24 February 2024 marks the second anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian action in 2022 set off a conflict in the heart of Europe upending decades of peace on the Continent. The conflict has now reached a tipping point with most observers seeing the momentum shifting in favour of Moscow. So, it is time to ask how this war has played out and where things are heading.
Any expectation that this war will be swift and decisive has been completely belied by events. Two predictions made by Russia experts have turned out to be absolutely prophetic: (a) That this will be a long war of attrition; and (b) That there is no way Russia can lose this war given the obvious advantages in manpower and material that it enjoys. This broad assessment has stood the test of time so far, despite some spectacular initial success that Ukraine enjoyed. Ukraine simply flattered to deceive, especially when it failed abysmally in its counter-offensive.
The loss of life and destruction of property has been extensive for both sides. But again, given the huge disparity in size between Russia and Ukraine, the per capita impact has been much more catastrophic for Ukraine than for Russia. Russia has gained momentum lately, so it does not have any incentive to negotiate now. In the case of Ukraine, it ought to be willing to negotiate if common sense prevailed, but it is politically suicidal for Ukraine and EU to negotiate now after investing so much in the war. Moreover, both sides are in a wait and watch situation particularly with regard to the US elections which may see a certain Mr Donald Trump in the White House. And if that were to happen, all bets are off.
EU clearly finds itself in a bind. It cannot not support Ukraine, but its support is increasingly turning out to be inadequate and divisions within EU are beginning to emerge. So, in practice EU will be able to support Ukraine only as long as it can, not necessarily as long as it takes. And Russia knows this only too well. EU has effectively talked itself into the following: (1) That Ukraine must not be allowed to lose this war. (2) This is not just Europe’s war, it is something that should concern the entire world including the Global South. (3) Russia will not stop at Ukraine. If it is allowed to get away in Ukraine, it will attack other countries, including those that belong to NATO. (4) Russia is EU’s implacable arch-enemy. The trouble with the above propositions is that they are all liable to becoming self-fulfilling prophecies, with disastrous strategic implications for the EU, the US, the NATO and more broadly the West.
It is proper after two years of the war in Ukraine to ask what it has done to the world order and international relations. Some broad-brush conclusions:
(a) There has been a serious fragmentation of the world order into at least three constituent parts: the West, the anti-West and the non-West (to borrow a phrase from the Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar). The G7 represents the first faction; Russia, China, North Korea and Iran represent the second faction. A number of other countries like India represent the non-West faction. The complicated dynamics of the interaction between these three factions may well determine the broad contours of the geopolitics of today’s world.
(b) While the Russia experts were absolutely right about many things including the length of the war and Russia’s edge in it, I think it is fair to say that many of them were just plain wrong when they argued that Russia will never accept “junior status” vis-a-vis China. Russian junior status vis-a-vis China is no longer arguable; it is demonstrably true, even if reversible in the medium to long term.
(c) China emerges a major winner from the war in Ukraine, mainly because it enhances the strategic options for it even while shrinking the strategic space for its main adversaries including the US, EU and India.
(d) The war in Gaza, predictably, takes the US focus away from Ukraine to the delight of Russia and to the satisfaction of China.
(e) Like long-COVID, could this be a long-war that all of us have to get used to? If so, India will have to hasten its plans for diversification away from Russian defence ties and also deal with the de facto Sino-Russian alliance. Africa will need to grapple with food insecurity. And Europe will be distracted for a long long time. Security in the Indo-Pacific may be a casualty.
(f) If one compares the initial war aims of Russia and Ukraine, it is fair to conclude that neither one has substantially achieved those. But Russia has gotten the territory that it really coveted and conversely, Ukraine has lost close to twenty per cent of its land to Russia. On the other hand, it is hard to deny that Russia’s strategic scenario has become much more adverse with Sweden and Finland joining NATO and Ukraine eventually set to join Western institutions.
(g) The energy scene has been complicated by the war in Ukraine and countries have been forced to overlook environmental considerations. The war against climate change thus has taken a back seat.
(h) EU is going to be hobbled by economic and financial travails for the foreseeable future as a result of the war in Ukraine. And if the US is less forthcoming, then the war effort will have to be more or less entirely financed by the EU.
(i) The question as to what the conflict might have been if Ukraine was in possession of nuclear weapons is not lost on any one. Many countries in vulnerable situations must be evaluating their nuclear options. Nuclear non-proliferation may become a casualty.
Where does the world go from here? There is simply no traction at present for a negotiated settlement for the conflict in Ukraine. But a force majeure kind of event, such as the election of Trump in the US or massive infusion somehow of money/weapons into Ukraine may change the course of the conflict and eventually spur willingness for negotiations between the parties. Until then, Europe will sadly continue to be the killing field it resembles at present.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 