US softening its tone on China?

The Pentagon’s readout said the following:

“On September 9, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth spoke with China’s Minister of National Defense, Admiral Dong Jun. Secretary Hegseth made clear that the United States does not seek conflict with China nor is it pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC. At the same time, however, he forthrightly relayed that the U.S. has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific, the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests. Overall, the Secretary and Minister exchanged views in a candid and constructive manner. They agreed to further discussions.”

The comparison of this statement needs to be made with the following readout by Pentagon in May 2024 after the meeting between former American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and the same Chinese interlocutor i.e. Chinese Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun. It is worth quoting in full:

“Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Admiral Dong Jun, Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), met today (May 31, 2024) in Singapore on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue to discuss U.S.-PRC defense relations, as well as regional and global security issues.

Secretary Austin emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of military-to-military communication between the United States and the PRC. Secretary Austin reaffirmed the announcement by President Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping in November 2023 that both sides will resume telephone conversations between theater commanders in the coming months, and the Secretary welcomed plans to convene a crisis-communications working group by the end of the year.  

The Secretary expressed concern about recent provocative PLA activity around the Taiwan Strait, and he reiterated that the PRC should not use Taiwan’s political transition — part of a normal, routine democratic process — as a pretext for coercive measures.  The Secretary underscored that the United States remains committed to its longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He also reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The Secretary made clear that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate — safely and responsibly — wherever international law allows.  He underscored the importance of respect for high seas freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law, especially in the South China Sea. He also discussed Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine and the PRC’s role in supporting Russia’s defense industrial base. The Secretary also expressed concerns about recent provocations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including its direct contributions to Russia’s ongoing assault on Ukraine.”

A clear reading of both statements illustrates a subtle shift in the US position vis-a-vis China. Some things like the change in nomenclature from Department of Defense to Department of War are probably superficial. But it is certainly the first time that an official of the Trump administration 2.0 (and probably any American Secretary in a long time) has made two solemn commitments to China. One, that the US does NOT seek conflict with China. Two, and arguably more important from the Chinese perspective, that the US is not pursuing regime change or strangulation of the PRC. The implications of the above statement are quite far-reaching. On not seeking conflict with China, is one to understand that even if (and it is a big if) China were to carry out reunification with Taiwan by force (something China has not ruled out) then the US will not intervene militarily. If this understanding is correct, there would appear to be no strategic ambiguity any more about the US position on Taiwan. On the point about not pursuing regime change, this will be welcomed in China because they have been saying loud and clear for a long time that actions by the US in the past were aimed at regime change in China. After all, it is no secret that the US facilitated the entry of China into the WTO so that economic liberalisation required by the WTO could eventually lead to political liberalisation in China. This of course did not happen.

Finally, the point about US not pursuing “strangulation of PRC” can be interpreted to mean that the US will ease up on sanctions and tech denial regimes against China so as not to prevent the latter’s economic and social rise.

The above must be read in conjunction with reports about the first draft of the National Defense Strategy which has apparently landed on the desk of Secretary Hegseth. This draft apparently makes clear that the US will focus on homeland security and security in the Western Hemisphere above all else. If this is true, then this too certainly indicates a shift in American strategy vis a vis China. Of course, in the latest readout of the meeting Secretary Hegseth does make it clear to his Chinese interlocutor that the US has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific (I am assuming what he meant was the Indo-Pacific), the priority theater, and will resolutely protect those interests. Similarly, in the Senate Hearing Committee for Ambassador-designate Sergio Gor, Secretary of State Marco Rubio did say that the story of the twenty first century will be written in the Indo-Pacific and that India will be at the core of that.

Be that as it may, it is hard to see Undersecretary of War, Elbridge Colby’s imprint in all of this. His prior views on China were much more hawkish than the current statements suggest.

In sum, this is an area of American foreign and security policy that needs close watching. It would seem that President Trump is quite keen to meet President Xi Jinping (whether this would be on the margins of the APEC meeting in South Korea or whether it would be a stand-alone visit to Beijing remains to be seen) with a view to arriving at a “big, beautiful deal” with Xi Jinping. Either way, we will find out soon enough.