The European Union appears besieged both externally and internally. And this is not good news for those who believe in a strong EU and its legitimate place in an emerging multipolar world.
The external challenge in the form of the war in Ukraine is not going its way, with Russia making small but significant gains and demonstrating much greater staying power than Ukraine. The belated aid from the US was welcome but it may be not be enough to turn things around quickly. Meanwhile, the decision by US and implicitly by NATO, to allow Ukraine to directly hit targets deep inside Russia is a serious and provocatory step. This has profound implications for what has hitherto been a proxy conflict and if this goes ahead, there is every possibility of the war in Ukraine descending into direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, with unpredictable consequences. The main strategy of NATO and the West is to ” irreversibly lock things up” so as to prepare for a Trump presidency. The idea is to reduce the room for manoeuvre as much as possible for Trump, should he become the next President. The next NATO summit scheduled to take place in the middle of July is worth watching closely; fiery rhetoric and escalatory measures are to be expected. While France and UK may be expected to go along with the above, the position of Germany will be crucial.
Meanwhile, the just-concluded European elections have delivered an outcome which is less far-right than expected but that is small consolation to the rebuke the ruling parties have suffered, inter alia, in both France and Germany. Despite enlargement, the old axiom is still true: a Franco-German consensus is necessary but not sufficient to get anything important done in the EU. But for sometime now, there have been differences in the approach of France and Germany. For starters, Macron and Scholz are as different as French cheese and German sausage. They barely tolerate each other. Second, France tends to be ambitious being a nuclear power and a UNSC permanent member but without the financial wherewithal. Germany on the other has the means to be ambitious, but is conservative and is not particularly attached to either the French “grandeur” or to its “strategic autonomy”. With both Macron and Scholz suffering significant political losses in the EU elections, expect both leaders to be preoccupied domestically. Indeed, Macron has already called for snap legislative polls and the outcome may be a sort of “co-habitation” further constraining Macron’s room for manoeuvre. All this without taking into account the differences that exist within the EU towards the war in Ukraine, relations with Russia and ties with the US. It is fair to say that the EU is more divided than ever. This will have consequences for the fundamental EU treaty objective of deeper integration and establishing an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe.
India must pay attention to the kind of Europe that is emerging. The broad sentiment in EU appears more anti-immigrant than before, more protectionist than before and more inward-looking than before. We will of course have to wait and see the kind of European Commission that emerges, whether or not Ursula von der Leyen is at the helm. For now though, we must pursue the FTA talks as well as we can and also see how we can make progress on the India-EU Trade and Technology Council. The fact that the EU has fundamental interests in India (think Indo-Pacific and China) and vice versa, can hopefully provide a basis for augmenting bilateral ties when the next EU-India summit takes place.
Diplomacy and Geopolitics 