is this: Is this deliberate equivocation on the part of the drafters of this Report so as to allow for the fact that a clear China policy is yet to be delineated at the highest levels in the current US administration?
Dr Mohan Kumar is the Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 