While the whole focus of the commentariat has been on whether Trump will be a hawk or not on China, there has been much less emphasis on implications of the Trump presidency for the European Union. In actual fact, it is the transatlantic alliance that may come under pressure and may call in question the whole notion of the “Western alliance”. This, in my view, has important implications for the World Order, at least as important as the US-China realtionship. Here is an attempt to list the major policy areas which need watching:
(1) Ukraine: Now that we know the appointment of Lt General Keith Kellogg as Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, it is useful to know his views about how to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. He wrote an article for America First Policy Institute on 11 April, 2024 entitled: America First, Russia and Ukraine which should be mandatory reading for those interested in the subject. The main takeaways are summarised below:
> This was an avoidable crisis, made worse by Biden;
>It was in America’s best interest to maintain peace with Putin and not provoke and alienate him with aggressive human rights and pro-democracy campaigns or an effort to promote Ukrainian membership in NATO;
>Importantly, it was in America’s interest to make a deal with Putin on Ukraine joining NATO, especially by January 2022, when there were signs that a Russian invasion was imminent. This was the time when the Biden Administration should have dropped its obsession with publicly criticizing Putin and worked toward a compromise. A U.S. offer to delay Ukraine’s admission into NATO for a decade might have been enough to convince Putin to call off the invasion, but Biden Administration officials refused to make such an offer.
>Kellogg argues that Ukraine lost the counteroffensive because of US reluctance to offer military assistance in time;
>The Biden Administration began in late 2022 to use the Ukrainian military to fight a proxy war to promote U.S. policy goals of weakening the Putin regime at home and destroying its military. It was not a strategy, but a hope based on emotion and was not a plan for success, Kellogg says.
>Kellogg quotes national security expert and retired Army Colonel Kurt Schlichter: “Ukraine is not losing because America hasn’t given it enough shells. Ukraine is losing because there aren’t enough Ukrainians. –“
>On how to end the war, Kellogg says: Specifically, it would mean a formal U.S. policy to seek a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict. The United States would continue to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement. Future American military aid, however, will require Ukraine to participate in peace talks with Russia.
>To convince Putin to join peace talks, US and NATO should offer to put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.
>In exchange for abiding by a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone, and participating in peace talks, Russia could be offered some limited sanctions relief. Ukraine would not be asked to relinquish the goal of regaining all its territory, but it would agree to use diplomacy, not force, with the understanding that this would require a future diplomatic breakthrough which probably will not occur before Putin leaves office. Until that happens, the United States and its allies would pledge to only fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine. Levies will be placed on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.
The above is in direct contradiction to the “whatever it takes policy” followed by the EU in its support for Ukraine. The EU can flail its arms as much as it wants, but it has to simply suck it up, as the Americans would say.
(2) NATO: Trump’s plans on NATO may be evolving. While it may be inconceivable that Trump decides to quit NATO altogether, it seems clear that he will go beyond merely asking the NATO members to pay up. What this “re-orientation” of NATO will be, we will have to wait and see. One speculative report is that the U.S. would keep its nuclear umbrella over Europe during a second Trump term by maintaining its airpower and bases in Germany, England and Turkey, and its naval forces as well. But the bulk of infantry, armor, logistics and artillery would ultimately pass from American to European hands. The shift would involve significantly and substantially downsizing America’s security role and stepping back instead of being the primary provider of combat power in Europe, and a country which provides support only in times of crisis. In addition to the above, NATO will have to come to grips with the fact that Ukraine can never really be part of it.
(3) Gaza: Biden has achieved a ceasefire in Lebanon, but it is anyone’s guess how long it will last. On Gaza, the Americans under Trump will diverge sharply with EU (and much of the world) when it comes to civilian casualties and more crucially, on the principle of a two-state solution. Conventional wisdom is that almost all of Trump’s appointees are staunchly pro-Israel. Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State designate has said: I want Israel to destroy every element of Hamas it can get their hands on. These people are vicious animals who did horrifying crimes. Pete Hegseth, the Defence Secretary designate is reported to have said: Israel is not some mystical land that can be dismissed, it is the story of God’s chosen people. He also added for good measure: There is no such thing as an outcome of a two-state solution, there is one state! But the best remarks (or the worst, depending on your perspective) are arguably those of Mike Huckabee who is slated to be the US Ambassador to Israel: There is really no such thing as a Palestinian, you have Arabs and Persians. And you have such complexity within that. There is no such thing as a Palestinian really. That’s been a political tool to try to force land away from Israel.
If this is the policy that is enforced by Trump and there is little reason to believe he won’t, then this will directly contradict EU’s well-crafted policy on the subject. Not to mention the fact that it will also antagonize much of the world, including the Global South and the Arab countries.
(4) Trade and Tariffs: Trump’s statements on tariffs so far offer a clue, but it remains to be seen how much he loves this word, which he calls the most beautiful word (tariff that is) in the english language. And so far the signals are ambiguous. While he has said that he will impose 20 per cent duty on products from Canada and Mexico, leading Trudeau to rush to Mar-a-Lago hat in hand, Trump has also said in the same breath that products from China will initially attract 10 per cent duty. This, on the face of it, would suggest that it is better to be in China’s shoes than in Canada’s or Mexico’s. India has mercifully not figured so far, but who is to tell? The problem for EU is also what will happen to two crucial things: one, will Trump really dismantle the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act, as he said during the campaign? And what is the level of tariffs he will impose on products from the EU. Only time will tell.
(5) Climate Change: Trump and his belief that climate change is basically a “hoax” is too well known to bear any repetition here. Even under Biden, the US had expressed concern at the WTO about EU’s impending CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) which will be fully operational by 2026. Trump may be expected to oppose it tooth and nail. This too could create strain in the US-EU relationship.
It would be highly naive to think that the transatlantic relationship can go back to status quo ante with Trump as President. The million dollar question is how Trump’s policies will change the idea of the “Western alliance” that we have all understood so far and what inference powers such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran will draw from all this. Interesting times ahead!
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 