At long last, we may be seeing the beginning of the end of the conflict in Ukraine. The problem lies in determining the eventual terms under which the conflict is likely to come to an end. Wars are not just cruel, they are also fundamentally unfair. And Ukraine is proving to be no exception to that rule.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it was natural for the world to sympathize with a small European country whose territorial integrity was violated in open breach of the UN Charter. In parallel, there was also an immediate demonization of Russia by the West at the time, with the EU leading the charge. There was very little attempt to understand the causes of the conflict and even less understanding of the security stakes involved for Russia.
Two arguments made by the West were fallacious at best, and perfidious at worst. First, Ukraine, EU and the West argued that the conflict in Ukraine was completely “unprovoked”. Second, there was no attempt at either acknowledging or understanding the legitimate “security interests” of Russia in the matter. To argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was “unprovoked” is to betray a very poor understanding of history as it unfolded after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. NATO’s actions in the 2000s upto and including the Bucharest summit in 2008, constituted a series of provocations, all of which have been well documented. Indeed, the American scholar John Mearsheimer addressed the European Parliament as recently as November 18 with a talk entitled “Europe’s Bleak Future” and the full transcript of his speech, available on the web, is well worth reading. As for the “security interests” of Russia, it should have been obvious to any reasonable observer that stationing of NATO weapons and troops within a particular perimeter would be a matter of existential security concern for Russia. All this is not to condone Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was certainly illegal from the point of view of international law. But confronting and resolving a conflict requires prior understanding of the causes which led to the conflict in the first place. John Mearshimer is by far the best author to read in this regard.
When the conflict began in February 2022, Ukraine made some gains which turned out to be ephemeral and even illusory. But then, it is also true that Russia’s initial war objectives spelt out by President Putin were successfully thwarted by Ukraine. To be fair to Russia, in March 2022 there was a willingness on its part to draw the outline of a possible settlement and by all accounts, Ukraine too was willing to look at these proposals. Unfortunately, this so-called “Istanbul peace process” was aborted by the West, led in particular by the then British PM Boris Johnson. The West persuaded Ukraine that it should fight on and not settle with Russia. In retrospect, this was a fatal error on the part of Ukraine and its Western allies. It was clear from the very beginning that the longer the conflict in Ukraine persisted, it would turn into a war of attrition. And if it did, Russia could never lose the war (given the overwhelming superiority in manpower and firepower) and conversely, Ukraine could never win such a war! This realization has now dawned on people after millions of people have perished on both sides, millions of refugees have been displaced and when there has already been large-scale destruction of property.
Fast forward to November 2025. President Trump is certainly demonstrating indecent haste in putting an end to the conflict in Ukraine. His 28-point peace plan, worked out apparently between his envoys and Russia’s, now available on the web, bears some resemblance to parts of the draft agreement that reportedly emerged from the Istanbul process in March 2022. In fact, some may argue that the terms of the Istanbul draft of March 2022 were better for Ukraine than the current 28-point plan. For instance, Ukraine was not necessarily required to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in that draft. Now, under the latest plan, Crimea, Luhansk and Doentsk will be recognized as de facto Russian.
While the 28-point plan is too long a document to be recounted in full here, the main features are listed below:
> The territorial issue is sought to be resolved, arguably in favour of Russia. There has been enough commentary of how Crimea and Donbas will now be deemed to be part of Russia. Ukraine will have serious difficulty accepting this, especially with regard to land that it currently occupies in Donbas region. So will EU, which backs Ukraine on this issue.
>The security interests of Russia have been spelt out and thus substantially taken into account. There is a stipulation that the strength of Ukraine’s armed forces will be pegged at 600,000. Obviously, Ukraine can never be part of NATO and this would be enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution. In addition, NATO will not station any troops in Ukraine.
>It is only “expected” that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further! So, the potential for future conflict exists.
>Russia to be integrated into the global economy and invited to be part of G8. Lifting of sanctions on Russia to be discussed and done on a case by case basis.
>On the other hand, Ukraine is to get “reliable security guarantees” but there are no specific details as to what they might be. Curiously, if Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee provided to it will be deemed invalid.
>Frozen Russian funds to be used for reconstruction of Ukraine but with a 50 per cent share of the profits for the US. EU which is the keeper of these funds, was apparently not consulted and is ballistic at this clause.
>There are many other elements in the peace plan, but the main point is that it leaves aspects of the final political and security settlement hanging in the air.
In terms of reaction, Russia has been cautious, but that could be posturing more than anything else, since this is a plan that is generally skewed in its favour. Conversely, the Europeans have been neuralgic in their reaction to the 28-point peace plan, deeming it as “capitulation” to Russia. It is also particularly galling to the EU that they seem excluded from the peace process for a region that is in their backyard. President Zelensky, once bitten, has been careful not to antagonize President Trump and has said Ukraine will discuss the peace plan with him. But he has also spoken to his nation saying for Ukraine it is a choice between keeping its dignity and keeping the support of the US as an ally. The 28-point Trump peace plan could yet unravel. But pressure on Ukraine and the EU is immense to agree to the peace plan as early as next week. It is difficult not to think of the whole thing as an exercise in realpolitik, geopolitics and hard power, all at once.
Ambassador Dr Mohan Kumar is Director General of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies housed in the OP Jindal Global University. Views are personal.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 