A trilateral summit between China, Japan and South Korea was held on May 27 in Seoul. This trilateral cooperation summit has met eight times in the past with very little to show for it. There was a Trilateral Cooperation Vision adopted about 5 years ago which has remained largely on paper. There is a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul since 2011. From its inception, the grouping was intended to promote and strengthen trade, investment and commercial ties between the three countries. After all, these three countries account for over 20 percent of both global trade and GDP. At one time, the three countries had intended to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among themselves which, if it had happened, would have been consequential. But that was not to be. This summit has never been attended by the Chinese President himself. It is always the Chinese Premier who represents China at these meetings. This made sense in the past when Chinese Premiers had some residual clout to make economic and commercial decisions. It is highly doubtful if the current Chinese Premier Li Qiang has any meaningful power in this regard.
The timing of this trilateral cooperation summit between China, Japan and South Korea is curious, to say the least. For one, it is taking place after serious rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. It also comes close on the heels of another important trilateral summit held in Camp David (US) between the leaders of US, Japan and South Korea in August 2023. China’s motivation in attending this summit therefore appears obvious. But Japan and South Korea, with PM Kishida and President Yoon going along with it is interesting. More on this later.
In the event, the Joint Statement issued in Seoul after the trilateral summit involving China, Japan and South Korea on May 27 is anodyne. It talks of more frequent meetings (this one is taking place after 5 years), some institutionalisation of the existing arrangements, people to people exchanges, combating climate change, public health, tackling ageing, sports, cultural festivals and the like. Perhaps the most important decision is to use RCEP as a base to work up towards a FTA between all the three countries. Seems a tall order, at least for now. Most observers feel that the very fact that the trilateral summit took place itself is an achievement and one will have to wait and watch how things unfold.
China clearly saw the Camp David Summit of August 2023 between US, Japan and South Korea as a strategic challenge. After all the joint statement emanating from Camp David promised to strengthen security cooperation among US, Japan and South Korea (all three treaty allies anyway) and called out China specifically for “dangerous and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea”. The Spirit of Camp David declaration also talked of a free and open Indo-Pacific and emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. It also reaffirmed the commitment of US, Japan and South Korea to the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions. China must have noted with alarm not only the rapprochement between Japan and South Korea but also the joint attempt by these two countries to get close to the US from a strategic and security perspective.
The real question is therefore what was in it for the Japanese PM and South Korean President to meet with the Chinese Premier in summit format after a gap of 5 long years. The explanation lies in the massive trade and investment relationship that both Japan and South Korea have with China. While there is no question that Japan and South Korea (Japan much more than South Korea) will want to “de-risk” their trade and investment ties with China over the medium to long term, in the short term they do not want too much disruption in their existing trade and commercial ties with China. For both Japan and South Korea, China is the number one trading partner and any disruption will hurt them badly in the short run. The other thing that Japan and South Korea may be doing is a bit of strategic hedging of their own vis-a-vis the US. The US has carried out serious industrial policy actions such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) and Science Act which is intended to lure microchip manufacturing back to the United States. This has serious implications for both Japan and South Korea. This is perhaps why Japan and South Korea agreed to language in the Joint Statement which talks of strengthening supply chain cooperation with China. Japan and South Korea may thus want to keep their options regarding China open, in the event of Trump winning the American presidency in 2025 and other unpredictable geopolitical developments.
The real “Great Game” is thus being played out in the Indo-Pacific with Japan and South Korea being courted simultaneously by the two Great Powers, namely, the US and China.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 