There is wide consensus among foreign policy wonks that the Liberal International Order established in the aftermath of World War II has well and truly ended. There is also substantial agreement that a new and settled order is yet to take its place. So, what are we witnessing at present and how can countries navigate this turbulent period?
Politically, the great institutions set up immediately after the end of World War II are displaying signs of irreversible atrophy. The main among these is the United Nations (UN) set up with enormous idealism in 1945. The UN Charter stood the test of time with articles of faith such as national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and refraining from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a member state. Looking at the world today, it is hard to imagine any of the above principles being scrupulously observed by even the so-called permanent members of the UN Security Council, the P5 as it were. If the P5 cannot set an example, why should other member states follow the UN Charter? In a situation where it is each country to its own and the devil take the hindmost, the world has quickly moved from relative order to utter disorder. Examples abound: Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, South Sudan, Myanmar — the list is endless.
The paralysis of the UN has been accompanied by a real tumult in the transatlantic alliance between US and Europe and the coming into being of new alliance-like ties between China and Russia. This is putting tremendous strain on the regulatory architecture that had hitherto kept peace in the world for much of the cold war period.
From an economic and trade perspective, the guardian was the World Trade Organization (WTO) which came into being with fanfare in 1995. After successfully fulfilling its mandate for about a decade, the organization began a process of terminal decline which now appears unstoppable. All three functions of the WTO, namely, negotiations, dispute settlement and trade monitoring have ground to a halt. And the WTO has little to show now for the 30 years it has existed. The result has been a free for all in which there has been a tariff war, a rush to sign Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which are not necessarily WTO-compatible, weaponisation of trade, investment and technology and a mad rush to acquire critical minerals and rare earths.
From a military perspective, world military expenditure reached a little under 2.8 trillion dollars in 2024, rising by about 10 per cent compared to 2023, which is the steepest year-on-year rise since the end of cold war. There are as many as 22 conflicts in the world classified as wars. Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East all have serious ongoing conflicts and the UN Security Council, specifically tasked to resolve matters involving war and peace, appears impotent to both putting an end to existing wars or indeed preventing new ones from occurring. Institutions like the NATO are wobbly and dialogue between the Great Powers such as US, China and Russia is either absent or highly inadequate. 2025 may well be the most violent year that mankind has seen since the end of World War II.
The stability of the international relations system depends, inter alia, on the distribution of power among the major countries, such as US, China and Russia. The system is likely to be stable when either there is a single hegemon which has the potential to impose its will in any part of the world (unipolar moment) or there is a concert among the major powers , signifying a balance of power (better part of the cold war period). Today’s world resembles neither of the above scenarios.
US is doubtless the most pre-eminent power in the world today. But China is catching up fast and there are a plethora of middle powers who can swing one way or the other. This essentially means that the US, despite being the most powerful country in the world, cannot always have its way in every region of the world. Indeed, the Great Powers, namely, US, China and Russia are challenged even in what may be considered their own backyard. The current world order is therefore characterised by “fragmented multipolarity” which by definition entails instability and unpredictability. This makes it challenging for decision-makers and statesmen to formulate viable foreign and security policies which can withstand the turbulence inherent in the existing strategic landscape. There is really no alternative for a majority of the countries except to hedge their bets, say a prayer and hope for the best.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 