The two-front scenario that India might face has been analyzed to death by both military and strategic scholars. This is commonly understood to mean that India may be forced into a situation where it has no choice but to tackle China and Pakistan, both at once. The Late Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat as far back as September 2020 had said: “Chinese economic cooperation with Pakistan, in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, along with continued military, economic and diplomatic support mandate high levels of preparation by us. This also poses the threat of coordinated action along the northern and western fronts, which we have to consider in our defence planning”. In October 2020, the then Air Force Chief RKS Bhadauria stated in a press conference that his “force was ready for a two-front war”. In January 2021, the then Army Chief General Naravane said: “There is increased cooperation between Pakistan and China, both in military and non-military fields. A two-front situation is something we must be ready to deal with”. Thus, it is fair to say that the top Indian military leadership has been carefully considering and seriously preparing for a two-front security threat. But preparation is one thing; confronting it in reality is another.
The real question at present is whether the two-front nightmare has come true for India? It is easy to forget that following the deadly clashes in Ladakh in June 2020, there was massive mobilization of troops by both China and India. Since then, there have been numerous parleys between the two countries leading to some military disengagement of troops especially in Eastern Ladakh. But the fundamental fact remains that as many as 50,000 Chinese soldiers and an equal number of Indian troops are in a “eyeball to eyeball” situation. The Sino-Indian border, fortunately, is not “hot” and a thaw in Sino-Indian ties is both evident and welcome. Even so, it is hard to deny that there is a strategic threat confronted by India at its Himalayan border with China.
On 22 April 2025, a group of five armed terrorists attacked tourists in the picturesque Baisaran Valley in Pahalgam, Kashmir. 26 innocent tourists lost their lives and at least twenty others were injured. This was by far the deadliest terrorist attack that India has endured since the horrific 2008 events in Mumbai. A little known offshoot of the well known Pak-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, called The Resistance Front, initially claimed responsibility, only to retract it four days later. That does not change the fact of Pakistan’s involvement which India announced to the world at large, before taking a series of punitive measures: Holding of the bilateral Indus Waters Treaty (1960) in abeyance, closing the Integrated Check Post Attari, cancelling the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme for Pak nationals, declaring defence personnel posted at the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi as Persona Non Grata and bringing the overall strength of the High Commissions down to 30 from 55. Pakistan took retaliatory action, mirroring most of India’s measures. Most imortantly, Pakistan suspended the Simla Agreement of 1972. It seems unlikely that the matter will end here. There is almost a presentiment of some military action that India might undertake, at a time and place of its choosing. It is fair to say that the Indian subcontinent is on edge.
With fifty thousand troops each from China and India continuing to remain in Ladakh and the Indo-Pak border seeing live exchange of fire over the last few days, both the LOC (the Line of Control which separates India from Pakistan as the de facto border) and the LAC (the Line of Actual Control which separates India from China as the de facto border) are in an abnormal state. For India therefore, there is little doubt that a two-front strategic threat now emanates from both the LOC and the LAC. This is probably the first time in independent India that this has come about. Some go as far as to say that there might be a three-front threat, given the linkages developing between the Pak and Bangladesh armies, but I will desist from going there.
It will be interesting to see how China deals with the emerging crisis between India and Pakistan. On the one hand, China is Pakistan’s all weather friend and it is easy to see unconditional support for Pakistan coming from China. On the other hand, there is an ensuing thaw in Sino-Indian ties and India will want to know whether China is willing to risk it all by throwing its weight behind Pakistan in the unfortunate eventuality of hostilities breaking out between India and Pakistan.
How the Trump Administration reacts to all of this is crucial as well. Two statements by President Trump may be revelatory in this regard. One, when PM Modi was visiting DC in February this year and in the joint press conference with President Trump, a question was posed about events in Bangladesh. While the question was directed at President Trump, he responded by saying that PM Modi will take the question on Bangladesh. In reaction to the events in Pahalgam, President Trump called the terrorist attacks a “bad one”, mischaracterised the Kashmir issue as going on for 1000 years and when asked whether he would intervene, President Trump declined and said “they (meaning India and Pakistan) will get it figured out one way or the other.” With US focusing its efforts on resolving the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza, pursuing the tariff war and monitoring the emerging threats in Indo-Pacific, it should hardly surprise anyone that the US may neither have the inclination nor the bandwidth to tackle conflict in South Asia, should it arise.
The bottomline therefore is this. The continuing stand-off in Ladakh and recent events in Pahalgam have brought India’s strategic focus back to the LOC and the LAC. India will need to rely both on military deterrence and nimble diplomacy to ensure that what is at present a two-front threat does not escalate into a two-front war in the future.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 