We now have enough initial and substantive evidence to try and make sense of what the Trump administration might adopt as its basic foreign policy doctrine. The following broad principles suggest themselves:
(a) Disinclination to prosecute existing wars abroad and opposition to commencing new ones.
(b) Making America a manufacturing and industrial power again, by fair means or foul.
(c) Cracking down on illegal immigration through dramatic gestures such as deportation. Selective and regulated legal immigration where required.
(d) Will no longer have key alliances based on common values, such as EU or even G7. Instead, US will have a number of transactional relationships which it will aim to exploit to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives.
Based on the above, Trump may be expected to take positions outlined below on some of the most critical issues facing the world order.
NATO: Secretary of State designate Marco Rubio in his Senate confirmation hearing stated that the US will continue to support the alliance but that it expected the Europeans to spend more money. This is unsurprising. But Rubio went on to add that the US should be a “backstop to aggression in Europe” rather than a “bedrock to the continent’s security”. This is a paradigm shift since the end of World War II and will not be lost on the Europeans. How this will play out in terms of pulling out some American troops from the continent, formation of an European defence force and defence spending by EU countries, all of this needs close watching.
Ukraine: On the war in Ukraine, Rubio stated that it is time for the US to be realistic, something sure to cause much angst in Europe. Rubio confirmed what has already been known for sometime: the war in Ukraine has become one of attrition. He added, significantly, that both Russia and Ukraine will be ultimately required to make concessions. Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg has already made known his views on the subject, which the Europeans do not neccesarily like. But they do not have much choice in the matter. Transatlantic ties are set for a roller coaster ride. But things may not reach breaking point; EU will simply have to cough up more concessions to the Americans and accept American hegemonic power.
Middle East: If the ceasefire deal in Gaza goes through (Israel is expected to relent after last minute objections), it seems clear where the credit belongs. Trump’s statement, amounting to bluster, that if there is no deal there will be “hell to pay” for Hamas seems to have helped. But more important, Israel seems to have relented under pressure from Trump. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff appears to have read the riot act to Netanhayu. The Qatari negotiator, significantly, said that the deal agreed to has exactly been the same one on the table for months and hinted that it is Israel which had objected all along. Phases two and three of the deal will doubtless be more contentious but Trump seems capable of displaying “tough love” to Israel, something Biden was incapable of. Trump will most certainly push for a Saudi-Israel normalization which actually opens up possibilities for a compromise on the Palestinian issue, not least because the Saudis cannot justify normalization with Israel without some concrete progress on Palestine. Blinken has spoken at length about how a Palestinian State can potentially come about; ironically, Trump may actually end up succeeding in this regard where others have failed.
China: The latest telephonic conversation between Xi Jinping and Trump ( it will be interesting to know if Xi initiated it or Trump) suggests that the latter wishes to avoid confrontation and prefers to do a deal with the former. Xi Jinping was invited by Trump for his inauguration and the former declined. Yet, Trump has now signalled his eagerness to travel to Beijing to meet Xi Jinping. Purely on grounds of psychology, round one goes to Xi Jinping. There are two interesting statements attributed to Trump on Taiwan. One in his first term and I paraphrase it: Taiwan is like two feet from China; if China chooses to invade Taiwan, there is not a fucking thing we can do about it! The second statement more recently, and again I paraphrase: Xi Jinping will not invade Taiwan, because he thinks I am crazy and unpredictable! The million dollar question: Can unpredictability stemming from perceived insanity count for effective foreign policy? Only time will tell. We knew all along that Trump will struggle with two instincts: Manage China through his ostensible dealmaking prowess or frontally take on China showing how strong he is to his domestic constituency. For now though, it is the former Trump who is showing up. Rubio said what he had to say about China at the Senate confirmation hearing calling it “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted”; in actual practice, that will make no damn difference to his Boss.
Trade: Rubio was right in saying that the US will pull back from Free Trade Agreements and restore the focus on American manufacturing. The US domestic market will be ruthlessly used as leverage to extract reciprocal concessions, from friends and foes alike. On tech and critical minerals, de-risking from China may continue but with key modifications. The idea of a “small yard, high fence” may be set aside, if for no other reason than for people like Musk. Instead, Trump has hinted that he may welcome Chinese investment and technology into the US; indeed, he might suggest to Xi Jinping this is the best way to access the American market. He will, in effect, tell China to help US become the factory of the world. Whether Xi Jinping will fall for it in its entirety, is another matter. The WTO will find it difficult to survive another Trump term. It will languish further and render itself irrelevant. The rest of the world can cry itself hoarse on the integrity of the multilateral trading system and the need to reform it. Trump will not give a damn.
India: It is difficult to fathom where India figures in Trump’s scheme of things. It would seem India is not a high priority for Trump; but that may have to do with India’s lack of sheer hard power; after all, Trump values that more than anything else. A bunch of Ambassadors/ Special Envoys have been announced, but none for India so far. One hopes the Quad summit will be held in India when Trump can make a State Visit with pomp and circumstance. Still, India will be enlisted for support by US vis-a-vis China and in that context, Quad may be expected to flourish. Vietnam is similarly placed like India and faces pressure on the trade front from the US. How Vietnam handles the US may have lessons for India. India must play the “wait and watch” game without appearing too anxious; indeed, benign neglect by the US may be no bad thing for India, allowing it space and time for achieving economic and military strength through tough reforms.
United Nations: While Rubio expressed American support for NATO, he said no such thing about the United Nations. Indeed, on UN, his comments were conspicuous by its absence. The appointment of Elise Stefanik as US Ambassador to UN in New York complicates things. She is a known critic of the international organization and in the past has argued for a “complete re-assessment” of American funding for the UN. Antonio Guterres cannot be too thrilled at the prospect.
Era of multiple strategic hedging: Even before Trump, countries were hedging their bets since the liberal international order was on its last legs and a messy multipolar one was taking its place. What Trump brings to this potent mix is more unpredictability and more opacity. This will inevitably lead all powers, big and samll, to hunker down and hedge their bets even more. Vietnam is the best example of how this is done in practice. The Vietnamese had succeeded in inviting first Joe Biden and then Xi Jinping all in the last quarter of 2024. Now they wish to invite Trump. India while wishing to build on the excellent momentum in its ties with the US, still wishes to hedge its bets by attempting to improve its poor ties with China. China, for its part, will try and have a working relationship with the US, even while strengthening its ties with the EU. EU, not wishing to put all its eggs in the American basket will improve ties with China and perhaps even with India. And so on and so forth. Welcome to the era of multiple strategic hedging where nothing is stable and nothing remains immutable.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 