Consider this for a minute. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its newly found independence, Ukraine possessed the third largest nuclear arsenal after US and Russia. It reportedly had as many as 5000 nuclear warheads and intercontiental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Imagine if Ukraine had kept those weapons, would Putin have dared to do what he did in February 2022? That said, Ukraine may have found it difficult to keep them for two reasons. First, it was not just expensive but the keys for launching the nuclear weapons were with Moscow. Second, it faced serious economic and social issues which were more of a priority than nuclear weapons at the time. Ukraine then trusted the Great Powers at the time and signed the so called Budapest Memorandum whose signatories, apart from Ukraine, were US, UK and Russia. This memorandum pretty much guaranteed the territorial integrity and security of Ukraine including its borders. But again, look what happened. So much for guarantees of great powers. It is a matter of supreme irony that Ukraine is still seeking security guarantees from the US, after what the latter has done to the transatlantic relationship.
One scholar clearly foresaw the problem Ukraine faces today. As far back as 1993, John Mearsheimer argued that it was imperative for Ukraine to hold onto nuclear weapons to maintain peace as these nuclear weapons would be a deterrent and would ensure that Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it . How prescient was that?
Ukraine’s story will have huge implications for the aspirations of countries to possess nuclear weapons. They will now seriously weigh the pros and cons of going nuclear. That, if it happens, will have serious repercussions for the NPT and the exisiting non-proliferation regime.
The problem is compounded by President Trump’s threat to withdraw the nuclear security umbrealla for Europe, if they do not meet conditions such as significantly increasing their defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP. The French leader Charles de Gaulle may have anticipated this several years back. It is interesting to ask why France got the bomb when it was already covered by the American nuclear umbrella? Quite simply because French President Charles de Gaulle simply didn’t trust Washington to live up to its security guarantees. Extended deterrence was a sham, he felt, and for Paris to be truly secure, it had no choice but to acquire a nuclear capability of its own. As he put it in 1963, “American nuclear weapons remain the essential guarantee of world peace. . . But the fact remains that American nuclear power does not necessarily respond immediately to all the eventualities concerning Europe and France. So, we decided to equip ourselves with an atomic force that is unique to us.” Again, how prescient was that?
With the US behaving the way it is under Trump, the Europeans have started openly discussing extension of nuclear deterrence based on weapons possessed by France and the UK. Germany’s new leader Merz was the first to openly talk about it. Others like Poland have said it is definitely worth looking at. The trouble is the French “force de frappe” as they call it, is exclusively and uniquely French and there is no consensus in France to share this with others. The far right leader Marine Le Pen has already ruled out this possibility. There is also the question of how much UK will be involved in extending its nuclear deterrence to countries of continental Europe, and how comfortable they will be with that. Poland, fast emerging as a major European defence power, has also differeing views on this. The Polish PM (the other Donald as it were) Tusk stated in parliament recently that there has been a profound change in American geopolitics and he is happy for Poland to look at possibilities related to possession of nuclear weapons. The Polish President Duda however remains a steadfast fan of Trump and has argued in favour of American nuclear weapons being stationed in Poland which could act as a deterrence against Russia. Either way, it is fair to conclude that countries like Poland are scrambling to look at nuclear weapons. In all of this, no one is even asking the question of how countries like Poland can acquire nuclear weapons unless they withdraw from the “venerable” Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty!
Poland is not the only power seeking nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has for long felt that it should have nuclear weapons, especially if Iran is on the verge of getting one. Turkey, which hosts U.S. nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, signaled a policy shift in 2019 when President Erdogan criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in nuclear energy could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so. South Korea is another candidate with 70 per cent of the population supporting the development of nuclear weapons, obviously in reponse to the North Korean threat. Japan is toying with the idea but public support is still not forthcoming. In any case, Japan has the wherewithal to quickly go nuclear if it decides to do so. It very recently did a volte-face on the full use of nuclear power, so do not rule out anything yet.
One or more of the above countries going nuclear could open the floodgates for others. It will then lead to a situation where the non-proliferation regime as we know it will unravel quite quickly. The political scientist Kenneth Waltz is said to have famously observed that when it comes to spread of nuclear weapons, more may actually be better. The world may be about to find out!
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 